JUDGMENT Jagmohan Lal, J. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by Kanti Mohan Avasthi against the Managing Committee, Sri Jai Narain, Intermediate college, Lucknow (opposite party no. 1) Sri Jai Narain Misra, President of the College (opposite party no. 2), Sri Kamta Nath Pandey, Secretary-cum-Manager of the said College (opposite party no. 3), the Deputy Director of Education, VI Region, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, opposite, party No. 4) and the District Inspector of schools Lucknow, (opposite party no. 5.). The petitioner was appointed as the Principal of Sri Jai Narain Intermediate College (hereinafter to be called as the College) in 1961. There were some charges against him and he was placed under suspension in July, 1968 After that an enquiry was made. The Managing Committee passed a resolution on 4-2-1969 (vide annexure 20) to the effect that the petitioner should be dismissed from service subject to the approval of the District Inspector of Schools. A copy of this resolution was then sent to the District Inspector of Schools for his approval. The Inspector did not approve the resolution of the Committee and lie passed an order dated 15-7-1969 (vide Annexure 21) to the effect that the petitioner shall be reinstated as Principal with effect from the date of the said order but some other punishments including the stoppage of five increments with cumulative effect shall be imposed on him. When this order of the Inspector was communicated to the Management, the Management refused to comply with this order on the ground that this disapproval was not communicated by the Inspector within six weeks as required by Regulation 44 and as such the resolution dated 4-2-1969, which had been sent to the Inspector on 8-2-1969, shall be deemed to have been duly approved by him. The Inspector was, on the other hand, of the view that full papers had not been received by him along with the resolution and it was only at a later stage that these papers were received by him and from that date his order dated 15-7-1969 was within six weeks. Some correspondence ensued between the Management and the Inspector on this matter with each party sticking to the stand taken by it. Some correspondence ensued between the Management and the Inspector on this matter with each party sticking to the stand taken by it. The Management passed an order dated 21-7-1969 (vide annexure 37) to the effect that the petitioner shall be deemed to have been dismissed from service with effect from 8-2-1969, the date on which the resolution dated from 4-2-1969 was sent to the Inspector, and that he would not be entitled to any subsistence allowance after that date. The Management also filed an appeal against the order of the Inspector before the Regional Deputy Director (opposite party No. 4) under the provisions of clause (c) of sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 16-G of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921. The petitioner also filed an appeal before that authority against the other punishments which were awarded to him by the Inspector under his order dated 15-7-1969. Both these appeals had been filed and were pending before the Deputy Director when this writ petition was filed on 18-9 1969. On the application of the Management the Deputy Director had also passed a stay order dated 12-8-1969 (vide Annexure 34) staying the implementation of the order dated 15-7-1969 passed by the Inspector. By a subsequent order dated 28-8-1969 (Annexure 36), the Deputy Director further directed the Management of the College to continue to pay the subsistence allowance to the petitioner till the decision of the appeal. Those appeals are still pending before the Deputy Director and have not been decided by him since then. It was in these circumstances that the petitioner filed this writ petition praying for the following reliefs:- The Court may be pleased to (a) Summon the record of the case and issue a writ of certiorari quashing the order of dismissal dated July 21, 1969 passed against the petitioner by the opposite party No. I contained in annexure 37. (b) Issue a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the opposite party No. 5 contained in annexure 21, in as far as it is against law and issue a further writ of certiorari quashing the order of opposite party No. 4 contained in annexure 34. (c) A writ of mandamus be issued commanding the opposite parties Nos. (b) Issue a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the opposite party No. 5 contained in annexure 21, in as far as it is against law and issue a further writ of certiorari quashing the order of opposite party No. 4 contained in annexure 34. (c) A writ of mandamus be issued commanding the opposite parties Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to treat the petitioner as Principal of the College without break since the date of his suspension and a further writ of mandamus be issued commanding the opposite party Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to pay the petitioner a sum of Rs. 3961.08 paisa on account of the difference between his salary and suspension allowance from July 5, 1968 to July 15, 1969 till to date and also pay the petitioner regularly his salary month by month till the decision of this writ petition and after wards. 2. The writ was contested by the opposite parties 1 to 3 while the opposite parties 4 and 5 did not contest it. Counter affidavits were filed on behalf of the contesting opposite parties. 3. I heard the learned counsel for the parties. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the opposite parties that this writ petition was premature and it was not maintainable because the appeal filed by the Management of the College before the Deputy Director was still pending. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that that appeal was directed against the order of the Inspector arising out of the resolution of the Management passed on 4-2-1969 and that the present writ petition is mainly directed against the subsequent order dated 21-7-1969 (annexure 37) which is not the subject-matter of appeal before the Deputy Director. A perusal of the resolution dated 4-2-1969, contained in annexure 20 and the subsequent order, contained in annexure 37, however, show that this subsequent order is nothing but an attempt made by the Management to give affect to their resolution dated 4-2-1969 in disregard of the order of the Inspector and that is also subject-matter of the appeal filed before the Deputy Director. In that appeal both these questions which have been raised in this writ petition to challenge the order of dismissal are involved. In that appeal both these questions which have been raised in this writ petition to challenge the order of dismissal are involved. One of those questions is whether the disapproval of the Inspector to the resolution dated 4-2-1969 shall be deemed to have been communicated within the prescribed period of six weeks and if not, is that disapproval of no legal effect. The second question is whether even if this disapproval is deemed to be within the prescribed limitation, was this disapproval good and valid on merits. Sec. I6-G (3) (c) confers authority on the Deputy Director to decide these matters after hearing the parties and his decision has been made final under sub-sec. (4) of that section. It is, therefore, proper that both the parties should await the decision of the Deputy Director on that matter whether the dismissal of the petitioner as proposed by the Management in its resolution dated 4-2-1969 is justified or not. