Judgment :- 1. The petitioners in this Criminal Miscellaneous Petition are the 'A' party in M. C.11 of 1971 on the 61e of the Executive First Class Magistrate, Perintalmanna. They challenged the order of the learned magistrate placing the property in dispute, in the hands of the Village Officer as receiver. This the learned magistrate has done under proviso 3 to S.145 (4) Cr. P. C. According to the revision petitioners the magistrate has gone in excess of the power conferred on him under the proviso. 2. The question therefore that arises for decision is whether under S.145 of the Code a receiver could be appointed by the magistrate. On a strict view of the provisions of S.145 it must be said that the court has no power. There are clear provisions in the Code for appointment of receiver in certain other situations, as for instance, under S, 88 in respect of a proclaimed offender and under S.146 (2) when the magistrate is unable to decide as to which of the parties was in possession of the subject of dispute on the date of the initiation of the proceedings. When the legislature has omitted to make such a provision under S.145 it must be taken, as observed by the Supreme Court in Nathia Agarwala v. Jahanara Begum ((1966) II S. C. W. R.48) under a similar situation, that such omission or departure is deliberate. S.145, as it stands, does not provide for the appointment of a receiver during the pendency of the dispute. Learned counsel for the respondents took me to some decisions which say that if the magistrate has power to attach under S.145 (4), it must be inferred that be is clothed with the power of appointing receiver to take charge of the attached property also. In my view, when the Legislature has deliberately omitted to provide for the appointment of a receiver under S.145, such inference will not be justified. At the same time it must be conceded that the right to attach, carries with it the right to take necessary steps for the custody and management of the property attached. "Attach" means, to take or apprehend by command-mentor writ or precept (see Wharton's Law Lexicon). By virtue of the attachment, the property is placed in "custodia legis" (in the keeping of the law). "Attach" means, to take or apprehend by command-mentor writ or precept (see Wharton's Law Lexicon). By virtue of the attachment, the property is placed in "custodia legis" (in the keeping of the law). There can, therefore, be no doubt that by the attachment the property comes under the custody of the court. This position has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Deo Kuer v. Sheo Prasad (AIR. 1966 SC. 359). Their Lordships observed: 'The position in the case of an attachment under S.145 of the Criminal P. C. is the same. In a suit for declaration of title to property filed when it stands attached under S.145 of the Criminal P. C., it is unnecessary to ask for the further relief of delivery of possession. Assuming that in the case of such an attachment, the Magistrate holds possession on behalf of the party whom he ultimately finds to have been in possession, the fact is irrelevant. It is unnecessary to ask for possession when property is in custodia legis. Property under attachment under S.145 of the Criminal P.C. is in custodia legis." In that case, on the date of the civil suit the property was under attachment by a magistrate under powers conferred by S.145 Cr. P. C., and was not in the possession of any party. It was conceded by the parties that in the case of an attachment under S.146 of the Code, a suit for a simple declaration of title without prayer for delivery of possession is competent. But it was contended that the position in the case of attachment under S.145 of the Code is different as in such a case, the magistrate holds possession for the party who is ultimately found by him to have been in possession. The court held that in a suit for declaration of title to property filed when it stands attached under S.145 of the Code, it is not necessary to ask for the further relief of the delivery of possessions, because possession is already with the magistrate and the successful party can get delivery from the magistrate. It is thus clear that by attachment under S.145 the property attached, passes on to the possession of the magistrate. The next step will therefore, be to make arrangements for the management of the property so attached. It is thus clear that by attachment under S.145 the property attached, passes on to the possession of the magistrate. The next step will therefore, be to make arrangements for the management of the property so attached. Courts have held that under such circumstances the magistrate has power and the right, to make suitable arrangements to maintain such possession. The authorities are Maung San U v. Maung Lu Gale (AIR. 1938 Rangoon 88); Nandkishore v. Radhakishun (AIR. 1943 Pat. 124) and Jethmul Bhojraj v. Harbans Narain Singh (AIR. 1955 Patna 92). In the Rangoon decision the court observed: "Under S.145 (4) a Magistrate has no power to appoint a receiver and to give in his charge the property in dispute. It can at the most attach it, bat the Code does not make it clear by what method the attachment is to be effected. Bat if the analogy of S.88 were to be followed, the Magistrate ought to attach the land through the Collector of the District. The word "attach" merely means to bring under the control of the Court, and the Magistrate is entitled to effect that object in any way which is within his power. The appointment of a receiver with the powers of a receiver under the Civil Procedure Code is not one of those ways because unless that power is expressly given, a Magistrate cannot exercise it. At the same, time, if the Magistrate's attachment is to be effected Magistrate must put some person into.possession of the property who will have authority to maintain his possession. However the word "receiver" should not be applied to such person because of possibilities of misunderstanding." In Nandkishore v. Radhakishun (AIR. 1943 Pat. 124) the Division Bench observed: "The effect of an attachment under the proviso to S.145 (4) is to bring the property under the custody or control of the Magistrate. The parties no longer have any control or possession over the property and the Magistrate may take such steps as be thinks fit for its proper custody and management. It is therefore competent for the Magistrate to settle the land attached pending the disposal of the case. Such action does not militate against S.145 (8)". On the same lines is the decision in Jethmul Bhojraj v. Harbans Narain Singh (AIR. 1955 Patna 92). It is therefore competent for the Magistrate to settle the land attached pending the disposal of the case. Such action does not militate against S.145 (8)". On the same lines is the decision in Jethmul Bhojraj v. Harbans Narain Singh (AIR. 1955 Patna 92). The result therefore, is that even though the court is not empowered in so many words under S.145 to place the property attached in the hands of a receiver, it can take necessary steps to settle the property some way or other, so that the court's possession might be maintained. Such steps the court is bound to take, as by the attachment the property has fallen into the hands of the court. Exactly the same thing has been done by the Magistrate in the instant case also. After attachment, he has placed the property in the hands of the village officer to be looked after by him on behalf of the court. Of course, it is incorrect and inappropriate to call the village officer the receiver in respect" of the property. 3. Even if the matter is looked at from the stand point of avoidance of a ' breach of peace which is the primary object of the section, it is necessary for the court to take custody of the property. The security proceeding contemplated under S.145 is initiated by the magistrate when he is satisfied on police report or other information that a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace exists concerning any land, water, boundaries etc. The likelihood of a breach of peace is what confers jurisdiction on the magistrate and in the present case also it was reported that 'A' party and 'B' party are scrambling for possession, and if that is allowed to continue like that, a breach of peace was quite likely. The correct step open to the court in such circumstances will be to assume possession of the property and leave the parties to settle their claims in the court. It would therefore be incorrect to say that the property cannot be taken possession of by the court as under the section the only right conferred is to attach the property. This argument overlooks the legal consequences of an attachment under S.145. The matter is only in the preliminary stage and 1 do not see any reason to interfere at this stage. This argument overlooks the legal consequences of an attachment under S.145. The matter is only in the preliminary stage and 1 do not see any reason to interfere at this stage. The Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is, therefore, dismissed and the case is sent back for disposal according to law..