V. D. Misra, J. ( 1 ) THIS is landlord s second appeal under section 39of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 against the order of the Rent Control Tribunal up-holding the order of the Additional Rent Controllerdismissing the application for eviction of the tenant. ( 2 ) ONE Kalsum Bi was the owner of the premises bearing municipalnos. 1817 to 1821. M/s. Bhagwan Dass Faqir Chand (hereinaftercalled the Tenant ) became a tenant under Mst. Kalsum Bi about25/30 years ago. Portions of the property were sublet from time totime to various persons. A part of the property was sublet to M/s. Delhi Vanaspati Syndicate (hereinatfer called the landlord ). Theentire building was purchased by the landlord in 1958 from Mst. Kalsum Bi through her attorney Habib ul Rehman. Thereafter, anapplication for eviction of the tenant under clauses (b) and (g) of theproviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act,1958 (hereinafter REFERRED TO to as Act of 1958) was made on thegrounds that the tenant had sublet the premises without obtaining theconsent of the land-lord in writing and that the landlord required thebuilding bona fide for the purposes of reconstruction. It was allegedthat shop No. 1818 was sublet in 1955 and that Balakhana, bearingmunicipal No. 1817, was sublet by the tenant to the land-lord somewhere in 1956. The tenant resisted the claim of the landlord for eviction on the ground that he was authorised to sublet and had obtainedconsent in writing from Mst, Kalsumbi. He denied that landlord required the building for reconstruction. ( 3 ) MST. Kalsum Bi had served a notice of ejectment on the tenant in1956 (Exh. R-1) on the ground that he had sublet, assigned or otherwise parted with possession of the part of the tenancy premises without the consent of the landlord (Mst. Kalsum Bi) and substantialdamage had been caused to the premises. By a writing, Exh. R-2. dated 29-6-1956 on the back of notice Exh. R-l, Habib Ul Rehman,mukhtiar of Mst. Kalsum Bi, cancelled and withdrew the notice inconsideration of the tenant having agreed to pay rent at an enhancedrate of Rs. 185. 00 per month instead of Rs. 137/8. 00 per month. Simultaneously two rent receipts Exhs. R-26 and R-27 were issued by Habibul Rehman in favour of the tenant. Exh. R-26 was in respect of therent from December, 195 5/04/1956 at the rate of Rs. 137/8. 185. 00 per month instead of Rs. 137/8. 00 per month. Simultaneously two rent receipts Exhs. R-26 and R-27 were issued by Habibul Rehman in favour of the tenant. Exh. R-26 was in respect of therent from December, 195 5/04/1956 at the rate of Rs. 137/8. 00per month whereas Exh. R-27 was in respect of rent for the month ofmay at the rate of Rs. 185. 00 per month. The tenant continued to payrent at this rate till the building was sold to the landlord (Exh. R-27 tor-41 ). It was thus pleaded that writing Exh. R-2 and the rentreceipts amounted to consent in writing for the acts of sub-letting. ( 4 ) THE learned Additional Rent Controller came to the conclusionthat two sub-tenancies had been created prior to the coming into forceof the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 (hereinafter REFERRED TO to as Act of 1952) while the remaining sub-tenancies were created subsequently. He also found that Mst. Kalsum Bi had given her consent inwriting to sub-letting through Habib ul Rehman. He did not acceptthe contention of the landlord that he bona fide required the premisesfor reconstruction. The application of the landlord was, therefore. dismissed. ( 5 ) THE landlord preferred TO an appeal to the Rent Control Tribunalagainst the order of the Additional Rent Controller. The Tribunalfound that the writing Exh, R-2 was genuine; that it was not necessaryto obtain the consent in writing in terms of Section 14 (1) (b) of theact of 1958 before creating the Sub-tenancies; and that the consentgiven by Mst. Kalsum Bi through her attorney Habib ul Rehman wasnot illegal. The Tribunal also up-held the finding of the Additional Rent Controller that the landlord did not require the premises bonafide for reconstruction and dismissed the appeal. ( 6 ) WHEN this matter came up before 1. D. Dua, C. J. (now Hon blejudge of the Suprem Court) he decided to place the appeal before a Division Bench so that the scope and effect of the decision of the Supremecourt in Karam Singh Sobti v. Partap Chand and another, 1964 P. L. R. 210 may be determined. It is in these circumstances that thematter has come up before us. ( 7 ) UNDER sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Act of 1958 an appeallies to this court only on a substantial question of law. This court. It is in these circumstances that thematter has come up before us. ( 7 ) UNDER sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Act of 1958 an appeallies to this court only on a substantial question of law. This court. therefore, cannot re-assess the evidence afresh and enter into merits ofthe case, and is bound by the decision of Tribunal on questions of factmr. L. R. Gupta, learned counsel for the landlord-appellant, contends that the writing, Exh. R-2 is not genuine and is forged; and thatexh. R-2 read with rent receipts Exh. R-26 and R-27 do not amountto consent in writing. The Tribunal after detailed consideration of theevidence on record, including the statements of Om Parkash RW2 andjagdish Pershad, RW3 who were present at the time Exh. R-2 waswritten, came to the conclusion that this writing was genuine and was not forged. This is a finding of fact and cannot be interferred with inthe appeal. ( 8 ) THE landlord had not challenged before the Tribunal that the writing Exh. R-2 read with rent receipt Exhs. R-26 and R-27 does notamount to consent in