ORDER E.K. Moidu, J. 1. The simple question that arises for determination in this Civil Revision petition is whether a compromise entered in execution proceeding by which the execution is postponed either in part or in whole on an undertaking given by the judgment debtor for removing any obstruction in order to give delivery of property in accordance with the decree is enforceable in the execution proceeding itself or not. This question came up for consideration before the District Judge, Trichur in Rent Control Revision Petition No. 12/69. The executing court held that the compromise is liable to be considered in execution; but the District Judge held a contrary view. Hence the revision petition. 2. The revision petitioner was a tenant of Room No. 1101 on the ground floor of a double-storeyed building in Trichur under the respondent. The respondent got him evicted out of the room for the purpose of reconstruction in August, 1965. Under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1965, the respondent was obliged to restore possession of the room after its reconstruction. The respondent however did not give back possession of the room to the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner made an application to the Rent Controller to get back possession of the room. The Rent Controller passed the order to the following effect: "The landlord would put the petitioner in possession of an extent in the reconstructed building equal to that he was in occupation before he was evicted by order of this Court". The respondent pursued all the remedies available to him ' under the Act going up to the High Court to get this order vacated. But, he failed in his attempt. Finally, the petitioner moved the Rent Controller in execution on 16-2-68 for redelivery of the room. The rent Controller allowed that petition. But, when the Amin went to the spot on 20-2-68, he found that the entrance to the room was blocked on account of a common steel shutter fitted up in frontage of the adjacent room and major portion of the room which was to be delivered over to the petitioner. The respondent was also found to be in possession of the adjacent room. The respondent was also found to be in possession of the adjacent room. However, between the petitioner and the respondent there was compromise as per a joint statement to the effect that the respondent shall remove the shutter obstructing entry into the petitioner's room within a month from that date. The Amin, therefore, effected delivery of the room, but he produced the joint statement in court with the report that the room could be delivered only on condition that the respondent shall remove the shutter which obstructed the passage into the petitioner's room. The court, therefore, ordered that the delivery had been given and the execution petition was, therefore, dismissed. But, the respondent did not remove the shutter on the basis of the undertaking made by him in the joint statement. So, on 5-4-69 the petitioner filed an application again to the Rent Controller directing the respondent to remove the shutter and in the alternative permitting the petitioner himself to remove the same. The revision petitioner's application was allowed by the Rent Controller, but that order was set aside by the revisional authority. 3. It is admitted that on 20-2-68 the respondent entered into a compromise with the petitioner to the effect that he shall remove the shutter which caused obstruction to the petitioner's entry into the room which was to be delivered to him. Though the delivery of the room was effected on that date, the petitioner was not in a position to conduct trade in that room as there was a common shutter fitted up p both to the petitioner's room as well as the respondent's room. The respondent agreed to remove that obstacle within a month from that date. The question that arises is whether the removal of the shutter causing an obstruction to the petitioner's room could be agitated under S.47 C.P. C in execution or whether it is necessary for the petitioner to institute a separate suit to establish his rights on the basis of the compromise entered into between him and the respondent. 4. It is well settled that if the parties vary the decree intending to create fresh liabilities, then the old decree comes to an end and a new contract comes into being. There after, the new contract has to be enforced by a suit and it cannot be enforced in execution. 4. It is well settled that if the parties vary the decree intending to create fresh liabilities, then the old decree comes to an end and a new contract comes into being. There after, the new contract has to be enforced by a suit and it cannot be enforced in execution. But, if no new contract is brought about and only a mode is provided for the discharge of the liability under the decree, then the decree H subsists and could be executed subject to the law of Limitation. This is the principle which was laid down as early as in Oudh Commercial Bank, Ltd., Fyzabad v Thakurain Bind Basni Kuer and other, AIR 1939 Privy Council 80. The law is stated as follows: "The Code contains no general restriction of the parties' liberty of contract with reference to their rights and obligations under the decree. In the absence of express statutory authority it is not possible to regard 0.20 R.10 as excluding any possibility of the