M. R. A. ANSARI ( 1 ) THE appellant filed an application before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, hereinafter referred to as the Act claiming compensation of Rs. 10,000. 00 for injuries sustained by him in a motor accident on 53. 1962. According to that the appellant was crossing the road opposite to the Regal Building in Parliament Street at about 3. 30 p. m. on the date of the accident after satisfying himself that there was a red signal against the vehicular traffic coming from the Parliament Street towards connaught Circus. When the appellant was half-way across the road, the first respondent came driving the car at a fast speed and ignoring the road signal, continued to drive the car and knocked down the appellant. The appellant sustained a fracture on his leg. The accident occurred only due to the rash and negligent driving of the car by the first respondent. The appellant was removed to the hospital and his right leg was put under plaster. He had to remain in the hospital till 14. 3. 1962. Even after discharge from the hospital, he had to continue the treatment as an outdoor patient till 30th May, 1962. The injuries resulted in permanent partial disability and had affected his earning capacity. He estimated the compensation at Rs. 10,000. 00and claimed this amount from. the driver-owner of the car, the first repondent herein, and the insurance company with which the car was insured, the second respondent herein. ( 2 ) THE application was resisted by the respondents mainly on the ground that the accident took place only due to the negligence of the appellant himself inasmuch as he had crossed the road at a place not meant for pedestrians and also at a time when there was a green signal at the traffic point permitting the vehicles to proceed. The following issues were framed by the Tribunal : 1. Whether the petitioner was injured in accident due to rash and negligent driving of respondent No. 1 ? 2. To what amount as compensation is the petitioner entitled ? 3. Whether the petitioner was guilty of contributory negligence ? 4. Relief. The following issues were framed by the Tribunal : 1. Whether the petitioner was injured in accident due to rash and negligent driving of respondent No. 1 ? 2. To what amount as compensation is the petitioner entitled ? 3. Whether the petitioner was guilty of contributory negligence ? 4. Relief. On a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by both the parties the learned Tribunal held that the accident occurred only due to the negligence of the appellant himself and not due to the rash or negligent driving of the car by the first respondent. He therefore dismissed the application filed by the appellant. The latter has now preferred the present appeal against the said order of the learned Tribunal. ( 3 ) THE first question for consideration is whether the accident took place as a result of rashness or negligence of the first respondent or whether it took place on account of the negligence of the appellant himself. In addition to the appellant, one more alleged eye-witness was examined by the appellant, in support of his case that the accident occurred due to the fault of the first respondent. A. W. 1 is Trilok Nath. He stated that he and the appellant were standing on the foot-path near the Regal Building and that the appellant crossed the road in front of the building. He beard a crash and saw that the appellant had been knocked down by the car. He then informed the appellant s wife on the telephone. The presence of this witness at the time of the accident appears to be doubtful. He admittedly is an interested witness because he is a colleague of the appellant who worked in the same office in which the appellant was working. Although he was a friend of the appellant still he did not remain at the scene of the accident till the arrival of the police nor did he give any report to the police about the accident. The report about the accident is said to have been given by one Trilochan Singh who, however, has not been examined as a witness. A. W. 1 also did not accompany the appellant to the hospital. A. W. 5 is the appellant himself. He does not throw much light upon the manner in which the accident occurred. The report about the accident is said to have been given by one Trilochan Singh who, however, has not been examined as a witness. A. W. 1 also did not accompany the appellant to the hospital. A. W. 5 is the appellant himself. He does not throw much light upon the manner in which the accident occurred. He simply stated that when he was crossing the road he was knocked down by a car and became conscious and when he regained unconsciousness, he found himself on the foot-path. ( 4 ) ON the other hand, the evidence adduced on behalf of the respondents is also of a very doubtful character. Apart from the first respondent, two other witnesses, Rattan Lal and Manchanda, were examined in support of the respondent s case. These two witnesses are in the nature of interested witnesses, because, admittedly, they were having business dealings with the first respondent and there is no guarantee of their being present at the time of the accident. They were not examined by the police. The learned Tribunal was, therefore, right in not placing any reliance upon their evidence. ( 5 ) THE learned Tribunal was, no doubt, right in his view that the burden of proving that the accident