writing. ( 9 ) THE interpretation of a document, unless it is a document of title. is a question of fact and cannot be raised for the first time in appealunder Section 39 of Act of 1958. ( 10 ) IT is then contended by Mr. Gupta that the consent in writingrequired under Section 14 (1) (b) of the Act of 1958 should beobtained previous to the sub-letting and the consent obtained after sub-letting will not save the tenant from eviction. Section 16 of thisact is relied upon. Section 14 (1) (b) of Act of 1958 is in the following terms: "14. (1) (B)-THAT the tenant has, on or after the 9th day of June, 1952,sublet, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of thewhole or any part of the premises without obtaining theconsent in writing of the landlord;"relevant portion of Section 16 is as under : "16. (1) Where at any time before the 9th day of June, 1952 atenant has sublet the whole or any part of the premises andthe sub-tenant is, at the commencement of this Act, in occupation of such premises, then, notwithstanding that the consent of the landlord was not obtained for such subletting,the premises shall be deemed to have been lawfully sublet. (1) Where at any time before the 9th day of June, 1952 atenant has sublet the whole or any part of the premises andthe sub-tenant is, at the commencement of this Act, in occupation of such premises, then, notwithstanding that the consent of the landlord was not obtained for such subletting,the premises shall be deemed to have been lawfully sublet. (2) No premises which have been sublet either in wholeor in part on or after the 9th day of June, 1952, withoutobtaining the consent in writing of the landlord, shall bedeemed to have been lawfully sublet. (3) After the commencement of this Act, no tenant shall,without the previous consent in writing of the landlord, (a) sublet the whole or any part of the premises held byhim as a tenant; or (b) transfer or assign his rights in the tenancy or in anypart thereof. At this stage Section 13 (l) (b) of Act of 1952 may also be reproduced which was as under : "13. (1) (B) that the tenant without obtaining the consent of thelandlord in writing has, after the commencement of thisact,- (i) sublet, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of,the whole or any part of the premises; orsection 16 of the Act of 1958 holds that key to the interpretationof provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of thisact as well as of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of theact of 1952. It deals with restrictions on subletting. Sub-section (1)of Section 16 makes subletting lawful, though it was without the consent of the landlord, provided that the subletting has taken place before9th day of June, 1952 and the sub-tenant is in occupation of the premises at the time when the Act of 1958 came into force. Sub-section (2) of Section 16 reiterates the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of Act of 1952 and lays down that that the sublettingafter 9th day of June, 1952 without obtaining the consent in writing ofthe landlord shall not be deemed to be lawful. It does not say that therequisite consent should be obtained before subletting the premises andthe consent obtained after subletting will not enure for the benefit of thetenant. However, sub-section (3) of Section 16 prohibits sublettingof the premises after commencement of Act of 1958 without the previous consent in writing of the landlard. It does not say that therequisite consent should be obtained before subletting the premises andthe consent obtained after subletting will not enure for the benefit of thetenant. However, sub-section (3) of Section 16 prohibits sublettingof the premises after commencement of Act of 1958 without the previous consent in writing of the landlard. The use of word previous in this sub-section shows that where it was the intention of the legislature that the consent in writing should be obtained before subletting, itsaid so specifically. The absence of the word previous in sub-section (2) shows that it was not the intention of the legislature that consent inwriting should be obtained before subletting. Before the Act of 1952a tenant could successfully show acquiescense of the landlord in subletting to escape forefeiture of tenancy. Since the absence of consentin writing by a landlord for subletting gave rise to unnecessary litigation between a landlord and a tenant, the Act of 1952 required theconsent of the landlord in writing after its commencement. The purpose seemed to be that the consent of the landlord evidenced by awriting would cut out litigation on this ground. After all a landlordcould always agree to subletting either before or after subletting of thepremises. For that reason no condition was laid down that such consent should be obtained subletting the premises. ( 11 ) MR. Gupta relies on Karam Singh Sobti s case where a passingobservation was made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that asubletting after June, 1952 without the previous consent in writing ofthe landlord was treated as un-lawful for the purposes of the Act of1958. We have gone through this judgment and we find that theirlordships were not concerned with either Section 14 (1) (b) or Section16 of the Act of 1958 or Section 13 (1) (b) of Act of 1952, when thoseobservations were made. After making a reference to Sections 16, 17and 18 of the Act of 1958 it was observed by their Lordships that theywere not concerned with the details of those provisions except to pointout that the Act of 1958 made radical changes in the matter of evictionof tenants on the ground of subletting and that a distinction was madebetween subletting before June, 1952 and subletting after that date. It was in that connection that those observations were made. It was in that connection that those observations were made. Thisjudgment did not lay down that consent in writing of the landlord forsubletting has to be obtained by a tenant before actually creating thesub-tenancy after June, 1952. ( 12 ) MR. Gupta contends that the consent given by Mst. Kalsum Bi wasillegal since it was given in consideration of the enhanced rent whichthe tenant agreed to pay, and the agreement to pay the enhanced rentwas in breach of the public policy. In this connection he refers tosections 5 and 16 (4) of the Act of 1958 which are in the followingterms: "5. