JUDGMENT R.L. Gulati, J. - This Special Appeal is directed against the judgment of brother Kirty in Civil Misc. Writ No. 3264 of 1967. 2. The three appellants are the employees of the respondent Company, the Upper Doaba Sugar Mills Ltd. Shamli, Muzaffarnagar. A dispute appears to have arisen between the respondent company and some of its workmen. The dispute was referred to arbitration under Section 5-B of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. An agreement was entered into between the Company and the Chini Mill Mazdoor Union representing the workmen. This agreement was published by the State Government under sub-section (5) of Section 5-B. The dispute referred for arbitration was; "Whether the workmen mentioned in Annexure 'A are entitled to be fitted in the grades claimed for? If so, to what relief they are entitled?" Originally the dispute was in respect of seventy workmen, but as a result of negotiations the cases of sixty workmen were amicably settled and the arbitrators had to decide the cases of only ten workmen. Out of these ten workmen, the claim of six was rejected and the claim of the remaining four workmen, who figured as respondent Nos. 5 to 8 in the writ petition, was allowed. The writ petition filed by the Company under Article 226 of the Constitution has been partly allowed. Hence this Special Appeal by the employees of the Company. 3. Sri. K.P. Agarwal, who appeared for the appellants, has raised a preliminary objection. He contends that the award which has been impugned in the writ petition was not amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court. A writ may lie against a statutory arbitration award but not against a private arbitration award. According to the learned counsel the instant is a case of private arbitration. 4. There can be no dispute that no writ would lie against a private award. But the question that arises is as to whether an award given under Section 5-B can be said to be a private award. 5. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, who appeared for the company, has cited a large number of cases to show that an award under Section 5-B would be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Some of the cases cited by him may be enumerated; These cases, however, are under Section 10-A of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central); Rohtak Delhi Transport Pvt. Ltd. v. Ch. Some of the cases cited by him may be enumerated; These cases, however, are under Section 10-A of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central); Rohtak Delhi Transport Pvt. Ltd. v. Ch. Risal Singh, (1964) 1 Lab LJ 89 : (A.I.R. 1963 Punj 472); Koru (P) President Tile Workers Union, Feroke v. Standard Tile and Clay Workers (P) Ltd, Feroke, (1964) 1 Lab LJ 102 : (A.I.R. 1963 Ker 324); Alleppey District Small Scale Coir Manufacturers Association v. Travancore Coir Factory Workers Union, Alleppey, (1965) 1 Lab LJ 650 (Ker); Coimbatore Salem Transports (Pvt.) Ltd., Erode v. Their Workmen, (1967) 2 Lab LJ 120 (Mad); Nellai Cotton Mills v. Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Madras, (1967) 2 Lab LJ 240 (Mad); Veikuntam Estate, Marthandam v. Arbitrator (Ramswami (T.S.), (1968) 1 Lab LJ 93 : (1968 Lab IC 1563 (Mad)); Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1968) 1 Lab LJ 710 : (A.I.R. 1967 Pat 224); Rohtas Industries Staff Union v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1963 Pat 170. 6. It is, however, not necessary to deal with or comment upon these cases. The point, to my mind, appears to be settled by a decision of the Supreme Court in Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Ltd., A.I.R. 1963 SC 874. The question in that case was as to whether a petition under Article 136 (1) of the Constitution would be maintainable against an award under Section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central). It was held that an arbitrator under Section 10-A was neither a Tribunal nor a court and, as such a petition under Article 136 (1) was not maintainable. In the course of the judgment their Lordships have, however, made an observation to the effect that against such an award a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution would lie. Their Lordships observation in paragraph 15 of the judgment may be extracted; "The agrument, therefore, is that against an award pronounced by an arbitrator appointed under Section 10-A, a writ of certiorari would lie under Article 226, and so, the arbitrator should be deemed to be a Tribunal even for the purposes of Article 136. In our opinion, this argument is not well founded. Article 226 under which a writ of certiorari can be issued in an appropriate case, is, in a sense wider than Article 136. In our opinion, this argument is not well founded. Article 226 under which a writ of certiorari can be issued in an appropriate case, is, in a sense wider than Article 136. because the power conferred on the High Courts to issue certain writs is not conditioned or limited by the requirement that the said writs can be issued only against the orders of Courts or Tribunals. Under Article 226 (1) an appropriate writ can be issued to any person or authority including in appropriate cases any Government, within the territories prescribed. Therefore, even if the arbitrator appointed under Section 10-A is not a Tribunal under Article 136 in a proper case, a writ may lie against his award under Article 226." 