occurred due to the rashness or negligence of the first respondent lay upon the appellant and that if he failed to discharge this onus satisfactorily, the weakness of the respondent s evidence would not matter. But the learned Tribunal did not take into consideration two factors which supported the appellant s case, namely, (1) the admission made by the first respondent in the criminal Court that the accident was due to his rashness and negligence, and (2) the circumstances under which the accident occurred. The first respondent was challenged by the police in connection with this accident and when a charge was framed against him to the effect that the accident occurred due to his rashness and negligence, he pleaded guilty to the the charge and was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 600. 00. The learned counsel for the appellants contends that the conviction of the first respondent by the Criminal Court was conclusive evidence of the rashness and negligence of the first respondent and that the judgment of the criminal Court was binding upon the Tribunal. 600. 00. The learned counsel for the appellants contends that the conviction of the first respondent by the Criminal Court was conclusive evidence of the rashness and negligence of the first respondent and that the judgment of the criminal Court was binding upon the Tribunal. In support of this contention, he has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Sadhu Singh v. The Punjab Roadways and another1, in which Mr. Justice D. K. Mahajan held that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was a statutory Tribunal and was bound by the judgment of the criminal Court. In so holding, the learned judge has relied upon adecision of Madras High Court in Jerome D silva v. The Regional Transport Authority3 and a judgment of the Mysore High Court in the case of P. Channappa v. Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal3 With respect, these two decisions do not really support the view taken by Mr. Justice Mahajan. In both these cases, the statutory Tribunal on which the judgment of the criminal Court was held to be binding was the Road Transport Authority. In these cases, the driver of the motor vehicle was prosecuted in a criminal Court and was acquitted. But the Road Transport Authority were seeking to cancel his licence on the same charge on which he was prosecuted and acquitted. It was on these facts that it was held in these cases that it was not open to the statutory Tribunal to make a fresh enquiry into the same charge which had already been enquired into by the criminal Court. On the other hand, there is a direct decision of Madras High Court under the Motor Vehicles Act which lays down the scope of the power of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. This is the case Krishnan Asari and another v. Adaikalam and others. After referring to the case law on the subject, the High Court held that any decision of a criminal case could not be relied on as one binding in a civil action and that equally the findings in a civil proceeding were not binding on a subsequent prosecution founded upon the same or similar allegations. After referring to the case law on the subject, the High Court held that any decision of a criminal case could not be relied on as one binding in a civil action and that equally the findings in a civil proceeding were not binding on a subsequent prosecution founded upon the same or similar allegations. There is a decision of the Mysore High Court on the point in Seethamma and others v. Benedict D sa and others in which also it was held that the mere fact that the driver of the bus who was prosecuted for rash and negligent driving had been acquitted would not be a proof of the fact that he was not guilty of negligence. The acquittal order has to be construed in the circumstances of each case. The purpose for which such order of acquittal could be used was only to prove that there was an order of acquittal and nothing more. With respect, therefore, I cannot agree with the view expressed by Mr. Justice Mahajan in the case referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant and I cannot on the strength of the judgment of the criminal court alone hold that the respondent was guilty of rashness or negligence. ( 6 ) BUT the plea of guilty made by the first respondent in the criminal case can be used as an admission just like any other piece of evidence. Supposing the first respondent had been examined as a witness on his own behalf in the criminal case and in his evidence, he had admitted that the accident took place due to his rashness or negligence and the first respondent in the proceedings before the Tribunal instituted by the appellant had denied, his rashness or negligence, his evidence in the criminal case can be used to contradict him. In the same manner, the evidence of the appellant in the proceedings before the learned Tribunal may be contradicted by his plea of guilty in the criminal case. The learned Tribunal has, however, brushed aside this piece of evidence on the ground that the respondent had given a satisfactory explanation for making such an admission in the criminal Court. In the same manner, the evidence of the appellant in the proceedings before the learned Tribunal may be contradicted by his plea of guilty in the criminal case. The learned Tribunal has, however, brushed aside this piece