Judgment B.N.Jha, J. 1. As complicated questions of law were involved, the case was referred to a Division Bench. Hence, it has been placed before us. 2. There is no dispute in this case that Lal Bahadur Choudhary (defendant No. 1) borrowed a sum of Rs. 3,500.00 from the plaintiff and in token thereof he executed a handnote on November 1, 1955, stipulating to pay interest at the rate of one per cent. per month. A suit for recovery of the aforesaid sum, namely, Rs. 3,500.00 together with the interest amounting to Rs. 2,537/8/- was instituted on November 16, 1961. The suit apparently is barred by limitation, but the limitation is tried to be saved by the plaintiff on the ground that defendant No. 1 executed a fresh handnote on October 27, 1958 and, as such, fresh period of limitation started from that date. The Civil Courts were closed for the annual Vacation from October 9 to November 15, 1961 and re-opened on November 16, 1961, and hence the suit was filed on the reopening day. It may be stated here that the plaintiff had brought the suit originally on the basis of the handnote dated October 27, 1958 but subsequently, he got the plaint amended and the suit, as it stands at present, is for the recovery of the loan of Rs. 3,500.00 taken on the basis of the previous handnote dated November 1, 1955 and interest from that date till the date of the institution of the suit at one per cent. per month is sought to be recovered on the aforesaid sum of Rs. 3,500/-. 3. The defence in this case was that (i) the suit was barred by limitation; (ii) the loan under the handnote dated November 1, 1955 was paid off long before the handnote of October 27, 1958 when a fresh loan of Rs. 4,700/-was taken and, subsequently, the dues under this handnote were also paid off by executing another handnote, but the handnote dated October 27, 1958 was not returned to the defendants and (iii) that the suit is not maintainable under the provisions of Sec. 4 of the Bihar Money Lenders Act, as the plaintiff was not a registered money lender. 4. Before the trial court the plea of payment failed. 4. Before the trial court the plea of payment failed. In the opinion of the trial court, the handnote (Exhibit 1/a) dated October 27, 1958 was not executed on account of the dues of the hand-note of November 1, 1955 but it was executed for a fresh loan and as such the handnote of October 27, 1958 could not be regarded as an acknowledgment of the dues under the handnote in suit and as such the suit was held to be barred by limitation. The defence regarding the bar of Section 4 of the Bihar Money Lenders Act to the maintainability of the suit was not pressed at the time of hearing of the suit perhaps in view of the fact that the plaintiff had filed the registration certificate (Exhibit 4). On the above findings, the suit was dismissed. In the lower appellate court, when the hearing of the appeal was about to be concluded , an application was filed by the appellant on July 18, 1966 stating that if for any reason the handnote dated October 27, 1958 (Exhibit 1/a) could not be treated as an acknowledgement of the original handnote of November 1, 1955 (Exhibit 1), then a decree may be passed in favour of the plaintiff-appellant on the basis of the handnote of October 27, 1958, on the materials on the record. The lower appellate court disbelieved the story of payment so far as the dues under the handnote in suit was concerned and held that as the handnote (Exhibit 1/a) dated October 27, 1958, was executed in respect of the dues of the handnote (Ext.1) dated November 1, 1955 no fresh consideration passed at the time of the execution of the second handnote (Exhibit 1/a). In the view of the lower appellate court, the handnote (Exhibit 1/a) could not be regarded as an acknowledgement of the dues under the handnote (Exhibit 1). Therefore, the suit on the basis of the handnote (Exhibit 1) dated November 1, 1955, was held to be barred by limitation. In the view of the lower appellate court, the handnote (Exhibit 1/a) could not be regarded as an acknowledgement of the dues under the handnote (Exhibit 1). Therefore, the suit on the basis of the handnote (Exhibit 1) dated November 1, 1955, was held to be barred by limitation. Though the plea of bar of Section 4 of the Bihar Money Lenders Act was not pressed at the time of the hearing of the suit before the trial court, but perhaps in view of the application of the plaintiff-appellant dated July 18, 1966, the lower appellate court allowed this plea to be raised if the handnote dated October 27, 1958 (Exhibit 1/a) could be regarded as the basis of the suit, and in that view, the lower appellate court has held that if the basis of the suit is the second handnote (Exhibit 1/a), it must be held to be a loan, though notional, within the meaning of Sec. 4 of the Bihar Money Lenders Act, and as the plaintiff did not hold any money lending licence, the suit was hit by the aforesaid Section 4. In any view of the matter, the appellate court held that the plaintiffs suit could not succeed and, therefore, the plaintiffs appeal was dismissed. Hence, he has come up to this Court. 