JUDGMENT W. Broome, J. - These twenty-five writ petitions challenge orders passed on various dates in May, June and July, 1970, terminating the services of the petitioners, two of whom (Nanak Chand petitioner in Writ petition 2808 of 1970, and Subedar Singh, petitioner in Writ Petition 2810 of 1970) were working as Sub-Inspectors of Police while the rest were serving as Police constable. The impugned orders describe the petitioners as temporary employees and state that their services stand terminated from the date of receipt, one month's pay being given in lieu of notice. 2. Two lines of argument have been pursued by learned counsel for the petitioners : (1) that the Police Act and Police Regulations do not contemplate any temporary employment of police officers and consequently the petitioners must be deemed to be permanent members of the Police Force, whose services were not liable to be terminated in this summary fashion, and (2) that a number of police employees junior, to the petitioners have been retained in service, although their records are worse than those of the petitioners and consequently the orders terminating the petitioners' services are discriminatory and violative of Article 16 of the Constitution. 3. The second argument need not detain us long, in view of the clear pronouncements of the Supreme Court on this topic. In Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. The Union of India, A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 1854, it was observed as follows :- "It would be absured to say that if the service of one temporary servant is terminated on the ground of unsatisfactory conduct the services of all similar employees must also be terminated along with him, irrespective of what their conduct is. Therefore even though some of those mentioned in the plaint by the appellant were junior to him and did not have as good qualifications as he had and were retained in service, it does not follow that the action taken against the appellant terminating his services was discriminatory for that action was taken on the basis of his unsatisfactory conduct. A question of discrimination may arise in a case of retrenchment on account of abolition of one of several temporary posts of the same kind in one office but can in our opinion never arise in the case of dispensing with the services of a particular temporary employee on account of his conduct being unsatisfactory. A question of discrimination may arise in a case of retrenchment on account of abolition of one of several temporary posts of the same kind in one office but can in our opinion never arise in the case of dispensing with the services of a particular temporary employee on account of his conduct being unsatisfactory. We therefore reject the contention that the appellant was denied the protection of Article 16 and was treated in a discriminatory manner." This view was reiterated in the later case of Union of India v. Prem Prakash Midha, 1969 S.L.R. 655, in which the following observations were made :- "The District Court also held that when the service of the respondent was terminated and officers junior to him were retained in service, the respondent was denied equal opportunity to hold public service under Article 16 of the Constitution. But there is nothing in Article 16 of the Constitution which supports the view expressed by the learned District Judge. By Article 16 all citizens are entitled to equality or opportunity in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. By merely terminating the employment of the respondent, the respondent was not denied of equal opportunity to hold public service. Under Article 16 of the Constitution, it is not one of the fundamental rights that a person who is an employee of the State shall be entitled to continue in service and that his employment shall not be terminated so long as persons junior to him remain in service." In view of these unequivocal pronouncements we are satisfied that the present petitioners cannot make out any case of discrimination under Article 16. 4. We may thus confine our attention to the first argument viz., that the petitioners could not be treated as mere temporary employees because the Police Act and Police Regulations do not contemplate the creation of any temporary posts in the Police Force. This question has already been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Hukum Singh Verma v. State of U.P., Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4961 of 1964 decided on 13-12-1968, and the argument was replied; but it appears that when the present petitions were filed, the learned judges constituting the Admission Bench felt that the decision in that case required reconsideration. That is how these cases came to be referred to a Full Bench for disposal. Writ Petition No. 4961 of 1964 decided on 13-12-1968, and the argument was replied; but it appears that when the present petitions were filed, the learned judges constituting the Admission Bench felt that the decision in that case required reconsideration. That is how these cases came to be referred to a Full Bench for disposal. 5. In every one of these petitions counter-affidavits have been filed on behalf of the State, asserting that the petitioners were employed in a temporary capacity and have never been made permanent. In the case of the two petitioners who were working as Sub-Inspectors (writ petitions 2808 and 2810) the notices published in the Police Gazette, calling for applications for enlistment in the police-force, which resulted in their being recruited, have been filed as Annexure A to the counter-affidavits; and these notices clearly show that the posts were advertised as temporary (asthai). Similarly the appointment and posting orders passed in respect of the same two petitioners, filed as Annexure B to the counter-affidavits in those cases, show that the petitioners were appointed as Sub-Inspectors in a purely temporary capacity, though it was indicated that they might be absorbed in permanent vacancies, as and when such vacancies occurred, provided they were considered suitable by the D.I.G. But the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners is that despite the clear declarations given both in the notices inviting applications and in the appointment and posting orders, the petitioners should nevertheless be deemed to hold permanent posts, because there is no provisions for the creation of temporary posts in the relevant Act and Rules. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners relies on the provisions of Section 243 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which lays down that :- "the conditions of service of the subordinate ranks of the various police forces in India shall be such as may be determined by or under the Acts relating to those forces respectively." These provisions, it is argued, have been kept alive by Article 313 of the Constitution; and consequently the conditions of service in the police-force are still governed entirely by the Police Act, 1861, and the rules that have been framed and the orders and notifications that have been issued thereunder. Great stress is laid by learned counsel for the petitioners on the opening words of Section 2 of the Police Act, which state that "the entire police-establishment under a State Government shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be one police-force and shall be formally enrolled," and on Section 8, which provides that "every police officer appointed to the police-force (other than an LG., D.I.G. or Assistant I.G.) shall receive on his appointment a certificate in the form annexed to this Act by virtue of which the person holding such certificate shall be vested with the powers, functions and privileges of a police-officer". These sections of the Act, it is argued, show that everyone who is recruited to the police-force has to be enrolled and is granted a certificate where by he becomes a full-fledged police-officer, vested with all the powers that are to be exercised by such an officer; and it is suggested that this implies that no police-officer can ordinarily be recruited on a temporary basis. The only instances of temporary recruitment envisaged by the Act, according to learned counsel for the petitioners, are the special cases mentioned in Secs. 13. 14, 15 and 17 of the Act, which deal with the deputing of special contingents of police to meet local emergencies and the appointment of private individuals as special police constables. In support of his contention learned counsel has further placed reliance on paragraph 396 of the Police Regulations, which states that the Police Force consists of Provincial Police (Civil, Armed and Mounted), Government Railway Police and Village Chaukidars, as well as on Paragraphs 406 and 409, which relate to the appointment of Sub-Inspectors and Constables by the D.I.G. and the Superintendent of Police respectively. 7. We are unable to see, however, how the provisions in the Police Act and in the Police Regulations to which our attention has been drawn can be said to support the argument put forward by learned counsel for the petitioners. No section of the Police Act and no Paragraph of the Police Regulations has been brought to our notice that is incompatible with the existence of temporary posts in the police-force. No section of the Police Act and no Paragraph of the Police Regulations has been brought to our notice that is incompatible with the existence of temporary posts in the police-force. Sec. 2 of the Police Act lays down that the police establishment under a State Government "shall be constituted in such manner as shall from time to time be ordered by the State Government"; and this power to constitute the police-force clearly includes the power to create all kinds of posts in that force, both permanent and temporary. The mere fact that when a police-officer joins the police-force, he is formally enrolled therein by being given a certificate in accordance with Section 8, investing him with all the powers, functions and privileges of the police-officer, in no way implies that he must be a permanent officer, for there seems to be no reason why a temporary employee should not also be invested with all these powers. And even assuming that Secs. 13, 14, 15 and 17 of the Act relate to temporary appointments (which is decidedly doubtful in the case of the first three sections) , there is nothing to suggest that these are the only temporary appointments that can be made under the Police Act. Ample material has been produced on behalf of the State Government in the counter-affidavits that have been filed in reply to these petition to show that police-officers have been regularly recruited on a temporary basis each year for a considerable number of years; and we can see nothing illegal or incompatible with the provisions of the Police Act in such recruitment. The misapprehension that temporary posts in the Police Force are not contemplated by the Police Act and the Police Regulations seems to have arisen on account of the complete absence from the police Regulations of any rules or instructions in respect of temporary police-officers. But this is probably due to the fact that the Regulations in question were framed long ago, at a time when it was not considered necessary to have any temporary posts. 8. Learned counsel for tine petitioners has tried to make capital out of the provisions of Chapters XXXVI and XXXVII of the Police Regulations, on the basis of which he argues that every recruit to the Police Force must automatically become a probationer. with a tenure far less precarious than that of a mere temporary employee. 8. Learned counsel for tine petitioners has tried to make capital out of the provisions of Chapters XXXVI and XXXVII of the Police Regulations, on the basis of which he argues that every recruit to the Police Force must automatically become a probationer. with a tenure far less precarious than that of a mere temporary employee. Chapter XXXVI, which deals with the training of Sub-Inspectors, contains the following paragraphs which as relied upon in support of this contention : "P. 534. From the date on which they are posted to districts as sub-inspectors, civil police, sub-inspectors shall be on probation for a period of two years, on the expiry of which if he consider them fit for permanent appointment, they may be confirmed by the Deputy Inspector General. P. 535. During the period of their probation they will be required to undergo a course of practical training as follows in all branches of police work .................... Sub-Inspectors on probation may be confirmed in their appointments by the Deputy Inspector General after the expiry of the probationary period of two years prescribed in paragraph 534. P. 537. The Deputy Inspector General may, on his own authority- (i) discharge a probationary sub-inspector