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner then contended that in spite of the pendency of its appeal before the Deputy Director, there was a statutory obligation on the management to give effect to the order dated 15-7-1969 passed by the Inspector and that even the Deputy Director, as an appellate authority had no jurisdiction to stay the implementation of that order till the decision of the appeal. In this connection reliance is placed on regulation 45 framed under the Intermediate Education Act. This Regulation provides :-The Committee (the Management Committee) shall implement the decision of the Inspector or Regional Inspectress within two weeks of its intimation, provided that the President of the Regional Appellate Committee may, on representation by the Management, stay, pending consideration of an appeal, the payment of balance of salary of the employee for the period of suspension, if any." It may be stated that before Sec. 16-G (3) (c) of the Act was amended in 1966 this appeal lay to the Regional Appellate Authority which consisted of the Regional Deputy Director as its President and two other members as provided in that section. Since that Committee was not a permanent body and only its President, who was the Regional Deputy Director, was a permanent officer, it was provided in the Regulations that he could grant an interim relief in connection with such appeal within the limitations prescribed by Regulation 45. Since that Committee was not a permanent body and only its President, who was the Regional Deputy Director, was a permanent officer, it was provided in the Regulations that he could grant an interim relief in connection with such appeal within the limitations prescribed by Regulation 45. After amendment the Regional Deputy Director is the sole Appellate Authority. So the question arises whether these limitations in connection with the granting of the interim relief that had been imposed by this Regulation on the President of the Regional Appellate Committee would also apply to the Deputy Director who is now the sole Appellate Authority. In my opinion this provision would not apply to the Deputy Director. The reason is that this restriction with regard to the granting of interim relief was placed on the powers of the President which was only a part of the Appellate Authority and not on the Appellate Authority itself. Under Regulation 86, the memorandum of appeal was required to be submitted to the President of the Regional Appellate Committee and then he was also given this power of granting interim relief by Regulation 45. If this Regulation 45 laying down the restrictions within which interim relief could be granted during the pendency of the appeal had applied to the Regional Appellate Committee itself, it could be argued that the same provision read with Section 24 of the U.P. General Clauses Act shall also apply to the Deputy Director as the sole Appellate Authority who had been substituted for the Regional Appellate Committee after the amendment made in 1968. But this Regulation defines the power of only a part of the Regional Appellate Committee and not of the Appellate Committee itself. This Regulation as it stands, unless it is suitably amended, would not apply to the Deputy Director who is now the sole Appellate Committee. In the absence of any other specific restrictions being placed on his powers the Deputy Director, as the sole Appellate Authority, had the inherent power to grant such interim relief in connection with that appeal as he considered proper in the circumstances of the case. In the present case the petitioner who was till then under suspension wanted that he should be reinstated as Principal on the strength of the order of the Inspector passed by him on 15-7-1969. In the present case the petitioner who was till then under suspension wanted that he should be reinstated as Principal on the strength of the order of the Inspector passed by him on 15-7-1969. This was the order which was challenged by the Management in the appeal filed before the Deputy Director. If the Deputy Director passed a stay order in connection with that appeal that till the decision of the appeal the order of the Inspector shall not be given effect to, it cannot be said that he committed any illegality or that he exceeded his jurisdiction. So I find nothing wrong with this stay order contained in annexure 34 passed by the opposite party No. 4. 5. It was then contended that the Deputy Director had also passed his subsequent order dated 28-8-1969 (Annexure 36) directing the Management to continue to pay the subsistence allowance to the petitioner till the decision of the appeal but that order was not complied with by the opposite parties 1 to 3 and they are in no mood to comply with that order as is evident from the allegation contained in paragraph 9 of their supplementary counter affidavit sworn on 21-11-1970. It is argued that opposite parties 1 to 3 cannot have it both ways that they may take advantage of the stay order of the Deputy Director staying the implementation of the order of the Inspector and at the same time refuse to comply with his order regarding payment of the subsistence allowance. This position of the contesting opposite parties is apparently incongruous. It is, however, for the petitioner to move the Deputy Director in the matter who may grant appropriate relief to the petitioner if he so thinks proper. But on that ground it cannot be said that the stay order passed by the Deputy Director is not a valid order or it ceases to have its effect. So long as that stay order is in operation and the appeal filed by the Management of the College has not been decided by the Deputy Director, it is not possible for this Court to grant any relief to the petitioner in this writ petition which appears to be premature. 6. So long as that stay order is in operation and the appeal filed by the Management of the College has not been decided by the Deputy Director, it is not possible for this Court to grant any relief to the petitioner in this writ petition which appears to be premature. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that the resolution dated 4-2-1969 passed by the Management cannot be implemented by the opposite parties 1 to 3 before obtaining the prior approval of the Inspector and in that view of the matter their subsequent order, contained in annexure 37, should be struck down. This again brings us to the same question whether or not the Inspector shall be deemed to have approved that resolution by his not communicating the disapproval to the Management within the prescribed period of six weeks. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that even assuming that this disapproval was communicated by the Inspector beyond the prescribed period of six weeks, that by itself would not make that disapproval ineffective in view of the decision of this Court in Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 5572 of 1963, decided on 29-3-1966, at Allahabad. That may be so, but the Deputy Director has also to consider in the appeal whether the disapproval of the Inspector is good on merits or not. Since I am not entering into the merits of that controversy, it is not necessary for me to express any opinion on this point. 7. As a result of the above findings, the writ petition is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.