5. In this case much confusion has been created by the plaintiff himself- Originally, the plaintiff brought the suit on the basis of the hand-note dated October 27, 1958 (Exhibit 1/a), the principal being Rs. 4,700.00 and interest, Rs. 1,692/-. Thus, the claim was for recovery of Rs. 6,392/-. Before the written statement by the defendants was filed in the case, the plaintiff got his plaint amended by order No. 26 dated February 11, 1963. He changed the cause of action for the suit and based his claim on the footing of the handnote dated November 1, 1955 (Exhibit 1), the principal being Rs. 3,500/-, He further alleged that when the aforesaid loan of Rs. 3,500.00 dated November 1, 1955 was going to be barred, defendant No. 1 agreed to change the hand note as Karta of his joint family and executed a fresh handnote for a sum of Rs. 4,700.00 in respect of the previous handnote. The claim was also amended. The principal was mentioned as Rs. 3,500.00 and Rs. 3,500.00 dated November 1, 1955 was going to be barred, defendant No. 1 agreed to change the hand note as Karta of his joint family and executed a fresh handnote for a sum of Rs. 4,700.00 in respect of the previous handnote. The claim was also amended. The principal was mentioned as Rs. 3,500.00 and Rs. 2,537/8/- as interest from November 1, 1955 to November 16, 1961 and the total claim was reduced from Rs. 6,392/- to Rs. 6,037/8/-. Defendants Nos. 1 and 6 filed written statement on August 19, 1963, alleging that the dues under the handnote dated November 1. 1955 (Exhibit 1) had been paid off by them, long before October 27, 1958 but the hand note was not returned. They denied the story that in lieu of the consideration of the previous hand note, defendant No. 1 executed another hand note on October 27, 1958 for a fresh advance. Various other defences were also raised which need not be considered at this stage. Therefore, on the pleadings of the parties, the issue before the court was whether the dues under the hand-note (Exhibit 1) had been paid by the defendants and a fresh advance was given to them by the plaintiff on October 27. 1958 under the handnote (Exhibit 1/a) or the handnote dated October 27, 1958 was executed for the consideration of the previous handnote (Exhibit 1). The court of appeal below has disbelieved the story of the defence regarding plea of payment and has held that no fresh advance was made on October 27, 1958 at the time of the execution of the second handnote (Exhibit 1/a). 6. The case has got to be decided on the pleadings of the parties and the issue raised therein. It is nobodys case that the dues under the previous hand note merged into the dues of the subsequent hand note and the consideration under the subsequent hand note, therefore, became a fresh loan. After amendment of the plaint, the court had only to decide whether the dues of the previous handnote had been paid off by the defendants or not and, if not paid whether the suit was barred by law of limitation. The trial court negatived the plea of payment but held the suit to be barred by limitation. After amendment of the plaint, the court had only to decide whether the dues of the previous handnote had been paid off by the defendants or not and, if not paid whether the suit was barred by law of limitation. The trial court negatived the plea of payment but held the suit to be barred by limitation. At the appellate stage, the plaintiff-appellant filed an application to the effect that if the hand-note dated October 27, 1958 could not be treated as an acknowledgment of the original hand-note dated November 1, 1955, the latter handnote (Exhibit 1/a) be treated as the basis of the suit as renewing the past liability under the hand note dated November 1, 1955. The appellate court allowed the new case to be made, out by the plaintiff and has held that in that case Sec. 4 of the Bihar Money Lenders Act is a bar to the maintainability of the suit. In my opinion, the court of appeal below should not have allowed the appellant to fall back upon the second hand-note as the basis of the suit, as an alternative case. As stated above, the plaintiff had originally based his claim on the second hand note (Exhibit 1/a) dated October 27, 1958 as a fresh advance but got his plaint amended and the plaint as it stands, the basis of the claim of the plaintiff is the first hand note (Exhibit 1) dated November 1, 1955. If the case as set up in the lower appellate Court is allowed to be made, the plaintiff is allowed to make out a third case which was never put forward at the trial even, as an alternative case. This procedure is not permissible under the law. Therefore, the question as to whether Sec. 4 of the Bihar Money Lenders Act is a bar to the maintainability of the suit loses much of its importance in view of the pleadings of the parties and the findings arrived at by the trial Court. But since the appellate court has considered this aspect of the matter and the point was much canvassed at the Bar, it is necessary to deal with this aspect. 