JUDGMENT A. K. Kirty, J. - This is an appeal under Section 32 (9) of the State Financial Corporations Act 1951 (Act LXIII of 1951) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The U.P. Financial Corporation, the appellant, is constituted under the Act. On 29-5-1959 the respondent No. 1, Messrs. Deekey Industries (P) Ltd. borrowed a sum of Rs. 35,000/- from the appellant on the terms and conditions incorporated in the indenture of the said date to which the parties were Messrs. Deekey Industries (P) Ltd., through Sri N. N. Gupta, Managing Director, of the first part, Sri N. N. Gupta, called the surety, of the second part and Rani Devendra Kumari, who was mortgaging her property in consideration of the advance to the Company, the third part, and the U.P. Financial Corporation, the present appellant. This indenture, inter alia, evidenced the loan of Rs. 35,000/- advanced to respondent no. 1 and incorporated the terms and conditions in regard to the repayment of the same in fixed instalments with interest. By this document certain properties were also mortgaged to secure the advance. The properties mortgaged were also mortgaged to mentioned in Schedule A, B and C of the said indenture. We are here concerned with Schedule C. The immovable property to mentioned therein belonged to Rani Devendra Kumari and it was expressly noted in the schedule as follows :- "This property is hereby mortgaged by Rani Devendra Kumari Chairman of the Company in Consideration of the loan being advanced hereunder to the said Company (respondent No. 1)." 3. Respondent No. 1 failed to pay the instalments in accordance with the terms and conditions mentioned in the aforesaid indenture whereupon the appellant filed an application in the court of the District Judge, Kanpur, under Section 31 of the Act. In this application the respondents of this appeal were arrayed as opposite parties 1 to 3 respectively. Notices were given to all of them. It, however, appears that the second opposite party to the application, viz. N.N. Gupta, inspite of service of notice of the application, did not appear to contest the same. Therefore, as against him, the proceedings were held ex-parte. The application was contested by opposite party no. 3, Rani Devendra Kumari and also by opposite party no. 1 messrs. Deekey Industries (P) Ltd. 4. The court below framed as many as seventeen issues. N.N. Gupta, inspite of service of notice of the application, did not appear to contest the same. Therefore, as against him, the proceedings were held ex-parte. The application was contested by opposite party no. 3, Rani Devendra Kumari and also by opposite party no. 1 messrs. Deekey Industries (P) Ltd. 4. The court below framed as many as seventeen issues. Ultimately, it passed an order dismissing the petition against Sri N.N. Gupta, opposite party No. 2, and Rani Devendra Kumari, opposite party No. 3 and with costs. It further ordered as follows :- "The order of attachment dated 21-10-1965, recorded on the back of paper No. 1001, is varied to this extent that the property, mentioned in Schedule C of the petition is ordered to be released from attachment and the property mentioned in Schedules A and B of the petition is directed to be sold." Rest of the order need not be quoted here, because, in the instant appeal, the only question is as to legality and property of the order dismissing the application against Rani Devendra Kumari, opposite party No. 3, and directing the property mentioned in Schedule C to be released from attachment. 5. The questions in regard to the liability of respondent No. 3, and the appellant's right to have the property mentioned in Schedule C sold in a proceedings under Section 31 of the Act were considered by the court below under issue No. 17. 6. The court below itself has recorded findings to the effect that Rani Devendra Kumari, opposite party No. 3, had mortgaged the property mentioned in Schedule C to the appellant in consideration of the loan advance to the Company, Opposite Party No. 1. After recording this finding, the court below proceeded to consider as to whether the properties mentioned in Schedule C could be sold in a proceeding arising out of the application filed under Section 31 of the Act. After recording this finding, the court below proceeded to consider as to whether the properties mentioned in Schedule C could be sold in a proceeding arising out of the application filed under Section 31 of the Act. The court below then referred to various provisions contained in Section 31 of the Act and concluded as follows :- "It is quite clear from a perusal of Sub-Sec. (1) of Section 31 that where an industrial concern in breach of any agreement, makes any default in repayment of any loan or advance or any instalment thereof, or otherwise fails to comply with the terms of its agreement with the Financial Corporation or where the Financial Corporation requires an industrial concern to made immediate repayment of any loan or advance under Section 30 and the industrial concern fails to make such repayment, any officer of the Corporation authorised by the Board in this behalf, may apply for an order for sale of the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Financial Corporation as security for the loan or advance." 7. The court below, however, was of the opinion that the matter court not be judged with reference to the provisions of Section 31 only of the Act. It observed that Section 31 has to be read with Section 32 which provided the procedure in respect of application under Sec. 31. It, then, referred to the various subsections of Section 32 and observed; reading sub-secs. (4 to 7) of Section 32 together, there can be no doubt that the Act contemplates that a notice is to be issued to the industrial concern to which the loan had been advanced and that if no cause is shown by it on the date specified in the notice, the attached property is to be directed to be sold and that if the industrial concern shows cause, the claim of the Corporation has to be investigated. The section makes no provision at all for the serving of any notice on any other person other than the industrial concern. It follows that the legislature intended that no property belonging to a person other than the industrial concern, was to be the subject of proceedings in an application under Section 31 of the Act and no such person was to be party therein. It follows that the legislature intended that no property belonging to a person other than the industrial concern, was to be the subject of proceedings in an application under Section 31 of the Act and no such person was to be party therein. Consequently, the words, "the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Financial Corporation as security for the loan or advance taken by it must be held that the property mortgaged by a person other than the industrial concern as security for the loan or advance to the industrial concern is not included within the meaning of these words. It follows that the property mentioned in Schedule C to the petition, which belongs to opposite party No. 3, cannot be ordered to be sold in these proceedings. The fact that no personal decree has been claimed against opposite party No. 3 does not alter the position." 