ORDER K.B. Srivastava, J. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, arises out of a service matter. 2. The petitioner Sriprakash Ojha was appointed as a Rakshak (Railway Protection Force) on January 10. 1967 and was placed on probation for a period of two years. He received a notice (Annexure 1), dated September 12, 1968 intimating that although a particular residential quarter had been allotted to Rakshak Surendra Singh, the latter had delivered possession over it to the petitioner in June, 1968 and although the petitioner was required to vacate it, he had failed to do so and continued his unauthorised possession which rendered his conduct unsatisfactory. It further mentioned that taking in view the above lapse on his part, it was considered that his further retention in service was not in the interest of the department and as such it was proposed to terminate his probation under Rule 25 (ii), Railway Protection Force, Rules, 1959. Before, however the proposed action was taken, the petitioner was allowed seven days' time from the date of the receipt of the notice to make any representation against the proposed action. The petitioner received the notice on September 17, 1968 and on that very date, he submitted his reply (Annexure 2). The Circle Inspector was appointed as an Inquiry Officer, and as a result of that inquiry, the Assistant Security Officer, Opposite party No. 2, passed an order (Annexure 3) on November 19, 1968 imposing the penalty of discharge from service with effect from that date. A copy of the order sheet was made an enclosure to Annexure 3. The petitioner submitted an appeal to the Security Officer but the appeal was dismissed on December 20, 1968. The appellate order was communicated by the Assistant Security Officer to the petitioner, vide Annexure 4, on December 23, 1968. The petitioner then instituted the writ petition on March 17, 1969 praying for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the Assistant Security Officer's order discharging him from service and the Security Officer's order dismissing his appeal and for a writ of mandamus commanding the Union of India and the Assistant Security Officer, opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2, to treat the petitioner as still in service. 1 and 2, to treat the petitioner as still in service. It is rather surprising that even though there is the prayer for the quashing of the Security Officer's order, he has not been impleaded as an opposite party. 3. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the two orders cast a stigma and, therefore, amount to punishment. His further contention is that the impugned orders have imposed (as?) a punishment and even though they are camouflaged as innocuous orders of discharge, they are, in fact and reality, orders of dismissal or removal from service and these orders could not have been passed without compliance with the provisions contained in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and since no second show cause notice was ever issued, therefore, these unconstitutional orders require to be quashed. 4. The elaborate discussion in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1958 SC 36 has reference to all stages of employment in the public services including temporary posts, probationers, as also confirmed officers. In so far- as those observations have a bearing on the termination of services or discharge of a probationary public servant, they may be summarised as follows :- 1. Appointment to a post on probation gives to the person so appointed no right to the post and his service may be terminated, without taking recourse to the proceedings laid down in the relevant rules for dismissing a public servant, or removing him from service. 2. The termination of employment of a person holding a post on probation without any inquiry whatsoever cannot be said to deprive him of any right to a post and is, therefore, no punishment. 3. But if instead of terminating such a person's service without any inquiry, the employer chooses to hold an inquiry into his alleged misconduct, or inefficiency or for some similar reasons, the termination of service is by way of punishment, because it puts a stigma on his competence and thus affects his future career. In such a case he is entitled to the protection of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. 4. In such a case he is entitled to the protection of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. 4. In the last mentioned case, if the probationer is discharged on any one of those grounds without a proper inquiry and without his getting a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his discharge, it will amount to a removal from service within the meaning of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and will, therefore, be liable to be struck down. 5. But if the employer simply terminates the services of a probationer without holding an inquiry and without giving him a reasonable chance of showing cause against his removal from service, the probationary civil servant can have no cause of action, even though the real motive behind removal from service may have been that his employer thought him to be unsuitable for the post he was temporarily holding, on account of his misconduct or inefficiency, or some such cause. 5. The above then is the general law regarding the termination of the services of a probationer. The learned counsel for the respondents, however, replied that the ratio in Dhingra's case has no application, and indeed, the ratio that has any application is contained in State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das, A.I.R. 1961 SC 177. In that case, one R was appointed in the year 1950 a sub-inspector on probation in the Orissa Police Force. In view of adverse reports received against him on July 25, 1954, notice was served on him calling upon him to show cause why he should not be discharged from service "for gross neglect of duties and unsatisfactory work." In the notice, ten specific instances of neglect of duty and two instances of misconduct, acceptance records, were set out. He submitted his explanation. The D. I. G. in discharging R from service, passed formal order as follows :- "Probationary S.I. Ramnarayan Das ......... is discharged from service for unsatisfactory work and conduct with effect from the date the order is served on him." R then filed a writ petition which was allowed by the High Court. The appeal as against that was, however, allowed by the Supreme Court. Before coming to the decision of the Supreme Court. I would like to clear certain matters. The appeal as against that was, however, allowed by the Supreme Court. Before coming to the decision of the Supreme Court. I would like to clear certain matters. Rule 668 of the Orissa Police Manual provided that the authority empowered to make the appointment may at any time within the period of probation and without the formalities laid down in Rule 820 remove the officer directly appointed who had not fulfilled the conditions of his appointment and who had shown himself unfit for such appointment. Rule 681 provided that those appointed shall be on probation for a period of two years. At the end of that period, those pronounced competent and fit will be confirmed. The others will be discharged. Rule 55-B of the Orissa Civil Services (Classification. Control and Appeal) Rules provided that where it is proposed to determine the employment of a probationer whether during or at the end of the period of probation, for any specific fault or on account of his unsuitability for service, the probationer shall be apprised of the grounds of such proposal and given an opportunity to show cause against it, before orders