VENKATAHAMIAH, J. ( 1 ) THESE four writ petitions are filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of india by the management of Modi Printing Works, Gulbarga, questioning the order dt. 2-8-1966 passed on Application (LCH) Nos. 205, 206, 207 and 208 of 1965 on the file of the Labour Court, Hubli, under S. 33c (2) of the industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The fads of the cases arc briefly these. On a reference of an industrial dispute between the petitioner and its workers regarding the termination of services of certain workmen under S. 10 (1) of the Act by the state Government to the Labour Court, Hubli, the Labour Court passed an award in Reference (ID) (LCH) No. 7 of 1962 on 12-7-1962, the operative portion of which read as follows :"in the result, therefore, I pass an award directing the second party to reinstate the four workmen in question, viz, (1) Sharanappa allad, (2) Siddappa Swamy, (3) Basavanappa Biradar, and (4) revanasiddayya Hiremath, with full back wages from 27th March 61 and continuity of service, within one month from the date when this award becomes enforceable. " ( 2 ) AGAINST the said award the petitioner filed a writ petition in WP. 1239 of 1962 on the file of this Court and obtained an interim order staying the enforcement of the award. The said writ petition was dismissed by this court on January 12, 1965. Since the petitioner did not comply with the directions contained in the award, the four workmen in whose favour the award had been passed filed in December 1965 four applications before the Labour Court, Hubli, in LCH Nos. 205 to 208 of 1965 under S. 33c (2) of the Act, praying that the back wages payable to them from 27-3-1961 to 27-11-1965 as per the award may be computed and ordered to be paid. After recording the evidence adduced by the parties and hearing them, the Labour Court ordered that Siddappa Swamy, Revanasiddayya Swamy, basavannappa Biradar and Sharanappa Allad were entitled to receive under the award Rs. 2,800, 5,600, 2,240 and 3,640 respectively. These four writ petitions are filed against the said orders passed by the Labour Court. Sri V. L. Narasimhamurthy appeared for the management (petitioner) in all the petitions. The workmen were absent and unrepresented at the time of hearing. 2,800, 5,600, 2,240 and 3,640 respectively. These four writ petitions are filed against the said orders passed by the Labour Court. Sri V. L. Narasimhamurthy appeared for the management (petitioner) in all the petitions. The workmen were absent and unrepresented at the time of hearing. ( 3 ) SRI Narasimhamurthy raised several contentions in the course of his submissions. They are" (1) that the orders passed by the Labour Court were vitiated as they were opposed to principles of natural justice; (2) that the Labour Court could not entertain these applications since the matter fell exclusively within S. 33c (1) of the Act; (3) that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to decide the applications without a reference by the State Government; (4) that the workmen were not entitled to wages for the period between 27-3-1961 till 21-11-1965 since they -were employed during that period; and (5) that the orders were liable to be set aside on account of the labour Court not summoning some witnesses cited by the management. " ( 4 ) THE first ground urged on behalf of the management was one relating to violation of principles of natural justice by the Labour Court in not allowing Sri R. J. Desai the Vice-President of the Gulbarga District Press owners' Association, who was also an Advocate to represent the management before the Labour Court. It was submitted that permission was denied to him to appear in the cases on the ground that he was an Advocate and that the workmen did not agree for his appearance on behalf of the management. Sri Nararsimhamurthy submitted that the Labour Court was wrong in refusing permissing to Sri R. J. Dcsai since he was not appearing as an Advocate but as an officer of an Association of which the management was a member and under S. 30 of the Act such an officer had a right to appear in the proceedings under the Act ana that the said right was not dependent upon the consent of the workmen. It was submitted that in view of the refusal of the Labour Court to permit Sri R. J. Desai to appear in the case, the impugned orders were liable to be set aside. We find it unnecessary to deal with the question whether Sri R. J. Desai had a right to appear or nol in the circumstances of this case. It was submitted that in view of the refusal of the Labour Court to permit Sri R. J. Desai to appear in the case, the impugned orders were liable to be set aside. We find it unnecessary to deal with the question whether Sri R. J. Desai had a right to appear or nol in the circumstances of this case. We find from the records of the Court below that one R. Swamy has represented the management in the proceed;ngs before the lower Court pursuant to a letter of authorisation given by the management. The questions involved in the case were not at all complicated. It is not shown that there has been failure of justice by not allowing. Sri R. J. Desai to appear jn the case. Parties have filed their respective pleadings and examined witnesses in the case. It may be mentioned here that principles of natuial