JUDGMENT B.N. Lokur, J. - On July 16, 1960, the Government of Uttar Pradesh issued a notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, that several plots in a number of villages specified in the notification were likely to be needed for a public purpose, namely, the planned development of the area. This notification was partially modified by the notification of February 9, 1962, excluding certain plots from the scope of the notification of July 16, 1960. A portion of the area covered by the notification as modified was owned by the Aryan Brothers (Private) Limited and was to be developed as Prakash Industrial Estate. The requisite permission for the development of this portion as an Industrial Estate was obtained by the Aryan Brothers (Private) Limited from the Prescribed Authority under the U.P. Regulation of Buildings (Operation) Act, 1958. The petitioner, the Indian Aluminium Cables Limited; purchased from the Aryan Brothers (Private) Limited about two bighas of land out of the proposed Prakash Industrial Estate on October 24, 1964, and applied to the Prescribed Authority under the said Act for section of the plan for construction of a factory, office buildings, residential blocks etc. The Prescribed Authority, however, rejected the proposal of the petitioner on the ground that the land was under acquisition for planned development by the Improvement Trust under the Master Plan. The land of the petitioner formed part of 31, 8658 acres of land (hereinafter referred to as 31 acre land) "which was to provide a truck terminus under the Master Plan. It appears, however, that it was later decided to locate the truck terminus on a different portion of land to be acquired which measured about 20 acres (hereinafter referred to as 20 acre land) ." The report of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, a copy of which is produced as an annexure to the petition, mentioned that the land sold by Aryan Brothers (Private) Limited to the petitioner had been left out of acquisition on the advice of the Improvement Trust. Thereafter the petitioner approached the Prescribed Authority under the Regulation of Building (Operation) Act with the request that in the altered circumstances sanction should be accorded to the petitioner to construct a factory etc. on the land. The necessary sanction was given and the petitioner completed the construction of the factory and other buildings required for the factory. 2. Thereafter the petitioner approached the Prescribed Authority under the Regulation of Building (Operation) Act with the request that in the altered circumstances sanction should be accorded to the petitioner to construct a factory etc. on the land. The necessary sanction was given and the petitioner completed the construction of the factory and other buildings required for the factory. 2. Meanwhile, pursuant to the decision to locate the truck terminus on the 20 acre land, the Government issued a notification under Secs. 17 (I) , 17 (1-A) and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of this area on August 30, 1967, the notification was challenged by the affected land-holders who obtained a stay order from this Court. The Improvement Trust also informed the Government that as the 20 acre land had not been finally transferred to the Improvement Trust for purpose of the truck terminus due to the stay orders, it would be better if the 31 acre land also be notified for that purpose. The Government accordingly gave instructions to the Collector that it would not be advisable to rescind the notification under Sec. 4(1) for acquiring the 31 acre land until the question regarding the 20 acre land earmarked for the truck terminus was decided by this Court. (The Writ Petition challenging the notification about the 20 acre land under Secs. 17 (1) and 17 (1-A) and Section 6 were dismissed by this Court but the petitioners have been given leave to appeal to the Supreme Court and the petitioners have also obtained stay orders) . Accordingly, on January 8, 1969, a notification was issued under Section 6, Sec. 17 and Section 17 (1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the 31 acre land. The petitioner has challenged this notification in this writ petition as the petitioner's plots Nos. 64 to 70 and 98 are situated within this area. 3. The same notification was impugned by some other land-holder within this area in Writ Petition No. 2653 of 1969 and G.C. Mather, J. quashed the notification by his judgment dated April 16, 1971 with the following observation :- "The second notification has been issued merely to keep the 31 acre also available in case the notification in respect of the 20 acre area falls through. This shows that in fact the Government is not satisfied that the 31 acre area is needed for the purpose. This shows that in fact the Government is not satisfied that the 31 acre area is needed for the purpose. When, admittedly, only one of these two parcels of land is required for the truck terminus, it is difficult to see how the Government can issue two notifications under Section 6, in the first saying that it was satisfied that one parcel was needed and in the second saying that the other parcel was needed for the purpose. Sec. 6 does not permit the making of declarations in the alternative. Under Section 6 the Government has to make up its mind as to `which particular parcel of land' is needed for the public purpose. The issuing of the two notifications betrays that the Government has not reached the requisite `satisfaction' under Section 6 upon which alone the declaration could be validly made. That being so, the impugned notification cannot be sustained." The present petition seeks to invalidate the notification on several grounds including the ground which has been accepted by G.C. Mathur, J. It is urged that the impugned notification has been issued by the State Government in the colourable exercise of its powers under Secs. 6 and 17. 