STATE OF MYSORE v. YALE MALLESAPPA — 1971 DIGILAW 298 (KAR)

VENKATARAMTAH, J. ( 1 ) THE above appeal has been filed by the State of Mysore against the judgment and decree dt. 31-3-1965 passed in O. S. 117 of 1964 on the file of the Civil Judge, Bellary. The said suit was originally filed on 21-9-1959 in the Court of the District Judge, Bellary, and was numbered as O. S. 8 of 1959. On the re-organisation of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in the State of Mysore by virtue of the Mysore Civil Courts Act, 1964, the said suit was transferred to the file of the Civil Judge, Bellary, for disposal and after such transfer it was numbered as O. S. 117 of 1964. ( 2 ) THE suit out of which this appeal arises was instituted by one Yele malleshappa for a declaration that the lands set out in the plaint 1000 acres and 61 cents with an assessment of Rs. 233-3-1 situate in the village of singadevanahalli, Bellary Taluk. Bellary District, did not constitute an estate under the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 (Madras Act 1 of 1908) (hereinafter referred to as the Estates Land Act), or an estate' within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 (Madras Act 30 of 1947) (hereinafter referred to as the Reduction of Rent act), or an mam estate within the meaning of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (Madras Act 26 of 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Abolition Act); for a permanent injunction restraining the State of Mvsore, the defendant in the suit, from interfering with the enjoyment and possession of the said lands by the plaintiff, for an account to be teken for ascertaining the rents realised from the lands during the management of the said lands by the defendant from 1950 upto date of suit; and for a decree for the payment of the said sum which might be ascertained in taking such account to the plaintiff. The said Yele Malleshappa having died in the course of the pendency of the suit, his legal representatives were brought on record on 2-8-1961. ( 3 ) THE case of the plaintiff as set out in the plaint was that certain inam lands in the village of Singadevanahalli also known as Bhatrahalli were enfranchised as personal inams under two title deeds Nos. ( 3 ) THE case of the plaintiff as set out in the plaint was that certain inam lands in the village of Singadevanahalli also known as Bhatrahalli were enfranchised as personal inams under two title deeds Nos. 4045 and 4046 at the time of inam settlement in 1963. According to the plaint, the title deed No. 4045 was issued in respect of about 1099 acres and 25 cents of land and the title deed No. 4046 was issued in respect of about 1308 acres and 47 cents of land. The lands thus enfranchised did not constitute an estate either under the Estates Land Act or under the Reduction of Rent act. It was alleged that the original grantees of the inams and their successors in title dealt with and enjoyed the said lands as owners by exercising the right of transfer intervivos by gift, lease, mortgage, sales and by testamentary disposition without any interference by the Government. ( 4 ) ONE Japirdar Ranganagowda who was a successor in interest of, lands measuring 1308 acres and 47 cents covered by title deed No. 4046 instituted a suit for establishing his ownership and title against the Government when it threatened to take over the management in 1950, in circumstances similar to the case of the plaintiff, in O. S. 157 of 1952 on the file of the subordinate Judge, Bellary, which was decreed in his favour holding that the said lands did not constitute an estate and the Government was not entitled to take over the management of the lands, on 10-12-1954. It was therefore alleged that the lands covered by title deed No. 4045 which constituted the subject matter of the present suit, also had to be treated as not constituting an estate and the Government was liable to be restrained by a decree from interfering with the ownership and possession of the suit lands by the plaintiff The "plaintiff further alleged that out of the total extent of 1099 acres and 25 cents covered by title deed No. 4045, he had acquired interest in 1000 acres and 61 cents by purchase from one gireddi Virupaksha Gowda, who was the last of the successive owners of the said lands. The plaint schedule consists of 31 items which together measure 1000 acres and 61 cents. The plaint schedule consists of 31 items which together measure 1000 acres and 61 cents. Of them items 1 to 30 were purchased by the plaintiff from the above said Gireddi Virupaksha Gowda. On account of certain disputes which arose with regard to the said lands, the plaintiff had to file a suit for declaration of his title and right to possession of the said lands which was ultimately compromised as per the decree in ( 5 ) A. S. 167 of 1939 on the file of the High Court of Madras on 15-4-1941. The plaintiff thereafter continued to be in possession and enjoyment of the said lands and dealt with them as owner. Item No. 31 was purchased by the plaintiff from one Pandurangachar under a sale deed dt. 6-10-1949. ( 6 ) THE plaintiff, therefore, claimed to have acquired title in all the 31 items mentioned in the plaint schedule which in all measured 1000 acres and 61 cents. It appears that the Settlement Officer appointed under the Abolition act suo motu commenced proceedings under that Act for deciding whether the suit lands constituted an estate within the meaning of that act or not and by his order dt. 26-5-1950 decided that the said lands constituted an estate within the meaning of that Act. The plaintiff having filed an appeal against the said order in A. S. 124 of 1951 on the file of the estates Abolition Appellate Tribunal, Chittoor, the question whether the suit lands constituted an estate under the Abolition Act, was considered and decided by the Tribunal holding that the suit lands did not form an inam estate within the meaning of the Abolition Act. When the appeal was pending before the Tribunal, the Tahsildar of Bellary commenced proceedings under the Reduction of Rent Act against the suit lands and took over the management of the suit lands in 1950. Subsequent to the decision dt. 19-11-1951 of the Tribunal referred to above the plaintiff filed a writ petition in WP. No. 329 of 1952 on the file of the High Court of madras and obtained an order of temporary injunction against the government of Madras which had the jurisdiction over the suit lands at that time, directing it to stav further proceedings under the Reduction of rent Act. No. 329 of 1952 on the file of the High Court of madras and obtained an order of temporary injunction against the government of Madras which had the jurisdiction over the suit lands at that time, directing it to stav further proceedings under the Reduction of rent Act. Inspite of that, the State Government did not hand over the management of the suit lands to the plaintiff. The writ petition which was filed before the High Court of Madras was subsecuently transferred to the file of this Court on the passing of the Andhra Statle Act, 1953, under which that part of Bellary District in which the suit lands were situated became part of the former State of Mysore. The said writ petitior was finally disposed of bv this Court as per order passed on 5-3-1959 in WP. No. 58 of 1954. Bv that order, this Court dismissed the writ petition observing inter alia, that the plaintiff might seek his remedy in a Civil court if he was so advised. After the dismissal of the said writ petitioa bv this Court, the plaintiff instituted the present suit on 21-9-1959 for the aforesaid mentioned reliefs. ( 7 ) THE defendant contested the suit. In the written statement filed on 27-1-1960 and the additional written statement filed on 7-12-1960, the following pleas were raised on behalf of the State Government The allegation that the lands in question did not constitute an estate within the meaning of the Estates Land Act, Reduction of Rent Act and Abolition act, was denied by the defendant. It was urged that