7. But since the appellate court has considered this aspect of the matter and the point was much canvassed at the Bar, it is necessary to deal with this aspect. 7. The relevant provision of Sec. 4 of the Bihar Money Lenders (Regulation of Transactions) Act, 1939, (Bihar Act 7 of 1939), hereinafter referred to as the Act, reads as follows:- - "No Court shall entertain a suit by a money lender for the recovery of a loan advanced by him after the commencement of this Act unless such money-lender was registered under the Bihar Money-Lenders Act, 1938 at the time when such loan was advanced......" The aforesaid section bars a suit for the recovery of the loan if the plaintiff was not a registered moneylender at the time when such loan was advanced. Therefore, the crucial time for holding the money-lenders licence is the time when the loan for recovery of which the suit is brought, was advanced. The present suit, according to the plaint, is for the recovery of the loan of Rs. 3,500.00 together with interest under hand note (Exhibit 1) dated November 1, 1955. The plaintiff produced money-lenders licence (Exhibit 4) at the trial which shows that the plaintiff was a registered money-lender and, hence, perhaps the issue was not pressed. 8. As discussed above, the hand note (Exhibit 1/a) dated October 27, 1958 could not be regarded as the basis of the loan for recovery of which the suit was brought in view of the case of the plaintiff himself. In Mahasukh Ram Seth V/s. Sheo Prasad Seth. 1965 BLJR 247, the plaintiff had brought a suit for recovery of Rs. 7288/6/- on the basis of a hand note dated February 12, 1950 which included previous dues of Rs. 6688/6/- and Rs. 600.00 as a fresh advance made by the plaintiff on the date of the execution of the fresh hand note on that date, the plaintiff held a money-lenders licence though he had no licence on the date when the previous dues had been advanced under another handnote. 6688/6/- and Rs. 600.00 as a fresh advance made by the plaintiff on the date of the execution of the fresh hand note on that date, the plaintiff held a money-lenders licence though he had no licence on the date when the previous dues had been advanced under another handnote. The Division Bench of this Court, in view of the pleadings of the parties, held that the hand note dated February 12, 1950, which was the basis of the suit, was the loan within the meaning of Sec. 4 of the Act and as the plaintiff held money-lenders licence on the date the hand-note was executed, the suit was not barred under Sec. 4 of the Act. Similar was a case before the Supreme Court in Jiwanlal Achariya V/s. Rameshwarlal Agarwalla, AIR 1967 SC 1118 . In that case also the basis of the suit was the subsequent promissory note renewing the past liability arising out of the earlier advance. As the plaintiff held moneylenders licence on the date when the subsequent promissory note, which was the basis of the suit, was executed, the suit was not held to be barred under Section 4 of the Act as the promissory note in suit was held to be a loan within the meaning of Sec. 4 of the Act. Therefore, in each case it has got to be examined as to what was the basis of the suit and in that view, the maintainability of the suit under Sec. 4 of the Act has got to be considered. In the present case the basis of the suit is the hand-note dated November 1, 1955 (Exhibit 1) and not the hand-note dated October 27, 1958 (Exhibit 1/a) and, therefore, the question to be answered is whether the plaintiff held money lenders licence on NoV/s. 1, 1965 and not on October 27, 1958. As the plaintiff was a registered money-lender on November 1, 1955, the suit is not barred under Section 4 of the Act. 9. Now the next question that arises for consideration is as to whether the suit was barred by limitation. The hand-note in suit was executed on November 1, 1955 and the suit was filed on November 16, 1961. As the plaintiff was a registered money-lender on November 1, 1955, the suit is not barred under Section 4 of the Act. 9. Now the next question that arises for consideration is as to