Judgment :- 1. In this writ petition, which has been filed on behalf of a registered trade union by name the Kerala State Electricity Board Executive Workers' Union by its Vice President, the relief sought is the quashing of the proceedings of the Kerala Stats Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) evidenced by its resolution Ext. P9 dated 23 21971. Under Ext. P9 the Board has announced its decision to give representation on the Industrial Relations Council to six categories of employees enumarated therein and to recognise only eight trade unions mentioned in the resolution as the bargaining agents in respect of those categories both for purposes of representation in the Industrial Relations Council and also for purposes of collective bargaining. The writ petitioner, namely the Kerala State Electricity Board Executive Workers' Union, has not been included amongst the eight unions recognised is Ext. P9 as bargaining agents and hence it has come up with this writ petition. 2. The case put forward by the petitioner Union is as follows: By the proceedings of the Board evidenced by Ext. Pi dated 3111966 the petitioner Union had been recognised as a representative Union of executive employees and it had been actively taking part in discussions and conferences touching the problems of the executive employees of the Board. The petitioner Union was also a party to the settlement governing service conditions of the Board's employees and also regarding the bonus for the year 1969 70. Exts. P3 to P6 have been produced by the petitioner to show that the Union had been invited by the Chairman of the Board for discussions and talks preceding those settlements and was thus being treated by the Board as a representative Union. By the non-inclusion of the petitioner in the list of recognised unions enumerated in Ext. P9 the Board has deprived the petitioner Union of the right to function as as effective bargaining agent and thereby seriously interfered with its lawful activity as an organised trade union. The recognition by the employer as a bargaining agent is the very essence of the right to organise and form associations and unions which is guaranteed under Art.19 (1) (c) of the Constitution and hence the denial by the Board of such recognition to the petitioner Union constitutes an infringement of the said fundamental right. The recognition by the employer as a bargaining agent is the very essence of the right to organise and form associations and unions which is guaranteed under Art.19 (1) (c) of the Constitution and hence the denial by the Board of such recognition to the petitioner Union constitutes an infringement of the said fundamental right. In any event, since the petitioner Union had been originally granted recognition by the Board under its prior proceedings evidenced by Ext. P1 the Board acted illegally and arbitrarily in divesting the petitioner of its existing status without giving the petitioner any notice or opportunity of making its representations. Hence, Ext. P9 is violative of the principles of natural justice. Further, in making the selection of the unions for the grant of recognition as bargaining agents the Board has followed any reasonable principle or uniform policy and while excluding the petitioner Union which has a membership of more than 2000 employees, recognition has been accorded to certain other unions having only a much lesser membership. This differential treatment constitutes arbitrary discrimination violative of Art.14 of the Constitution. The impugned proceedings where passed by the Board under the influence of extraneous political pressure brought to bear on it by the concerned Minister of the State Government and by the ruling political parties. On the basis of these allegations made in the writ petition it is contended by the petitioner that the action taken under Ext. P9 is illegal, ultra vires and void. 3. On behalf of the respondent it is submitted that what has been done by the Board as per Ext. P9 is only to effect a reconstitution of the industrial relations committee on a rational basis and to formulate the principles for determining the bargaining units and bargaining agents in the light of the realities of the existing situation and in the context of the pattern of industrial relations that has evolved over the last few years. It is contended that it was fully competent for the Board to take a policy decision on those matters in such manner as in its judgment would be conducive to the efficient functioning of its industrial relations machinery and the decision so taken by it is not liable to be called in question before this court under Art.226 of the Constitution. The petitioner's claim that it is a representative Union of executive employees is denied by the respondent and it is pointed out that the petitioner Union represents only a small portion of the executive employees and it was not a member of the industrial relations committee at any time since the constitution of the said committee in 1968. The respondent submits that the decision incorporated in Ext. P9 was taken after a detailed consideration of all the relevant aspects including the suggestions that had been made regarding the matter at the meeting of the Industrial Relations Council specially held for the purpose on 23-1-1971. According to the respondent, the experience gained in the past had shown that recognition of small splinter unions like the Union represented by the petitioner tended only to create more unrest and that stability in the matter of industrial peace could be attained only by entering into labour management agreements for stipulated terms with representative unions. For this purpose rational and realistic standards had to be adopted in recognising unions for purposes of collective bargaining. The decisions incorporated in Ext. P9 were arrived at by the Board as a result of its careful deliberations and not under any extraneous influence whatever and the selection of the bargaining agents has been made on a proper and realistic assessment of the representative character of the various unions. In regard to the contention put forward by the petitioner that the selection of the bargaining agents was made arbitrarily the respondent submits that there is nothing unreasonable in the management deciding to deal with only those organisations that can really be regarded as representative unions of the different categories of workmen for purposes of collective bargaining. It is pointed out that even in the report of the National Commission on Labour it has been recommended that the majority Union should be given the right to sole representation and to enter into agreements with the employer. The petitioner's allegation that Ext P9 was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice is answered by the respondent by stating that a labour union has no legal right whatever to be granted recognition by the employer and the concept of natural justice cannot have any application in the matter of formulation by the employer of the industrial relations policy to be pursued by it during the next three-year period. The allegation that Ext P9 has been passed mala fide is strongly refuted by the respondent. 