Singadevanahalli in respect of which title deed No. 4045 was issued was different from the village Bhattarahalli which later came to be known as Laxmipura village, in respect of which title deed No. 4046 was issued. It was specifically pleaded that Singadevanahalli in which the suit lands were situated was a separate village from Bhattarahalli alias Laxmipura village. According to the defendant, the suit lands constituted an estate within the meaning of the statutes in question. The defendant pleaded that the proceedings in o. S. 157 of 1952 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Bellary, instituted by Rangana Gowda in respect of lands measuring 1308 acres and 47 cents covered by title deed No. 4046 had nothing to do with the suit lands, and, therefore, reference to the said proceedings was not relevant. The defendant pleaded that the proceedings in o. S. 157 of 1952 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Bellary, instituted by Rangana Gowda in respect of lands measuring 1308 acres and 47 cents covered by title deed No. 4046 had nothing to do with the suit lands, and, therefore, reference to the said proceedings was not relevant. The action of the Tahsildar under the Reduction of Rent Act was justified since the said Act was applicable to the suit lands. In regard to the decision of the tribunal, it was pleaded that the State Government was not a party to the said proceedings and the decision therein was not binding on the State government. It was further pleaded that a decision under the Abolition act had no bearing on the action taken under the Reduction of Rent Act. ( 8 ) THE jurisdiction of the Civil Court to enquire into the validity of the action taken under the Reduction of Rent Act was also questioned by the defendant. It was submitted that a suit for mere declaration only without a prayer for appropriate consequential reliefs, was in view of S. 42 of the specific Relief Act, not maintainable. The liability of the Government to render accounts to the plaintiff was also denied. On the basis of the above pleadings the trial Court framed several issues and after trial, by its judgment dt. 31-3-1965 decreed the suit as prayed for. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the State of Mysore has filed this appeal. ( 9 ) THE main questions that arise for consideration in this appeal are: (i) Whether Singadevanahalli in respect of which title deed No. 4045 is issued and Bhattrahalli which is now known as Laxmipura in respect of which title deed No. 4046 has been issued, constituted one village or are they two separate villages? (ii) Whether the suit lands constitute an estate within the meaning of the Estates Land Act as it stood at the time when action was taken under the Reduction of Rent Act in respect of the lands in question? (iii) Whether the Abolition Act is applicable to the suit lands and whether the decision of the Estates Abolition Appellate Tribunal under the abolition Act is binding on the State Government? (iv) Whether the action taken by the Government under the Reduction of Rent Act is unauthorised? (iii) Whether the Abolition Act is applicable to the suit lands and whether the decision of the Estates Abolition Appellate Tribunal under the abolition Act is binding on the State Government? (iv) Whether the action taken by the Government under the Reduction of Rent Act is unauthorised? and, (v) To what reliefs the plaintiff is entitled? ( 10 ) BEFORE going into the merits of the respective contentions of the parties before us, we felt that it is appropriate to briefly refer to the history of the several statutes with which we are concerned in this appeal. The suit lands are situate in the District of Bellary which formed part of the State of Madras until the Andhra State Act, 1953, was passed. Ordinarily the land tenures in the State of Madras were ryotwari in form. ( 11 ) BUT in some Districts a class of landlords had grown up both in the Southern and Northern parts of Madras Presidency. The permanent settlement was introduced in certain parts of the Madras Presidency in 1802. At that time there were various land tenures in vogue in that Presidency. In some districts both kinds of tenures, namely, landlord tenures and the ryotwari tenures were prevalent. We are concerned in this case with land lord tenures which were otherwise known as 'inams'. The essential ingredients of an inam were, (i) that it was a grant or gift of land of land revenue or both, made by the ruler to the inamdar; (ii) the lands which were given as inam were rent or tax free in whole or in part; (iii) the reversionary rights to the said lands vested in the ruler or the Government; and (iv) unless they were enfranchised by levy of full assessment as in the case of other ryotwari lands in the locality or by levy of additional quit rent to bring the total quit rent to the level of assessment payable by similar lands governed by ryotwari tenure, the lands were not liable to be dealt with contrary to the terms under which the inam wag granted. Inams were classified into two groups major inams and minor inams. Under the classification of major inams came estates as denned under the Abolition Act. Minor inams were those which were given for support of pagodas, mattums, village headman, mosoues and dargas, khazis, Christian churches, chuttrums. Inams were classified into two groups major inams and minor inams. Under the classification of major inams came estates as denned under the Abolition Act. Minor inams were those which were given for support of pagodas, mattums, village headman, mosoues and dargas, khazis, Christian churches, chuttrums. water-pandals, topes, tanks, wells annicuts and miscellaneous works of utility (vide Blair's report S. O. 337 Rev. dt. 24-2-1971 of Madras Presidency) Since it was felt that there was need for regulation of the relationship between the inamdras and the Government and the inamdars and the tenonts under them the Government of madras set up a machinery for poinr into the historv of several inams and for making entries in the register of inams in accordance with the result of surh enquiry. Pursuant to the said decision in the District of Bellary also the Inams Commission commenced enouiry and prepared the Inams register on the basis of the finding arrived at the time of the enquiry. ( 12 ) IT was pursuant to the enquiry held by the Inams Commissioner, the two title deeds, namely. 4045 and 4046 in which reference has alreadv been made bv us, were issued by the Tnams Commissioner in favour of the parties who were considered as the inamdars at that time. Orders were passed by the Inams Commissioner confirming the inam in respect of land covered bv title deed No 4045 on 23-2-1863 Similarly the title deed No. 4046 was also issued confirming the concerned inam by the Inams Commissioner. ( 13 ) SINCE there was clamour for regulation of the relationship between the inamdars on the one hand and the Government on the other and of the relationsnip between inamdars and the tenants, the Madras Legislature passed the Estates Land Act, 1908. The said Act came into force on July 1, 1908. ( 13 ) SINCE there was clamour for regulation of the relationship between the inamdars on the one hand and the Government on the other and of the relationsnip between inamdars and the tenants, the Madras Legislature passed the Estates Land Act, 1908. The said Act came into force on July 1, 1908. The expression estate regarding which the said Act was passed was defined originally by S. 3 (2) of that Act as follows:" 'estate' means (a) any permanently-settled estate or temporarily-settled zamindari; (b) any portion of such permanenly-seltled estate or temporarily-settled zamindari which is separately registered in the office of the Collector; (c) any unsettled palaiyam or jagir; (d) any village of which the land revenue alone has been granted in inam to a person not owning the kudivaram thereof provided that the grant has been made, confirmed, or recognised by the British government, or any separated part of such village; (e) any portion