7. This observation is no doubt an obiter dicta, but even an obiter dicta of the Supreme Court is binding. See, Chobey Sunder Lal. v. Sonu, AIR 1969 Allahabad 304 and Commr. of Income-tax. Hyderabad v. Vazir Sultan and Sons, A.I.R. 1959 SC 814. 8. The provisions of Section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act (Central) are in pari materia with the provisions contained in Section 5-B of the Industrial Disputes Act (U.P.) In fact the two provisions are identically worded. The decision with regard to the interpretation of Section 10-A of the Central Act, would therefore, apply with equal force to a case under Section 5-B of the U.P. Act. 9. Sri Agarwal, however, invited our attention to certain provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act to show that the proceedings under Section 5-B were different from the proceedings before a Conciliation Officer, an Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court. He referred to Sections 6-D. 6-E, 6-F, 6-G, 6-T, 11-D, 11'-E and 11-F. Section 6-D relates to the commencement and conclusion of proceedings before a Labour Court or Tribunal and provides that such proceedings shall be deemed to have commenced on the date of reference of a dispute to adjudication, and such proceedings shall be deemed to have been concluded on the date on which the award becomes enforceable under Section 6-A. Section 6-E provides for the conditions of service etc. to remain unchanged in certain circumstances during the pendency of conciliation proceedings before a Conciliation Officer or a Board or a Labour Court, Section 6-G relates to the power of the State Government to withdraw any proceedings under the Act pending before a Labour Court or a Tribunal or transfer a proceeding from one Labour Court or Tribunal to another. Section 6-T prohibits strikes or lock outs, if commenced or declared, in contravention of Section 6 or when the dispute is taken up by the Board or is referred for adjudication to a Labour Court or Tribunal. Section 11-D declares that every Conciliation Officer and every member and Chairman of a Board and every Presiding Officer of a Labour Court or Tribunal shall be deemed to be a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 11-E provides that every labour court or tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for the purpose of Sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and finally Section 11-F prescribes the powers of the Labour Court or Tribunal in relation to contempt. 10. It is urged that all these provisions would not operate when the matter is referred to arbitration under Section 5-B and, therefore, it should be held that the arbitration proceedings are private proceedings and not statutory proceedings. I see no force in this Contention. In fact after the decision of the Supreme Court in Engineering Mazdoor Sabha. A.I.R. 1963 SC 874 (Supra), the argument of this nature is no longer open. There can be no manner of doubt that the powers of an arbitrator under Section 5-B are materially different from the powers of a Conciliation Officer, an Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court, but never the-less the proceeding before an arbitrator under Section 5-B cannot be said to be purely private. In the case of the Engineering Mazdoor Sabha (Supra) the Supreme Court has pointed out the distinction between a statutory arbitration and a private arbitration and has held that an Arbitrator under Section 10-A, although enjoys a jurisdiction of a much limited nature, yet he has the trappings of a court and the award given by him is of the nature of a quasi-judicial order and not purely administrative or executive order. The Supreme Court has pointed out that the arbitration proceedings under Section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act are proceedings midway between statutory and private arbitration proceedings, neither being wholly statutory nor being purely private. 11. For these reasons I must hold that the award by the arbitrator given under Section 5-B is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The preliminary objection thus fails. 12. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties on the merits, it is necessary to set out a few more facts. In 1957, a Central Wage Board was established by the Government of India to recommend, inter alia, a suitable wage structure for the sugar industry. The recommendations of the Central Wage Board were accepted by the Government of India and it called upon the employers and the State Governments to take immediate steps for its implementation. The U.P. Government having decided to implement the recommendations of the Wage Board, a notification dated April 27, 1961 was issued by it under Section 3 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, which was published in the U.P. Extra-ordinary Gazette. In the notification, 19 grades were specified. The employers were asked to fit in their employees in suitable grades. The respondent