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1971 DIGILAW 279 (KAR)

SUBRAO RANBA RAVALU KEDARI v. KALLAPPA NANA KADAPURE

1971-09-10

HONNAIH, VENKATACHALAIAH

body1971
VENKATAHAMUH, J. ( 1 ) THE question to be decided in this revision petition is whether in a suit for injunction falling under Clause (c) of S. 26 of the Mysore Courtfees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the valuation of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction can be different from the valuation for the purpose of payment of court-fee. ( 2 ) THE above revision petition has been referred to the Division bench by Datar, J. , since he felt that there was a contract between two decisions of this Court in CRP. No. 1534 of 1968 and Nagaraj v. Nanjappa, (1872) 1 Mys. L. J. ,109. . ( 3 ) IN the instant case, the petitioner filed a suit for bare injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession of the suit land. The land in question was an agricultural land assessed to land revenue. He valued the suit in the Court of the Civil Judge, Belgaum, valuing the land for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 20,000 and for purposes of court fee at Rs. 250. On going through the valuation slip produced in the case along with the plaint the learned Civil Judge found that there were two different valuations, furnished by the petitioner one for purposes of jurisdiction and another for purposes of court fee. He therefore called upon the petitioner to furnish a fresh valuation slip in accordance with clause (c) of S. 26 of the Act and to pay proper court-fee thereon, failing which, it was ordered that the plaint would be returned for presentation to the proper Court on the basis of the valuation at Rs. 250. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has filed the above revision petition. ( 4 ) SRI R. U. Goulay, the learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that in view of the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S. 50 of the Act, it was permissible for the petitioner to furnish two different valuations in respect of the suit land one for purposes of court fee and another for purposes of jurisdiction. ( 4 ) SRI R. U. Goulay, the learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that in view of the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S. 50 of the Act, it was permissible for the petitioner to furnish two different valuations in respect of the suit land one for purposes of court fee and another for purposes of jurisdiction. S. 50 (l) reads as follows: "suits not etherwise provided for - (1) In a suit as to whose value for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of Courts specific provision is not otherwise made in this Act or in any other law, value for that purpose and value for the purpose of computing the fee payable under this Act, shall be the same: provided that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (2) of S. 7, the value of land specified in clause (a), (b) or (c) of the said sub-section shall, for purposes of determining the jurisdiction of courts, be the market value of such land. " the construction sought to be placed by Mr. Goulay on the proviso appears to be not sound. In order to understand the proviso, we have got to read the provision to which it is attached as a proviso. Sub-sec (1) of S. 50 deals with cases for which no specific provision is made in any other part of the Act or in any other law. If there is no other provision, then according to S. 50 (l) the value for purposes of court-fee would be the value for the purpose of jurisdiction. It is no doubt true that the proviso controls sub-sec. (1) of S. 50 to the extent that the suit in question is one to which S. 7 (2) of the Act is attracted. A suit falling under S. 26 (c) of the act is not one to which S. 7 (2) is applicable. It is clear from the opening clause of S. 7 (2 ). That this case is one falling under S. 26 (c) of the Act is beyond dispute. S. 2g deals vvith suits for injunction. Clause (a) of s. 26 deals with cases where the relief sought is one of injunction with reference to any immovable property where the plaintiff alleges that his title to the property is denied, or where an issue is framed regarding the plaintif's title to the property. S. 2g deals vvith suits for injunction. Clause (a) of s. 26 deals with cases where the relief sought is one of injunction with reference to any immovable property where the plaintiff alleges that his title to the property is denied, or where an issue is framed regarding the plaintif's title to the property. Clause (b) of S. 26 does not deal with land. So, the present case which is one for bare injuncron falls clearly under clause (c) of S. 26 of the Act. Clause (c) of S. 26 leaves the choice to the plaintiff to value the relief sought by him at any amount subject to the liability to pay court-fee on the basis of such valuation or Rs. 100 whichever is higher. It is, therefore, open to the petitioner to put any value both for purposes of jurisdiction and for purposes of payment of court fee in a case falling under clause (c) of S. 26 and file the suit in an appropriate court on the basis of such valuation. We are of the opinion that this is not a case which is covered by the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S. 50 the Act. The introduction of the proviso by an amendment in sub-sec. (1) of S. 50 does not make any difference so far as this case is concerned, since the proviso envisages a departure from what is contained in S. 50 (1) only in the case of suits in which the relief claimed falls under any of those sections referred to in the opening clause of S. 7 (2 ). The principle underlying clause (c) of S. 26 of the Act is not totally new. Similar provision is there in S. 7 (iv) (d) of the Indian Court Fees Act, 1870. Dealing with a case arising under S. 7 (iv) of that Act, the Supreme Court observed in sathappa Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ramanathan Chettar, AIR. 1958 SC. 245, 252 as follows:"in other words, so far as suits falling under S. 7, sub-sec, (iv) of the Act are concerned, S. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act provides that the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for the purpose of jurisdiction shall be the same. Ramanathan Chettar, AIR. 1958 SC. 245, 252 as follows:"in other words, so far as suits falling under S. 7, sub-sec, (iv) of the Act are concerned, S. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act provides that the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for the purpose of jurisdiction shall be the same. There can be little doubt that the effect of the provision of S. 8 is to make the value for the purpose of jurisdiction dependent upon the value as determinable for computation of court-fees and that is natural enough. The computation of court-fees in suits falling under S. 7 (iv) of the Act depends upon the valuation that the plaintiff makes in respect of his claim and the plaintill' exercises his option and values his claim for the purpose of court-fees, that determines the value for jurisdiction. The value for court-fees and the value for jurisdiction must no doubt be the same in such cases; but it is the value for court-fee stated by the plaintiff that is of primary importance. It 3s from this value that the value for jurisdiction must be determined. The result is that it is the amount at which the plaintiff has valued the relief sought for the purposes of court-fees that determines the value for jurisdiction in the suit and not vice versa. " ( 5 ) FOLLOWING the said decision of the Supreme Court, Jagannatha Shetty, J. , held in Nagaraj v. Nanjappa that the value for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction with regard to matters falling under clause (c) of S. 26 of the Act should be the same as the value at which relief is valued by the plaintiff or Rs. 100 whichever may be higher. We feel that the decision in CRP. No. 1791 of 1969 lays down the correct law. This Court while deciding CRP. No. 1534 of 1968 does not appear to have noticed that the suit falling under clause (c) of S. 26 of the Act is not one to which S. 7 (2) of the Act is applicable. We, therefore, hold that the order of the learned civil Judge directing the petitioner to file a proper valuation slip furnishing only one valuation both for purposes of court-fee and for purposes of jurisdiction is right and deserves to be affirmed. In the result the revision petition fails and is dismissed. We, therefore, hold that the order of the learned civil Judge directing the petitioner to file a proper valuation slip furnishing only one valuation both for purposes of court-fee and for purposes of jurisdiction is right and deserves to be affirmed. In the result the revision petition fails and is dismissed. No costs. --- *** --- .