justice are not a 'mere ritual or dogma' the violation of which always results in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings being vitiated. The proceedings will be vitiated only when it is also shown that such a violation has resulted in failure of justice. On going through the records of the proceedings we are satisfied that the management has not been prejudiced in any way. We, therefore, reject the first contention urged on behalf of the management. ( 5 ) THE next contention was that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the applications under S. 33c (2) of the Act since the matters exclusively fell within S. 33c (1) of the Act. Sub-sees, (1) and (2) of Section 33c of the Act as they are in force now read as follows :"33c. Recovery of money due from an employer. Sub-sees, (1) and (2) of Section 33c of the Act as they are in force now read as follows :"33c. Recovery of money due from an employer. (1) Where any money is due to a workmen from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter V-A, the workmen himself or any other person authorised bv him in writing in this behalf, or, in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue : provided that every such application shall be made within one year from the date on which the money became due to the workman from the employer: provided further that any such application may be entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year, if the appropriate government is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period. (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may. subject to any rules that may be made under this act, be decided by such Labour Court, as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government. " (The rest of the section is unnecessary for our purpose ). ( 6 ) THE legislative history and scope of S. 33c of the Act as it was before it was amended by Act 36 of 1964 has been discussed by the Supreme Court in Chief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. " (The rest of the section is unnecessary for our purpose ). ( 6 ) THE legislative history and scope of S. 33c of the Act as it was before it was amended by Act 36 of 1964 has been discussed by the Supreme Court in Chief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. , Ltd. , v. Rameswar, AIR 1968 SC 218 as follows :" The following propositions on the question as to the scope of s. 33c (2) are deducible from these decisions: (1) The legislative history indicates that the legislature after providing broadly for the investigation and settlement of disputes on the basis of collective bargaining, recognised the need of individual workmen for a speedy remedy to enforce their existing individual rights and therefore inserted S. 33a in 1950 and S. S3c in 1956. These two sections illustrate cases in which individual workmen can enforce their rights without having to take recourse S. 10 (C) and without having to depend on their union to espouse their case. (2) In view of this history two considerations are relevant while construing the scope of S. 33c. Where industrial disputes arise between workmen acting collectively and their employers such disputes must be adjudicated upon in the manner prescribed by the Act, as for instance under S. 10 (1 ). But having regard to the legislative policy to provide a speedy remedy to individual workmen for enforcing their existing rights, it would not be reasonable to exclude their existing rights sought to be implemented by individual workmen. Therefore though in determining the scope of S. 33c care should be taken not to exclude cases which legitimately fall within its purview, cases which fall, for instance under S. 10 (1), cannot be brought under S. 33c. (3) S. 33c which is in terms similar to those in S. 20 of the Industrial disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act 1950 is a provision in the nature of an executing provision, (4) S. S3c (1) applies to cases where money is due to a workman under an Award or settlement or under Chapter VA of the Act already calculated and ascertained and therefore there is no dispute about the computation. But sub-sec. (2) applies both to non-monetary as well as monetary benefits. In the case of monetary benefit it applies where such benefit though due is not calculated and there is a dispute about its calculation. But sub-sec. (2) applies both to non-monetary as well as monetary benefits. In the case of monetary benefit it applies where such benefit though due is not calculated and there is a dispute about its calculation. (5) S. 33c (2) takes within its purview cases of workmen who claim that the benefit to which they are entitled should be computed in terms of money even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by their employers. It is open to the Labour court to interpret the award or settlement on which the workmen's right rests. (6) The fact that the words of limitation used in Sec. 20 (2) of the industrial (Appellate Tribunal) Act 1950 are omitted in Sec. 33c (2) shows that the scope of S. 33c (2) is wider than that of S. 33c (1 ). Therefore, whereas sub-sec. (1) is confined to claims arising under an award or settlement or Chapter VA, claims which can be entertained under sub-sec. (2) are not so confined to these under an award, settlement or Chapter VA. (7) Though