ORDER M.N. Shukla, J. - This appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, Moradabad dated 24-4-1970 convicting the Appellant u/s 302 IPC and sentencing him to death. 2. In the present case there is no direct evidence regarding the commission of the crime and the conviction is based entirely on circumstantial evidence. The incident is alleged to have taken place on the night between 14th/15th June, 1969 in the house of one Smt. Moonsra in village Harthala, distt. Moradabad. The person killed was her son namely Kartar Singh, a young lad of 11 years. The lady's husband, one Faqira owned considerable property in the shape of 40 Bighas of agricultural land. His family consisted of himself, his wife namely Smt. Moonga, his two daughters and his son, Kartar Singh. The Appellant Karan Singh was resident of village Pachkaura within the police circle of Amroha, distt. Moradabad. It is alleged that Karan Singh used to visit Faqira and developed illicit intimacy with Smt. Moonga. About one and a half year prior to the present occurrence Faqira had disappeared and had since then not been heard of. It was, therefore, believed that he had probably been killed. After the disappearance of Faqira the Appellant started residing with Smt. Moonga and began cultivating Faqira's land. It is alleged that they were living together as husband and wife. Since the Appellant alone was unable to cope with the cultivation of so much land, after some time he called his young brother, namely Charan Singh for assisting him. Charan Singh was said to be younger, stouter and more handsome than the Appellant and according to the prosecution Smt. Moonga developed illicit intimacy with Charan Singh and in fact, betrayed preference for him in comparison with the Appellant. It is further alleged that the sequel to this partiality was the murder, of Charan Singh himself in the field of village Harthala in the year 1968. The prosecution suggestion is that it was Karan Singh Appellant who was responsible for the murder of Charan Singh as a result of jealousy and the apprehension that the land might go out of his grasp. 3. Shortly before the occurrence Smt. Moonga presented an application for mutation of the name of her son Kartar Singh in place of his father Faqira in respect of the agricultural land. 3. Shortly before the occurrence Smt. Moonga presented an application for mutation of the name of her son Kartar Singh in place of his father Faqira in respect of the agricultural land. Though apparently the application was given in consultation with the Appellant, it is suggested that he really disliked it and was anxious that Smt. Moonga should sell the land so that he may be able to appropriate its proceeds. 4. It may be mentioned that after Charan Singh was removed from the scene, the Appellant called his other brother, namely, Dharampal, who was barely eleven years of age to assist him in the task of cultivation of the agricultural plots. Consequently Dharampal was also residing with Smt. Moonga and in fact, he was a co-accused with the Appellant but was acquitted by the trial judge. It is alleged that a couple of days prior to 14-6-1969 the Appellant had gone with Smt. Moonga and her children and the co-accused Dharampal to his own village Pachkaura in Tahsil Amroha but had later sent back Smt. Moonga and her children with Dharampal to village Harthala. It was suggested that all this was pre-planned so that the suspicion with regard to the murder, which was later committed, might not be fastened on the Appellant. It is further suggested that probably the two accused had entered into a conspiracy in pursuance of which the Appellant was to come quietly at night, Dharampal was to open the door and the former by surreptitiously entering in the house of Smt. Moonga was to commit the murder. 5. The prosecution case is that in accordance with the aforesaid plan Karan Singh arrived in the village Harthala quietly at about mid-night on the night between 14/15th June, 1969, knocked at the door of Smt. Moonga which was opened by somebody from inside and after the murder of Kartar Singh and throwing the dead body on the roof, made good his escape. Shortly afterwards when Smt. Moonga woke up and did not find Kartar Singh on the cot, she started searching and raised an alarm which attracted the villagers and they found the dead body lying on the roof of her baithaka. 6. A FIR of the incident was lodged on 15-6-1969 at 5 a.m. by Smt. Moonga at a Kotwali Moradabad, which is at a distance of three miles from village Harthala. 6. A FIR of the incident was lodged on 15-6-1969 at 5 a.m. by Smt. Moonga at a Kotwali Moradabad, which is at a distance of three miles from village Harthala. Lallu Singh Pradhan had accompanied her to the Thana. The Investigating Officer Dhan Singh Sirohi (PW 20) reaohed village Harthala at about 7 a.m. on 15-6-1969. He found the dead body lying on the roof of Smt. Moonga. He prepared the inquest report and took the blood stained and unstained earth from the scene of occurrence. Blood was found on two places, namely on the roof of Smt. Moonga's baithaka and on the roof of Roop Chand's Kothri. The Investigating Officer sent the dead body to the mortuary of Moradabad. 