whether the suit was barred by limitation. The hand-note in suit was executed on November 1, 1955 and the suit was filed on November 16, 1961. Therefore, under Article 73 of the Indian Limitation Act, the suit was apparently barred because it provided three years limitation for institution of a suit in case of a promissory note from the date of its execution. The plaintiff alleged in his plaint that when the hand-note in suit was going to be barred, defendant No. 1 requested the plaintiff to get a fresh hand-note executed in lieu of the debt under the hand-note in suit. The plaintiff agreed to it and the defendant, as karta of his joint family, executed the hand-note on October 27, 1958 in respect of the principal and the interest of the previous hand-note. The plaintiff contended that the limitation was saved by the execution of a fresh hand-note by defendant No. 1 on October 27, 1958 which was within three years from the date of the execution of the hand-note in suit and by execution of the second hand-note the defendant acknowledged the debt of the plaintiff in respect of the hand-note in suit. It is well settled that a creditor can bring a suit for recovery of even a barred debt if there is a clear promise to pay in writing under Sec.25 of the Contract Act which gives a fresh cause of action to the creditor and fresh period of limitation starts from that date. If the debt is not barred but before the expiration of such period of limitation prescribed for a suit for the recovery of the debt, acknowledgement of liability in respect of the debt is made in writing and signed by the debtor, a fresh period of limitation starts under Sec.19 (old) of the Limitation Act. In this case, the second hand-note was executed before expiration of three years of the execution of the hand-note in suit which is the period prescribed for the recovery of the debt under Article 73 of the Limitation Act. In this case, the second hand-note was executed before expiration of three years of the execution of the hand-note in suit which is the period prescribed for the recovery of the debt under Article 73 of the Limitation Act. Learned Counsel for the respondents contended that the second hand-note could not be regarded as an acknowledgement of the debt under the previous hand-note. This contention has prevailed before the two courts below. The trial Court held that the second hand-note was not taken in respect of the dues of the first hand-note but for a fresh cash consideration but the lower appellate court came to a finding that at the time of the execution of the hand-note dated October 27, 1958, no fresh consideration passed but it was executed in respect of the debt of the hand-note in suit. In his opinion, however, there was nothing in the hand-note to indicate that the defendant No. 1 acknowledged the liability which must clearly appear from the terms of the writing itself, as the second hand-note stated that it was executed for a cash consideration of Rs. 4700/-. For this conclusion, the lower appellate court relied upon a Bench decision of this court in Ram Dular Das V/s. Jamuna Dhar Jha, 1958 BLJR 792 = ( AIR 1959 Pat 69 ). The Court below has observed as follows:- - "In that case it has been held that by virtue of Explanation 1 to Sec.19 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 , it is not the requirement of a valid acknowledgement that the exact nature of the property or right acknowledged should be specified. Nonetheless, the property or right in respect of which the admission of liability is made must be sufficiently deducible from the document relied upon. Whether or not the admission of liability relates to the property or right in suit depends upon the construction of documents containing such acknowledgement. The cardinal principles of a construction of the document is that the meaning sought to be put upon it must be ascertainable from the language used in it and the surrounding circumstances should not be considered unless the meaning be doubtful. Applying the said principle, the second hand-note dated 27-10-1958 for Rs. 4700.00 (Exhibit 1/a) cannot be said to be an acknowledgement of the first hand-note dated 1-11-1955 for Rs. Applying the said principle, the second hand-note dated 27-10-1958 for Rs. 4700.00 (Exhibit 1/a) cannot be said to be an acknowledgement of the first hand-note dated 1-11-1955 for Rs. 3500/-(Exhibit 1) within the meaning of Sec.19 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 for the simple reason that in the said second hand-note there is absolutely no reference whatsoever of the said first hand-note. That being so, if the plaintiff bases his suit on the first hand-note dated 1-11-1955 for Rs. 3500/-(Exhibit 1), as he has done after amending the plaint, then the plaintiffs suit must be held to be barred by limitation. This point is decided accordingly." I apprehend that the learned Additional District Judge did not appreciate the law correctly on the point. 