4. The learned counsel for the State submitted in the first instance that since the notification has been already quashed by G.C. Mather, J. this petition has become in fructuous. There is, however, no substance in this argument. G.C. Mathur, J. quashed the notification only in respect of the land belonging to the petitioners in the writ petition before him. The notification is still in existence in regard to the land of the petitioners in this petition and the petition cannot be said to be infructuous. Apart from that, the period of limitation against the judgment of G.C. Mathur, J. has not yet expired and the possibility of the State appealing against the judgment successfully cannot be ruled out. It is hence open to the petitioner to proceed with the present petition. 5. It was next contended on behalf of the State that Section 6 (3) of the Land Acquisition Act makes declaration under Section 6 conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose and the question of validity of the notification under consideration is not justiciable. 5. It was next contended on behalf of the State that Section 6 (3) of the Land Acquisition Act makes declaration under Section 6 conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose and the question of validity of the notification under consideration is not justiciable. In Raja Anand Brahma Shah v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1081, the Supreme Court has provided :- "the declaration of the Government under Section 6 (1) of the Act will be final subject, however, to one exception, namely, in the case of colourable exercise of the power the declaration is open to challenge at the instance of the aggrieved party." Since the notification is attacked on the ground of colourable exercise of the power of the Government the State cannot lean upon the provisions of Section 6 (3) as debarring the Court from investigating into the various allegations in judging the validity of the declaration in the light of those allegations. 6. I respectfully agree with the view expressed by G.C. Mathur J. in the aforesaid writ petition. It is unnecessary to set out my reasons for holding that the impugned notification is bad in law. The Improvement Trust, who are responsible for the act of acquisition, had decided and the Government had approved that the truck terminus shall be set up on the 20 acre land and the proposal to utilise the 31 acre land for that purpose was abandoned, and it had also decided to release the 31 acre land from the acquisition proceedings. It is only after the declaration regarding the 20 acre land was challenged in this Court and stay orders were issued that the proposal to locate the truck terminus on the 31 acre land was revived as an alternative arrangement in the event of the writ petitions regarding the declaration in respect of the 20 acre land succeeded finally. It is significant that the decision to locate the truck terminus on the 20 acre land has not been abandoned and the declaration in regard thereto has not been withdrawn; obviously it is the intention that if the writ petitions in respect of the 20 acre land ultimately failed, that land would be utilised for the truck terminus. The 31 acre land has to be utilised only if the writ petitions succeeded and the notification in respect of the 20 acre land is quashed. The 31 acre land has to be utilised only if the writ petitions succeeded and the notification in respect of the 20 acre land is quashed. Thus the declaration that the 31 acre area is needed for a public purpose, namely for laying out the truck terminus is dependent upon the ultimate fate of the writ petitions in respect of the 20 acre area. The declaration under Section 6 (1) has to be made when "the appropriate Government is satisfied after considering the report, if any, made under Sec. 5-A, Sub-sec. (2) that any particular land is needed for a public purpose for a company." The report of the Special Land Acquisition Officer made under Sec. 5-A(2) clearly mentioned, as already stated, that the land sold by Aryan Brothers (Private) Ltd. to the petitioner has been left out of consideration in the revised proposals. That being so, it was not open to the Government to make a declaration in respect of the land of the petitioners, Apart from that, Sec. 6 (1) contemplates that the Government after being satisfied that any land is needed, for a public purpose shall make a declaration to that effect. A decision, however, has already been taken that the truck terminus shall be set upon the 20 acre land and a declaration was made accordingly. As long as that declaration stood, it would be wrong for the Government to state that they were satisfied that the 31 acre land is also needed for the same purpose, since only one truck terminus has to be set up. At best it can be said that the Government was satisfied that the 31 acre area is likely to be needed for a public purpose if writ petitions in respect of the 20 acre land were