Judgment :- 1. By these petitions, two orders passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer' the first respondent to each of these petitions, which have been marked as Ext. P3. in each of these cases are sought to be set aside. By Ext. P3 order in O. P. No. 3802 of 1969 it has been directed that a record of rights in respect of 1 acre 15 cents of land in Agali Village as detailed in form V attached to that order and by Ext. P3 in O. P. No. 3803 it has been directed that in respect of 10.94 acres of lands in the same amsom as detailed in form V attached to that order, will be prepared. These orders have been passed after proceedings were commenced by the third respondent in O. P. No. 3802 and by respondents 3 and 4 in O. P. No. 3803, under S.29 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. The main complaint of the petitioner is that there has been no application of the mind by the Revenue Divisional Officer to the questions arising for determination in passing the order Ext. P3 in each of these cases and that sufficient opportunity had not been afforded to the petitioner to state or prove the petitioner's case and that the authorities acted on no material whatever in reaching the conclusion that the record of rights as in form V appended to the two orders should be prepared with respect to the lands mentioned already. 2. On a consideration of the contentions that have been raised and on a perusal of the orders, Ext. P3 in each of these cases, I feel no doubt, that there has been no application of the mind to the questions arising for determination and that there was no material before the authority in coming to the conclusion that it did and that there has been failure of the principles of natural justice. I would therefore have simply set aside the two orders and remitted the case to the proper authority who will now be the Tahsildar, Mannarghat in view of the amendment to S.29 effected by Act 35 of 1969, without saying anything more in the case. But this is hot the first time that I get orders similar to Ext. P3 in each of these cases. But this is hot the first time that I get orders similar to Ext. P3 in each of these cases. In fact a number of cases had come up before me which indicated that the matter had been disposed of without proper application of the mind to the questions arising for determination, and I am constrained to say, in a casual and perfunctory manner. I must therefore say a few words about the nature of these enquiries and what is expected of these authorities on whom powers have been conferred to create record of rights. After the amendment to S.29 the record of rights prepared under that section will be evidence in any proceeding and the burden of disproving the correctness of what is contained in the record of rights will be on the person challenging the entries in the record. This is provided by S.29 (8) which reads as follows: "29 (8) The record of rights prepared under this section shall be admissible in evidence before any court or tribunal and 2very entry in any record of rights which has become final shall until the contrary is proved be presumed to he correct." The preparation of the record of rights will therefore affect the rights of the parties to the property. 3. The provisions in S.29 have obviously been enacted with a view to protect the interests of cultivating tenants and persons who have interest in land. Many of these persons are in a more disadvantageous position than the landlords under whom they have such tenancy rights or other interests in property. It is conceivable that these rights or interests may be put an end to by landlords either by coercion or by persuasion or by other means and the section is intended to enable such persons to approach the statutory authority with a view to have a record established of their rights which cannot then be very easily brushed aside or terminated. It cannot however be ruled out that the provisions in the section are sometimes may often used deliberately, to create tenancy rights or other alleged interest in property belonging exclusively to others. This being so, it is essential that there should be a fair and a reasonably thorough enquiry in an impartial manner with a sense of detachment whenever a claim is made that a person is a cultivating tenant or has other interest in property. This being so, it is essential that there should be a fair and a reasonably thorough enquiry in an impartial manner with a sense of detachment whenever a claim is made that a person is a cultivating tenant or has other interest in property. The statute itself not only contemplates but specifically provides for such an enquiry. S.29, as it stood in sub-section (4) thereof provided that the records should be prepared in such manner as may be prescribed. The Kerala Land Reforms (Tenancy) R.1964 made provision for it in R.16 and 17. These rules were amended on the 19th December, 1966 and it is R.16 and 17 substituted by that amendment that were applicable at the time the matter was decided by the Revenue Divisional Officer, the first respondent to each of these petitions. The provisions in these rules clearly provide for notice, an opportunity being given to the parties and an enquiry being held to the claims and objections if any received. R.17 specifically so provides. This is in the nature of a quasi judicial enquiry. It will be too much to attribute to the Revenue Divisional Officer, or the Tahsildar who is now to deal with this question, the attributes of a court in the normal sense in which a court is understood. Nor perhaps would there be justification for applying the strict rules of procedure or the strict rules of evidence. Nevertheless natural justice demands that there must be an adherence to certain principles and certain fundamental aspects of evidence before determination is reached on controversial questions. I cannot do better regarding this aspect than quote from a recent judgment of the Supreme Court which has been brought to my notice by counsel appearing for the petitioner which I consider is most apt, as far as the question arising for decision in these cases is concerned. In M/s. Brareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. The workmen and others (1971 (2) Supreme Court Cases 617) the Supreme Court observed as follows: "14. An attempt is however made by the learned Advocate for the appellant to persuade us that as the evidence Act does not strictly apply the calling for of the several documents particularly after the employees were given inspection and the reference to these by the witness Ghosh in his evidence should be taken as proof thereof. An attempt is however made by the learned Advocate for the appellant to persuade us that as the evidence Act does not strictly apply the calling for of the several documents particularly after the employees were given inspection and the reference to these by the witness Ghosh in his evidence should be taken as proof thereof. The observations of Venkatrama Iyer, J., in Union of India v. Karma (1958) 2 LLJ. 259, 263-264) to which our attention was invited do not justify the submission that in labour matters where issues ate seriously contested and have to be established and proved the requirements relating to proof can be dispensed with. The case referred to above was dealing with an enquiry into the misconduct of the public servant in which he complained