of evidence on the ground that the respondent had given a satisfactory explanation for making such an admission in the criminal Court. The explanation offered by the first respondent is that he was planning to go abroad and did not want to be detained in this country by reason of the protraction of the Criminal case against him and that, therefore, he pleaded guilty to the charge with a view to expedite the termination or the criminal case. It is surprising that the learned Tribunal has accepted this explanation. The first respondent would not have anticipated the nature of the sentence that would have been awarded against him by the criminal Court. If he had been sentenced to undergo imprisonment, then, obvicusly, his purpose in pleading guilty to the charge would be frustrated. I cannot countenance the plea that the criminal Court had given an assurance to the first respondent that he would only be sentenced to pay a fine in case he pleaded guilty to the charge. ( 7 ) THE second circumstance which has not been taken into consideration by the learned Tribunal is that the accident took place in broad day light and at a crowded place. Even if it is assumed that the appellant crossed the road at a time when there was a green signal permitting the vehicular traffic approaching from parliament street to proceed towards Connaught Circus, a duty is cast upon the driver of a motor vehicle to proceed in such a manner as to avoid an accident in case a pedestrian suddenly crossed the road. The green signal is not a licence for driving a vehicle without paying due regard to the pedestrians crossing the road. Even according to the first respondent, there was a bus which was obstructing his view and the appellant had suddenly crossed that bus and come in the way of his car. A prudent driver ought to have anticipated such a contingency. There is unfortunately a tendency on the part of drivers of the motor vehicles to proceed at a tremendous speed the moment they get the green signal. This tendency has to be deprecated. A prudent driver ought to have anticipated such a contingency. There is unfortunately a tendency on the part of drivers of the motor vehicles to proceed at a tremendous speed the moment they get the green signal. This tendency has to be deprecated. ( 8 ) THE two circumstances mentioned above, in my view, sufficiently prove that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the first respondent. But at the same time, it has to be found that the appellant was also guilty of contributory negligence. It was as much a duty of the appellant as it was of the first respondent to take precautions before crossing the road. The story that he crossed the road only after seeing the red signal has not been satisfactorily proved. It was his duty to cross the road only after verifying that no vehicular traffic was moving on the road which might accidentally hit him. The accident would have been easily avoided by the appellant if he had observed the necessary precautions. This contributory negligence on the part of the appellant will be relevant on the question of quantum of compensation. ( 9 ) THE Act itself does not prescribe any conditions for the award of compensation nor does it indicate the guide lines for the determination of the amount of compensation. Section 110-B of the Act merely provides for the determination of the amount of compensation by the Claims Tribunal "which appears to it to be just". In order to decide whether a person is entitled to the award of compensation for the injuries sustained by him in a motor accident and also the quantum of compensation to which he is entitled, one has to look to the general law of torts. Winfield in his book on the Law of Tort has defined a tort as follows : "tortious liability arises from the breach of a duty primarily fixed by the law; this duty is towards persons generally and its breach is redressible by an action for unliquidated damages. " ( 10 ) ACCORDING to the same learned author, one of the foundations of tortious liability is negligence. Mr. Justice R. S. Sarkaria has the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. One of the factors that has to be taken into consideration for determining the quantum of compensation is the contributory negligence of the victim of the accident. Mr. Justice R. S. Sarkaria has the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. One of the factors that has to be taken into consideration for determining the quantum of compensation is the contributory negligence of the victim of the accident. ( 11 ) THE learned Tribunal has estimated the general damages at Rs, 3,000. 00 and the special damages at Rs. 1,000. 00. These amounts have been determined after taking into consideration all the relevant factors excepting, of course, the contributory negligence of the appellant. The amount of Rs. 4,100. 00 determined by the learned Tribunal as the total compensation payable to the appellant, if it was held that he was entitled to receive any compensation, would, thus, have to be reduced by half on account of his contributory negligence. The appellant would, thus, be entitled to receive only Rs. 2,050. 00 by way of compensation. Both the respondents will be jointly and severally liable to pay this amount. ( 12 ) IN the result, the order of the learned Tribunal is set aside and the appeal is allowed in part. There shall be no order as to costs.