consisting of one or more villages or any of the estates specified above in clauses (a), (b) and (c) which is held on a permanent under tenure. " ( 14 ) THE expression 'kudivaram' in Tamil signifies the cultivator's share in the produce of land which is different from the landlord's share received by him as rent which is called 'melvaram'. The definition of 'estate' under clause (d) gave rise to considerable litigation in which it became necessary for the Courts to decide (i) whether there was a grant of the whole village so as to make the area granted an estate, and (ii) whether the landlord to whom the land was granted owned the 'kudivaram' also. It was also noticed that in the villages in which there were estates as defined under the Estates Land Act, there were other grants in lieu of religious and personal services. The views expressed from time to time by the courts in interpreting clause (d) of S. 3 (2) of the Estates Land Act, made it necessary for the Madras Legislature to amend clause (d) of S. 3 (2) of the Estates Land Act by substituting the said clause by the following clause by an amendment made in 1936. The views expressed from time to time by the courts in interpreting clause (d) of S. 3 (2) of the Estates Land Act, made it necessary for the Madras Legislature to amend clause (d) of S. 3 (2) of the Estates Land Act by substituting the said clause by the following clause by an amendment made in 1936. After substitution which was so effected by the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 18 of 1936, clause (d) of S. 3 (2) read as follows:" (d) any inam village of which the grant has been made, confirmed or recognised by the British Government, notwithstanding that subsequent to the grant, the village has been partitioned among the grantees or the successors in title of the grantee or grantees. " ( 15 ) AGAIN the said provision was amended by Madras Estates Land (Amendment) act 2 of 1945 by adding Explanation (1) which read as follows:" Where a grant as an inam is expressed to be a named village, the area which forms the subject-matter of the grant shall be deemed to be an estate notwithstandnig that it did not include certain lands in the village of that name which have already been granted on service or other tenure or been reserved for communal purposes. " ( 16 ) THE said explanation was made operative retrospectively from the date on which the Madras Act 18 of 1936 by which clause (d) of S. 3 (2) was substituted and brought into force. The said explanation was apparently intended to bring the law in conformity with the interpretation placed by the High Court of Madras on the expression 'whole village' in G. Narayanaswami's case, (1916) ILR. 39 Mad. 683. ( 17 ) SO by the time the Reduction of Rent Act was passed in 1947, the definition of the expression 'estate' had undergone a change by reason of the amendments effected in 1936 and 1945. The Reduction of Rent Act though it was passed in 1947 came into force on January 7, 1948. The object of the said Act was to provide for the reduction of rents payable by ryots in estates governed by the Estates land Act approximately to the level of assessment levied on Jands in ryotwari areas in the neighbourhood and for collection of such rents exclusively by the State Government. The object of the said Act was to provide for the reduction of rents payable by ryots in estates governed by the Estates land Act approximately to the level of assessment levied on Jands in ryotwari areas in the neighbourhood and for collection of such rents exclusively by the State Government. The necessity for the law arose on account of the fact that in many cases higher rates of rents were being realised by the holders of estates from the tenants than the assessment levied on lands in ryotwari areas in the vicinity. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 1 of the said Act made the Act applicable to all estates as defined in S. 3 (2) of the Estates Land Act. S. 2 provided for the appointment of a Special Officer for purposes of recommending fair and equitable rents for lands in such estates and the procedure to be followed by him in making such recommendation. S. 3 required him to make a report to the State Government containing the recommendations on the basis of the enquiry made by him under S. 2. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 3 authorised the Government to fix the rates of rent payable in respect of each class of ryoti lands in such estates Sub-sec. (4) empowered the Government to recover rents at the rates fixed under S. 3 (2) from the ryots. Sub-sec. (7) of S. 3 prohibited the land-holder from collecting rents from ryots in an estate. Ss. 5 and 6 of the Act made special provisions in regard to religious educational and charitable institutions. S. 7 provided for rules to be framed by Government and Ss. 4, 8 and 9 made certain incidental provisions facilitating the achievement of the object with which the Act had been passed. The action of the State Government which has been questioned in these proceedings is one taken under this Act. ( 18 ) WE may at this stage refor to the Abolition Act which was passed in 1948 which incidentally arises for consideration in this case. The Abolition act was passed with the object of repealing the permanent settlement which was in operation in Madras Presidency and to provide for the acquisition of rights of land-holders under permanently settled and in certain estates in the Province of Madras and the introduction of the ryotwari settlement in respect of such estates. The Abolition act was passed with the object of repealing the permanent settlement which was in operation in Madras Presidency and to provide for the acquisition of rights of land-holders under permanently settled and in certain estates in the Province of Madras and the introduction of the ryotwari settlement in respect of such estates. The said Act applied to all estates as defined in S. 3 (2) of the Estates Land Act except inam villages which became estates by virtue of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) act, 3936. In other words, it was only those inam villages which could be treated as estates under the provisions of the Estates Land Act as it was originally enacted that were dealt with by the Abolition Act. If a certain inam village could not be brought within the meaning of the expression 'estate' as denned in the Estates Land Act as it was originally enacted, but could be treated as an estate after the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) act, 1936 was passed, then such an inam village did not come within the purview of the Abolition Act. ( 19 ) WE shall now take up for consideration the questions raised in this appeal. The first question which requires to be decided is whether singadevanahalli and Bhattrahalli which is now known as Laxmipura village constitute one village or two separate villages. The trial Court has come to the conclusion that they are two different villages and are two independent units for purpose of revenue. It has also come to the conclusion that the position was the same even at the time of the inam settlement. ( 20 ) THE evidence adduced by the parties on this question mainly consists of documentary evidence. Title deed No. 4045 which is issued in respect of the lands in question is marked as Ext. P2 in the case and the title deed no. 4046 which is issued in respect of Bhattrahalli which known as Laxmipura is marked as Ex'. P1. In Ext. P1 the extent of land given as inam is 1308 acres and 47 cents. We find from the particularls given in Ext. P1 the total extent of the land in that village, is about 1783 acres 16 cents with an assessment of Rs. 763-5-0. Out of that, 1778 acres and 34 cents form dry land and 4 acres and 82 cents are wet land. We find from the particularls given in Ext. P1 the total extent of the land in that village, is about 1783 acres 16 cents with an assessment of Rs. 763-5-0. Out of that, 1778 acres and 34 cents form dry land and 4 acres and 82 cents are wet land. Out of the