he was not permitted to be cross-examined. It however turned out that he was allowed to put questions and that the evidence was recorded in his presence. No doubt the procedure prescribed in the Evidence Act by first requiring his chief-examination and then to allow the delinquent to exercise his right to cross-examine him was not followed. but that 'the Enquiry officer, took upon himself to cross examine the witnesses from the very start. It was contended that this method would violate the well recognised rules of procedure. In these circumstances it was observed at page 264: "Now it was no doubt true that the evidence of the respondent and his witnesses was not taken in the mode prescribed in the Evidence Act; but that Act has no application to enquires conducted by Tribunal even though they may be judicial in character. The law requires that such Tribunals should observe rules of natural justice in the conduct of the enquiry and if they do so their decision is not liable to be impeached on the ground that the procedure followed was not in accordance with that which obtains in a Court of law". But the application of principle of natural justice does not imply that what is not evidence can be acted upon. On the other hand what it means is that no material can be relied upon to establish a contested fact which are not spoken to by persons who are competent to speak about them and are subjected to cross-examination by the party against whom they are sought to be used. On the other hand what it means is that no material can be relied upon to establish a contested fact which are not spoken to by persons who are competent to speak about them and are subjected to cross-examination by the party against whom they are sought to be used. When a document is produced in a court or a Tribunal the questions that naturally arise is if in a genuine document, what are its contents and are the statements contained therein true. When the Appellant produced the balance sheet and profit and loss account of the company, it does not by its mere production amount to a proof of it or of the truth of the entries therein. If these entries are challenged the Appellant must prove each of such entries by producing the books and speaking form the entries made therein. If a letter or other document is produced to establish some fact which is relevant to the enquiry the writer must be produced or his affidavit in respect thereof be filed and opportunity afforded to the opposite party who challenges this fact. This is both in accord with principles of natural justice as also according to the procedure under Order XIX, Civil Procedure Code and the Evidence Act both of which incorporate these general principles. Even if all technicalities of the Evidence Act are not strictly applicable except in so far as S.11 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the rules prescribed therein permit it is inconceivable that the Tribunal can act on what is not evidence such as hearsay, nor can it justify the Tribunal in basing its award on copies of documents when the originals which are in existence are not produced and proved by one of the methods either by affidavit or by witness who have executed them, if they are alive and can be produced. Again if a party wants an inspection, it is incumbent', on the Tribunal to give inspection in so far as that is relevant to the enquiry. The applicability of these principles are well recognised and admit of no doubt." 4. I will not be justified in going to the merits of the contentions on either side in these proceedings under Art.225 of the Constitution. But since I am setting aside the orders Ext. The applicability of these principles are well recognised and admit of no doubt." 4. I will not be justified in going to the merits of the contentions on either side in these proceedings under Art.225 of the Constitution. But since I am setting aside the orders Ext. P3 in each of these cases I must point out the reasons for doing so. The first contention that was raised by the petitioner in each of these petitions is that the land in question was part of a private forest. Private forest has been defined under the Act in S.2 (47). The definition is in these terms: "2 (47). 'private forests' means forests to which the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949 (Act XXVII of 1949), applies, excluding (i) areas which are waste and are not enclaves within wooded areas; (ii) areas which are gardens or nilams; (iii) areas which are planted with tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom or cinnamon; and (iv) other areas which are cultivated with pepper, arecanut, cashew or other fruit bearing trees or area cultivated with any other agricultural crop;" 5. In the order Ext. P3 in O. P. No. 3802 this contention has been rejected by saying that the land in question is a 'nilam'. It was so said though the notice Ext. P1 along with the form attached to it described the property in question as 'paramba'. In the order Ext. P3 in O. P. No. 3803 the same contention has been negatived by stating that the land in question is a 'paramba'. If the land in question is a paramba it may not fall outside the definition private forest. 6. Now, of course, different questions may arise as to whether there is any private forest at all, in view of the recent statute nationalising the private forests. Nevertheless the question will have to be considered because the statute is under challenge. I do not wish to say more on this aspect. But I have drawn attention to this aspect to point out the unsatisfactory manner in which the question had been dealt with. I must not be understood as having expressed any opinion one way or the other on the question whether the lands formed parts of a private forest or not. 7. But I have drawn attention to this aspect to point out the unsatisfactory manner in which the question had been dealt with. I must not be understood as having expressed any opinion one way or the other on the question whether the lands formed parts of a private forest or not. 7. The second contention was that a receiver had been appointed for the properties by a civil court and that therefore no proceedings should be taken without the sanction of the civil court. This contention too has not been dealt with properly. 8. Reliance had been placed on the assignment deeds taken by the third respondent in O. P. No. 3802 and the documents taken by respondents 3 and 4 in O. P. No. 3803. If statements contained in the documents were to be relied on, the persons responsible for making the statements should have been examined and an opportunity should have been given to the opposite side to cross-examine those persons. The Supreme Court decision already referred to makes this position clear. 9. I set aside the orders Ext. P3 in each of these cases. I again make it clear that nothing said in this judgment must be taken as an expression of opinion on the merits of the claims of the parties. 10. The applications will be sent to the Tahsildar, Mannarghat to be dealt with afresh. The proceedings will be commenced by issue of fresh notices and an enquiry as contemplated by the Kerala Land Reforms (Tenancy) Rules, 1970 will be held in the light of what is stated in this judgment regarding the manner in which the equity should be held. 11. These original petitions are ordered as above. There will be no order as to costs. Allowed.