7. The post mortem examination on the dead body of Kartar Singh was conducted by Dr. Narendra Kumar Pandey (PW 11) who was the MO, Sadar Hospital, on 16-6-1969 at 1 p.m. The Doctor found the following ante-mortem injuries on the person of the deceased: 1. Transverse lincised wound 3" x 1/4" x soft tissues deep in front of neck upper part underlying thyroid cartilage cut at the upper end respiratory passage exposed, more cut to left side. 2. Incised wound transverse 1-1/2" x 1/4" x muscle deep 1/2" above the inner end of the Rt. coller bone. 8. In the opinion of the doctor the injuries could have been caused by the knife (Ex. 5) which was later recovered at the instance of the Appellant. He also stated that the death of the deceased could have occurred on the night between 14/15th June, 1969. He was of the opinion that death was due to shook and haemorrhage, which were caused on account of injury No. 1, which had clearly cut the left Thyroid cartilage. 9. The Investigating Officer arrested the Appellant from the house of Smt. Moonga on the morning of 16-6-1969 in the presence of Bahoran Singh (PW5) and Thakur Singh (PW 6). The Appellant is alleged to have stated that he could point out the knife with which he had committed the murder. Taking these witnesses and the Investigating Officer, the Appellant went to the field of one Mahabir Singh (PW 4) and took out the knife (Ex. 5) which was blood stained from the bushes. 10. The defence of the Appellant was one of complete denial of his connection with the alleged incident. Taking these witnesses and the Investigating Officer, the Appellant went to the field of one Mahabir Singh (PW 4) and took out the knife (Ex. 5) which was blood stained from the bushes. 10. The defence of the Appellant was one of complete denial of his connection with the alleged incident. He also denied giving the blood-stained knife. He stated that his brother Charan Singh was neither stronger than himself nor had any affair with Smt. Moonga. He admitted that Charan Singh had come for two or three days to Smt. Moonga's house but was murdered in the village. He further admitted that the FIR dated 8-11-1968 which was proved in the case as Ex. C-1 was dictated by him at the Thana nominating a number of persons including Ram Prasad of village Maharwan Ali as the murderer of Charan Singh. 11. The prosecution relied on the following circumstances for proving its case: (1) Motive for committing the crime; (2) that the Appellant had returned on the day of the occurrence from his village Pachkaura to village Harthala where the murder was committed; (3) the Appellant was seen at two points on the roofs shortly before the murder; (4) the Appellant was seen going away from the house of Smt. Moonga shortly after the murder; (5) the recovery of the dead body of the deceased at the roof of Smt. Moonga; (6) the recovery of the bloodstained knife (Ex. 5) at the instance of the Appellant; and (7) the Appellant's false denial of relevant facts conclusively established. The question, therefore, arises as to whether each one of the above circumstances has been individually proved and whether all the circumstances taken together established beyond any reasonable doubt that the Appellant was the murderer. It is only if the chain of circumstantial evidence is complete so as to make it incompatible with the innocence of the Appellant that the conviction can be sustained. * * * (12-17. His Lordship then examined the evidence and concluded that the evidence proves the following facts: That there was sufficient motive for the Appellant to commit the murder of Kartar Singh and the prosecution has fully established the motive. That the material circumstance of the Appellant having been seen at various points near the town of Moradabad between 5 p.m. and 7-30 p.m. on 14-6-1969 has been established beyond doubt by the prosecution evidence. That the material circumstance of the Appellant having been seen at various points near the town of Moradabad between 5 p.m. and 7-30 p.m. on 14-6-1969 has been established beyond doubt by the prosecution evidence. That the circumstance of the Appellant being seen on the roof of Smt. Moonga's baithak or on the roof of the house of Roop Chand may be true or may not be true. This circumstance has not been conclusively proved. That the prosecution has fully proved the fact of the Appellant being seen going out of the village immediately or shortly after the occurrence and this is an important circumstance. That the dead body was found lying on the roof of Smt. Moonga's baithak. Blood was found at that place and also on the roof of Roop Chand. The two roofs are on the same level and close and connected with each other. It might be that the murder was committed on the roof of Roop Chand and in order to give the matter a look of probability, the dead body of Kartar Singh was placed on the roof of Smt. Moonga so that an impression might be created that he was sleeping at that place and was murdered while asleep. This is a material fact in the chain of circumstantial evidence and fixes the place of murder of Kartar Singh. His Lordship then proceeded on to observe:) 18. Another major circumstance alleged against the Appellant is the recovery at his instance of the blood stained knife (Exhibit 5) with which the murder of the deceased was committed. The Investigating Officer (PW 20) Dhan Singh Sirohi arrested the Appellant from the house of Smt. Moonga on the morning of 16-6-1969 and in the presence of the Sub-Inspector Dhan Singh Sirohi (P.W. 20), Bahoran Singh (P.W. 5) and Thakur Singh (P.W. 6) the Appellant stated that