company fitted its employees in the grades laid down in the notification. We are concerned with the changes made in the gradation of four persons including the three appellants, who figured as respondent Nos. 5 to 8 in the writ petition. The charges are reproduced below;- Name Designation and grade prior to implementation of notification, Designation and grade on implementation of notification. Respondent No. 5 Shri Anand Prakash Mittal. Sales Accountant-Rs. 125-7-1/2 200 (Consolidated). Sales Incharge-Clerical Grade-If B Rs. 130-7-.65-EB-8 Rs. 205, (plus Rs. 40/-D.A.) Respondent No. 6 Sri Jagdish Pd. Sharma. Accounts Section, Grade I Clerk -Rs. 85-5-150-EB-175 (Consolidated). General Assistant Accounts (Clerical Grade III) Rs. 105-6-135 EB-7-170 (Plus Rs. 30/- as D. A. Respondent No. 7 Sri Brahma Prakash. Accounts Section, Clerk Grade II -Rs. 75-3-125-EB-5-150 (Consolidated.) General Assistant Accounts (Clerical Grade-Ill) Rs. 105-6-135 EB 7-170 (plus Rs. 30 D.A ) Respondent No. 9 Sri R.D. Soti. Provident Fund Section. Special Grade Clerk. Rs. 125-7-1/2-200 (Consolidated). Section In-charge (Provident Fund Clerical II-B). Rs. 130-7-165-EB 8 205 (Plus Rs. 40/ - D.A.) 13. Accounts Section, Clerk Grade II -Rs. 75-3-125-EB-5-150 (Consolidated.) General Assistant Accounts (Clerical Grade-Ill) Rs. 105-6-135 EB 7-170 (plus Rs. 30 D.A ) Respondent No. 9 Sri R.D. Soti. Provident Fund Section. Special Grade Clerk. Rs. 125-7-1/2-200 (Consolidated). Section In-charge (Provident Fund Clerical II-B). Rs. 130-7-165-EB 8 205 (Plus Rs. 40/ - D.A.) 13. Prior to the reorganisation of the establishment in accordance with the notification referred to above, Anand Prakash Mittal was sectional In-charge of the section known as Sales Office and Ram Chandra Goel was the Sectional Incharge of the other section known as Sugar Godown. Both these section in-charges were in the same grade, viz.; Rs. 125-7-1/2-200. They were under the Sales Manager. On the implementation of the notification the Company re-designated these two persons as Sales In-charge in the case of Anand Prakash Mittal and Sugar Godown Keeper in the case of Ram Chandra Goel and gave them the next higher grade, namely, Clerical II-B, Rs. 130-7-165-EB-8-205 (plus Rs. 40/- as D.A.). They were not satisfied with the gradation and claimed managerial status of Assistant Sales Manager in a grade which was 4 grades above the grade in which they had been working. 14. The next person with whom we are concerned in this appeal is Brahma Prakash, who figured as respondent No. 7 in the writ petition. He has been assigned the designation of Assistant Accountant (Clerical Grade-II-B) by the arbitrators: prior to the implementation of the Notification he was working as Accounts Section Clerk Grade II. There is one more person with whom we are concerned. He is Sri. R.D. Soti, who has been designated as section In-charge Clerical Grade II-B. I shall now deal with the cases of these persons individually. 15. Before proceeding further, I might dispose of one more argument of the learned counsel for the appellants. He submits that even if the award is amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court, the same cannot be interfered with as it would amount to interference with the findings of fact. Mr. Agarwala cited a large number of authorities in support of this proposition. In my opinion, it is not necessary to refer /to those cases, because the proposition put-forward by him cannot be disputed. This Court will not interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the arbitrators. Mr. Agarwala cited a large number of authorities in support of this proposition. In my opinion, it is not necessary to refer /to those cases, because the proposition put-forward by him cannot be disputed. This Court will not interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the arbitrators. But if it is found that the arbitrators have travelled beyond the scope of the reference or have misinterpreted the notification, then their award would be liable to interference leaving the findings of fact intact. 16. Now taking the case of Anand Prakash Mittal, I find that prior to the implementation of the notification, he was designated as Sales Accountant and was drawing salary in the scale of Rs. 125-7-1/2-200 consolidated. After the re-organisation he was designated as Sales In-charge and was placed in Clerical Grade II (B) Rs. 130-7-165-EB-8-205 plus Rs. 40/- D.A. He claimed the status and the designation of an Assistant Sales Manager. Previously the Company has no post of Sales Manager. The person, who was in-charge of the sales was known as the Sales Superintendent, After the implementation of the recommendations of the Wage Board, the Sales Superintendent was designated as Sales Manager and Anand Prakash Mittal claimed the post of an Assistant Sales Manager. Now this post is a managerial post. A managerial post necessarily involves independent administrative work., According to the findings recorded by the Arbitrators, Sri Anand Prakash Mittal did not do any administrative work independently. Although he was placed in the grade immediately below that of the Sales Superintendent yet his work was clerical and