10 The relevant portion of the provisions under Sec.19 of the Limitation Act of 1908 may be quoted here and it reads thus: "19 (1). Where, before the expiration of the period prescribed for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgement of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by some person through whom he derives title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgement was so signed. (2) Where the writing containing the acknowledgement is undated, oral evidence may be given of the time when it was signed; but, subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (I of 1872), oral evidence of its contents shall not be received. Explanation I.-- For the purposes of this section an acknowledgement may be sufficient though it omits to specify the exact nature of the property or right, or avers that the time for payment, delivery, performance or enjoyment has not yet come, or is accompanied by a refusal to pay, deliver, perform or permit to enjoy, or is coupled with a claim to set-off, or is addressed to a person other than the person entitled to the property or right." The learned Additional District Judge appears to be of the opinion that the question whether the second hand-note would be regarded as an acknowledgement of the dues under the previous hand-note, would depend upon the language of the document itself. As the second hand-note does not absolutely refer to the previous hand-note, no evidence is admissible to ascertain the meaning of the second hand-note as the language of the second hand-note was quite clear. Hence, in his opinion, the second hand-note could not be regarded as an acknowledgment of the debt under the hand-note in suit. The learned Additional District Judge has not taken into consideration the whole law on the subject. It is true that the intention of the parties must be gathered from the document itself if there be any document. It is also correct that where the language is quite clear no other evidence or surrounding circumstances will have to be taken to gather the intention of the parties, even if there be patent ambiguity in the document. But when the language is clear but the statement does not refer to the existing facts or circumstances, the question of latent ambiguity arises and in that case, under Section 95 of the Evidence Act, oral evidence or circumstances are admissible to clarify the meaning of the document. In the present case, the second hand-note recites that it is being executed for a cash consideration of Rs. 4700.00 but the learned Additional District Judge himself has found that the second hand-note was not executed for a fresh cash consideration but in lieu of the previous dues of the hand-note in suit. Therefore, it is a clear case of a latent ambiguity and for the construction of the hand-note, oral evidence and circumstances will have to be taken into consideration. The law on this point has been very clearly laid down by Meredith J. in Md. Murtaza V/s. Abdul Rahman, ILR 27 Pat 122 = (AIR 1949 Pat 364) where his Lordship made the following observations:- - "Where the ambiguity is latent, the terms of the document are perfectly clear and unambiguous in themselves. No ambiguity can become apparent until they are considered in relation to existing facts. For example, taking that given in the Evidence Act, if the document says. "I sell my house in Calcutta", but it is shown that I have no house in Calcutta, but I have a house in Howarah, evidence is admissible to show that the house in Howrah was meant. For example, taking that given in the Evidence Act, if the document says. "I sell my house in Calcutta", but it is shown that I have no house in Calcutta, but I have a house in Howarah, evidence is admissible to show that the house in Howrah was meant. It is clear from this that evidence to contradict or vary the recitals is admissible in such a case, because it is only by contradicting the recital that the ambiguity can be made apparent. That is a case where the correctness of the recital is in issue; and evidence is admissible to show it is incorrect, not for the direct purpose of making an inference as to intention, but for the purpose of making the ambiguity apparent. Once the ambiguity has been made apparent in this way, then external evidence can be left in and considered to clear up the ambiguity and show what was the intention of the parties." In that case, his Lordship was just considering the case as to whether oral evidence or other evidence was admissible to prove