he could point out the knife with which he had committed the murder. Taking these witnesses and the Investigating Officer the Appellant went to the field of Mahabir Singh and took out the knife which was blood stained from behind the bushes in the field of Mahabir Singh, which was about 100 yards from the village Abadi. Dr. Taking these witnesses and the Investigating Officer the Appellant went to the field of Mahabir Singh and took out the knife which was blood stained from behind the bushes in the field of Mahabir Singh, which was about 100 yards from the village Abadi. Dr. Narendra Kumar Pandey (P.W. 11) Medical Officer, District Hospital, Moradabad who conducted the post mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased stated that both incised wounds found on the person of the deceased could be caused by the knife (Exhibit 5). 19. It is true that on analysis the presence of blood alone could be established on the knife and the Serologist was unable to say that it was blood of human origin as it had by the time disintegrated. But the absence of the Serologist's confirmation on the point, in our opinion, is not fatal to the prosecution case. In Wasim Khan v. State of U.P. (1956 AWR 371 SC) the accused had denied that the knife belonged to him. The stains thereon were not established to be of human blood-Still, it was held that it was the duty of the accused to explain how the knife came to be in his possession. He was convicted as there was no explanation for his possession of a big blood stained knife "a weapon, which of used against the deceased, could cause the injury on him". In the instant case the witnesses who deposed about the recovery of the blood stained knife have given a cogent account of the recovery and the factum is fully established by their testimony. 20. The learned Counsel for the Appellant vehemently assailed the admissibility of the statements of the prosecution witnesses on this point. It was contended that in the instant case the Appellant had already made one statement to the SI with regard to his offer to have the blood-stained knife recovered and he later repeated the same in the presence of the witnesses and consequently the latter statement could not be said to have led to the discovery of the knife. There appears to be considerable force in this submission. It is clear from the testimony of the SI Sri Dhan Singh Sirohi (PW 20) that the Appellant had first made a statement offering the recovery of the blood stained knife before the SI alone. There appears to be considerable force in this submission. It is clear from the testimony of the SI Sri Dhan Singh Sirohi (PW 20) that the Appellant had first made a statement offering the recovery of the blood stained knife before the SI alone. Later he repeated that statement on the arrival of the witnesses namely Bahoran Singh and Thakur Singh (P.Ws. 5 and 6). Sri Dhan Singh SI deposed that on 16-6-1969 on receiving information he reached the house of Smt. Moonga at 5-45 a.m., arrested the accused and interrogated him. Thereupon the Appellant stated that he was prepared to point out the knife with which he had cut the neck of the deceased and that he could have the same recovered. In his cross-examination the SI further clarified the position by stating that after coming out from the house of Smt. Moonga the Appellant prevaricated for a few minutes and then made the statement about the blood stained knife. He added that as soon as the Appellant started with the SI the witnesses arrived and that in the way the Appellant made the same statement again in the presence of the witnesses. It is also manifest from the depositions of Bahoran Singh and Thakur Singh (PWs 5 and 6) that the Appellant and the SI were already engaged in conversation and the Appellant was in the custody of the SI when the aforesaid witnesses reached the place. In these circumstances there were clearly two statements made by the Appellant and in law it is only the first statement of the accused made to the SI Dhan Singh Sirohi (PW 20) which can be regarded as leading to the discovery of the blood stained knife and that alone is admissible u/s 27 of the Evidence Act. 21. The proposition of law is well established that it is only the first statement of the accused to whomsoever made which leads to the discovery of the fact, if a fact is discovered. This was the view expressed in In Re: Kattameedi Chenna Reddi and Another, AIR 1940 Mad 710 which seems to be the leading case on the point and subsequently followed by other High Courts. 22. In Dasu Ram Vs. This was the view expressed in In Re: Kattameedi Chenna Reddi and Another, AIR 1940 Mad 710 which seems to be the leading case on the point and subsequently followed by other High Courts. 22. In Dasu Ram Vs. State, AIR 1952 Raj 20 the evidence of the SI was that the accused had already told him that he would recover the ornaments from his house and that the accused made the same statement in the presence of the witnesses for the second time, who were not present when the disclosure was for the first time made to the SI. Following the decision in In re Chenna Reddi (supra) the Rajasthan High Court held that it could not be said that the ornaments in question were discovered on the information given to the SI in the presence of the witnesses. Sharma, J. observed: The only information that could be said to have led to the discovery was the information given to the SI when he was alone. Hence, the evidence of the witnesses about the accused having shown his readiness to recover the property was not admissible. 