ministerial. According to the award Anand Prakash used to assist the Sales Superintendent while working as a Sales Accountant. From this the arbitrators concluded that he should be designated as Assistant Sales Manager. This is a clear fallacy. Every clerk attached to the Sales Manager or the Sales Superintendent assists him in someway or the other. The assistance is merely clerical and ministerial and not managerial. So far as the assistance is concerned, even his peon assists the Sales Manager but that does not mean that the peon becomes an Assistant Manager. There is a clear distinction between a clerical and ministerial post and an administrative post. This distinction the Arbitrators have lost sight of. The fact that Anand Prakash was placed in the scale of pay immediately below the Sales Super-intendant does not alter the situation. There is a clear distinction between a clerical and ministerial post and an administrative post. This distinction the Arbitrators have lost sight of. The fact that Anand Prakash was placed in the scale of pay immediately below the Sales Super-intendant does not alter the situation. An Assistant Sales Manager is a manager for all practical purposes and is engaged in the same kind of work as the Manager is and in the absence of the manager, he automatically takes over his duties. That is not true in the case of an Assistant in the office, or an assistant in the sales section or in the Accounts Section l am, therefore, satisfied that so far .as the case of Anand Prakash Mittal is concerned,, the award given by the Arbitrators is manifestly erroneous, based, as it is, on a misinterpretation of the notification. 17. Now coming to the case of Brahma Prakash, I find that he was a Clerk in the Accounts Section drawing salary in the scale of Rs. 75-3-125-EB-5-150 (consolidated). After the reorganisation he was designated as General Assistant Accounts and was placed in the Clerical grade III in the scale of Rs. 105-6-135-EB-7-170 plus Rs. 30 D.A. His claim is that he should be classified as an Accountant. Previously he was writing cash book, day book and a maintained staff advance ledgers, muster rolls etc. and explained them to the Company's auditors. In my opinion, these duties clearly are of clerical nature. An accountant is something different from an Accounts Clerks. The job of an Accountant is to organise and supervise the entire accounts section and at the end of the year to close the accounts, to draw up a profit and loss account and a balance-sheet and also to coordinate the finances of the Company. The writing of a cash-book or the posting of a ledger or the checking of totals etc. are not the functions of an accountant. They are the functions of an Accounts Clerk. Here also the arbitrators had misdirected themselves completely with regard to the post of an Assistant Accountant. Like the Assistant Manager, an Assistant Accountant performs almost the same duties as an Accountant does. His work is administrative and not clerical. are not the functions of an accountant. They are the functions of an Accounts Clerk. Here also the arbitrators had misdirected themselves completely with regard to the post of an Assistant Accountant. Like the Assistant Manager, an Assistant Accountant performs almost the same duties as an Accountant does. His work is administrative and not clerical. From the duties performed by Brahma Prakash as found by the arbitrators it is clear that he was a Clerk in the Accounts Section and had nothing to do with the work of an Accountant, to whom he might have been rendering assistance. The award given by the arbitrators that he should be designated as Assistant Accountant appears to be manifestly erroneous and deserves to be quashed. 18. Now we come to the case of R.D. Soti. Previously, he was a Clerk in the provident fund section in the grade of Rs. 125-7-1/2-200 (Consolidated). Afterwards he was designated as Section In-charge (Provident Fund) Clerical Grade II-B, in the scale of Rs. 130-7-165-EB-205 plus Rs. 40/- as D.A. He claimed to be a Security Officer and this claim has been allowed by the arbitrators. He was appointed in November,. 1951 as P.A. at a salary of Rs. 120/-and he was over-all in-charge of Watch and Ward Department, for which he was paid Rs. 20/- p.m. as extra-allowance. After some time he was transferred to distillery and his duties in. the Watch and Ward department were entrusted to one D. D. Elhance, the Factory Manager. He was. however, reinstated in October, 1959 and was-entrusted with the work of the Provident Fund with Watch and Ward Department. The arbitrators have recorded a finding that he was responsible for overall supervision and control of Watch and Ward and Jamadars and Inspectors worked under his control and direction. He was responsible for proper control of the Watch and Ward for all the 24 hours. On these findings it is true that designation of Security Officer given to him by the Arbitrators cannot be said to be erroneous. It appears-that Soti was placed on probation for six months on March 2, 1961, as his work was not found satisfactory. Company thereafter, advertised the post of Security Officer and Soti did not apply for the post. On these findings it is true that designation of Security Officer given to him by the Arbitrators cannot be said to be erroneous. It appears-that Soti was placed on probation for six months on March 2, 1961, as his work was not found satisfactory. Company thereafter, advertised the post of Security Officer and Soti did not apply for the post. The arbitrators, however, have found that in spite of his reversion, he continued to perform the same duties as before and he was virtually a Security Officer until someone was appointed in his place. In these circumstances, I do not think that the findings of the arbitrators and the award given in respect of this man is in any way vitiated by any error of law. I am inclined to maintain the award so far as this man is concerned. 