M. R. A. ANSARI ( 1 ) ONE Mehar Chand an employee of the Reserve Bank of India at Delhi, met with a motor accident on 5. 5. 1962 which resulted in his death on the spot. His legal representatives (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) filed an application before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act claiming compensation of Rs. 33,000. 00 from the owner of the car as well as the Insurance Company with which the car was insured. According to the averments in this application, the deceased was going on his bicycle on the Lodi Road at about 4. 30 P. M. when a car No. DLE 1913, driven recklessly and negligently by the driver, knocked him down. The deceased was dragged by the car to some distance and when the car ultimately came to a stop by striking against an electric pole, it was found that the deceased was dead. The deceased was drawing a salary of Rs. 170. 00 per month and was aged about 50 years on the date of the accident. The petitioners were thus deprived of the source of their maintenance. They estimated the pecuniary loss sustained by them by the untimely death of the deceased at Rs. 33,000. 00 and claimed this amount from the owner of the car as well as from the Insurance Company. ( 2 ) THE application was resisted by the owner of the car on the ground that the accident occurred at a time when the car was not driven by the driver employed by him but by another person who was permitted by the regular driver of the car to drive it without the permission or knowledge of the owner of the car. According to the owner of the car, the accident occurred when the driver of the car was not driving it in the course of his employment. The owner of the car, therefore, disclaimed his liability to pay any compensation to the petitioners. So far as the Insurance Company is concerned, it disclaimed its liability to pay any compensation inasmuch as the car was not being driven at the time of the accident by a licensed driver but by another person who had no licence to drive the car. 2. The following issues were framed by the learned Tribunal : 1. So far as the Insurance Company is concerned, it disclaimed its liability to pay any compensation inasmuch as the car was not being driven at the time of the accident by a licensed driver but by another person who had no licence to drive the car. 2. The following issues were framed by the learned Tribunal : 1. Whether the accident was caused on account of rash and negligent driving of the driver of vehicle No. DLE 1913 on 5. 5. 1962 at 4. 30 P. M. ? 2. Who was driving the vehicle in question at the time of the accident ? 3. Whether, the person driving the vehicle in question at the time of the accident was not in the employment, or driving under the control of respondent No. 1 ? 4. To what amount of compensation, if any, are the petitioners entitled to claim and from whom ? 5. Relief. The learned trial court held on issue Nos. 1 and 2 that at the time of the accident, the car was being driven by one Lazrus who was not the driver employed by the owner of the car and that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the said Lazrus. On issue No. 3, the learned trial Court held that the person who was driving the car at the time of the accident was not in the employment of the owner of the car or under the latter s control. On issue No. 4, it was held that if the petitioners were entitled to receive any compensation, they would be entitled to receive Rs. 18. 600. 00. It was further held that the petitioners would be entitled to receive this amount only from the person who was actually driving the car, namely, Lazrus and not from either the owner of the car or from the Insurance Company. But inasmuch as neither Lazrus nor the regular driver of the car, namely, Loius, had been impleaded as parties to the application and only the owner of the car and the Insurance Company were impleaded, the application filed by the petitioners was dismissed. The petitioners have filed the present appeal against the said order of the learned Tribunal. ( 3 ) THE following facts are not in dispute : One Loius was the driver who was employed by Mr. Zaheer, the owner of the car. The petitioners have filed the present appeal against the said order of the learned Tribunal. ( 3 ) THE following facts are not in dispute : One Loius was the driver who was employed by Mr. Zaheer, the owner of the car. Lazrus was the son of an ayah who was employed by Mr. Zaheer. Loius was teaching Lazrus how to drive the car on the date of the accident and while Lazrus was actually at the steering wheel, Loius was sitting by his side. Although Loius himself has not admitted that the accident occurred due to the rash or negligent driving of the car by Lazrus, there is no dispute between the contesting parties that the accident occurred only due to the fact that Lazrus lost control over the car and the car was being driven in a zig-zag-manner along the road and after knocking down the deceased the car could not be stopped immediately and that the car stopped only after travelling to a certain distance and after hitting an electric pole. Therefore, the finding of the learned. Tribunal is not disputed by the respondents in this case regarding the cause of the death of the deceased. The only question in dispute is whether the respondents are liable to pay any compensation to the legal representatives of the deceased. ( 4 ) SINCE admittedly the car was being driven by Lazrus who was not a licensed driver, the Insurance Company is not liable to pay any compensation. The sole question for determination, therefore, is whether the owner of the car Mr. Zaheer is liable to pay the compensation. The vicarious liability of the owner of the car for the negligent act of his employee has been the subject of decisions of courts of this country as well as in England. Counsel for both sides have cited a number of these decisions. It is not necessary to examine these decisions in view of the fact that the law on the point has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Sitaram Motilal Kalal v. Santanuprasad Jaishankar Bhatt and others1. The facts of this case were that the owner of the ear had entrusted it to another person for being plied as a taxi, placing the taxi entirely in the charge of the said person. The facts of this case were that the owner of the ear had entrusted it to another person for