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, no personshall claim or receive any rent in excess of the standard rent. notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary. (2) No person shall, in consideration of the grant, renewalor continuance of a tenancy or sub-tenancy of any premises,- (a) claim or receive the payment of any sum as premiumor pugree or claim or receive any consideration whatsoever, in cash or in kind, in addition to the rent; or (b) except with the previous permission of the Controller. claim or receive the payment of any sum exceedingone month s rent of such premises as rent in advance. "sec. 16 (4) :- "no landlord shall claim or receive the payment of anysum as premium or pugree or claim or receive any consideration whatsoever in cash or in kind for giving his consent tothe subletting of the whole or any part of the premises held bythe tenant. " ( 13 ) IT is contended that since Mst. Kalsum Bi allowed the tenant tohave the sub-tenants on the condition of the latter s agreeing to payenhanced rent in breach of these provisions the consent became illegal. The prohibition is against the person claiming or receiving in excess ofthe standard rent. There is nothing on record to show as to what wasthe standard rent of the premises and so it cannot be assumed that theincrease in rent results in any excess of the standard rent. Noticesexchanged between the parties have been REFERRED TO to by the learnedcounsel. Whereas the notice sent on behalf of the landlord allegesthat the standard rent of the premises is not less than Rs. 200. 00 permonth the reply of the tenant to this notice is that it cannot be morethan Rs. 185. 00. Noticesexchanged between the parties have been REFERRED TO to by the learnedcounsel. Whereas the notice sent on behalf of the landlord allegesthat the standard rent of the premises is not less than Rs. 200. 00 permonth the reply of the tenant to this notice is that it cannot be morethan Rs. 185. 00. But these do not in any manner show as to what thestandard rent was. Receiving payment of any amount as premium orpugree or any other consideration whatsoever, in cash or in kind, in addition to the rent in consideration of the grant, renewal or continuanceof a sub-tenancy is also prohibited. It is not the case of the appellantthat any premium or pugree was received for giving the consent. Asalready discussed the increase in rent, as long as it was not in excess ofthe standard rent, being not prohibited, could be charged from the tenant and so could not be termed illegal. Mr. Gupta has REFERRED TO io A. I. R. 1959 S. C. 689 (Woman Shriniwas KM v. Ratilal Bhagwandas andco.) where the Supreme Court while dealing with Bombay Rents,hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act found that subletting wasabsolutely prohibited and so an agreement entered into after that Acthad come into force, contrary to the provision prohibiting subletting,would be unenforceable as being in contravention of the express provision of the Act which prohibited it. The appellant cannot derive anybenefit from it. Delhi Rent Control Acts did not absolutely prohibitsubletting, in our opinion Tribunal was right in holding that the consent was not illegal since the enhanced rent did not go beyond thestandard rent of the premises. ( 14 ) THE last contention of Mr. Gupta is that the initial act of sublettingby the tenant without prior consent in writing of landlord, being illegal,subsequent consent of Mst. Kalsum Bi will not amount to a waiver ofthis ground of eviction. In this connection he refers to Sections 86and 92 of Civil Procedure Code and relies upon Mohan Chand v. Mawndra Nath, AIR 1955 Cal 442 . Thakore Saheb Khanjikashari Khanji v. Gulam Rasul Chandbhai, A. T. R. 1955. Bombay449, and Gaekwar Baroda State Railway v. Hafiz Habib Ul Hag andothers, A. T. R. 1938 PC 165 where consent given during pendencyof suit was held illegal. Mr. Thakore Saheb Khanjikashari Khanji v. Gulam Rasul Chandbhai, A. T. R. 1955. Bombay449, and Gaekwar Baroda State Railway v. Hafiz Habib Ul Hag andothers, A. T. R. 1938 PC 165 where consent given during pendencyof suit was held illegal. Mr. Kirpal has REFERRED TO to AIR 1947 P. C. 197 (Vellayan Chettiar and others v. The Government of Province ofmadras and another) where while dealing with Section 80 Civil Procedure Code itwas held that though the provisions of that section were mandatory andmust be enforced by the court, they could be waived by the authorityfor whose benefit they were provided. While dealing with Sections 8610hcd/70-7and 87 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was held that the conditioncould not be waived by the sovereign princes since the consent was to begiven by a third party who was not a party to the suit. ( 15 ) IN view of our decision that tenant could obtain the consent inwriting of the landlord under the Act of 1952, we need not decide thisquestion. ( 16 ) THE result is that appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case the parties are left to bear their own costs.