Judgment :- The learned Executive First Class Magistrate, Ottapalam has stayed the proceedings in M.C. 15/69 under S. 3 of Act 20 of 1970. The M.C. was taken under S. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as it was reported that the dispute between the A party and the B party over possession of the property is likely to lead to breach of peace. The property involved is an extent of 1015.47 acres of malavaram known as Uppukulam Malavaram. These properties belong in jenmom to Puthiya Kovilakam Padayankkattu, Kozhikode. The Receiver appointed by the High Court of Madras for the administration of the properties of the kovilakam granted a kanom demise to Sri R. M. Palat, who in his turn bequeathed the properties on kanom to his son Dr. Raman Palat under a will. This Raman Palat left for U.K. leaving a power of attorney to his mother who is A party No. 1 and she in her turn executed another power of attorney in favour of Sankaran Palat who is A-party No. 2. B-party set up claims of possession on the basis of oral leases from Palat estate. These oral leases are denied by the A-party, according to whom physical possessions has never gone out of their hands. 2. Proceedings were initiated on the reports submitted by the Inspector of Police, Perinthalmanna and the Dy. S.P. Shornur to the effect that breach of peace is imminent consequent on the dispute between A and B parties over possession. The learned Magistrate has now stayed the entire proceedings thinking that Act 20 of 1970 is applicable. I think the view taken by the learned Magistrate is wrong and unsustainable. Act 20 of 1970 has been enacted for a different purpose and in respect of properties falling altogether under different category. The Act itself is styled the Kerala Cultivators and Tenants (Temporary Protection) Act, 1970 - 'an Act to provide for the stay of suits and other proceedings for determination of rights in respect of lands occupied by certain classes of persons for the temporary protection of tenants against proceedings for the recovery of arrears of rent and for matters incidental thereto'. The preamble reads: - "Whereas it is expedient to provide for the stay of suits and other proceedings for determination of rights in respect of lands occupied by certain classes of persons, for the temporary protection of tenants against proceedings for the recovery of arrears of rent and for matters incidental thereto" The purpose of the enactment, therefore, is to determine the rights in respect of lands occupied by certain class of persons against whom proceedings for the recovery of arrears of rent and matters incidental thereto are pending. In the present proceedings taken on the strength of the police report, none of these points would arise. There the A-Party and the B-Party are scrambling for possession of the property. The primary object of a proceedings under S. 145 is to prevent breach of peace and to hold property in custodia legis till the dispute is settled, i.e., the question as to who was in possession at the time the proceedings were initiated is settled. The purpose is certainly not to protect the tenancy rights of any of the parties; whereas, the purpose of Act 20/70 is to render temporary protection to tenants against proceedings for the recovery of arrears of rent and other incidental matters in my view therefore, the Act 20/70, which provides for the stay of suits and other proceedings is not applicable to a proceedings under S. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The reasoning of the learned Magistrate is gatherable from the following observations appearing in his order. He has observed :- "Thus to say that the Act 20 of 1970 does not apply to 145 proceedings is to give it a meaning order than that which was actually intended. There are circumstances in the Act showing that the phraseology is used in a larger sense. The construction that the Act 20 of 1970 applies to 145 proceedings is more in accord with reason, justice and legal principles. It is obvious that it is not open to us to read into this section a limitation which is not there. In the contemplation of the legislature 'any proceedings' in S. 3 of Act 20 of 1970 includes proceedings under S. 145, Cr.P.C. also. The difference between the preamble and the section is not accidental but intentional". It is obvious that it is not open to us to read into this section a limitation which is not there. In the contemplation of the legislature 'any proceedings' in S. 3 of Act 20 of 1970 includes proceedings under S. 145, Cr.P.C. also. The difference between the preamble and the section is not accidental but intentional". The expression 'any proceedings' appearing in S. 3 of Act 20/70 must be read as proceedings in respect of any land over which tenancy right is claimed and the tenants stands in need of a temporary protection against proceedings for the recovery of arrears of rent or other connected matters. Such a contingency is not present in the case before us, wherein two rival parties claim possession of the property and they fight each other for the establishment of their claim. The preamble of the Act, already quoted, makes it clear that the temporary stay contemplated under the Act is not intended to cover a proceeding under S. 145. Lord Halsbury, L.C. observed in Powell v. Kempton Park Racecourse Co. 1899 A.C. 143 - The Interpretation of Statutes and General Clauses Acts by Bindra, 4th Edn. P. 20 :- "Two propositions are quite clear, one that preamble affords useful light as to what a statute intends to reach, and another that if an enactment is itself clear and unambiguous, no preamble can qualify or cut down the enactment." So far as the present statute is concerned, words are in themselves precise and unambiguous in respect of the intention of the statute and taking the words and expressions in their natural and ordinary sense. I feel no doubt that the Act is not intended to apply to proceedings under S. 145, Cr.P.C. 3. The other of the learned Magistrate is hence set aside and the case is sent back for disposal according to law. Ordered accordingly.