total extent of 1783 acres 16 cents, 474 acres and 69 cents had been given away as personal and service inam leaving a balance of 1308 acres and 47 cents, which was made up at 690 acres and 38 cents of by land under cultivation and 4 acres and 82 cents of wet land under cultivation and 612 acres and 77 cents of uncultivated land. The entire extent of 1308 acres 47 cents which remained after deducting the personal and service inams in that village, was treated as the land given to the srotriamdar or the inamdar as per Ext. P1. It is not shown in Ext. P1 that in that village there was any other extent of land measuring 1099 acres 25 cents which formed the subject matter of title deed No. 4045 with which we are concerned It is also mentioned in that document that some portion of the lands in that village was covered by hills. In Ext. P2 which relates to the lands in Singadevanahalli village the total extent of land is shown as 1475 acres 57 cents with an assessment of Rs. 371-5-0, the entire extent being dry land. Out of this extent, an extent of 376 acres 32 cents had been given away as per inam register by way of general and service inams. The remaining extent was 1099 acres 25 cents out of which 375 acres 84 cents were under cultivation and 723 acres 41 cents constituted banjar lands. The whole of 1099 acres 25 cents which remained after giving away 376 acres 32 cents by way of personal and service inams, was confirmed in favour of the srotriamdar or the inamdar. Even in this document, it is not shown that any other land in respect of which title deed No. 4046 could have been issued, was in existence within the village limits. It is no doubt true that in Ext. P1, title deed No. 4046, the name of the village is shown as Bhattrahalli or Singadevanahalli. In Ext. Even in this document, it is not shown that any other land in respect of which title deed No. 4046 could have been issued, was in existence within the village limits. It is no doubt true that in Ext. P1, title deed No. 4046, the name of the village is shown as Bhattrahalli or Singadevanahalli. In Ext. P2 which relates; to the suit lands, we find mention of only Singadevanahalli and not Bhattrahalli. The question whether Singadevanahalli and Bhattrahalli refer to one or two villages can be easily explained with reference to extsd7 to D11 marked in this case. ( 21 ) EXT. D7 is the village map of Singadevanahalli, and that it relates to the lands in question is not in dispute. It is mentioned in that document which was prepared in accordance with the survey completed in 1886 that Singadevanahalli was in a ruined state. Exhibit D8 relates to Bhattrahalli, in respect of which title deed Number 4046 was issued, shows that a large portion of land within that village consists of hills. Ext. D9 is the map of Bellary Taluk. In that map we find singadevanahalli (around which blue pencil mark is made) slightly to the south of the point at which 15 20' latitude and 76 55' longitude intersect. ( 22 ) IMMEDIATELY to the North of Singadevanahalli we find the name of a small village called Bhattrahalli which has nothing to do with the title deed no. 4046. Bhattrahalli (around which red pencil mark is made) referred to in title deed No. 4046 which is the other village with which we are concerned in this case and in respect of which title deed No. 4046 has been issued is shown in the same Taluk Map nearly ten miles in North-Western direction from Singadavanahalli. It is to be found to the North of 15 deg. 20' latitude and slightly to the West of 76 50' longitude. It may be noticed that very near that place a big hillock is shown which apparently is the hill that we find in Ext. D-8. Tn between Singadevanahalli and bhatrahalli, there is a distance of about eight miles and there are several other villages. Ext. D-10 is a book-let published by the Government of madras in the year 1919 containing the alphabetical list of villages in bellary District. D-8. Tn between Singadevanahalli and bhatrahalli, there is a distance of about eight miles and there are several other villages. Ext. D-10 is a book-let published by the Government of madras in the year 1919 containing the alphabetical list of villages in bellary District. At page 4 of that book we find reference to Bhattrahalli village which is the subject matter of title deed No. 4046 in the first column and Singadevanahalli with which we are concerned in this case, in the second column. Ext, D-11 is the village map of Singadevanahalli showing the phymashi numbers of the lands in that land. Exts. Pll and P12 are extracts from the permanent register pertaining to revenue department in bellary Distrct. Ext. P-11 refers to Singadevanahalli which is an inam village and Ext. P-12 refers to Bhattrahalli which is also an inam village. In Ext. P-ll we find reference to the inam-patta numbers or title deed numbers issued in respect of both minor inams and the major inam lands situated in that village. We find reference to title deed No. 4045 in column 2 of Ext. P-11. Similarly in Ext. P-12 which relates to Bhattrahalli village we find reference to title deed No. 4046 relating to that village. If they had been one and the same village, there would have been only one account in respect of both these villages referring to both title deeds Nos. 4045 and 4046. ( 23 ) WE have some oral evidence also on the above question. D. W. 6 E. M. Basalingaiah was working as the Estate Manager in-charge of all the estate villages in Bellary District under the administrative control of the deputy Commissioner, Bellary, at the time he gave evidence. Through him exts. D7 to D11 have been marked No doubt he has no personal knowledge of the preparation of Exts. D-7 to D-11, but since they are documents published under the authority of the Government, we hold that they are proved. He has sworn that Singadevanahalli in respect of which Ext. P-2 was issued and Bhattrahalli in respect of which Ext P-1 was issued, were two separate village units. According to him the name Bhattrahalli has now been changed as Laxmipura village after the name of the purchaser laxmama. He has also stated that the revenue accounts of the two villages are maintained separately. P-2 was issued and Bhattrahalli in respect of which Ext P-1 was issued, were two separate village units. According to him the name Bhattrahalli has now been changed as Laxmipura village after the name of the purchaser laxmama. He has also stated that the revenue accounts of the two villages are maintained separately. D. W-4 is one Bhimsena Rao who was the karnam of Bhattrahalli which is now known as Laxmipura. According to him Bhattrahalli of which he was the karnam was at a distance of about twelve miles from Singadevanahalli in which the suit lands are situated. He has further sworn that those two villages are distinct from one another. ( 24 ) HE has further stated that whereas Laxmipura village was comprised in kurugod Firka, Singadevanahalli was comprised in Kolur Firka. We may mention here that a taluk is divided into several firkas for purpose of revenue administration. If really the two villages were one and the same. they could not have been placed in two separate firkas. This witness has further stated that the village records of these two villages are also separate. We do not find anv other reliable material placed on behalf of the plaintiff in this case to show that Singadevanahalli covered by title deed No. 4045 and Bhatrahalll covered by title deed No. 4046 constitute one and the same village. Sri V. Krishnamurthy, the learned counsel for the plaintiff, argued that all these documents i. e. Exts. D-7 to D-ll relate to a period subsequent to the point of time at which the grant of inam was made and, therefore, they may have no bearing on the question in issue. ( 25 ) AS already stated Exts. D-7 and D-8 are of 1886. The list of villages published by the Government of Madras was printed in 1919. It is stated that the revenue accounts of these two villages are separate and distinct. The inam settlement itself took place sometime in 1863. Under