VENKATARAMIAH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner in the above petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is a person providing transport facilities in the district of chitradurga. He applied to the Regional Transport Authority, Chitradurga, for grant of a stage carriage permit to operate two stage carriages each day in opposite directions on an inter-State route between Chitradurga in the State of Mysore and Srisaila in the State of Andhra Pradesh and back, via Challakere, Hanagal, Rampura, Bellary, Guntakal, Gutti, dhone, Kurnool and Atmakur. He also made another application to ply two stage carriage vehicles between Chitradurga and Srisaila on a route which was slightly different from the one referred to above, although the route from Chitradurga to Hagari was common to both the applications. The first of the above two applications was considered by the Regional transport Authority in subject No. 33 on 18-1-1964 and a permit was granted as prayed for. We are informed that the second application which was dealt with under subject No. 34 was rejected. Against the grant of permit made on the first application, three appeals were filed before the mysore State Transport Appellate Tribunal (hereinfarter referred to as the M. S. T. A. T.) by three appellants including the Mysore State Road transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) respondent-4 herein. The M. S. T. A. T. by its order dated 2-11-1964 dismissed all the three appeals. The Corporation thereafter filed an appeal against the order of the M. S. T. A. T. before the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the M. R. A. T.) in Appeal No. 726/66 (MV ). The appellants in the other two appeals also filed two appeals before the M. R. A. T. which were however later withdrawn and dismissed. ( 2 ) ULTIMATELY, the M. R. A. T. dealt with only the appeal of the Corporation on merits and by its order dated 30-7-1970 allowed the appeal partly rendering the permit invalid on a portion of the said route, namely, between bellary and Chintagunte Border which was part of a notified route in a scheme approved under S. 68d of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), which completely excluded operation of stage carriage vehicles by any other person or persons on that section. The resulting position was that the petitioner could operate his service only from Chitradurga to Bellary beyond which he could not operate the service on account of the scheme having come into force. It is admitted that the said scheme was published in the Mysore Gazette dated 7-5-1964 and it provided as follows:"the State Transport undertaking will operate services on all the routes to the complete exclusion of other persons except in regard to the portions of the inter district routes lying outside the Bellary district. The existing permit holders on inter-State routes, may continue to operate such inter-State routes subject to the condition that their permits shall be rendered ineffective by the competent authority for the overlappping portion in the District of Bellary. " ( 3 ) THE portion of the route in question, namely, from Bellary to State border, is one of the routes covered by the scheme and the petitioner is not one of those who is excluded from the operation of the scheme in any manner whatsoever even though the permit that was granted by the regional Transport Authority was in respect of an inter-State route. The said permit had not been counter-signed by the concerned authority in the State of Andhra Pradesh till 23-6-1965 by which date the scheme had come into operation. Since the permit had not been counter-signed by the authority in Andhra Pradesh, the petitioner could not be considered as an existing permit holder of an inter-State route on the date on which the scheme came into operation. This position was rightly not disputed by sri B. Tilak Hegde, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, in view of the decisions of this Court and of the Supreme Court on similar matters. But sri Hegde attacked the order of the M. R. A. T. on other grounds. He contended that the impugned order of the M. R. A. T. suffers from certain irregularities. His first submission was that the M. R. A. T. had committed a mistake in thinking that the permit which had been granted to the petitioner was one on a route which was the subject matter of his application and which was disposed of by the Regional Transport Authority in subject No. 34, wherein the permit was not granted to him. He based this submission on the operative portion of the order of the M. R. A. T. In the course of the order the M. R. A. T. observed that the petitioner could not operate between Chitradurga and Chintagunta border even though the route in question does not touch Chintagunte border at all. This submission of sri Hegde appears to be well-founded. ( 4 ) WE, therefore, feel that the mistake said to have been committed by the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal is not of much consequence at all. Since the petitioner himself admits that after Bellary, the route in respect of which the permit was granted to him and the notified route were overlapping to the extent of nearly tan miles, and there was complete exclusion of operation by other persons on the said section, the petitioner could not operate on the said section. A scheme approved and published under S. 68d of the Act has the force of law and it is the duty of every authority to have regard to the contents of such a scheme while dealing with a matter concerning it. Since even according to the admitted facts the petitioner could not ply his stage carriages beyond on its part implemented the scheme in full and it has been operating its services