19. In the result, I allow this appeal, in part. I agree with the learned Single Judge that the award in respect of Anand Prakash Mittal and Brahma Prakash should be quashed but so far as R.D. Soti is concerned, the award, in my opinion, is right and does not call for interference. I accordingly set aside the order of the learned Single Judge so far it relates to Soti and restore the award of the arbitrators. Under the circumstances, I make no orders as to costs. PATHAK, J. :- 20. I agree with my brother Gulati that in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1963 SC 874 we must hold that a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution will lie against the impugned award. The question in that case was whether an appeal could lie under Article 136 of the Constitution against an award pronounced by an arbitrator under Section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The appellant submitted that it could lie because a writ in the nature of certiorari under Article 226 would lie against the award. The Supreme Court, rejecting the submission, pointed out that Article 226 was in a sense wider than Article 136 because the power conferred on the High Court to issue certain writs was not conditioned or limited by the requirement that those writs could be issued only against the orders of courts or tribunals. Under Article 226 (1). The Supreme Court, rejecting the submission, pointed out that Article 226 was in a sense wider than Article 136 because the power conferred on the High Court to issue certain writs was not conditioned or limited by the requirement that those writs could be issued only against the orders of courts or tribunals. Under Article 226 (1). it was observed, an appropriate writ could be issued to any person or authority including in appropriate cases-; any Government within the territories prescribed. "Therefore, even if the arbitrator appointed under Section 10-A is not a tribunal under Article 136, in an appropriate case a writ may lie against his award under Article 226". The Supreme Court further observed that the arbitrator appointed under Section 10-A cannot be considered as exactly similar to a private arbitrator to whom a dispute had been referred under an arbitration agreement under the Arbitration Act, that the arbitrator under Section 10-A was clothed with certain powers, his procedure was regulated by certain rules and the award pronounced by him was given by statutory provisions a certain validity and a binding character for a specified period, and that, therefore, it was possible to describe such an arbitrator, in a lose sense, a statutory arbitrator. The submission of the learned Solicitor General that the arbitrator appointed under Section 10-A could not be treated as a statutory arbitrator was rejected. From all those observations of the Supreme Court, it seems to me that the Supreme Court clearly implied that a writ under Article 226 could issue against an award made by an arbitrator appointed under Section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. Now, so far as this is concerned, the position appears to me to be substantially the same in respect of an award made by an arbitrator appointed under Section 5-B of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. Keeping in line with the observations of the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1963 SC 874 (Supra), in my opinion, a writ under Article 226 will lie against the impugned award. 21. As regards the merits of the dispute. I am in entire agreement with my brother Gulati that the award in respect of Anand Prakash Mittal and Brahma Prakash should be quashed but no interference is called for so far as R.D. Soti is concerned. 22. 21. As regards the merits of the dispute. I am in entire agreement with my brother Gulati that the award in respect of Anand Prakash Mittal and Brahma Prakash should be quashed but no interference is called for so far as R.D. Soti is concerned. 22. The appeal is allowed in so far only that the order of the learned single Judge in respect of R.D. Soti is set aside, and to that extent the award of the arbitrator is restored. There is no order as to costs. BY THE COURT 23. For the reasons contained in our respective judgments, the appeal is allowed in part inasmuch as the order of the learned single Judge is set aside in so far as it relates to R.D. Soti and to that extent the award of the arbitrator is restored. We make no order as to costs.