these circumstances , it is not unreasonable to hold that the position as demonstrated by Exts D-7 to D-ll must have been in existence even at the time when the inam grants were made in this case. We have also pointed out that if really they constituted one and the same village, either in Ext. P-l or in Ext. Under these circumstances , it is not unreasonable to hold that the position as demonstrated by Exts D-7 to D-ll must have been in existence even at the time when the inam grants were made in this case. We have also pointed out that if really they constituted one and the same village, either in Ext. P-l or in Ext. P-2, there would have been reference to the land which had not been given away by way of inam grant in the particulars of the total extent of land available in each of these villages mentioned in those two documents. If the existence of a particular fact on a particular date is established, it is open to the court to pssume both backwards and forwards within a reasonable time, the position must have been the same unless the partv denying it is able to rebut such presumption. We, therefore, hold that in this case, the finding of the court below, namelv, that, Bhattrahalli in respect of which title deed No. 4046 was issued and Singadevanahalli in respect of which title deed No. 4045 was issued are two different villages, has to be upheld. We, therefore, hold that the contention of the plaintiff on whom the burden of proof lies that they constituted one and the same village is liable to be rejected. In view of this finding, the allegations in para 5 of the plaint, namely, that Ranganagowda having filed a suit in o. S. 157 of 1962 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Bellary and obtained a decree therein declaring that Bhattrahalli which was covered by title deed No. 4046 was not an estate, would not be of any use to the plaintiff since the subject matter of the said proceedings is entirely different from the subject matter of these prccpedinp's We have got to hold that the proceedings in O S. 157 of 1959, on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Bellary, is not, therefore relevant for the purposes of this case. It does not also have any evidentiary value in this suit. ( 26 ) THE next question on which considerable arguments were expended on both sides is whether the suit lands constituted an estate within the meaning of S 3 (2) of the Estates Land Act as it stood at the time when action was taken under the Reduction of Rent Act. ( 26 ) THE next question on which considerable arguments were expended on both sides is whether the suit lands constituted an estate within the meaning of S 3 (2) of the Estates Land Act as it stood at the time when action was taken under the Reduction of Rent Act. Before going into the above ouestion. we consider it reccesary to rofer to two objections raised by Sri V Krishnamurthy to our investigation into the said question, namely, (i) that it was not opep to the civil court to decide the question whether the lands in question constituted an estate or not and (ii) that the said question having been decided by the appellate tribunal under the Abolition act holding the lands did not constitute an estate there was no scope for a fresh investigation in this suit. ( 27 ) SRI V. Krishnamurthy in support of the aforesaid two contentions relied upon Ss 5, 8 and he Abolition Act. S. 5 provider, for the appointment of one or or Settlemnt Officers for carrying out the functions and duties assigned to them under the Act. S 8 provides for the constitution of a tribunal for the ourpose of the Act S. 9 which came to be reoealed by Madras Act 34 of 1954 but which was in force at the relevant point of time, read as follows:"9. Determlnation Of of estatr: (1) As soon as may be after the passing of the Act, the Settlement Officer may suo motu and shall, on application, enquire and determine whether any inam village in his jurisdiction is an inam estate or not. (2) Before holding the inquiry, the Settlement Officer shall cause to be published in the village in the prescribed manner, a notice requiring all persons claiming an interest in any land in the village to file before him statements bearing on the question whether the village is an inam estate or not. (3) The Settlement Officer shall then hear the parties and afford to them a reasonable opportunity of adducing all such evidence either oral or documentary as they may desire, to examine all such documents as he has reason to believe are in the possession of the Government and have a bearing on the question before him and give his decision in writing. (4) (a) Any person deeming himself aggrieved by a decision of the Settlement Officer under sub-section (3) may, within two months from the date of the decision or such further time as the Tribunal may in its discretion allow, appeal to the tribunal. (b) Where any such appeal is preferred, the tribunal shall cause to be published in the village in the prescribed manner, a notice requiring all persons who have applied to the Settlement Officer under sub-sec. (1) or filed before him statements under sub-section (2) to appear before it, and after giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard, give its decision. (c) The decision of the Tribunal under this sub-section shall be final and not be liable to be questioned in any Court of Law. (5) No decision of the Settlement Officer under sub-sec. (3) or of the Tribunal under Sub-sec. (4) shall be invalid by reason of any defect in form of the notice referred to in sub-sec. (2) or sub-sec. (4), as the case may be, or the manner of its publication. (6) Every decision cf the Tribunal and subject to such decision, every decision of the Settlement Officer under this section shall be binding on all persons claiming an interest in any land in the village, notwithstanding that any such person has not preferred any application or filed any statement or pdduced any evidence or appeared or participated in the proceedings before the Settlement Officer or the tribunal as the case may be. (7) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Settlement officer and the Tribunal may presume that an inam village is an inam estate. " ( 28 ) RELYING upon the provisions of S. 9 of the Abolition Act and S. 9 of the code of Civil Procedure, it was argued that by necessary implication the abolition Act took away the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to determine whether any inam village is an inam estate or not. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in A. ddanki Tiruvankata Thata desika Charyulu v. State of A P. , AIR. 1964 SC. 807. in which it was held that the determination by the Settlement Officer whether an inam village was an inam estate was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer and in regard to it, the iurisdiction of the civil court was clearly barred. 