JUDGMENT B.N. Lokur, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution was originally filed by Messrs. R. R. Steels and Alloys Limited, a public limited company, (hereinafter referred to as "the Company"), who hold a licence for manufacture of steel ingots. The company purchases scrap of iron and steel and after welting it with the aid of an electric are furnace, shapes the molten scrap into steel ingots. Under an agreement made with Messrs R. R. Rolling Mills, a partnership firm, (hereinafter referred to as "the firm"), the company makes over the ingots manufactured by it to the firm for rolling them into different sections of steel, namely, Rounds, Flats etc. which articles fall within the excisable goods mentioned in Tariff item 26-AA (ia) in the First Schedule to the Central Excise Act, 1944. Under that item, these articles are leviable to excise duty at the rate of Rs. 50.00 per metric tonne plus the excise duty leviable on steel ingots under Tariff item 26, which for the purpose of this petition is, Rs. 75.00 per metric tonne. Thus, these articles and other articles covered by Tariff item 26-AA (ia), (hereinafter referred to as steel products") are leviable to excise duty of Rs. 125.00 per metric tonne. 2. There are two processes for manufacture of steel products from iron and steel scrap; the scrap is straightaway re-rolled into steel products (hereinafter referred to as "re-rolling process") or the scrap is melted in art electrical are furnace and manufactured into steel ingots which are then re-rolled into steel products (hereinafter referred to as the "melting process"). 3. Certain exemptions from excise duty have been granted modified and rescinded from time to time by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, in respect of the steel products. Some of the relevant notifications have been produced as annexures to the petition and the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, who are the Union of India, the Collector of Central Excise, Allahabad, and the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Bareilly; some others were referred to at the time of the hearing of this petition. Some of the relevant notifications have been produced as annexures to the petition and the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, who are the Union of India, the Collector of Central Excise, Allahabad, and the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Bareilly; some others were referred to at the time of the hearing of this petition. Notification No. 75 of 1962 dated the 24th April, 1962, partially exempted steel ingots produced from materials specified therein, but reference is made to this notification only to be stated that the exemption was taken away by rescinding the notification on the 1st March, 1964. Another notification deserving notice is notification No. 206 of 1963, dated the 30th November, 1963, which exempted steel products from the whole of the excise duty leviable, if made from any of the following materials or a combination thereof :- (i) fresh unused re-rollable scrap on which the appropriate amount of duty of excise has already been paid, (ii) semi-finished steel including blooms, billets, slabs, sheets, bars, timbers and hoe bars, on which the appropriate amount of duty of excise has already been paid; (iii) old and used re-rollable scrap. Notification No. 63 of 1964 dated the 1st March, 1964, extended partial exemption from excise duty to steel ingots produced from fresh unused steel molten scrap. The combined effect of Notification Nos. 206 of 1963 and 63 of 1964 would be that steel products manufactured by the re-rolling process, whether from fresh unused scrap or from old and used scrap, is wholly exempt from duty while steel products manufactured by the melting process from fresh unused scrap is partially exempt from duty but steel products manufactured by the melting process from old and used scrap is not entitled to any exemption. This situation is challenged by the company on the ground that it entails arbitrary discrimination between manufacturers of steel products by the melting process (hereinafter referred to as "the melters") and manufacturers of steel products by the re-rolling process (hereinafter referred to as "the re-rollers") and also involves unfair competition between the two categories of manufacturers of steel products, resulting in an unreasonable restriction on the right of the melters to carry on business with confiscatory consequences; in other words, the company contends that the situation created by total exemption in favour of the re-rolles and denial there of to the melters is hit by Article 14, 19 (1) (g) and 31 of the Constitution. 4. It may be recalled that this petition was originally filed by the company alone. In their counter-affidavit, the respondents disputed the locus standi of the company to challenge the legality and validity of the exemption in favour of the re-rollers on the ground that the company does business of manufacturing steel ingots only and not also the business of re-rolling those ingots into steel products. In view of this objection, the company and the firm together made an application for adding the firm also as a petitioner. It was stated that under the agreement between the company and the firm, the firm exclusively re-rolls the steel ingots manufactured by the company for the company which pays to the firm the re-rolling charges and bears the entire burden of excise duty due on the steel products. This application was opposed by the respondents but for the reasons stated on the application, the proposed addition of the firm as another petitioner was allowed, whereupon the objection of the respondents to the maintainability of the petition at the instance of the company does not survive. 