4. It is seen from the averments in the writ petition itself that the petitioner Union does not represent the majority of the executive employees working under the Board; it has a membership of only about 2000 whereas, according to the counter-affidavit of the respondent, the total number of the executive employees is about 7000. Most of the remaining personnel belonging to that category are members of the Electricity Board Executive Employees' Union which has been recognised under Ext. P9 as the bargaining agent in respect of executive employees. 5. Let us first examine whether by reason of the impugned action taken by the Board under Ext. P9 the petitioner Union can be said to have suffered any infraction of its rights so as to entitle it to seek relief from this court under Art.226 of the Constitution. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the direct consequence of the non-inclusion of the petitioner in the list of recognised unions given in Ext. P9 is to make it impossible for the petitioner Union to effectively discharge its legitimate function of representing its members in matters of collective bargaining. The petitioner contends that this constitutes an unauthorised abridgement of the fundamental right guaranteed under Art.19 (I) (c) of the Constitution and that hence the action taken by the respondent under Ext. P9 is liable to be called in question under Art.226 of the Constitution. 6. Under Art.19 (1) (c) of the Constitution the fundamental right to form associations or unions is conferred on all citizens subject to the terms of clause (4) empowering the State to make any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the said right. Can it be said that this fundamental freedom to form associations or unions carries with it as a necessary concomitant a right to have such associations or unions recognised by the concerned authorities, namely the employers in the case of labour unions. Can it be said that this fundamental freedom to form associations or unions carries with it as a necessary concomitant a right to have such associations or unions recognised by the concerned authorities, namely the employers in the case of labour unions. This question came in for examination by the Supreme Court in an early case reported in Raja Kulkarni v. State of Bombay, 1954-1 LL.J.I, while considering the validity of S.13 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 which provides that a trade union can be registered as a "representative union" for an industry in a local area only if it has for the whole of the period of three months next preceding the date of its application, a membership of not less than 15% of the number of the employees employed in any industry in any local area. The contention raised before the Supreme Court was that the above section, in so far as it imposes restrictions on the right of the trade unions to participate in collective bargaining, infringes the fundamental right guaranteed under Art.19 (1) (c) of the Constitution. Rejecting that contention and upholding the validity of the provision, the Supreme Court observed: 'The statute lays down the minimum qualification of 15 per cent of membership to enable the union to be called a 'representative union' so as to represent the interests of the entire body of workers in their relations with the employers. After laying down the test of not less than 15 per cent it was perfectly reasonable not to allow any other union such as the appellants to interpose in a dispute on behalf of the textile workers when they did not command the minimum percentage or when their membership fell below the prescribed percentage. The right to freedom of speech and expression is not denied to the appellants, nor are they prohibited from forming associations or unions." 7. In All India Bank Employees' Association v. The National Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes), Bombay, AIR. 1962 S C. 171, their Lordships had again occasion to consider the content and scope of the right guaranteed under Art.19(1) (c) of the Constitution. In All India Bank Employees' Association v. The National Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes), Bombay, AIR. 1962 S C. 171, their Lordships had again occasion to consider the content and scope of the right guaranteed under Art.19(1) (c) of the Constitution. It was held that even a very liberal interpretation of the said constitutional provision cannot lead to the conclusion that the fundamental right to form unions carries with it a concomitant guarantee that the trade unions so formed shall be enabled to carry out effective collective bargaining or shall achieve the purpose for which they were brought into existence. Their Lordships said: "In our opinion, the right guaranteed under sub-cl. (c) of Cl. (1) of Art.19 extends to the formation of an association and in so far as the activities of the association are concerned or as regards the steps which the union might take to achieve the purpose of its creation, they are subject to such laws as might be framed and the validity of such laws is not to be tested by reference to the criteria to be found in Cl. (4) of Art.19 of the Constitution." The same principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in M/s Raghubar Dayal Jai Parkash v. The Union of India, AIR. 1962 SC. 263, wherein their Lordships had to deal with a challenge raised against S.6 of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952 on the ground of alleged violation of Art.19(1) (c) of the Constitution. Upholding the validity of the section the Supreme Court held that the freedom of association guaranteed by Art.19 (1) (c) does not carry with it a guaranteed right to recognition of the association. 