parties coming to a valid agreement for time to which the Court under S.47 will have regard. If it appears to the Court, acting under S.47, that the true effect of the agreement was to discharge the decree forthwith in consideration of certain promises by the debtor, then no doubt the Court will not have occasion to enforce the agreement in execution proceedings but will leave the creditor to bring a separate suit upon the contract. If, on the other hand, the agreement is intended to govern the liability of the debtor under the decree and to have effect upon the time or manner of its enforcement, it is a matter to be dealt with under S.47. In such a case to say that the creditor may perhaps have a separate suit is to misread the Code, which by requiring all such matters to be dealt with in execution discloses a broader view or the scope and functions of an executing Court." 5. This view has been followed in Jai Lal Sheo Chand v. Bhu Dev Bhola Singh, AIR 1956 Punjab 256. That was a case where an eviction order was passed by the Rent Controller against the judgment debtor to the effect that he shall surrender possession of the building to the landlord on or before 4-11-52. This view has been followed in Jai Lal Sheo Chand v. Bhu Dev Bhola Singh, AIR 1956 Punjab 256. That was a case where an eviction order was passed by the Rent Controller against the judgment debtor to the effect that he shall surrender possession of the building to the landlord on or before 4-11-52. But, on that date, the judgment debtor paid some amount to the landlord who in his turn permitted the judgment debtor to be in possession of the premises till March, 1953. The true effect of the agreement was considered in that decision. It was held that the true effect of the agreement was not to discharge the decree forthwith in consideration of certain promises made by the judgment debtor; on the contrary the agreement was intended to govern the liability of the judgment debtor under the decree and to have effect upon the time or manner of its enforcement. In that view of the matter, the landlord in that case was justified in seeking out execution of the decree for the eviction on the failure of the judgment debtor to vacate the premises by March 1953. 6. But, a discordant note was struck in a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in Maharaj Kumar Mahmud Hassan Khan v. Moti Lal Banker, AIR 1961 All. 1 . That decision has been overruled by the Supreme Court in a decision reported in Moti Lal v Md. Hassan Khan AIR 1968 SC 1087 . The Supreme Court held as follows: "It is open to the parties to enter into a compromise with reference to their rights and obligations under a decree. There is nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure which prevents the parties from entering into such a compromise. If the compromise amounts to an adjustment of the decree, it must be recorded under 0.21, R.2 and if not so recorded, it cannot be recognised by any Court executing the decree. The compromise of May 29, 1954 was so recorded within the prescribed period of limitation. The compromise was a fair bargain to postpone the execution of the decree on payment of reasonable interest. The terms of the compromise related to the execution of the decree. The compromise of May 29, 1954 was so recorded within the prescribed period of limitation. The compromise was a fair bargain to postpone the execution of the decree on payment of reasonable interest. The terms of the compromise related to the execution of the decree. The executing Court has power to determine all questions arising between the parties to the suit relating to the execution of the decree and to give appropriate relief on such determination. Exclusive power to determine such questions is given to the executing Court by S.47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The executing Court can determine all questions relating to the agreement postponing the execution of the decree." 7. On the basis of the above finding, it is clear that in the instant case there was no new contract between the petitioner and the respondent with regard to the removal of the obstruction which was caused to the room to be delivered over to the petitioner. The removal of the obstruction to the room to be delivered to the petitioner was only a mode provided for the discharge of the liability under the decree There was no new contract between the petitioner and the respondent pertaining to the future tenancy between the petitioner and the respondent. The liability under the order passed by the Rent Controller subsisted as long as the respondent did not give effect to the delivery of the property to the petitioner. It is not argued that the claim is barred by the law of Limitation. Under these circumstances, I find that the learned District Judge was not right in holding that the compromise in question could not be agitated in execution under S.47 C. P. C. On the contrary, on the facts and circumstances of the present case, I find that the Rent Controller was correct in permitting the matter to be agitated in execution. The point is, therefore, found in favour of the revision petitioner and in the affirmative. 8. In the result, the revision petition is allowed. The order of the District Judge is set aside and the order of the Rent Controller, Trichur is restored. I make no order as to costs.