allowed and that area were not to be available for locating the truck terminus. The satisfaction of the Government recorded in the declaration is clearly outside the scope and ambit of Section 6 (1) ; the satisfaction required by that section is satisfaction of the present need and not the possible future need. 7. The satisfaction of the Government recorded in the declaration is clearly outside the scope and ambit of Section 6 (1) ; the satisfaction required by that section is satisfaction of the present need and not the possible future need. 7. The learned counsel for the State, however, urged that Section 3 (1) as amended by Section 3 (a) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967, provides for two different declarations in respect of two different parcels of land providing for public purpose and the Government was competent to issue a declaration in respect of 31 acre area for the truck terminus even though a declaration for the same purpose was made in respect of 20 acre area. Sec. 6 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by Section 3 (a) of the Land Acquisition Act, reads; "6 (l) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act when the appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under Sec. 5-A sub-sec. (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to Government or of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders and different declaration may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub-sec. (1) irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (wherever required) under Sec. 6-A, sub-sec. (2)''. The italicised words have been added by the Act of 1967. It is well known that these words had to be added as a result of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1593, holding that Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act is not a kind of reservoir from which the Government may from time to time draw out land and make declarations with respect to it successively and that there could be only a single declaration under Section 6, particularising the area specified in the notification under Section 4 (1). The words added to Section 6 (1) by the Amendment Act have to be construed in the light of the background against which they have been added. The words added to Section 6 (1) by the Amendment Act have to be construed in the light of the background against which they have been added. The amendment merely enables declarations to be made in respect of different parcels of land covered by the notification under Section 4 (1) at different times successively; it does not further enable different declarations to be made in respect of different parcles of land for an identical particular purpose. When a large tract of land is notified under Section 4 (1) , say for planned development of the area, it will be open to Make a number of declarations separately in respect of small parcels of land within the area for particular purposes as for a school, a market place, a bus stand etc., but if the Government has not made up its mind whether a particular parcel of land is suitable for any of these of other particular purposes the Government cannot make declarations in respect of more than one parcel of land as required for the same particular purpose. The essence of Section 6 (1) is that the Government has to be satisfied that a particular parcel of land is required for a particular purpose; it does not further permit satisfaction of different parcels of land in the alternative to suit a particular purpose. In the view I take, the argument of the learned counsel for the State has to be rejected. 8. It was further submitted on behalf of the State that the impugned notification merely states that the land is needed for a public purpose namely, planned development of the area and on the authority of this Court in R.K. Garg v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1966 A.L.J. 350 at 353, and also of the Supreme Court in State at Madhya Pradesh v. Vishnu Prasad, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1593, the declaration satisfies the requirements of Section 4 (1) . However, the State has fairly made it clear in the Supplementary Counter-Affidavit that the particular development intended for the 20 acre land as well as for the 31 acre land is the provision for a truck terminus. However, the State has fairly made it clear in the Supplementary Counter-Affidavit that the particular development intended for the 20 acre land as well as for the 31 acre land is the provision for a truck terminus. The validity of the declaration has then to be examined not in the context of the larger purpose of planned development but of the particular purpose namely provision for a truck terminus and, when so examined, the result would be that the Government cannot be regarded as having been satisfied that the 31 acre land was in fact needed for providing a truck terminus. 9. In the view I take the petition must succeed and it is hereby ordered that the notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act read with Section 17 (1) and Section 17 (1-A) dated January 8, 1969, Annexure K to the petition, and the notice under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act dated June 7, 1969, Annexure D to the petition, are hereby quashed so far as they concern the lands of the petitioners,. namely, plots Nos. 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70 and 98. No order as to costs.