8. The legal position being thus well-settled that Art.19 (1) (c) does not confer on a trade union a right to claim the grant of recognition by the employer, it is not possible to accept the petitioner's contention that the denial of recognition to it by the Board constitutes a violation of the petitioner's fundamental right under the said article of the Constitution. There being no other statutory provision in force in this State which confers on every trade union, irrespective of the state of its membership, a right to be recognised by the employer, or imposes a corresponding obligation on the employer to grant such recognition to all trade unions, it must be held that the petitioner Union has no legal or enforceable right for the grant of recognition to it by the Board. 9. It may be that in the past the Board had treated the petitioner also as a representative union. But, that fact by itself will not confer on the petitioner any claim for being accorded continued recognition in the future also. The employer has full freedom to effect any changes in its industrial relations policy so as to suit the needs of altered situations and to resolve in its discretion with which associations or unions it will conduct negotiations for collective bargaining. No element of quasi-judicial determination is involved in taking such a policy decision. So long as there is no legal right vested in any union entitling it for the grant of recognition by the employer, it cannot be said that by reason of the decision to recognise only the majority unions the other unions are visited with any adverse civil consequences. The principles of natural justice are, therefore, not attracted to a matter of this kind and the petitioner's attack against Ext. P9 on the ground of contravention of natural justice is devoid of merit. The decisions reported in Southern Railway Mazdoor Union v. Southern Railway, 1970-1 L. L. J. 83, and North-East Frontier Railway Mazdoor Union v. The General Manager, North East Frontier Railway, 1970-II L.L. J. 486, which were relied on by the petitioner's Advocate, are clearly distinguishable since both those cases were governed by the specific procedural rule laid down in para 3610 of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual which was held to be statutory in origin. 10. There is little substance in the plea put forward by the petitioner that the Board has acted arbitrarily in deciding to recognise only the representative unions as bargaining agents. The principles that should govern the grant of recognition to unions have been discussed at considerable length by the National Commission on Labour headed by Dr Gajendragadkar. 10. There is little substance in the plea put forward by the petitioner that the Board has acted arbitrarily in deciding to recognise only the representative unions as bargaining agents. The principles that should govern the grant of recognition to unions have been discussed at considerable length by the National Commission on Labour headed by Dr Gajendragadkar. The Commission has emphatically expressed the view that industrial democracy implies that the majority union should have the right to sole representation, that is, the right to speak and act, for all workers and to enter into agreements with the employer and that where more unions than one contend for recognition the union having a larger following should be recognised. The Bombay legislature has incorporated this principle in the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, the validity of which was upheld by the Supreme Court in Raja Kulkarni v. State of Bombay, 1954-1 L. L. J.1. The principle of restricting the grant of recognition to only representative unions is therefore nothing novel but is one that has been commended by such an expert body as the National Commission on Labour. It cannot therefore be said that the respondent Board has acted unreasonably or arbitrarily in deciding to adopt the policy of category wise bargaining through unions realistically assessed as representative unions which alone will be recognised as bargaining units. 11. The petitioner Union admittedly does not represent the majority of the personnel belonging to the category of executive employees. Since the Electricity Board Executive Employees' Union has a much larger membership, the grant of recognition to the said Union does not involve any illegal discrimination against the petitioner. 12. The petitioner has put forward a contention that the fact that the Kerala State Electricity Board Drivers' Union has been recognised in Ext. P9 as a bargaining unit will show that the principle of recognition of only majority unions was not being strictly adhered to by the Board. According to the petitioner, the drivers also belong to the general category of executive employees. It is argued that since the recognition of a separate union consisting only of a small section of such employees is not at all consistent with the principle of recognising only majority unions, which is declared in Ext. P9 it is manifest that the said principle was not being uniformly applied by the respondent. It is argued that since the recognition of a separate union consisting only of a small section of such employees is not at all consistent with the principle of recognising only majority unions, which is declared in Ext. P9 it is manifest that the said principle was not being uniformly applied by the respondent. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Board it has been submitted that the drivers form a separate category distinct from the other executive employees and that it was for this reason that the Board thought it proper to grant recognition to the Drivers' Union which represents the majority of the drivers in the service of the Board. I see no reason to reject this plea put forward by the respondent. 13. Excepting for the bare assertion made by the petitioner in the original petition that the decisions incorporated in Ext. P9 were taken by the Board under extraneous political pressure, no materials have been produced before this court to substantiate that plea. The allegation of mala fides has been strongly refuted in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent and it has been submitted that the decisions incorporated in Ext. P9 were taken by the Board bonafide after careful deliberation without being influenced by any extraneous considerations. I accept the truth of the averments contained in the counter-affidavit and hold that the plea of mala fides is not established. 14. In the result, the original petition fails and is dismissed. The parties will bear their respective costs.