1964 SC. 807. in which it was held that the determination by the Settlement Officer whether an inam village was an inam estate was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer and in regard to it, the iurisdiction of the civil court was clearly barred. It was, therefore, contended on behalf of the plaintiff that no investigation was celled for by the civil court on the question whether the suit lands constituted an estate or not and that the decision already given by the tribunal should be accepted as having decided that question. This argument docs not appeal to us. The provisions of S. 9 of the Abolition Act which provide for an enquiry into the question whether an inam village was an inam estate or not, were made for the purpose of the Abolition Act. ( 29 ) WE are not concerned in this case with any action taken under the Abolition act. Secondly, by S. 1 (3) of the Abolition Act inam villages which became estates by virtue of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) act, 1936, are excluded from the operation of the Abolition Act. Sub-sec. (7) of S. 2 of the Abolition Act defines the expression "inam estate" as an estate within the meaning of S. 3 (2) (d) of the Estates Land Act, but specifically states that it does not include an inam village which became an estate by virtue of the amendment in 1936. But on the other hand, the reduction of Rent Act, under which the impugned action is taken by the government which was passed prior to the Abolition Act, is applicable to all estates as defined in clause (2) of S. 3 of the Estates Land Act as it was in force when the said Act was passed. The position therefore, was that whereas the Reduction of Rent Act was applicable to all estates defined by the Estates Land Act, the Abolition Act applied to estates which were estates within the meaning of the Estates Land Act prior to the amendment of 1936. We are concerned in this case with clause (d) of S. 3 (2) of the Estates Land Act. We are concerned in this case with clause (d) of S. 3 (2) of the Estates Land Act. As the said clause stood prior to the amendment an extract of which has already been given above, only those villages could be treated as estates of which the land revenue alone had been granted as inam to a person not owning the kudivaram thereof provided that the grant had been made, confirmed or recognised by the British government or separate parts of such villages. In this case, the case of the plaintiff has been that the shrotriamdar or the inamdar had both the melvaram and kudivaram rights and not merely the melvaram rights. ( 30 ) THAT is clear from paragraph 4 of the reply or rejoinder filed bv the plaintiff on 22-12-1960 to the additional written statement filed on behalf of the government, where it was pleaded on behalf of the plaintiff that the defendant was put to strict proof that the plaintiff had no title to the land except the collection of revenue or rent. In paragraph 4 of the plaint, the plaintiff alleged that the original grantees of the inam dealt with and enjoyed the suit properties as owners. Similarly in paragraph 6 of the plaint it was stated that the plaintiff was in possession and enjoyment of the suit lands exercising acts of ownership till the management thereof was taken over bv the defendant. In Ext. P-61, which is a certified copy of the deposition of the plaintiff Yele Malleshappa recorded on 23-5-1950 bv the Inam Settlement Officer, the plaintiff had stated as follows:"i am the inamdar of this village. I have filed a statement. Iamendment of 1936. We are concerned in this case with clause (d) of S. 3 (2) of the Estates Land Act. As the said clause stood prior to the amendment an extract of which has already been given above, only those villages could be treated as estates of which the land revenue alone had been granted as inam to a person not owning the kudivaram thereof provided that the grant had been made, confirmed or recognised by the British government or separate parts of such villages. In this case, the case of the plaintiff has been that the shrotriamdar or the inamdar had both the melvaram and kudivaram rights and not merely the melvaram rights. In this case, the case of the plaintiff has been that the shrotriamdar or the inamdar had both the melvaram and kudivaram rights and not merely the melvaram rights. " ( 31 ) THAT is clear from paragraph 4 of the reply or rejoinder filed bv the plaintiff on 22-12-1960 to the additional written statement filed on behalf of the government, where it was pleaded on behalf of the plaintiff that the defendant was put to strict proof that the plaintiff had no title to the land except the collection of revenue or rent. In paragraph 4 of the plaint, the plaintiff alleged that the original grantees of the inam dealt with and enjoyed the suit properties as owners. Similarly in paragraph 6 of the plaint it was stated that the plaintiff was in possession and enjoyment of the suit lands exercising acts of ownership till the management thereof was taken over bv the defendant. In Ext. P-61, which is a certified copy of the deposition of the plaintiff Yele Malleshappa recorded on 23-5-1950 bv the Inam Settlement Officer, the plaintiff had stated as follows:"i am the inamdar of this village. I have filed a statement. I purchased this village. I am myself cultivating the lands. We give the lands to ryots for cultivation for gutha. I have only mortgage and sale deeds. I have no other old records. I am changing rvots Saguvali karars I have filed containing conditions that the ryots should leave the land after cultivation. Another asami owns 100 acres of land. I have purchased 10. I have filed the sale deed also. " ( 32 ) EXT. P19 series which are produced before this Court are the several lease deeds said to have been taken by the plaintiff from a number of ryots under which he had leased out the plaint schedule lands to the tenants. Lastly before the trial court the question was specifically raised and argued on behalf of the plaintiff stating that the plaintiff had enjoyed both rights, namely, melvaram and kudivaram in the suit lands till 1950 (vide paragraph 13 of the judgment of the trial court ). Lastly before the trial court the question was specifically raised and argued on behalf of the plaintiff stating that the plaintiff had enjoyed both rights, namely, melvaram and kudivaram in the suit lands till 1950 (vide paragraph 13 of the judgment of the trial court ). The cumulative effect of the pleadings, evidence and the argument advanced on behalf of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff's case has always been that the lands in question did not form an estate within the meaning of clause (d) of S. 3 (2) of "he Estates Land Act as it stood prior to the amendment in 1936. It may also be noticed that either under the Estates Land Act or under the Reduction of Rent Act, no special machinery had been created to determine whether an inam village was an inam estate for the purpose of those Arts and in fact in the very decision of the Supreme Court, namely, Addank's case (2), the Supreme Court held for the purpose of the Reduction of Rent act, the village in question in that case was an estate. We, therefore hold that the objections raised by Sri V. Krishnamurthy that the Civil Court cannot go into the question whether the suit lands constituted an estate for the purpose of the Reduction of Pent Act or not, are not tenable. The decision of the tribunal under the Abolition Act is also not relevant for the purpose of this case. ( 33 ) WE now take up for examination the question whether the suit lands constitute an estate within the meaning of the Estates Land Act after clause (d) of S. 3 (2) was amended in 1936. After the Amendment in 1936 and the addition of Explanation 1 in 1945, by Madras Act 2 of 1945 with rerrospective effect from the date on which 1he Madras Act 18 of 1936 was brought into force, any inam village of which the grant had been confirmed or recognised by the British Government notwithstanding the fact that subsequent to the grant the village had been partitioned among the grantees or successors in title of the grantee or grantees, would be an estate within the meaning of the Estates Land Act. Explanation 1 thereof provided that where a grant as inam is expressed to be of a named village the area which forms the subject-matter of the grant should be deemed to be an estate notwithstanding that it did not include certain lands in the village of that name which have already been granted on service or other tenure or been reserved for communal purpose. We have, therefore, to examine whether in the instant case, (i) whether the grant was one of a named village, and (ii) whether all the lands in the village except certain lands in that village which had alreadv been granted on service or other tenures or been reserved for communal purpose, were granted by way of inam. ( 34 ) ACCORDING to the title deed No. 4045 (Ext. P-2), the total extent of the land in the village was 1475 acres 57 cents. Out of that 376 acres 32 cents had been given away as inams for service, etc. , by way of minor inams. The balance of the land remaining in the village was 1099 acres 25 cents and all that extent of 