23. The Madras case was followed by a division Bench of our Court and the same principle was adopted in Gauri Shanker v. State AIR 1955 All. 3283. In that case the accused alleged to have murdered his wife, made a statement to the police that he would lead to the discovery of the dead body and the knife. However, prior to that statement the police had also learnt from another person that the accused was offering to make the discovery of the corpse and the knife from his room. On these facts it was held that it could not be said that the discovery had been made at the instance of the accused so as to make the evidence of the discovery admissible u/s 27 of the Evidence Act. 24. The Madras decision was also followed by the Kerala High Court in Abdul Samad v. State AIR 1952 Ker 46. The principle must now be deemed to have crystalised into a binding rule of law in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Aher Raja Khima Vs. 24. The Madras decision was also followed by the Kerala High Court in Abdul Samad v. State AIR 1952 Ker 46. The principle must now be deemed to have crystalised into a binding rule of law in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Aher Raja Khima Vs. The State of Saurashtra, AIR 1956 SC 217 wherein it was laid down: Discovery of incriminating articles alleged to have been recovered by the accused is inadmissible in evidence if the police is already informed where they were hidden. Therefore, it is only the first statement of the Appellant made to Sri Dhan Singh Sirohi (PW 20) SI which is admissible u/s 27 of the Evidence Act. It may, however, be made clear that this does not in any manner affect the evidence of the prosecution witnesses Bahoran Singh and Thakur Singh (PWs 5 and 6) a so far as it proves the bare factum of recovery of the blood stained knife. That could be relevant and admissible u/s 6 of the Evidence Act independently if the provisions of Section 27. There is, however, no doubt that the prosecution has established by cogent evidence the recovery of the blood stained knife from he bushes in the field of Mahabir Singh on 16-6-1969 i.e. a day after the occurrence. 25. Another formidable objection raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellant relating to the recovery of the blood stained knife was that these statements were self-incriminating. It was contended that the Appellant had stated to the witnesses as well as the SI that he was willing to point out the knife "with which I had committed the murder" and that if the incriminating portions of the statement were excised, the entire statement would be denuded of significance. We are unable to accede to this submission. In two cases the Supreme Court held that the whole of such statement was admissible. Thus, in State of U.P. Vs. Deoman Upadhyaya, AIR 1960 SC 1125 the accused had in the presence of witnesses offered to point out the gandasa which he stated he had thrown into the tank. We are unable to accede to this submission. In two cases the Supreme Court held that the whole of such statement was admissible. Thus, in State of U.P. Vs. Deoman Upadhyaya, AIR 1960 SC 1125 the accused had in the presence of witnesses offered to point out the gandasa which he stated he had thrown into the tank. It was observed by Shah, J. in para 21 of the Reports that "his statement that he had thrown the gandasa in the tank is information which distinctly relates to the discovery of the gandasa" and hence it was held to be admissible in evidence u/s 27 of the Evidence Act. K. Chinnaswamy Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1788 it was held that the whole statement of the accused to the effect that "he had hidden them (the stolen ornaments) and would point out the place where they were" was admissible u/s 27. Wanchoo, J. remarked: The words 'where he had hidden them' are not on a par with the words 'with which I stabbed the deceased' in the example given in the judgment of the Judicial Committee. 26. But the latter view of the Supreme Court appears to be different. The decision in Prabhu Vs. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1113 may be taken as reflecting the latter view. In that case it was made clear (see para. 9 of the Reports) that the alleged statement of the Appellant that the axe had been used to commit murder or the statement that the blood stained shirt and dhoti were his, must be excluded from consideration, but the act of production of the article on the part of the accused was held as relevant and admissible. This was in conformity with the following dictum of Sir John Beaumont in Kottaya v. Emperor AIR 1947 PC 67 regarding the interpretation of Section 27: It is fallacious to treat the "fact discovered" within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that "I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house" does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added "with which I stabbed" these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant. Thus we must exclude from the statement of the Appellant in the instant case the words "with which I had committed the murder", but the rest of his statement to the SI offering to point out the weapon is clearly admissible u/s 27 of the Evidence Act. 27. The