being plied as a taxi, placing the taxi entirely in the charge of the said person. That person gave the taxi to a third person who was engaged by him as a cleaner for the purpose of taking a driving test to obtain a driver s licence. While taking the test the clearner knocked down and injured a person. It was held that under the circumstances, the owner was not liable to pay compensation to the legal representatives of the deceased. Although the facts of that case are in some respec s different from the facts of the present case, the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court would be applicable to the present case also. After referring to the several English cases on the subject, Hidayatullah J. (as his Lordship then was), who delivered the majority judgment of the court made the following observations : "the law is settled that a master is vicariously liable for the acts of his servants acting in the course of his employment. Unless the act is done in the course of employment, the servant s act does not make the employer liable. In other words, for the master s liability to arise, the act must be a wrongful act authorised by the master or a wrongful and unauthorised mode of doing some act authorised by the master. The driver of a car taking the car on the master s business makes him vicariously liable if he commits an accident. But it is equally well-settled that if the servant, at the time of the accident, is not acting within the course of his employment but is doing something for himself the master is not liable. There is a presumption that a vehicleis driven on the master s business and by his authorised agent or servant but the presumption can be met. " His Lordship also quoted with approval the following passage of Sir John Salmond (18th Edn. p. 124) : "a master is not responsible for the negligence or other wrongful act of his servant simply because it is committed at a time when the servant is engaged on his master s business. " His Lordship also quoted with approval the following passage of Sir John Salmond (18th Edn. p. 124) : "a master is not responsible for the negligence or other wrongful act of his servant simply because it is committed at a time when the servant is engaged on his master s business. It must be committed in the course of that business, so as to form a part of it, and not be merely coincident in time with it. " The rule laid down by Cockburn C. J. in the case of Storey V. Ashton1 was also approved as laying down the true rule in such cases. In that case, the defendant, a wine merchant, sent his cartman and clerk with a horse and cart to deliver some wine, and bring back some empty bottles; on their return when about a quarter of a mile from the defendant s offices the cartman, instead of performing his duty, and driving to the defendant s offices, depositing the bottles, and taking the horse and cart to stables in the neighbourhood, was induced by the clerk (it being after business hours) to drive in quite another direction on business of the clerk and while they were thus driving, the plaintiff was run over, owing to the negligence of the cartman. It was held that the defendant was not liable ; for that the cartman was not doing the act, in doing which he had been guilty of negligence, in the course of his employment as servant. ( 5 ) IN the present case, the only circumstance which is liable to be used against the respondents is that the accident occurred at a time when normally the driver of the car Loius would be taking the car to Mr. Zaheer s office for bringing him back to his house. But this circumstance by itself cannot justify the inference that the accident occurred due to a wrongful act of the driver of the car, namely, Loius, committed by him in the course of his master s employment. It is no doubt contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the driver of the car Loius had the tacit approval of his master for teaching Lazrus how to drive the car as Lazrus was the son of an Aya employed by Mr. Zahecr. Mr. It is no doubt contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the driver of the car Loius had the tacit approval of his master for teaching Lazrus how to drive the car as Lazrus was the son of an Aya employed by Mr. Zahecr. Mr. Zaheer has, however, denied either that he had permitted Loius to teach Lazrus how to drive the car or even that he had any knowledge of this fact. Mr. Zaheer is a respectable person, he being a Member of the Indian Civil Service, who was at that time working as a Member of the Union Public Service Commission there is no reason to doubt his word when he says that he neither permitted his driver Loius to teach Lazrus how to drive the car nor even knew that Loius was doing such a thing. ( 6 ) IT is next contended that even if Loius was teaching Lazrus how to drive the car without the knowledge or permission of Mr. Zaheer, the latter would still be held vicariously liable for the negligence of his driver inasmuch as Loius was at the time of the accident taking the car to Mr. Zaheer s office and that this would be an act done by Loius in the course of his employment. If Loius while taking the car to Mr. Zaheer s office, allowed Lazrus to drive the car, he committed a wrongful act in the course of his employment and in that event also, Mr. Zaheer will be vicariously liable, contends the learned counsel for the petitioners. But the evidence in this case does not prove that at the time the accident occurred. Loius was taking the car to Mr. Zaheer s office. On the other hand, the evidence in this case indicates that the car was travelling in the opposite direction, i. e. , away from Mr. Zaheer s office. The evidence, therefore, indicates that on the pretext of taking the car to Mr. Zaheer s office, Loius utilised the car for his own purpose, namely, teaching Lazrus how to drive the car, an act which was not authorised by Mr. Zaheer. The facts of this case, therefore, come within the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in the case cited and the master cannot be held vicariously liable for the accident that occurred. Zaheer. The facts of this case, therefore, come within the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in the case cited and the master cannot be held vicariously liable for the accident that occurred. This apeal has, therefore, to be dismissed but there shall be no order as to costs.