are passed by the authority competent to terminate the employment. It is in view of these service rules, that the Supreme Court held that the discharge was valid. It made the following observations :- "The respondent had no right to the post held by him. Under the terms of the employment, the respondent, could be discharged in the manner provided by Rule 55-B. Again mere termination of employment does not carry with it "any evil consequences" such as forfeiture of his pay or allowances, loss of his seniority, stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, etc. It is then difficult to appreciate what "indelible stigma affecting the future career" of the respondent was cast on him by the order discharging him from employment for unsatisfactory work and conduct. The use of the expression "discharge" in the order terminating employment of a public servant is not decisive, it may, in certain cases, amount to dismissal. If a confirmed public servant holding a substantive post is discharged, the order would amount to dismissal or removal from service, but an order discharging a temporary public servant may or may not amount to dismissal. If a confirmed public servant holding a substantive post is discharged, the order would amount to dismissal or removal from service, but an order discharging a temporary public servant may or may not amount to dismissal. Whether it amounts to an order of dismissal depends upon the nature of the enquiry, if any, the proceedings taken therein and the substance of the final order passed on such enquiry. Where under the rules governing a public servant holding a post on probation, an order terminating the probation is to be preceded by a notice to show cause why his service should not be terminated, and a notice is issued asking the public servant to show cause whether probation should be continued or the officer should be discharged from service the order discharging him cannot be said to amount to dismissal involving punishment. Undoubtedly, the Government may hold a formal enquiry against a probationer on charges of misconduct with a view to dismiss him from service, and if an order terminating his employment is made in such an enquiry, without giving him reasonable opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him within the meaning of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, the order would undoubtedly be invalid .............. Then enquiry against the respondent was for ascertaining whether he was fit to be confirmed. An order discharging a public servant, even if a probationer, in an enquiry on charges of misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, may appropriately be regarded as one by way of punishment, but an order discharging a probationer following upon an enquiry to ascertain whether he should be confirmed, is not of that nature." 6. The principle of law enunciated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ram Narayan's case, A.I.R. 1961 SC 177 depended largely upon the Orissa Rules which provided that where it was proposed to determine the employment of a probationer whether during or at the end of the period of probation, for any specific fault or on account of his un-suitability for service, the probationer shall be apprised of the grounds of such proposal and given an opportunity to show cause against it, before an order could be passed to terminate the employment. If the rules, therefore, do not so provide, the general law referred to in Dhingra's case, A.I.R. 1958 SC 36 will have full application. 7. If the rules, therefore, do not so provide, the general law referred to in Dhingra's case, A.I.R. 1958 SC 36 will have full application. 7. Let us see, therefore, as to what are the rules applicable to the petitioner. Rule 25, Railway Protection Force Rules, reads thus, 25. Probation. (1) All appointments by direct recruitment ................... shall be on probation for two years subject to the provision that the appointing authority may extend this period in special cases. (2) The appointing authority shall, on the expiry of the period of such probation or such extended period, pass an order declaring that the probationer has completed the period of probation satisfactorily and is suitable for confirmation in that rank. If he considers him unsuitable, the probationer shall be informed in writing of the reasons for terminating his probation and given an opportunity to submit any representation he may wish to make within a reasonable time and any representation submitted within that time shall also be considered and final orders passed by such authority." The natural construction that can be placed on the above rule is quite clear. The period of probation is two years. However, the appointing authority has the power to extend it beyond that in special cases. On the completion of the period of probation or of the extended period, the appointing authority has to make an assessment regarding the suitability or unsuitability of the officer for confirmation. If he regards him as suitable, he will pass an order confirming him. However, if he considers him unsuitable, he cannot pass an order terminating his probation except after compliance with the procedure mentioned in the rule, namely, the issue of a notice incorporating the reasons for the proposed termination, the giving of an opportunity to the officer to submit his representation and the consideration of that representation, before the order terminating his service can be passed. This rule has no application to termination during the period of probation. It applies only to the stage after the period of probation is over or after the extended period of probation is over, as the case may be. It cannot be resorted to while the period of probation is still on. My attention has been invited to Rule 41. The explanation added to Rule 41 gives exceptions to punishments. It applies only to the stage after the period of probation is over or after the extended period of probation is over, as the case may be. It cannot be resorted to while the period of probation is still on. My attention has been invited to Rule 41. The explanation added to Rule 41 gives exceptions to punishments. Clause (viii) says that termination of service of a member of the Force appointed on probation, during or at the end of the period of probation, in accordance with the terms of his appointment or the rules or orders governing probation shall not amount to a penalty. No rule has been cited before me to show that the procedure prescribed under Rule 25 (2) shall mutatis mutandis apply to proposed termination during the currency of the probation as distinguished from after its completion. Unless the rules so provide. Ram Narayan's case, A.I.R. 1961 SC 177 will have no application. 8. The result is that the termination of the petitioner's probation was brought about in an illegal manner. I have no hesitation, therefore, in quashing the order passed by the Assistant Security Officer. The difficulty arises with regard to the question of quashing of the appellate order passed by the Security Officer dismissing the petitioner's appeal. The Security Officer has not been impleaded as a party perhaps on account of gross negligence. The learned counsel possibly thought that Annexure 4 was the order passed by the Assistant Security Officer although it was an order merely communicating that order. In any case, the Security Officer should have been impleaded as a party. This blemish should not, however, stand as an obstacle in doing full justice. L therefore, quash the appellate order also. 9. Altogether, therefore, the writ petition is allowed in the manner stated above. In the circumstances of the case, however, the costs shall be easy.