This is an appeal by the plaintiff whose suit for a decree of Rs. 2000/- against the defendant was dis­missed by the lower appellate court re­versing the decree of the Munsiff. 2. The case of the plaintiff was that the defendant borrowed a sum of Rs. 2000/- from him on 12-11-65 by giv­ing a stamped receipt signed by him. sti­pulating to repay the same within a week. As the defendant did not repay the money as stipulated, the plaintiff instituted a criminal case under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code against him. but in that case, plaintiff was directed to seek his remedy in the civil court and so he filed the present suit. 3. The defendant filed a written statement and contested the suit. He de­nied having borrowed Rs. 2000/- or any other amount from the plaintiff on 12-11-65 or on any other date. He also denied having granted any receipt with his sig­nature as alleged. It was however alleg­ed by the defendant that he used to have monetary transactions with the plaintiff in the past and that at that time the plain­tiff might have obtained his signature on some blank paper, but he never signed on any revenue stamp, as in the document relied on by the plaintiff. 4. In support of his case, the plaintiff examined himself and 4 other witnesses. The plaintiff (P. W. 3) and P. W. 4 Mafiiudddin Sheikh gave evidence to prove that the defendant ex­ecuted the receipt Ex. 2 which was writ­ten by one Jadab Das. since dead, and received Rs. 2000/- from the plaintiff. P. W. 5 Hemendra Nath Rov is a petition writer who proved that the receipt Ex. 2 is in the hand of deceased Jadab Chan­dra Das. who was also a petition writer and whose hand-writing he knows. P. W. 1 Rafiqulla Sheikh who was the Presi­dent of Kisamat Hasdah Gaon Sabha proved that the defendant filed a petition Ex. 1 (dated 20-2-64) before him making some allegations against the plaintiff, where, inter alia it was stated that he (defendant) borrowed a sum of Rs. 2000/-from the plaintiff signing on a blank paper and that he had since repaved this amount. P. W. 2 Birendra Naravan Roy proved that he wrote the Ex. 1 at the in­stance of the defendant and that the de­fendant put his signature there in his presence. 5. 2000/-from the plaintiff signing on a blank paper and that he had since repaved this amount. P. W. 2 Birendra Naravan Roy proved that he wrote the Ex. 1 at the in­stance of the defendant and that the de­fendant put his signature there in his presence. 5. The defendant examined him­self and no other witness. In his examination-in-chief, he denied having borrow­ed from the plaintiff and also the fact that he had given the receipt Ex. 2. The two signatures on the revenue stamps in the said receipt purported to be his were also denied. The 3rd signature at the bottom of Ex. 2 marked Ex. 2 (3) was however neither denied nor admitted. In his cross-examination, he admitted that he had taken a loan of Rs. 2000/- from the plaintiff, but he said that it was without any receipt. He said that this amount was repayed to the plaintiff within 2/3 days. but without any receipt or witness. The disputed signatures were not sent to any expert for opinion. 6. On a consideration of the evi­dence, the learned Munsiff held that the defendant borrowed Rs. 2000/- from the plaintiff as alleged and that he has not repayed the same. With this finding, he decreed the suit with costs. The defen­dant then took an appeal before the As­sistant District Judge. The learned As­sistant District Judge after hearing the parties, reversed the decree of the learn­ed Munsiff and dismissed the suit. Hence the plaintiff has come up with this second appeal. 7. Mr. Sen, the learned counsel for the appellant attacked the decree of the lower appellate court on the following grounds: (1) That the court below erred in law by playing the role of an expert by comparing the signatures Exs. 2 (1) and 2 (2) in the receipt with the admitted signatures of the defendant. Exs. 2 C3) and 1 (1) and coming to a conclusion from such comparison, without the assistance of any expert and ignoring the direct evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4. that the signatures in Exts. 2 (1) and 2 (2) were not of the defendant. (2) That some material evidence, namely the document Ex. 1 and the admission of the defendant in his cross-examination that he had taken a loan of Rs. 2000/- from the plaintiff were ignored by the lower appellate court and that this amounts to an illegality. that the signatures in Exts. 2 (1) and 2 (2) were not of the defendant. (2) That some material evidence, namely the document Ex. 1 and the admission of the defendant in his cross-examination that he had taken a loan of Rs. 2000/- from the plaintiff were ignored by the lower appellate court and that this amounts to an illegality. (3) That the learned lower appellate court proceeded on a misconception of the law relating to burden of proof in the case. 8. I find that there is sufficient force in each of the above contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant. 9. It appears from the judgment that the learned Assistant District Judge first discarded the evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4 who proved the receipt Ex. 2 to have been signed by the defendant, as­signing some reasons for the same. Then reliving on decision in Fakhruddin v. State of Madhva Pradesh. AIR 1967 SC 1326 he proceeded to compare the dis­puted signatures of the defendant in Ex. 2 with two admitted signatures of the defendant and straightway came to the conclusion, without assigning any spe­cific reason, that the signatures Exs. 2(1) and 2 (2) are not of the defendant, with the following observation: "It is seen on the very first sight that Exs. 2(1) and 2(2) are not the same as Exs. 2 (3) and 1 (2). These Exts. 2(1) and 2 (2) are not the signatures of the writer of Exts. 2 (3) and 1 (2) as it ap­pears on the record". A comparison of hand-writing as a mode of proof is always hazardous and incon­clusive and specially when it is made by one not conversant with the subject and without any guidance or assistance that may be derived from the evidence of some expert. That is why. the practice of a Judge declaring whether a disputed signature agrees with the admitted sig­nature of a certain person merely on his own observation, without the assistance of any other evidence has been dis­approved in many cases of which re­ference may be made to AIR 1925 Cal 485; AIR 1946 All 67 and AIR 1947 All 411. 