JUDGMENT P. Subramonian Poti, J. 1. The petitioners seek the issue of a writ in the nature of quo warranto to respondents 3 and 4 requiring them to show under what title they are holding the office respectively of Mayor and Deputy Mayor of the Corporation of Calicut. The Petitioners, four in number, are councillors of the Corporation of Calicut having been elected as such in the year 1968. The first petitioner was the Deputy Mayor and in the petition he claimed that he is still the Deputy Mayor. One Sri Madhusoodhana Kurup was the Mayor of the Corporation of Calicut in November, 1970. The elections to the office of Mayor and Deputy Mayor were to be held in November, 1 1971. It was the duty of the Commissioner of the Corporation to convene the meeting for that purpose and accordingly he issued notices dated 19-10-1971 to the councillors intimating them that a meeting of the Council would be held at the Corporation Office on Saturday the 6th November, 1971 to elect the Mayor and Deputy Mayor. The meeting was to be at 3 p.m. to elect the Mayor and election of the Deputy Mayor was to be at the meeting of 5 p.m. One Sri P.P. Saidalikutty, a councillor of the Corporation of Calicut representing Division No.38, alleging that he did not receive the notice for the meeting on the 6th November, filed a suit O.S. 493 of 1971 before the Principal Munsiff's Court, Kozhikode-1 on 6-11-1971, the date fixed for the election. In that suit he sought an injunction restraining the commissioner of the Corporation of Calicut from holding the meeting on 6-11-1971. In that suit he sought an injunction restraining the commissioner of the Corporation of Calicut from holding the meeting on 6-11-1971. It appears I from the materials available that even before the interim order was passed the commissioner entered appearance through the standing counsel for the Corporation; but notwithstanding this an interim order was passed by the court in the following terms: "Whereas the petitioner having filed an application under O.39 R.1 and 2 C. P. C. for passing an interim injunction from holding the Council meeting on 6-11-1971 and electing the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor pending disposal of this petition and upon hearing the arguments of the Advocate on behalf of the petitioner and the court having allowed the application it is hereby ordered that you the above respondent is hereby restrained by this interim order of injunction from holding the Council meeting on 6-11-1971 and electing the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor pending disposal of this petition. (Sd.)" It is the petitioner's case that by 2.30 p.m. on 6-11-1971 about 22 councillors including the petitioners had gathered at the residence of Sri B. V. Abdullakoya, Member of Parliament, which was very near to the Corporation Office. Some of the councillors met the 1st respondent, the Commissioner who is alleged to have told them that the meeting convened by him would not take place in view of the order of , injunction passed by the court. The first petitioner who was the Deputy Mayor is said to have contacted the first respondent and is alleged to have been informed in the same way. It is said that therefore the petitioners could not turn up at the meeting and that was the case with the others who had earlier assembled at the residence of Sri. Abdullakoya. It is further alleged in the petition that before the appointed hour the fact of the order of injunction passed by the Civil Court was made known to the councillors by placing a copy of the order on the table of the Chairman and displaying another copy in the meeting hall. It is stated further that the Secretary of the Council attempted to read out the contents of the order to certain councillors, some of whom prevented him from reading it on the plea that the Commissioner alone was entitled to read anything to them. 2. It is stated further that the Secretary of the Council attempted to read out the contents of the order to certain councillors, some of whom prevented him from reading it on the plea that the Commissioner alone was entitled to read anything to them. 2. Under the impression that the meeting had been called off, it is said that the councillors including the petitioners, absented. 