5. This petition was presented on the 10th August, 1967, and subsequently two Notifications were issued by the Central Government under sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules. 5. This petition was presented on the 10th August, 1967, and subsequently two Notifications were issued by the Central Government under sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules. Notifications No. 26 of 1969 dated the 1st March, 1969, exempted the steel ingots manufactured with the aid of electric are furnace, whether from old and used scrap or from fresh unused scrap: This was an extension of the partial exemption granted by Notification No. 63 of 1964 in respect of the steel products manufactured from fresh unused scrap; Notification No. 27 of 1969 of the same date exempted steel products manufactured by the melting process to the extent of duty leviable on steel ingots. The effect of these notifications is that from the 1st March, 1969, the melters had to pay a duty of Rs. 50.00 per metric tonne as against the duty of Rs. 125.00 per metric tonne as before. On the pretext of the issue of these two notifications pending this petition, the petitioners made an application for a further amendment of the petition praying for a writ of mandamus requiring the respondents to refund to the petitioners the amount of duty recovered from them. This application has been allowed in spite of opposition by the respondent. 6. The crucial question for determination is whether the situation arising from exemption of the whole of excise duty in the case of re-rollers and partial exemption from the duty given to the melters offends Articles 14, 19 (1) (g) 31 of the Constitution. 7. This application has been allowed in spite of opposition by the respondent. 6. The crucial question for determination is whether the situation arising from exemption of the whole of excise duty in the case of re-rollers and partial exemption from the duty given to the melters offends Articles 14, 19 (1) (g) 31 of the Constitution. 7. Sri Shanti Bhushan, learned counsel for the petitioners, attacked the constitutionality of the situation on the ground that the differentiation between melters and re-rollers has been made on the basis of the difference in the prices of manufacture of steel products, although identical goods are manufactured from identical raw material, namely, the scrap; it was urged that the duty is relatable to the manufacture of goods and not to the process of manufacture and that even if the raw-material used by melters is regarded as steel ingots and not scrap, the duty has to be related to the final product and not to the raw material utilised in manufacturing the product; he also contended that the burden of excise duty should be uniform on all manufacturers and if the burden is unequal or uneven on two groups manufacturing the same article, Article 14 of the Constitution is per se violated. 8. Sri T. N. Sapru, appearing for the respondents, sought to meet these arguments by contending that although fiscal statutes are not immune from Article 14, certain latitude has necessarily to be given to taxation matters following the legislative policy in regard thereto. According to him, the discrimination between the duty payable by melters and by re-rollers is reasonable, having been founded upon the price of the raw-material used by the two categories of manufacturers and the overall cost of the steel products produced by them; in this connection, it was submitted that the price of the scrap required for re-rolling (hereinafter referred to as "the re-rolling scrap") is higher than the price of scrap required for melting (hereinafter referred to as "the melting scrap") and the cost of the steel products manufactured by the melter is near about the same as the cost of manufacture of the steel products by the re-rollers. 9. 9. In support of his contention that the levy must be uniform, Sri Shanti Bhushan relied upon the following observations in the majority judgment in M/s. Shinde Brothers v. Deputy Commissioner, Raichur, A.I.R. 1967 SC 1512: "But it is not easy to decide in a particular case whether the particular levy is a levy in respect of manufacture or production of goods. It appears to us that this question has to be decided on the facts of each case, but in deciding the question certain principles must be borne in mind. Firstly, one of the essential characteristics of an excise duty is uniformity of incidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Secondly, the duty must be closely related to production or manufacture of goods." In this case, the question was whether a case imposed under the Mysore Health Care Act was in truth and substance excise duty and their Lordships laid down the requirements which have to be fulfilled in characterising a levy as a duty of excise. In my opinion, when it is stated that uniformity of incidence is an essential characteristic of an excise duty, it is not intended to mean that the burden of the levy should be uniform on every producer or manufacturer. All that was intended was that the duty of excise prescribed by the statute should be the same for an article of a specified description; had it been the further intention that a class of manufacturers could not be exempted wholly or partially from the prescribed rate of duty, the provision of sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules enabling the Central Government to grant exemptions would-be unconstitutional but provisions for such exemptions have been considered by the Supreme Court in several cases and have not been struck down as transgressing Article 14; such provisions are challenged on the ground of excessive delegation or on the ground that they have been used arbitrarily. See, for example, British India Corporation Ltd. v. Collector, Central Excise, Allahabad, A.I.R. 1963 SC 104 and Oriental Weaving Mills (P) v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1963 SC 98. See, for example, British India Corporation Ltd. v. Collector, Central Excise, Allahabad, A.I.R. 1963 SC 104 and Oriental Weaving Mills (P) v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1963 SC 98. It is not in my opinion necessary that the burden of excise duty should be even and uniform on all manufacturers and it is permissible for the Central Government under sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules to grant exemptions to a particular class of manufacturers wholly or partially for good and sufficient reasons. 