JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - Learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the finding of the Deputy Director of Consolidation that the partition-deed dated 8-7-1964, was not proved, and, hence, was inadmissible in evidence, was legally incorrect. In support reliance has been placed upon Single Judge decision in Khayali Ram v. Joint Director of Consolidation, 1968 A.W.R. 306. In that case, it was submitted that by reason of Section 43 Indian Evidence Act, the judgment of a judicial officer in a previous litigation, was not admissible. This plea was repelled by the learned Judge, on the ground that it was a fresh point, and he was not inclined to permit it to be raised for the first time before him. The learned Judge then observed that "Such a contention .......... would lead to another question as to whether or not the Indian Evidence Act would apply to consolidation proceedings. Without expressing any final opinion on this question, to me it appears that the consolidation authorities not being courts, the proceedings before them are not governed by the Indian Evidence Act; so that the consolidation authorities can rely upon material which may not strictly be admissible according to the Indian Evidence Act." 2. Sec. 1, Indian Evidence Act, provides that the Act applies to all judicial proceedings in or before any court, but not to affidavits presented to any court or officer, not to proceeding before an arbitrator. Sec. 3 of the Evidence Act defines a `court' to include all Judges and Magistrates, and all persons, except arbitrators, legally authorised to take evidence. It will thus be seen that all persons legally authorised to take evidence are courts within meaning of the Evidence Act; and to judicial proceedings before them, the Evidence Act is applicable. 3. Sec. 3 of the Evidence Act defines a `court' to include all Judges and Magistrates, and all persons, except arbitrators, legally authorised to take evidence. It will thus be seen that all persons legally authorised to take evidence are courts within meaning of the Evidence Act; and to judicial proceedings before them, the Evidence Act is applicable. 3. Sec. 38, U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, provides :- "The Director of Consolidation, Deputy Director of Consolidation, Settlement officer, Consolidation, Consolidation Officer and Assistant Consolidation Officer shall have all such powers and rights and privileges as are vested in a civil court on the occasion of any action, in respect of the following matters :- (a) the enforcing of the attendance of witnesses and examining them on oath, affirmation or otherwise and the issue of a commission or request to examine witnesses abroad; (b) compelling any one for the production of any document; (c) the punishing of persons guilty of contempt and a summons signed by such officer may be substituted for and shall be equivalent to any formal process capable of being issued in any action by a civil court for enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of document." It is thus clear that the Consolidations authorities are legally authorised to take evidence. 4. Sec. 40 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act provides that a proceeding before the Director of Consolidation, Dy. Director of Consolidation, Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Consolidation Officer and Assistant Consolidation Officer shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding. Apart from this express provision there can be no doubt that the adjudication of an objection under S. 9-A by the Asstt. Consolidation Officer and the Consolidation Officer, and the adjudication of the appeal and the revision by the Settlement Officer and the Deputy Director of Consolidation are judicial proceedings. These authorities are thus `courts' within meaning of the Evidence Act; the provisions of that Act are applicable to the judicial proceedings before them. In our opinion, the tentative view expressed in Khayali Ram's case, 1968 A.W.R. 306 is not sustainable. 5. Learned Counsel relied upon a Full-Bench decision of this Court in B.N. Singh v. State of U.P., 1969 A.L.J. 862. There, the question was whether an affidavit sworn before an oath Commissioner appointed by the District Judge under Section 139, C.P.C., was admissible before the Consolidation authorities. 5. Learned Counsel relied upon a Full-Bench decision of this Court in B.N. Singh v. State of U.P., 1969 A.L.J. 862. There, the question was whether an affidavit sworn before an oath Commissioner appointed by the District Judge under Section 139, C.P.C., was admissible before the Consolidation authorities. The answer to this question depended upon the answer to the further question whether the authorities constituted under the Consolidation of Holdings Act were courts of civil jurisdiction within meaning of Section 139, C.P.C. The Full Bench, after a review of the various provisions of the Consolidation of Holdings Act, held that these authorities are not courts of civil jurisdiction so as to be governed by the Civil Procedure Code. This decision is in our opinion, distinguishable. Before us, the question is not whether the Consolidation authorities are courts of civil jurisdiction, but whether they are `courts' as defined by the Evidence Act. There, the definition is very wide, and different from the common notions of a court of civil jurisdiction. It may however, be mentioned that Sec. 9-A (3) , Consolidation of Holdings Act, provides that the Asstt. Consolidation Officer, while acting under Sub-Sec. (1) , Consolidation Officer, while acting under Sub-Sec. (2), shall be deemed to be courts of competent jurisdiction. Similarly, Sec. 11 (2) provides that the Settlement Officer hearing an appeal under Sub-Sec. (1) shall be deemed to be a court of competent jurisdiction. Though the phrase `deemed to be' occurring in these provisions may mean that the said authorities are not courts in the real sense of the word, but it would point out to an intent on the part of the Legislature that they were constituted to be courts of competent jurisdiction. From this also, it is clear that they will be courts within meaning of the Evidence Act. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the Court might entertain evidence to prove the document. In our opinion, this is too late a stage for such a proceeding. 7. It was also urged that the document being a registered one, the court was entitled to presume that it was duly executed and attested by the person by whom it purports to have been executed and attested. In this connection, reliance was placed upon Section 90 of the Evidence Act. 7. It was also urged that the document being a registered one, the court was entitled to presume that it was duly executed and attested by the person by whom it purports to have been executed and attested. In this connection, reliance was placed upon Section 90 of the Evidence Act. That Section provides :- "90 (1) where any document, purporting or proved to be twenty years old, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person's hand-writing, and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested. Explanation - Documents are said to be in proper custody if they are in the place in which, and under the care of the person with whom, they would naturally be; but no custody is improper if it is the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable. This explanation applies also to Sec. 81. (2) Where any such document as is referred to in Sub-Sec. (1) was registered in accordance with the law relating to registration of document and a duly certified copy thereof is produced, the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of Will document which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person's handwriting, and in the case of a document executed or attested that it was duly executed and attested by the person by whom it purports to have been executed or attested. 90A (1) Where any registered document or a duly certified copy thereof or any certified copy of a document which is part of the record of a court of justice, is produced from any custody which the court in the particular case considers proper, the court may presume that the original was executed by the person by whom it purports to have been executed. (2) This presumption shall not be made in respect of any document which is the basis of a suit or of a defence or is relied upon in the plaint or written statement. (2) This presumption shall not be made in respect of any document which is the basis of a suit or of a defence or is relied upon in the plaint or written statement. The explanation to Sub-Sec. (1) of Section 90 will also apply to this section." Sec. 90 (1) applies to all unregistered document which is 20 years old. Sub-Sec (2) applied to a document which is 20 years old and, which is registered as well, Neither of these two provisions are attracted to the present case, because the document is less than 20 years old. Sec. 90-A applies to a registered document which is part of the record of a court of justice. The partition-deed relied on by the petitioners, admittedly, did not form part of the record of a court of justice. Consequently, Sec. 90-A will also be inapplicable. Further, the presumption mentioned in Sec. 90-A cannot be raised in view of Sub-Sec. (2) thereof in respect of any document which is the basis of a suit or of a defence or is relied upon in the plaint or the written statement. In the present case, the petitioners relied upon the partition-deed as their document of title. Consequently, the presumption of due execution and attestation mentioned in Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 90-A cannot be raised in respect of this document. Under the circumstances, its execution and attestation had to be proved in accordance with the provisions of the evidence Act. That was admittedly not done. The Deputy Director was justified in holding that the document dated 8-7-1964 was inadmissible in evidence. 8. The petition is rejected.