23 out of 45 councillors assembled in the Council hall at the appointed hour and they appear to have elected the Mayor and Deputy Mayor. For the purpose of election of the Mayor, the 5th respondent, one of the councillors of the Corporation was said to have been elected by them as the Chairman of the meeting, in the absence of the Mayor and Deputy Mayor. The 3rd respondent's name was proposed as Mayor and was seconded and since there was no other nomination he was declared duly elected. The Mayor had to be administered the oath of office under S.66 of the Kerala Municipal Corporations Act, 1961. But that could not be done immediately E as the 2nd respondent, the District Collector was not present at the meeting. It is alleged that the 2nd respondent was not present because 1st respondent informed him that the meeting would not be held. Subsequently at 5 p. m. the election of the Deputy Mayor is said to have been conducted in the same fashion. Thereafter the 1st respondent is said to have gone to the office of the Corporation along with the District Collector, who at about 6.50 p.m. is said to have administered oath of office to the Mayor. There is the further allegation in the petition that the election of the Deputy Mayor was held afresh at 7 p.m. and the 4th respondent was once again elected. This, it is said was to make the election of the Deputy Mayor appear to be proper and in compliance with the statutory provisions. On these averments the petitioners contend that the election of the Mayor and the Deputy I Mayor are invalid. According to them there was no notice at least to one of the councillors, namely, the plaintiff on O.S. 493 of 1971. The Commissioner had called off the meeting and therefore no meeting could be validly held. On these averments the petitioners contend that the election of the Mayor and the Deputy I Mayor are invalid. According to them there was no notice at least to one of the councillors, namely, the plaintiff on O.S. 493 of 1971. The Commissioner had called off the meeting and therefore no meeting could be validly held. The petitioners aver that the conduct of the; meeting for election should be governed by R.6 of Schedule.1 to the Kerala Municipal Corporations Act, 1961, and it is contended that this rule has been violated. It is also contended that in view of the order of injunction the commissioner could not have convened the meeting and hence the proceedings which culminated in the election must be held to be irregular. The election of the Deputy Mayor is attacked for reasons noticed earlier. 3. The Commissioner of the Corporation of Calicut, while admitting the fact of the injunction order passed by the court, states that he had done whatever he should to respect the order of the court. While the petitioners state in the affidavit in support of the O.P. that the commissioner called off the meeting or at any rate told them that the meeting would not be held, in the counter affidavit filed by the commissioner he avers that he did not convey any such information as he was not competent to do so but only conveyed the fact of his receiving the order of injunction restraining him from holding the meeting. Necessarily therefore, there is a dispute on a question of fact. But counsel for petitioners fairly conceded that the Commissioner's affidavit may be accepted as correct for the disposal of the O.P. Then I must assume that the commissioner only communicated to the councillors the order restraining the holding of the meeting by him. In the counter affidavit the Commissioner states that Sri. Saidalikutty, who filed O.S. 493 of 1971 as well as all other councilors were actually served with notices and their acknowledgments obtained. This fact, according to the commissioner, was brought to the notice of the court before it passed the order of injunction. But nevertheless the court proceeded to issue the injunction. Saidalikutty, who filed O.S. 493 of 1971 as well as all other councilors were actually served with notices and their acknowledgments obtained. This fact, according to the commissioner, was brought to the notice of the court before it passed the order of injunction. But nevertheless the court proceeded to issue the injunction. What he could do then was only to inform the councillors of this and he made an attempt to do so by informing those who contacted him about the order and also by affixing the copy of the order in the council hall. He did not participate in any further deliberations of the Corporation or even in the ceremony of administering the oath to the Mayor. 4. The District Collector who is the 2nd respondent has also filed a counter affidavit. In that counter affidavit he would state that he did not proceed to the council hall at the appointed hour in view of the information conveyed to him by the 1st respondent of the order of injunction. Later he was informed by the 5th respondent of the election which was held at which the 3rd respondent was elected as Mayor. 23 Councillors who participated in the meeting are said to have requested him in writing to administer the oath to the 3rd respondent. Thereupon he took the advice of the local Government Pleader as to what should be the attitude to be taken and he was advised that it is for him to administer the oath and the order of injunction ! did not in any way stand against such a course. Accordingly he is said to have proceeded to the office of the Corporation Council at 6.53 p.m. to administer the oath. The Commissioner remained in the office while the Collector went to the Council hall and administered the oath of office to the 3rd respondent. 