the Court did not indicate which cases other than those under sub-sec. (1) would fall under sub-sec. (2), it pointed out illustrative cases which would not fall under sub-sec. (2) viz. , cases v/hich would appropriately be adjudicated under S. 10 (1) or claims which have already been the subject matter of settlement to which sections 18 and 19 would apply. (8) Since proceedings under S. 33c (2) are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court called upon to compute in terms of money the benefit claimed by a workman is in such cases in the position of an executing Court, the Labour Court like the executing Court, in execution proceedings governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, is competent under S. 33c (2) to interpret the award or settlement where the benefit is claimed under such award or settlement and it would be open to it to consider the plea of nullity where the award is made without jurisdiction. " ( 7 ) THE following changes were brought about by the amendment of S. 33c of the Act by Central Act 36 of 1964. " ( 7 ) THE following changes were brought about by the amendment of S. 33c of the Act by Central Act 36 of 1964. Whereas originally under S. 33c (1) only the workman concerned could make an application to the Government for recovery of money due to him under an award or settlement or under Chapter VA of the Act, after amendment any person authorised by such workman or in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs can also make an application before Government for recovery of the said amount. After the amendment a period of one year from the time when the amount becomes due to the delay being condoned by the government for sufficient reasons, has been prescribed as the period of limitation, which was no there before the amendment. Under the old sub-sec. (2) of S. 33c of the Act, the workman could approach the Labour court only when he was entitled to some benefit which was capable of being computed in terms of money for making such compensation. After the amendment he can approach the Labour Court even when money is due to get the actual amount due to him determined. Sub-sec. (4) of the amended section requires the Labour Court to forward its decision to the government to recover the money due to the workman. A similar provision was not there before. Sub-sec. (5) authorises the filing of a joint application on behalf of any number of workmen. These being the only changes, we feel that the observations of the Supreme Court in Chief Engineer, east India Cool Co. 's case (1) are equally applicable to the amended Section 33c of the Act subject to the statutory changes referred to above. ( 8 ) AFTER the amendment it is open to a workman who is entitled to receive some money under an award to approach the Labour Court for its ascertainment. In the instant cases the award only stated that the workmen were entitled to back wages from 27-3-1961 till date of reinstatement and the enforcement of the award was stayed by this Court in writ petition filed against the award. By a reading of the award it was not possible to find out the actual amount due to each of the workmen. By a reading of the award it was not possible to find out the actual amount due to each of the workmen. The management also was objecting to the actual amount on the ground that the workmen were not entitled to wages for the period during which they were employed elsewhere. Hence, these were appropriate cases where the Labour Court had to decide the question under S. 33c (2) of the Act. Our view receives support from the decision of the Supreme Court in Nityanand M. Joshi v. LIC, AIR 1970 SC. 100 in which similar contentions urged by the management were repelled as follows:" The learned Counsel for the respondents contends that the appeals should fail on another ground. He says that these applications were filed under S. 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, while they should have been filed under S. 33c (1 ). He further says that , at any rate, no application can be filed under S. 33c (2) because the sub-section does not mention how the question is to be decided. There is no force in these submissions. " ( 9 ) IT is plain from the wording of sub-sec. (1) and sub-sec. (2) of s. 33c that the former sub-section deals with cases where money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter VA, while the latter sub-section deals with cases where a workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money. In the present case applications were filed by the employees against the respondent for computing in terms of money the benefit of holidays and for recovering the amount. This case falls squarely within sub-sec. (2) of S. 33c. There is no award or settlement under which the benefit of holidays had already been computed. It is true that sub-sec. (2) of S. 33c does not indicate the mode in which the question as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which the benefit should be computed, may be decided. ( 10 ) BUT the sub-section had left it to the rule-making authority to make a suitable provision. This is indicated by the expression "subject to any rules that may be made under this Act" in sub-sec. (2) of S. 33c. ( 10 ) BUT the sub-section had left it to the rule-making authority to make a suitable provision. This is indicated by the expression "subject to any rules that may be made under this Act" in sub-sec. (2) of S. 33c. Rules have been made and Rule 62 (2) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) rules, 1957, provides :"where any workman or a group of workmen is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the workman or the group of workmen, as the case may be, may apply to the specified Labour Court in Form k-3 for the determination of the amount due or, as the case may be, the amount at which such benefit should be computed'. According to this rule an application in Form K-3 can clearly be made. " ( 11 ) AS held bv the Supreme Court in Chief Mining Engineer, East India Coal co. 