other rather technical ground on which according to the Appellant Section 27 of the Evidence Act should be ruled out in the present case is that bereft of the self incriminating words the statement of the accused would cease to be a 'statement' as such; it would merely reduce itself to conduct, namely, that of pointing out a certain article from a particular place. It was contended that the conduct of the accused in pointing out the weapon of assault could not be construed as furnishing information by making a statement consequence of which any fact was discovered so as to attract Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. In other words, the submission was that the information as a consequence of which discovery of some article is made can be conveyed only by a statement of the accused. If on the other hand he does not make any statement but merely points out the weapon and makes it over to the SI of Police, he does not convey any information by making a statement. Consequently, the alleged statement of the accused leading to the discovery of the weapon is not admissible in evidence. This argument is, however, untenable. If on the other hand he does not make any statement but merely points out the weapon and makes it over to the SI of Police, he does not convey any information by making a statement. Consequently, the alleged statement of the accused leading to the discovery of the weapon is not admissible in evidence. This argument is, however, untenable. So far as the accused is concerned, the key words used in Section 27 are 'information received' and not 'statement.' A statement need not necessarily be by word of mouth, it can be in writing or by signs or gestures as in case of a dumb witness. In fact, Section 119 of the Evidence Act provides that a witness who is unable to speak may give his evidence in any other manner in which he can make it intelligible as by writing or by signs. In that view of the matter production of the weapon of attack i.e. the conduct itself becomes tantamount to making a statement or conveying information and is, therefore, admissible u/s 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. 28. In The State of Bombay Vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad and Others, AIR 1961 SC 1808 it was observed by Sinha, C.J. in para. 13 of the Reports as follows: Similarly during the investigation of a crime by the police, if an accused person were to point out the place where the corpus delicti was lying concealed and in pursuance of such an information given by an accused person, discovery is made within the meaning of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, such information and the discovery made as a result of information may be proved in evidence even though it may tend to incriminate the person giving the information, while in police custody. In paras 8 and 9 of the Reports the following dictum laid down in M.P. Sharma and Others Vs. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi and Others, AIR 1954 SC 300 was cited with approval: 'To be a witness' is nothing more than 'to furnish evidence' and such evidence can be furnished through the lips or by production of a thing or by a document or in other modes. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi and Others, AIR 1954 SC 300 was cited with approval: 'To be a witness' is nothing more than 'to furnish evidence' and such evidence can be furnished through the lips or by production of a thing or by a document or in other modes. Thus, the rule seems to be that information as contemplated by Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act may be imparted not necessarily by making a statement in the narrow sense of an oral statement but also by conduct such as merely pointing out the place where the weapon of attack may be concealed. 29. In Prabhoo v. State of UP (supra) after excluding the self incriminating statement the only evidence which remained in the case was the conduct of the accused inasmuch as he produced from the house a blood stained axe and some blood stained clothes. That evidence was held by S.K. Das, J. (see para 9 of the Reports) to be admissible, though it is quite a different matter that in the absence of the other circumstances it was not considered sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the accused must be the murderer. In Paras Ram v. State 1969 AWR 865 a division Bench of this Court held that even if the statement of an accused relating to the discovery of the dead body was for some reason not admissible u/s 27 of the Evidence Act, the fact discovered could be proved u/s 8. We, however, respectfully think that it is not necessary to fall back upon the provisions of Section 8 of the Evidence Act and that the conduct of an accused in pointing out the corpus delicti or the weapon of assault is admissible on the very terms of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 30. The last circumstance which we cannot ignore is the deliberate denial by the Appellant of several facts which were proved by the prosecution. It was held in Pershadi Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 211 : Where in a murder charge the accused falsely denied several relevant facts which had been conclusively established, the court would be justified in drawing an adverse inference from this against the accused. It was held in Pershadi Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 