5. On behalf of respondents 3 to 5, 3rd respondent has filed a counter affidavit. In it, the 3rd respondent challenges the good faith of the plaintiff who filed the suit O.S. 493 of 1971 on the date of the election. According to the deponent the plaintiff therein had notice of the meeting, he having been duly served with written notice in time; and the filing of the suit was only an attempt at postponement of the election abusing the process of court. According to the deponent the plaintiff therein had notice of the meeting, he having been duly served with written notice in time; and the filing of the suit was only an attempt at postponement of the election abusing the process of court. The notice of the meeting is said to have been served on Sri. P.P. Saidalikutty on 27-10-1971. It is further said that the 22 councillors who did not participate in the meeting belonged to a minority group and did not participate because they were sure that their candidates would not be elected as Mayor and Deputy Mayor. The 3rd respondent appears to have been a member of a group of an alliance led by Congress (N) which had a strength of 23 while the opposition had a strength of 22. It is stated in the affidavit that in almost all the newspapers of Kerala a news item appeared a few days before 6th of November 1971 that one member of the opposite group had joined in the group of Congress(N). But the 3rd respondent would say that two members including himself left the Congress (N) thereby raising the strength of the opposition to 23 while the strength of the group led by Congress (N) was reduced to 22. This, according to him, was the position on 6th November 1971, the day scheduled for the election of the Mayor and Deputy Mayor. According to the 3rd respondent he had no knowledge of the order of injunction issued to the 1st respondent. He would also say that the 1st respondent did not hold the meeting. The councillors who held the meeting are said to have elected one among them to be the chairman of the meeting at which the Mayor and Deputy Mayor were elected as the rule permitted such an election in the absence of the Mayor and Deputy Mayor at the meeting. It is also contended that the election was in accordance with sub-r.(4) of R.2 of the Kerala Municipal Corporations (Election of Mayor and Deputy Mayor) Rules, 1961 which are the rules applicable and not R.6 to Schedule I of the Kerala Municipal Corporations Act as contended by the petitioners. It is also contended that the election was in accordance with sub-r.(4) of R.2 of the Kerala Municipal Corporations (Election of Mayor and Deputy Mayor) Rules, 1961 which are the rules applicable and not R.6 to Schedule I of the Kerala Municipal Corporations Act as contended by the petitioners. With regard to the election of the Deputy Mayor it is said that the meeting started at the scheduled time and continued till 7 p.m. and since by that time the Mayor had been duly installed in office the election of the Deputy Mayor is also said to be regular. 6. From the narration of the averments made in the affidavit in support of the O.P. and the counter affidavits, it can be seen that there is dispute as to certain facts. Whether the 1st respondent informed such of those councillors as contacted him that the meeting had been adjourned to another date is one of the controversies. Whether the councillors who held the meeting had knowledge of the order of injunction is also a matter on which the parties are not agreed. There is also dispute as to whether two meetings were held at which repeatedly Deputy Mayor was elected or I the meeting which started continued until the time when the Mayor had been administered the oath of office. Since these are not matters on which a decision could be reached by this court, counsel for the petitioners submitted that the facts in the counter affidavits may be assumed to be true for the purpose of adjudication of the matters raised in the O.P. and it is on that basis that I am proceeding with the matter. Of course, naturally this stand was taken by the counsel for the petitioners because as pointed out by counsel for respondents 3 to 5 an alternative remedy so far as the petitioners are concerned is provided by way of election petition and if questions of fact had to be resolved here it may be said that the appropriate forum for deciding the matter is the forum which could try an election petition. 7. I will now consider the contentions which have been urged in support of the claim of the petitioners that respondents 3 and 4 are holding the offices of Mayor and Deputy Mayor without having legal title thereto. Though it is urged that no notice to Sri. 7. I will now consider the contentions which have been urged in support of the claim of the petitioners that respondents 3 and 4 are holding the offices of Mayor and Deputy Mayor without having legal title thereto. Though it is urged that no notice to Sri. P.P. Saidalikutty, one of the councillors, was issued intimating him of the date of the meeting as 6-11-1971, in view of the counter affidavit filed by the Commissioner of the Corporation, this does not call for a decision here. It is not disputed here that the counsel for the Corporation did appear for the Commissioner before the interim order was passed. It is also said that even at that time the fact that the plaintiff had actually signed the notice was brought to the notice of the court. It is strange that the court should pass an order without reference to the appearance of and contest by the Corporation. It would appear that what the court passed was an ex parte interim order of injunction though actually that is not the case. Whatever that be, I am not called upon to adjudicate on the question whether one or more of the councillors had no notice of the meeting and therefore I leave the matter there. 