's case (1), S. 33c (1) applies only when there is no dispute about the amount due, but S. 33c (2) applies when there 13 such a dispute and its ascertainment is necessary. We, therefore, hold that there is no substance in the contention of the management that S. 33c (2) of the Act was not applicable to these cases. ( 12 ) THE next objection is that there should have been a reference by the government to the Labour Court to decide the applications under S. 33c (2) of the Act. That there is no such requirement in law is clear from the reading of the section. We reject this ground also sri Narasimhamurthy next contended that the workmen were not entitled to back wages for the period when they were employed elsewhere it may be observed that thp award directed payment of back wages from 27-3-1961 till date of reinstatement. The period between 27-3-1961 till the date of the award being anterior to the award, unless there was a direction in the award that the workmen should not get any wages for the period when they were employed elsewhere, the award has got to be obeyed as it is, for it must be assumed that the Labour Court did not want to deny wages on that ground. In respect of the period subsequent to the award also such a question does not arise in this case. In respect of the period subsequent to the award also such a question does not arise in this case. The management oblained an unconditional order of stay in the writ petition filed against the award and the writ petition was dismissed in January 1965 without making any observation in this regard. In a similar case in M. L. Bose and co. P. Ltd. v. Its Employees, AIR 1961 SC 1196 the Supreme Court held as follows :"mr. Sanyal then contended that in the present case the ends of justice would be met if the employees are awarded reasonable compensation, and he argued that in thp meanwhile the appellant his employed other workmen and their discharge would create complications. This Court has repeatedly held that when the dismissal of a workman is found to be illegal it is no answer to the workman's claim for reinstatement that in the meanwhile the employer has engaged another workman. However much the Court mav sympathise with the difficulties arising from such a position the workman is entitled to claim reinstatement which is a normal rule in the case of wrongful and illegal dismissal. Therefore we are not prepared to accede to the argument that a fair order of compensation would be justified in this case. The award has directed that 1/3 of the total emoluments should be paid to the workmen for the period from the date of dismissal till reinstatement; that was because it appeared to the tribunal that the workmen had earned from time to time by different work. Mr. Sanyal has suggested that we should direct a similar payment at a similar reduced rate from the date of the award until the date of reinstatement. We do not propose to make such an order. After the award became opreative the workmen were entitled to reinstatement by the appellant, but the appellant obtained an order for stay from this Court unconditionally. In such a case we do not see any reason for depriving the workmen of their full wages from the date the award became operative to the date of their reinstatement. " ( 13 ) FURTHER, we have to remember that the position of a Labour Court under s. 33c (2) of the Act is that of an executing Court which cannot go beyond the award. " ( 13 ) FURTHER, we have to remember that the position of a Labour Court under s. 33c (2) of the Act is that of an executing Court which cannot go beyond the award. We, therefore, hold that the workmen are entitled to back wages irrespective of the fact whether they were employed or unemployed. The last contention is about the non-summoning of some witnesses. The management has not shown how its case was prejudiced thereby. In this case there was no dispute about the award, and its terms. It was also not disputed that the workmen had not been re-employed till 27-11- 1965. In those circumstances we do not find any merit in the contention of the management. ( 14 ) IN the result, after negativing all the contentions of the petitioner, we dismiss these writ petitions. But, there will be no order as to costs since the workmen are absent and unrepresented. ( 15 ) BEFORE parting with these cases we have to observe with deep regret that even though more than ten years have elapsed the workmen have not been able to get relief. We hope that at least now the authorities concerned will take immediate steps to secure the monetary benefits due to the workmen as early as possible. --- *** --- .