1099 acres 25 cents was given away as inam in favour of the shrotriamdar or the inamdar. It is seen from the particulars given in Ext. P-11 which is an extract of the permanent revenue register of Bellary Disivrict (see page 175 written in red-ink in the records of the lower court) that out of 1099 acres 25 cents, 1090 acres 56 cents remained with the srotriamdar or the inamdar because an extent of 8 acres 69 cents had been acquired in 1871 for the purpose of laving a road. It is to be seen from the evidence of Ramamurthachar (PW. 6) that out of 1099 acres 25 cents an extent of about 100 acres of land in Singadavanahalli had been gifted away bv the predecessors in interest of the plaintiff in favour of Pandurangachar, father of PW. 6. Out of the extent of land so gifted, PW. 6 reconveyed an extent of 10 acres in phymashi No. 53 as per Ext. P-39 in favour of the plaintiff. It is, therefore, clear that out of 1090 acres 56 cents which remained with the holder of the inam, aftpr 8 acres 69 cents was taken away for the road in 1871, 90 acres is with PW. 6 reconveyed an extent of 10 acres in phymashi No. 53 as per Ext. P-39 in favour of the plaintiff. It is, therefore, clear that out of 1090 acres 56 cents which remained with the holder of the inam, aftpr 8 acres 69 cents was taken away for the road in 1871, 90 acres is with PW. 6 and the balance of about 1000 arres 56 cents became the pronerty of the plaintiff. Tn tbe plaint the claim 19 in respect of 1000 acres 61 cents which is more or less the same as referred to above. ( 35 ) WHAT, therefore emerges from the aforesaid discussion is that the entire extent which remained after certain minor inams had been given away prior to the grant in favour of the predecessor in interest of the plaintiff, was the subject matter of the inam grant to which title deed NO. 4045 relates. In view of the above finding, it follows that by virtue of explanation 1 to clause (d) cf S. 3 (2) of the Estates Land Act, the lands in question should be treated as an estate within the meaning of the Estates land Act. Sri V. Krishnamurthy however argued relying upon the heading of title deed No. 4045 which reads as 'register 173 of inams in the village of Singadevanahalli' and in which the lands that were given by way of inam had been particularised with reference to their survey numbers, that the grant in favour of the predecessor in interest of the plaintiff was 'not the grant of a named village, but it was a grant of certain lands in a village, and, therefore the land could not constitute an estate within the meaning of the Act. This argument has to be rejected in view of the observations of the Supreme Court made in respect of a similar village where similar expressions had been used, in Addanki's case (2) at P. 812: the grant was of a named village of Thakkellapadu. Learned counsel drew our attention to the heading in the Register of Inams in the village (Ex. Learned counsel drew our attention to the heading in the Register of Inams in the village (Ex. A2) and pointed out that it purported to be a Register of Inams in the village, but obviously no assistance can be derived from the use of the preposition 'in' as it is a well-known form of heading which is equally used even where an entire village is the subject of the grant (vide e. g. the observation in District Board, Tanjore v. Noor Md. ( (1952) 2 Mad. L. J. at p. 592 ). ( 36 ) IT was next contended that an extent of 375 acres 32 cents of land which was shown in Ext. P2 as having been given away as inams for service, etc. , was not shown by the Government to have been granted prior to the grant in favour of the predecessor in interest of the plaintiff. In the absence of any specific evidence led by the Government on that question, it was argued that it could not be said that the entire extent of land remaining after grants already made had been given away by way of inams in favour of the predecessor in interest of the plaintiff. On going through the contents of Ext. P2, we feel that "deduct the inams for general and service dry 376 acres 32 cents" amounted to saying that 376 acres 32 cents had already been given away before the grant in favour of the predecessor in interest was made. Even otherwise it cannot be said that the burden of proving the grant in a case of this type is on the Government. ( 37 ) THE question relating to the burden of proof relating to the question whether a particular extent of land constituted an estate or not, has been considered by the Supreme Court in more cases than one. In Varada bhavanarayana Rao v. State of A. P. , AIR. 1963 SC. ( 37 ) THE question relating to the burden of proof relating to the question whether a particular extent of land constituted an estate or not, has been considered by the Supreme Court in more cases than one. In Varada bhavanarayana Rao v. State of A. P. , AIR. 1963 SC. 1715, 1718the Supreme Court observed in paragraphs 14 to 17 as follows: " On a consideration of the history of the language used in the explanation and also the circumstances in which the Explanation came to be added, we have come to the conclusion that the legislature being well aware of the difficulties of proving whether the minor grants had been granted prior to or subsequent to the grant of a named village, decided to leave the matter easy as between the contending parties and created no presumption either way. That being the position, the question on which of the contending parties the burden of proof would lie has to be decided on the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act. S. 101 of the Evidence Act provides that whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. S. 102 provides that the burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. S. I03 provides that the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the burden of proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. " Applying these principles, we find that the plaintiff who asks the Court for a declaration that the area covered by the title deed 1082 is not an estate must prove that it is not an 'estate'. If no evidence were given on either side the plaintiff would fail. For we have found that there is no presumption in law either that the area in question is an estate or that it is not an estate. If no evidence were given on either side the plaintiff would fail. For we have found that there is no presumption in law either that the area in question is an estate or that it is not an estate. It follows from this that the plaintiff who is to prove that the suit lands do not form an estate must show that the minor inams were granted subsequent to the date of the inam grant of the named village. The plaintiff has clearly failed to discharge this burden. We have therefore come to conclusion, though for reasons different from what found favour with the High Court, that the plaintiff's suit has been rightly dismissed. " ( 38 ) IN an other decision of the Supreme Court Aluru Kondayya v. Singaraju rama Rao, AIR 1996 SC. 681, 690the Supreme Court had occasion to deal with the question of burden of proof in cases arising under the Estates Land Act. In paragraph 25 of the said decision, the following observations are to be found:" If a minor inam was proved to be granted prior to the date of the grant by virtue of Explanation (1) the grant expressed to be of a named village had to be regarded as a grant of an estate. If it was proved that the grantee after receiving the whole village created minor inams, the grant was of the whole village and, therefore, grant of an estate. But where evidence about the creation of the major and minor inams was not forthcoming, the question had to be decided on the presumption that the subject-matter of the grant shall be deemed to be an estate, notwithstanding that it did not include lands granted on service or other tenures of lands reserved for communal purposes. On the true effect of the Explanation there was a sharp conflict of judicial opinion resulting in three distinct views. In one set of cases it was ruled that the