10. The learned Assistant District Judge misunderstood the judgment in Fakhruddin v. State of M. P.. AIR 1967 SC 1326 on which he relied. 10. The learned Assistant District Judge misunderstood the judgment in Fakhruddin v. State of M. P.. AIR 1967 SC 1326 on which he relied. The rele­vant portion of the iudgment in this case may be conveniently quoted here and it runs as follows: "Both under Section 45 and Section 47. the evidence is an opinion in the former by scientific comparison and in the latter on the basis of familiarity re­sulting from frequent observations and experience. In either case, the court must satisfy itself by such means as are open that the opinion may be acted upon. One such means open to the court is to apply its own observation to the admitted or proved writings and to compare them with the disputed one. not to • become a hand-writing expert, but to verify the premises of the expert in the one case and to appraise the value of the opinion in the other case. This comparison de­pends on an analysis of the characteris­tics in the admitted or proved writings and the finding of the same characteris­tics in large measure in the disputed writing. In this wav. the opinion of the deponent whether expert or other is subjected to scrutiny and although re­levant to start with become probative. Where an expert's opinion is given, the court must see for itself and with the assistance of the expert come to its own conclusion whether it can safely be held ,that the two writings are by the same person. This is not to say that the court must play the role of an expert, but to say that the court may accept the fact proved only when it has satisfied itself on its own observation that it is safe to accept the opinion whether of the expert or other witness." It is quite clear from the above ob­servation that the Supreme Court has deprecated the practice of the court play­ing the role of an expert, as was done in the present case. What was laid down in the Supreme Court case is that before accepting the evidence' of an expert or |that of a person familiar with the hand-i writing and signature of a person. As contemplated under Section 45 and Sec­tion 47, respectively of the Evidence Act. the court is to apply its own observation to the admitted or proved writings and to compare them with the disputed one. As contemplated under Section 45 and Sec­tion 47, respectively of the Evidence Act. the court is to apply its own observation to the admitted or proved writings and to compare them with the disputed one. not to become a handwriting expert but to verify the premises of the expert in one case and to appraise the value of the opinion in the other case. 11. In the present case, as I have already pointed out. having already dis­carded the direct evidence of P. Ws. 3 & 4, the court below assumed the role of an expert and came to the conclusion, mere­ly on the basis of his own observation, without assistance from any evidence of expert, that the disputed signatures are not of the defendant. This, in mv opinion was not legal and proper. 12. Now let me come to the other contentions of the appellant which may be taken up together. As I have already pointed out. the defendant in his cross-examination as well as in the document admitted to have received a loan of Rs. 2000/- from the plaintiff. He did not say on which date he took this loan. He said that he repaid this money within 2/3 days. but without any receipt or witness. The learned Assistant District Judge has ex­plained away the evidence of the defen­dant with the observation that the plain­tiff cannot take advantage of the evidence •of the defendant when the plaintiff him­self has failed to prove his case. He also observed that the defendant has no bur­den to prove, but plaintiff must prove his case. 13. It is well-settled law that when each of the parties adduces evidence in the case, the question of burden of proof loses all importance. Even in a case where the burden of Proof initially lies with the plaintiff and he fails to discharge that burden by his evidence, but all the same, the defendant in his evidence admits the material fact or the evidence led by him tend to prove the plaintiff's case, there is no bar for any decree on the basis of such admission or evidence. It has also got to be borne in mind that in civil cases, unlike criminal case, it cannot be said that the benefit of reasonable doubt must necessarily eo to the defendant. A preponderance of proba­bilities may be the basis for a decree. It has also got to be borne in mind that in civil cases, unlike criminal case, it cannot be said that the benefit of reasonable doubt must necessarily eo to the defendant. A preponderance of proba­bilities may be the basis for a decree. That being the position, the learned lower ap­pellate court erred in law. in my opinion in not properly considering the evidence of the defendant or the document Ex. 1 with the observation mentioned above. He should have duly considered the evi­dence adduced by both the parties, be­fore he came to a final decision in the case. 14. From the foregoing discussion, it is seen that the learned court below erred in law in assuming the role of a hand-writing expert without any other assistance and in not considering the evi­dence of the defendant properly on a mis­conception of the law relating to burden of proof. That being so. the -judgment and decree appealed against must be set aside and I do accordingly. The appeal is re­manded to the court below for fresh dis­posal after hearing the learned lawyers of both the parties and in the light of the observations made hereinabove. I feel, it is desirable that this time the ap­peal should be heard by some Judge other than the Assistant District Judge who disposed of the appeal earlier. I accord­ingly direct that the District Judge him­self will hear and dispose of the appeal this time and he will do it expeditiouslv within a period of not more than three months from the date of receipt of the records in the court below. I should however not be misunderstood as having expressed any opinion on the merit of the case. The appeal is allowed. Costs will abide the result of the appeal in the court below. Appeal allowed.