who was selected for the Police Training College Course by direct recruitment or, (ii) revert to his substantive rank a probationary sub-inspector who was selected for the Police Training College Course under paragraph 445 of the Police Regulations. ... Any probationary sub-inspector against whom an order of discharge or reversion is likely to be passed, will be supplied in writing with the specific complainants and grounds on which he deserves punishment and he should be called upon to show cause why he should not be so punished. The probationary sub-inspector must furnish his representations in writing and it will be duly considered by the Deputy Inspector General of Police before passing the order of discharge or reversion ... If for some reason which should be recorded in writing the Deputy Inspector General of Police is of opinion that the probationary sub-inspector was still unfit to be confirmed the period of probation may be extended for a period not exceeding one year. If for some reason which should be recorded in writing the Deputy Inspector General of Police is of opinion that the probationary sub-inspector was still unfit to be confirmed the period of probation may be extended for a period not exceeding one year. The reason for postponing confirmation and the period for which it has been postponed shall be communicated to the probationary sub-inspector concerned." Similar provisions for probation are to be found in Chapter XXXVII of the Police Regulations, which prescribes the training for constables. Paragraph 541, dealing with constable recruits, lays down that :- "(1) . Recruits will be on probation for a period of two years. ................................................................ If during the period of probation their conduct and work have been satisfactory and they are approved by the Deputy Inspector General of police at the end of the period of probation for service in the force the Superintendent of Police will confirm them in their appointment. (2) In any case in which either during or at the end of the period of probation, the Superintendent of Police is of opinion that a recruit is unlikely to make a good police-officer he may dispense with his services. Before, however, this is done the recruit must be supplied with specific complaints and grounds on which it is proposed to discharge him and then he should be called upon to show cause as to why he should not be discharged. The recruit must furnish his representation in writing and it will be duly considered by the Superintendent of Police before passing the orders of discharge." Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that all the petitioners, having passed through the prescribed training courses and having been attached to police stations, must be deemed to have become probationers, in accordance with the above-quoted provisions of Chapters XXXVI and XXXVII of the Police Regulations, with the result that their services could not be terminated without affording them to show cause against the proposed action, even assuming that they still remain probationers and have not been confirmed as permanent police officers on the expiry of their probationary period. We are fully satisfied, however, that Chapters XXXVI and XXXVII were never meant to apply to temporary recruits. We are fully satisfied, however, that Chapters XXXVI and XXXVII were never meant to apply to temporary recruits. Moreover the paragraphs on which reliances has been placed have not been shown to have statutory force; and to us it appears that they thereby embody administrative directions as to what is necessary by way of training and experience before a police officer can be considered fit for permanent appointment. It has been explained in the supplementary counter-affidavits filed on behalf of the State that the procedure now followed by the police administration is to keep all recruits in temporary posts until the Head of the Department decided to bring them into the permanent strength, whereupon those who are found suitable are absorbed in clear vacancies, the last two year of temporary service being then counted as a probationary period. 9. It has been argued that the impugned orders of termination are bad because there is no specific provision in the Police Act or Police Regulations for such termination of services. But temporary police officers, like other temporary Government servants, are obviously covered by the Notification dated 30-1-1953 that has been reproduced in Appendix 1I to the Civil Services (classification, Control and Appeal) Rules and their Services are terminable on one month's notice or one months' pay in lieu of notice. Learned counsel for the petitioners points out that this Notification was issued in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and contends that it cannot apply to members of the Police Force, since they are governed solely by the provisions of the Police Act and the rules issued thereunder. But even if it is correct to say that only the Police Act and its rules can regulate the conditions of service of police-officer, we see no difficulty in applying the Notification in question to the petitioners, since it can be treated as having been issued, as regards police officers, in exercise of the rule-making power conferred on the State Government by Section 46 (2) of the Police Act. 10. Our conclusion is that there is no force in the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners that no temporary posts can be created in the Police Force. 10. Our conclusion is that there is no force in the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners that no temporary posts can be created in the Police Force. Sec. 2 of the Police Act is certainly wide enough to permit such posts to be created; and it appears that it is now the general rule in this State for all new recruits to be employed at first in a temporary capacity. We are fully satisfied that all the present petitioners were recruited on this basis and that throughout their service they remained temporary employees, whose services were liable to termination on one months' notice. 11. Neither of the two lines of argument pursued by learned counsel For the petitioners is found to have any force and the petitions must therefore fail. Orders dismissing the petitions with costs were passed by us on 12-5-1971. We promised at that time that we would give our reasons later and that has now been done.