8. In our opinion, the view taken by the court below is wholly untenable. Sub-sec. (1) of Section 29 of the Act provides :- "where any industrial concern, which is under a liability to the Financial Corporation under an agreement, makes any default in repayment of any loan or advance or any instalment thereof or otherwise fails to comply with the terms of its agreement with the Financial Corporation shall have the right to take over the management of the industrial concern, as well as the right to transfer by way of lease or sale and realise the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Financial Corporation." 9. The aforesaid provisions of the Act clearly show that under the conditions mentioned therein the Financial Corporation has been vested with a right, inter alia, to sell the property mortgaged. It has no reference to any mortgage or pledge or hypothecation made in its favour by the `industrial concern' to whom it might have made any advance or given any loan and in respect of which the industrial concern is under a liability to the Financial Corporation. We have perused all the material section of the Act but have not been able to find any specific provisions restricting the rights of the Financial Corporation to have the mortgaged property sold, only to property mortgaged in its favour by the industrial concern. We have perused all the material section of the Act but have not been able to find any specific provisions restricting the rights of the Financial Corporation to have the mortgaged property sold, only to property mortgaged in its favour by the industrial concern. Otherwise also, it seems to us that it could not have been intended by the legislature that, although, to secure repayment of the same loan properties of the industrial concern as well as properties of others might have been mortgaged, the Financial Corporation will have right to initiate proceedings under the Act only as against the industrial concern but it would have to file regular suits in order to have its rights as a mortgagee enforced against persons other than the industrial concern. Sec. 31 of the Act relates to the rights conferred on the Financial Corporation to recover all loans advanced by it by various processes, one of such processes being sale of the property mortgaged to it. In Section 31 (1) (a) of the Act, again, there are no words of limitation or restriction so as to indicate that the right and remedy afforded to the Financial Corporation will be available only against the industrial concern and not against others even though they have pledged their movable properties or mortgaged immovable properties to secure the loan taken by the industrial concern. Sec. 32 of the Act relates to procedure in respect of application under Sec. 31. Therefore, the provisions contained in Section 32 cannot cut down or restrict the substantive rights conferred on the Financial Corporation under Sec. 31. The court below appears to have been misled by the fact that, Sec. 32 does not contain any specific provision for giving notice to any person or body other than the industrial concern. That does not, however, mean that the giving of notice to any other person or party concerned is prohibited or forbidden by Sec. 32. Whenever the Financial Corporation wants to exercise the rights given to it under Section 31 also against any person or party other than the industrial concern, necessarily it will have to implead such persons or party in the application which it will have to file before the District Judge. In the instant case all the three parties concerned were impleaded as opposite parties. In the instant case all the three parties concerned were impleaded as opposite parties. Therefore, it seems to us that in all such cases the court, in the ordinary course, will issue notice to all persons arrayed as opposite parties in such application, even though no specific provision is to be found in Section 32 in regard to giving of notice to persons other than the industrial concern. Rules of natural justice also would require the giving of notice to such persons or parties. This in our opinion is implicit in the proceedings arising out of Section 31 as also in the provisions contained in Section 32 which relate to procedure. 10. The fact that no relief was sought against opposite, party No. 3, personally, or, that in the indenture in question opposite party No. 3, had not undertaken any personal responsibility or liability to repay the loan taken by opposite party No. 1, does not alter the legal position in any way as regards the liability of opposite party No. 3 as a mortgagor. In sub-sec. (a) of Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, the expressions `mortgagor', `mortgagee' etc. have been defined. To create a mortgage it is not necessary that the mortgagor himself must have taken any loan to secure the payment of which any property has been given by way of mortgage. Clearly, therefore, opposite party No. 3, by having mortgaged the property mentioned in Schedule C of the relevant document became liable to have the properties sold at the instance of the Financial Corporation in case the debtor industrial concern, namely The Deekey Industries (P) Ltd., did not repay the loan in terms of the agreement. On the findings recorded by the court below on the other issues, opposite party No. 3, was a person, who could be, and, rightly had been impleaded as a party to the application under Section 31 by the appellant. Clearly, for the reasons mentioned above, the appellant has a right to have the property mentioned in Schedule C sold to enforce repayment of the balance due to it from respondent No. 1 out of the amount advanced to the latter. 11. We have perused the indenture by which the mortgages was created. Clearly, for the reasons mentioned above, the appellant has a right to have the property mentioned in Schedule C sold to enforce repayment of the balance due to it from respondent No. 1 out of the amount advanced to the latter. 11. We have perused the indenture by which the mortgages was created. There are no terms and conditions therein providing for enforcement of mortgage by opposite party No. 3, only, after the Financial Corporation has exhausted its remedies against the properties mentioned in Schedules, A and B. Therefore the appellant was entitled to an order for the sale of the property mentioned in Schedules A, B and C. 12. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed. The order of the court below is modified, and the dismissal of the application against opposite party No. 3, is set aside. The order of the court below releasing the property mentioned in Schedule C is vacated. It is ordered that the properties mentioned in Schedule C shall also be sold for the realisation of the dues of the appellant. The appellant will be entitled to its costs of the appeal from, the respondent No. 3, only.