211 : Where in a murder charge the accused falsely denied several relevant facts which had been conclusively established, the court would be justified in drawing an adverse inference from this against the accused. In the present case the accused in his statement totally denied the recovery of the blood stained knife at his instance which fact was proved to the hilt by the prosecution evidence. In fact the Appellant disowned his statement given in reply to question No. 1 put to him in the committing court. He had the audacity to add in the sessions court that no question had been put to him in the committing court with regard to the blood stained knife. Further, the Appellant emphatically denied that in the evening prior to the night of occurrence he was seen on several spots on his way to village Harthala and later was also seen going out of Harthala after the occurrence. We have recorded a finding that both these facts were established by the prosecution evidence. Still, however, the Appellant chose to deny them and further stated that the prosecution witnesses were lying and he was in his own village Pachkaura at the time of the occurrence. We cannot help drawing an adverse inference against the Appellant from such brazen-faced denial of relevant facts which were proved by the prosecution. 31. Thus, the chain of circumstantial evidence is complete in this case. The material circumstances proved beyond doubt by the prosecution are: (1) that the Appellant had motive for committing the crime; (2) that he had returned on the day of occurrence from his village Pachkaura to village Harthala where the murder of Kartar Singh was committed; (3) that he was seen going away from the house of Smt. Moonga shortly after the murder; (4) that the dead body of the deceased was recovered at the roof of Smt. Moonga; (5) that the blood stained knife with which the assault was committed was recovered at the instance of the Appellant; and (6) that the Appellant had deliberately furnished explanations which were demonstrated to be false by proven facts. All these circumstances taken together are consistent with the only reasonable hypothesis that the Appellant had committed the murder of Kartar Singh. All these circumstances taken together are consistent with the only reasonable hypothesis that the Appellant had committed the murder of Kartar Singh. The irresistible conclusion from the circumstances proved in the case is that the Appellant had committed the offence with which he was charged. He was, therefore, rightly convicted and sentenced. 32. In the result we find no force in this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed. The conviction and sentence of the Appellant are affirmed. The reference made by the learned Sessions Judge for the confirmation of the sentence of death passed against the Appellant is accepted. The Appellant is in Jail. The sentence of death shall be carried out in accordance with law. Khare, J. 33. I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared by my learned brother Shukla, J. I respectfully agree that for the reasons given by him the following circumstances are fully established against the Appellant: (1) The Appellant had a motive for the crime. (2) The Appellant was seen at a small distance from village Harthala-the place of murder sometime between 5 p.m. and 7.30 p.m. on 14-6-1969. (3) The Appellant was seen going away from the side of the house of Smt. Moonga in village Harthala between 12 midnight and 12.30 a.m. during the night between 14th and 15th June, 1969. The Appellant had, therefore, opportunity to commit the murder. (4) The dead body of Kartar Singh was found lying on the roof of the house of Smt. Moonga in village Harthala. (5) A blood-stained knife was recovered at the instance of the Appellant soon after his arrest. The fact that the blood stains on the knife had become disintegrated by the time the sample reached the Serologist will not make that piece of evidence wholly useless. It is significant to note that the knife recovered at the instance of the Appellant could have been the weapon of attack. (6) False denial by the Appellant of all the incriminating circumstances appearing against him. 34. What the Appellant said at the time of the recovery of the blood-stained knife need not be taken into consideration. The factum of recovery of the blood-stained knife at the instance of the Appellant will be, as fully discussed by my learned brother Shukla, J., admissible at least u/s 8 of the Indian Evidence Act. 34. What the Appellant said at the time of the recovery of the blood-stained knife need not be taken into consideration. The factum of recovery of the blood-stained knife at the instance of the Appellant will be, as fully discussed by my learned brother Shukla, J., admissible at least u/s 8 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is, therefore, not at all necessary for the purposes of this appeal to express any opinion on the point whether or not the same (or even something more) could also be admissible u/s 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. 35. I respectfully agree that the chain of circumstances fully established against the Appellant lead to one and the only conclusion that the Appellant must have been the murderer of Kartar Singh. 36. The appeal has, therefore, to be dismissed and the sentence passed against the Appellant affirmed.