on all the routes as per the scheme. We, therefore, do not find any substance in the above submission of Sri Hegde. ( 5 ) THE next submission of Sri Hegde was that the appeal which was filed before the MRAT. was barred by time since it had been filed by respondent-4 on the 30th day after the order was pronounced by the MSTAT. The facts bearing on this contention are: The order of the MSTAT. was signed on 9-11-1964 and the appeal was filed on 9-12-1964. It is not disputed that the appeal was filed on the 30th day after respondent-4 was communicated about the order of the MSTAT. The contention of Sri Hegde is based on the language of Rule 178 (1) (b) of the Mysore Motor Vehicles rules, which prescribes that an appeal should be filed within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order. Placing emphasis on the word 'within' it was contended for the petitioner that the appeal should have been filed before the commencement of the 30th day. Placing emphasis on the word 'within' it was contended for the petitioner that the appeal should have been filed before the commencement of the 30th day. To put it in other words the contention was, that the appeal should have been filed before the close of the 29th day after the receipt of the order against which the appeal was filed. The word 'within' according to Chambers' Twentieth Century dictionary means 'in the limits of, 'not going beyond' or 'on the inner side of. If an appeal has to be filed within thirty days, then it would be out of time if it is filed beyond thirty days. In this case the appeal is filed admittedly on the 30th day. Sri Hegde however drew our attention to stroud's Judicial Dictionary where the expression 'within' has been explained in Para (1) as follows:"the word 'within' in relation to a period of time does not usually mean 'during' or 'throughout the whole of it, is more frequently used to delimit a period 'inside which' certain events may happen (per O'bryan, L. in Reynolds v. Reynolds (1941) VLR. 249 ). "sri Hegde however relied upon para (10) in which we find the following passage:" Where something is to be done 'within' a stated time 'before' a stated date, that means that it is to be done at some time during the course of the stated time immediately preceding the stated date (Thomas v. Lambert (4 LJKB. 153) ). " ( 6 ) THE above passage may not be applicable to the case on hand, since the time for filing an appeal is neither before any 'stated time' nor before any 'stated date'. The appeal has to be filed within thirty days and not before thirtieth day. In another part of the same book we find a reference to an English decision in Radcliffe v. Bartholomew, 1892 1 QB. 161. ( 7 ) IN that case the question for decision was whether a complaint under S. 14 of the Act for the prevention of Cruelty to Animals (12 and 13 Vict. c. 92) which could be made within one calendar month after the cause of such complaint arose was in time when the information was laid on the 30th of June when the act complained of had been committed on the 30th of May. c. 92) which could be made within one calendar month after the cause of such complaint arose was in time when the information was laid on the 30th of June when the act complained of had been committed on the 30th of May. The Court held that the complaint had been filed in time relying upon an earlier decision in Williams v. Burgess, 12 A and E. 635. in which it had been held that in civil proceedings the rule had been to exclude the day on which the act is done from the computation of the time within which the action, complaint, appeal or otherwise ought to be taken, the reason being that in such proceedings the time 'within' which an act had to be done should be construed as meaning the time beneficial to the person concerned. A similar view regarding computation of time has been taken by Lord Goddard, CJ. in stewart v. Chapman, 1951 2 KB. 792. ( 8 ) IN that case a motorist was served with a notice of an intended prosecution on January 25, 1951, in respect of an alleged careless driving on January 11, 1951. It was held that the notice had been served within fourteen days of the commission of the offence as required by s. 21 (1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1930. In this case, therefore, the appeal filed by the Corporation on the 30th day after receipt of the communication regarding the pronouncement of the order against which the appeal hed been filed, has to be held as one filed in time because the appeal has not been filed beyond thirty days. Even if there is any doubt in the matter, the court should lean in favour of the person who is given the right of appeal since he would be the party whose right to appeal would be affected if the other view is taken. We, therefore, feel that the contention of Sri Hegde on the above question is untenable. ( 9 ) SRI Hegde brought to our notice that there has been some misdescription in the address of the petitioner furnished before the MRAT. Since nothing turns on that it is unnecessary to deal with it in detail. We, therefore, feel that the contention of Sri Hegde on the above question is untenable. ( 9 ) SRI Hegde brought to our notice that there has been some misdescription in the address of the petitioner furnished before the MRAT. Since nothing turns on that it is unnecessary to deal with it in detail. We, however, make it clear that the portion of the route in question from which the petitioner has to be excluded from operation in accordance with the scheme is the section of the route Bellary-Hagri-Challakurki border and not the section Bellary-Hagari-Chintagunte border. With the above observation, we dismiss this writ petition with costs of Respondent-4. Advocate's fee Rs. 100. 00. --- *** --- .