10. It is indisputable that fiscal provisions can be subjected to the touchstone of Article 14, but nevertheless they are distinguishable to some extent in this regard from the provisions of ordinary laws. In the case of Orient Weaving Mills (P) Ltd. the Supreme Court observed : "The Act (Central Excise and Salt Act) recognises and only gives effect to the well established principle that there must be a great deal of flexibility in the incidence of taxation of a particular kind. It must very from time to time, as also in respect of goods produced by different processes and different agencies. The same principle has been recognised in Sec. 23 of the Sea Customs Act (VIII of 1878), which has been applied to excise duty also, by virtue of Sec. 12 of the Act. The latter section has authorised the Central Government to apply the provisions of the Sea Customs Act to excise duty imposed by the Act, with such modifications and alterations as it may consider necessary or desirable to adopt them to circumstances. It is a function of the State, in order to raise revenue for State purposes, to determine what kind of taxes shall be levied and in what manner. Its function, therefore, is to raise revenue for public purpose. The State naturally is interested in raising all the revenue necessary for public purposes, without sacrificing the legitimate interests of persons and groups, who deserve special treatment at the hands of the State for reasons, which the State may determine, entitling them to be placed in a special class." (Paragraph 8). In that case the exemption granted to cotton fabrics produced by Co-operative Societies and in the case of British India Corporation Ltd. the exemption granted to small manufacturers of footwear were held protected. 11. In that case the exemption granted to cotton fabrics produced by Co-operative Societies and in the case of British India Corporation Ltd. the exemption granted to small manufacturers of footwear were held protected. 11. In Khandige Sham Bhat v. Agricultural Income Tax Officer, A.I.R. 1963 SC 591 the Supreme Court observed : "If there is equality and uniformity within each group, the law will not be condemned as discriminative, though due to some fortuitous circumstances arising out of a peculiar situation some included in a class get an advantage over others, so long as they are not singled out for special treatment Taxation law is not an exception to this doctrine...... But in the application of the principles, the courts, in view of the inherent complexity of fiscal adjustment of diverse elements, permit a larger discretion to the Legislature in the matter of classification, so long as it adheres to the fundamental principles underlying the said doctrine. The power to classify is of `wide range and flexibility' so that it can adjust its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways." (Paragraph 7) . It is further observed : "It is true taxation law cannot claim immunity from the equality clause of the Constitution. The Taxation statute shall not also be arbitrary and oppressive but at the same time the Court cannot for obvious reasons meticulously scrutinise the impact of its burden on different persons or interests." (Paragraph 10) . Similar observations appear also in Venugopala Ravi Varma v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1969 SC 1094. It is said : "Equal protection clause of the Constitution does not enjoin equal protection of the laws as abstract propositions. Laws being the expression of legislative will intended to solve specific problems or to achieve definite objectives by specific remedies, absolute equality or uniformity of treatment is impossible of achievement. Again tax laws are aimed at dealing with complex problems of infinite variety necessitating adjustment of several disparate elements. The Courts accordingly admit, subject to adherence to the fundamental principles of the doctrine of equality, a larger play to legislative discretion in the matter of classification. The power to classify may be exercised so as to adjust the system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways: the Legislature may select persons, properties, transactions and objects, and apply different methods and even rates for tax, if the Legislature does so reasonably. The power to classify may be exercised so as to adjust the system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways: the Legislature may select persons, properties, transactions and objects, and apply different methods and even rates for tax, if the Legislature does so reasonably. Protection of the equality clause does not predicate a mathematically precise or logically complete or symmetrical classification; it is not a condition of the guarantee of equal protection that all transactions, properties, objects or persons of the same genus must be affected by it or none at all. If the classification is rational, the Legislature is free to choose objects of taxation, impose different rates, exempt classes of property for taxation, subject to different classes of property to tax in different ways and adopt different modes of assessment. A taxing statute may contravene Article 14 of the Constitution if it seeks to impose on the same class of property, persons transactions or occupations similarly situate, incidence of taxation, which leads to obvious inequality. A taxing statute is not, therefore, exposed to attack on the ground of discrimination merely because different rates of taxation are prescribed for different categories of persons, transactions, occupations or objects." (Paragraph 14). 