burden of proving that a tenant is entitled to permanent rights of occupancy in his holding by virtue of S. 6 of the madras Estate Land Act always lies upon the tenant, and it is for the tenant to establish affirmatively that the minor inams in the village were granted before the date of the grant of the named village, and if he failed to do so his claim is liable to fail. (See Rama Raoo v. Linga Reddy (AIR. 1957 AP. 632) and ramadhan Chettiar v. State of Madras (AIR. 1958 Mad. 104 ). In another set of cases it was held that where relief is claimed before the Court on the plea that a grant of land was of an estate, or that it was not of an estate, and the evidence is inconclusive, the perrson who has approached the Court for relief must fail (see the judgment of krishna Rao, J. , in Nelluru Sundarama Reddy v. State of A. P. (ILR 1959 A. P. 337 (FB) Varada Bhauanarayana Rao v. State of A. P. (1964) 2 SCR 501 ) and Addanki Thiruvenkata Thata Desikarcharulu ayyavarlamagaru v. State of A. P. (C. A. 619 of 1961 dt. 8-5-1964 (SC ). In the third set of cases it was held that the Explanation raises a presumption where a grant is expressed to be of a named village, that the area which formed the subject-matter of the grant shall be deemed to be an estate and it is for the party contending that the grant in question falls outside the definition of S. 3 (2) (d) of the Act to prove that case either by showing that the minor inams not comprised in the grant were created contemporaneously with or subsequent to the grant of the village by the original grantor (see Janakiramaraju v appalaswami ( (1954) Mad. 980=atr 1954 Mad. 772; ILR (1959) A. P. 337 FB; State of A. P. v. Korukonda Bhattan Appalacharyulu (ILR (1959) A. P. 687 (FB) 'and Sri Varadarajaswami vori Temple v. Krishna Govinda (ILR (J953) Mad. 1023) (FB ). " ( 39 ) THE Supreme Court in the above dceision ultimately held that there were two presumptions which applied to two different cases in the cases which arose before the Amending Act of 1936, the presumption under S. "23 applied and in cases which arose since the Amending Act of 1936, the presumption prescribed by the Explanation (1) applied and that was so because the Explanation though enacted by Act 2 of 1945, has been brought into force from the date on which the amending Act of 1936 became operative. It ultimately approved the view expressed by the Madras High Court in Mantravadi Bhavanarayana v. Merugu Venkatadu, AIR 1954 Mad 415 in which it was stated as follows: ( 40 ) IT is now settled law that by reason of the amendment made in 1945 which added an explanation to S. 3 (2) (d) of the Madras estates Land Act and numbered it as explanation 1, a grant constitututes an estate if it is expressed to be a named village irrespective of the fact that some of the lands in the village had already been granted on inam or service grants, or were reserved for communal purposes. ( 41 ) AFTER reviewing the material before it, the Supreme Court in Alur Kondayya's case (4) reversed the decision of the Madras High Court which had held that the grant in that case was not of the whole village or even of a named village and restored the decision of the trial Court which had held that the grant in that case was of the whole village within the meaning of S. 3 (2) (d) of the Estates Land Act as in force at that relevant time. On a consideration of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above, we are of the opinion that in this cr. se the burden was not on the state i. e. the defendant, to show that the minor inams in question had been granted prior to the grant in favour of the plaintiff's predecessor. Apart from the burden of proof, on the material that is made available, we are of the opinion that the minor inams must have been created prior to the grant in favour of the predecessor of the plaintiff. We, therefore, hold that the grant in this case in favour of the plaintiff's predecessor was of a named village and it was in respect of the entire extent of land in the village of Singadevenahalli which remained after certain minor inams had already been granted. ( 42 ) IN view of the above finding, it follows that the extent of 1099 acres 25 cents covered by title deed No. 4045 is an estate within the meaning of s. 3 (2) (d) of the Estates Lands Act as it was in force when action under the Reduction of Rent Act was taken in this case. ( 42 ) IN view of the above finding, it follows that the extent of 1099 acres 25 cents covered by title deed No. 4045 is an estate within the meaning of s. 3 (2) (d) of the Estates Lands Act as it was in force when action under the Reduction of Rent Act was taken in this case. ( 43 ) THE next point for consideration is whether the Abolition Act is applicable to this case and whether the decision of the Tribunal is binding on the State Government. We have already held that the Abolition Act is not applicable to the suit lands since they did not constitute an estate within the meaning of the Estates Land Act prior to its amendment in 1936. By virtue of S. 1 (3) of the Act any decision given under the Abolition act by the Tribunal being one given for the purpose of that Act, cannot be considered as relevant for the purpose of this case or binding on the state Government. We may at this stage notice a contention urged on behalf of the Government that the decision of the Tribunal was one given without notice to the Government and the Government was not bound by the said decision, in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in and the decision of this Court in Writ Petition 68 of 1954 filed by the plaintiff against the State Government questioning the action taken by the Government under the Reduction of Rent act (Exhibit P63) in which it was held that the decision of the Tribunal was not binding upon the Government since the Government had not been made a party to those proceedings. But, it is unnecesary for us to examine the correctness of the above submission made by the Gvernment, for we have held that the decision of the Tribunal under the Abolilition act is not relevant for the purpose of this case on another ground. ( 44 ) THE last question to be considered is whether the action taken by the government under the Reduction of Rent Act was unauthorised. ( 44 ) THE last question to be considered is whether the action taken by the government under the Reduction of Rent Act was unauthorised. When once it is held that the lands in question constitute an estate within the meaning of clause (d) of S. 3 (2) of the Estates Land Act after it was amended in 1936, the action taken by the Government or the Tahsildar under the Reduction of Rent Act, cannot be considered as unauthorised. ( 45 ) THAT was the view which was taken by the Supreme Court in Varada bhavanarayana's case (3) and in Addanki's case (2 ). No infirmity with regard to the action taken by the concerned authorities under the Reduction of Rent Act has been brought to our notice. We therefore, hold that the action taken by the authorities under the Reduction of Rent Act is not unauthorised. ( 46 ) IN the result, we allow the appeal and dismiss the suit. We set aside the declaration made by the lower Court that the suit lands did not constitute an estate under the Estates Land Act or an inam estate under the abolition Act or under the Reduction of Rent Act. We also set aside the decree for permanent injunction passed by the lower Court restraining the defendant from interfering with the management and possession of the suit lands and also the decree for taking an account of the rents realised by the Government from the year 1950 and payment of the same to the plaintiff. ( 47 ) WE however make it clear that it is open to the legal representatives of the plaintiff to recover from the Government whatever amount is due to them from the Government in accordance with the provisions of the reduction of Rent Act by resorting to appropriate proceedings. In the circumstances of this case, we direct that the parties shall bear their own costs in both the Courts. --- *** --- .