that in fact no consideration passed whereas the sale deed recited that the consideration had been paid in full. In the present case, there being no other debt than the debt under the hand-note in suit and once it is proved that the second hand-note was executed in lieu of the dues under the hand-note in suit, there is no escape from the conclusion that by executing the second hand-note, defendant No. 1 acknowledged the liability of the dues of the hand-note in suit and made a clear promise to pay the same on demand. In the case of Ramdular Das, 1958 BLJR 792 = ( AIR 1959 Pat 69 ) which has been relied upon by the learned Additional District Judge, it was found as a matter of fact that the admission in the evidence of the witness was not sufficiently precise to constitute an acknowledgement of liability in respect of the right in controversy within Sec.19 of the Limitation Act. Their Lordships were not considering a case of latent ambiguity in the document and how far that latent ambiguity could be made clear by other evidence. Moreover, in that case it was pointed out also that external evidence may be taken for the purpose of identifying the right indicated in the document in question. Their Lordships were not considering a case of latent ambiguity in the document and how far that latent ambiguity could be made clear by other evidence. Moreover, in that case it was pointed out also that external evidence may be taken for the purpose of identifying the right indicated in the document in question. On the findings arrived at by the Court of appeal below, the decision in the case of Ramdular Das (referred to above) does not justify the conclusion reached by it that the second hand-note does not in clear terms refer to the liability under the hand-note in suit and, as such, cannot be treated as an acknowledgement of the previous debt. In my opinion, defendant No. 1 by executing the second hand-note (Exhibit 1/a) clearly acknowledged the liability under the hand-note in suit (Exhibit 1) and a fresh period of limitation will start from October 27, 1958. As the court was closed on October 28, 1961 on account of annual vacation and it reopened on November 16, 1961 and the suit having been filed on that date must be held to have been filed in time and the plaintiff is entitled to a decree. This view also finds support from a decision of the Madras High Court in Kesavaramayya V/s. Visamsetti Venkataratnam, AIR 1926 Mad 452. 11. Learned Counsel for the respondents contended that the question of acknowledgement of a debt within the meaning of Sec.19 of the Limitation Act is a question of fact and the High Court cannot interfere in such a finding. It cannot be said that the question of acknowledgement of the liability is always a question of fact. It all depends upon the facts of a particular case. When in arriving at the finding as to the question of acknowledgement of liability the court, wrongly construing the provisions of Sec.19 of the Limitation Act, comes to a conclusion that the facts proved in the case do not constitute an acknowledgement of liability, it is certainly a mixed question of law and fact. In the present case the courts below are of the opinion that the fact of acknowledgement of the debt must appear from the language of the document itself. Here the courts below are not correct in taking that view. In the present case the courts below are of the opinion that the fact of acknowledgement of the debt must appear from the language of the document itself. Here the courts below are not correct in taking that view. The courts below had to come to the conclusion from the facts and circumstances of the case as to whether the debtor had acknowledged the liability of the previous debt or not specially in a case of latent ambiguity. The court below in coming to the conclusion as to the question of acknowledgement has arrived at the conclusion by taking a wrong view of law. In such a case the High Court is quite competent under the provisions of Sec.100 of the Code of Civil Procedure to interfere with the judgment of the lower appellate court. Hence I overrule the contention raised by learned counsel for the respondents. 12. As the hand-note in suit was executed by the Karta of the family no issue was raised in the courts below on the question of legal necessity of the debt perhaps under the impression that if the debt was found to be recoverable it would be recoverable against all the defendants. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are sons of defendant No. 1 who is the executant of the hand-note. Defendant No. 4 is the widow and defendant No. 5 is the son of Shyam Sundar Prasad, a deceased brother of defendant No. 1, and defendant No. 6 is the brother of defendant No.1. There is no dispute that the defendants are members of a joint Mitakshara family and defendant No. 1 is the karta of the family. Defendant No. 1, as executant of the promissory note, is himself liable and defendants 2 and 3 who are his sons are also liable on the ground of pious obligation. Defendants 4 to 6 could be only held liable if the debt was for legal necessity or benefit to the family or due enquiry regarding the existence of such a debt was made by the plaintiff. The plaintiff in paragraph 2 of the plaint has alleged that the debt was taken for purchasing bullocks and sundry expenses relating to the family and the Shradh of the father. The plaintiff in paragraph 2 of the plaint has alleged that the debt was taken for purchasing bullocks and sundry expenses relating to the family and the Shradh of the father. In the written statement filed by defendants 1 and 6 they only asserted that no portion of the debt was needed for the payment of the dues on account of the Shradh. Some evidence was also led which I shall refer hereinafter. As there was no finding of the courts below regarding legal necessity, we thought it necessary to hear the parties on the question of legal necessity and decide the question ourselves after giving an opportunity to the parties concerned as to the question of legal necessity of the debt in question under the provisions of Sec.103 of the Code of Civil Procedure instead of remanding the case to the court below for such a finding as, in our opinion, the parties were conscious of the fact of legal necessity and evidence on the point had been also adduced in that behalf. We, therefore, heard learned counsel for the parties on this point 13. From the pleadings of the parties it is clear that the defendants did not deny that the loan was taken for purchasing bullocks and for meeting sundry expenses of the family. The only denial was that no portion of the debt was needed for the payment of dues relating to the Shradh of their father. Therefore, from the pleadings of the parties, it is clear that the loan was taken for the purposes of the family. Apart from this Jadunandan Choudhary (P. W. 1) stated that the defendants took the loan for payment of the dues of the creditors of the Shradh of the father of defendant No. 1 and to purchase bullocks and to pay off small creditors. Nagendra Pd. (P. W. 5) also stated that the loan was taken for repayment to the shopkeepers of defendant No. 1. They became creditors during the Shradh. Defendant No. 1 took the money to purchase bullocks and for other necessity. According to this witness defendant No. 1 took the loan as the karta of the family and the necessities were enquired into. P. W. 5 was a servant of the plaintiff. They became creditors during the Shradh. Defendant No. 1 took the money to purchase bullocks and for other necessity. According to this witness defendant No. 1 took the loan as the karta of the family and the necessities were enquired into. P. W. 5 was a servant of the plaintiff. In cross-examination he stated that though he did not see any paper but defendant No. 1 stated about the necessities and the plaintiff believed them as he also personally knew about the necessities of defendant No. 1. He also knew that the shop-keepers were to be paid. The plaintiff (P. W. 7) stated in his evidence that defendant No. 1 said about the necessities and he believed him. Lal Bahadur Choudhary, defendant No. 1, who examined himself as D. W. 4 frankly stated that the necessity of the loan of Rs. 3,500 was to pay off the shop-keepers but the shopkeepers were not the creditors of any Shradh. He did not deny the fact that the loan was taken for purchasing bullocks and for meeting other necessities of the family or that there was no need for such a debt. On a consideration of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence discussed above, I am of the opinion that the alleged loan of Rs. 3500.00 was taken for the family necessities and is binding on all the defendants. 14. Admittedly, Lal Bahadur Choudhary, defendant No. 1, executed the hand-note in suit (Exhibit 1) and borrowed Rs. 3500.00 from the plaintiff. From a perusal of the hand-note it is clear that he contracted to pay interest at the rate of Re. 1/- per cent per month. The plaintiff, in the suit, has claimed interest from the date of the execution of the hand-note (Exhibit 1) to the date of the institution of the suit which he is entitled to recover from the defendants. However, in the circumstances of the case. I am not inclined to allow interest pendente lite and future. 15. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the courts below are set aside and the plaintiffs suit is decreed with costs throughout. B.D.Singh, J. 16 I agree.