12. Epari Chinna Krishna Moorthy v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1964 SC 1581 in a case in which exemption in favour of persons who produce gold ornaments themselves or run manufacturies with artisans or engage them for producing them is upheld vis-a-vis traders or shop-keepers who are like commission Agents, give gold to the artisans, pay them labour charges and charge commission for the ornaments so produced and sold to the customers. 13. The decisions of the Supreme Court indicate that taxation provisions enjoy a certain amount of liberty and latitude, some elasticity and flexibility, some discretion and discrimination, with the object of making necessary fiscal adjustments in a complex field and protecting or promoting the interests of deserving classes. The taxation scheme cannot be weighed with golden scales and uneveness and inequality of incidence of taxation is inherent in a system bristling with a variety of problems. The taxation scheme cannot be weighed with golden scales and uneveness and inequality of incidence of taxation is inherent in a system bristling with a variety of problems. This is not to say that it is permissible to favour one group and frown upon another group similarly situate, but distinction can be made between two like groups for reasons which the taxing authority in its wisdom and judgment considers good and sufficient and the advantage given to one group over the other cannot be meticulously scrutinized. 14. In the counter-affidavit of the respondents the reasons for the total exemption to the re-rollers are not set out at one place, although paragraph 14 purports to narrate the Considerations for granting the exemption. In that paragraph the only consideration worth noting is that if exemption were not to be granted to the small re-rollers their competitive position would have been adversely affected because of the observance of excise formalities and that the collection of a small amount of revenue from a large number of re-rollers spread all over would not have been commensurate with the cost of collection and administrative effort involved. But this is not a sound reason as the benefit of the exemption is available not only to the small re-rollers but to all re-rollers, big or small. In other paragraphs of the counter-affidavit, however, it has been asserted that the scrap used for melting is a cheaper material while the scrap used for re-rolling is very much high-priced (see paragraphs 3, 6, 13, 17, 23 and 24 of the counter-affidavit) . The petitioners, on the other hand, aver that there is no distinction between the two categories of scrap and all scraps can be used both for melting and for re-rolling; it is further urged that the price of scrap for re-rolling is not "always higher than the price of the scrap for melting". Although the petitioners have produced certain quotations regarding the price of melting scrap, they have not made available the price of re-rolling scrap; the rejoinder-affidavit itself significantly seems to suggest that there are two kinds of scrap known as melting scrap and re-rolling scrap (vide paragraphs 7 and 11) . Although the petitioners have produced certain quotations regarding the price of melting scrap, they have not made available the price of re-rolling scrap; the rejoinder-affidavit itself significantly seems to suggest that there are two kinds of scrap known as melting scrap and re-rolling scrap (vide paragraphs 7 and 11) . The respondents have contended that the price of the steel products manufactured from that processes is `nearabout' the same taking into consideration the exemptions; according to them, the exemption in favour of re-rollers tends to bring out a parity in the price of finished products manufactured by the re-rollers and those manufactured by the melters-a claim which is disputed by the petitioners. 15. In the absence of sufficient material to determine the comparative price of re-rolling scrap vis-a-vis the price of melting scrap and in the absence of material to determine the cost of manufacturing by the two processes, it is difficult to come to any conclusion that the basis on which the total exemption is given to re-rollers is as alleged by the petitioners, unreasonable. It is well-settled that there is a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutionality guaranteed (vide, for example, Moti Dass v. S.P. Sahil, A.I.R. 1959 SC 942 at 947. When the respondents explained in the counter-affidavit the reasons for giving special treatment to the re-rollers on the ground of the high price of re-rolling scrap and the overall cost of the finished products, it was incumbent upon the petitioners to destroy the sufficiency of the reasons by placing before the Court the facts and figures relating to this ground. They not having done so cannot be held to have established that the special treatment given to the re-rollers is obnoxious to the doctrine of equal protection of laws. Abuse of the power to exempt conferred on the Central Government cannot be easily assumed. 16. In the view I take, the petitioners are not entitled to any relief on the basis that the total exemption in favour of the re-rollers is repugnant to Article 14. It follows that the other objections to the exemption under Article 19(1) (g) and Article 31, which are by way of corollary to the objection under Article 14, also cannot be upheld in the circumstances. 17. It follows that the other objections to the exemption under Article 19(1) (g) and Article 31, which are by way of corollary to the objection under Article 14, also cannot be upheld in the circumstances. 17. The question of the refund of the duty paid also does not survive. It may, however, in this connection be mentioned that the petitioners can take advantage of the two Notifications of 1969 only for the period from and after 1st March, 1969, the date of the Notifications, and not for any prior period. 18. The result is that no relief can be given to the petitioners in this petition which is, therefore, dismissed. No order as to costs.