8. Though a contention was raised that the commissioner who is to convene the meeting called off the meeting, that again is no longer available to the petitioners as the petitioners have accepted here the stand of the Commissioner that beyond intimating the petitioners that he had been served with an order of injunction he did not make any representation as to any adjournment of the meeting or cancellation of the meeting. In fact, as I would show in due course, the commissioner has no power to adjourn any meeting which has been duly convened. His functions extend only to the convening of the meetings and it is to the provisions of the Kerala Municipal Corporations Act and the Rules thereunder that advertance has to be made to see whether he has got any power in this behalf and I see no power in the Commissioner to cancel the meeting which has been convened. Therefore this ground is also not available to the petitioners. 9. The main ground urged before me by Sri. Therefore this ground is also not available to the petitioners. 9. The main ground urged before me by Sri. V.K.K. Menon is that the meeting has been held in violation of R.6 to Schedule I of Kerala Municipal Corporations Act, 1961. It is necessary here to extract R.3 to 6 to Schedule I in this connection: "3(1) No meeting shall be held unless at least six clear days before the day of the meeting, notice of the day and hour when the meeting is to be held and of the business to be transacted there at has been given to the members. Explanation: in the computation of 'clear days' Sundays and holidays are not excluded, but the day of the meeting and the day of receipt of notice are excluded. (2) Incases of urgency, the Mayor may convene a meeting after giving to the members shorter notice than that specified in sub-r.(1). In such cases, notice of the day and hour of the meeting shall be published in such manner as the Mayor may deem most expedient. (4) At an ordinary meeting held in each of the months of April, June, August, October, December and February the Mayor shall place before the council a statement of receipts and disbursements on account of the Municipal fund from the close of the last preceding year upto the close of the month before that in which the meeting takes place. 5. (1) The Mayor shall call a special meeting on receiving a request in writing signed by not less than twelve members specifying the resolution which it is proposed to move. (2) No special meeting shall be held unless at least four clear days' notice, specifying the purpose for which such meeting is to be held and the date and hour thereof, has been given by a separate communication addressed to each member. (3) No business other than what is contained in the request by members, shall be transacted at a special meeting. 6. If the offices of Mayor and Deputy Mayor are vacant, the duties assigned to the Mayor by R.2 to 5 shall be performed by the commissioner. (3) No business other than what is contained in the request by members, shall be transacted at a special meeting. 6. If the offices of Mayor and Deputy Mayor are vacant, the duties assigned to the Mayor by R.2 to 5 shall be performed by the commissioner. The Commissioner shall also conduct the election of the councillor to preside over the council meeting in the absence of the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor." These are rules made under S.31 of the Kerala Municipal Corporations Act, 1961 and that section runs as follows: "31. Regulations for proceedings of council and standing committees: The council and the standing committees shall observe the procedure laid down in Schedule I, and may make supplementary regulations, not inconsistent therewith or with other provisions of this Act or any rules made by the Government, for the conduct of their respective proceedings and also for the maintenance of order at their meetings." According to the petitioners the council, in the matter of conduct of any meeting, has to observe the procedure laid down in Schedule I. It is therefore the case of the petitioners that if there has been any violation of any of these rules the meeting must be held to be irregular. In particular my attention is drawn to R.6 which provides that if the offices of Mayor and Deputy Mayor are vacant, the duties assigned to the Mayor by R.2 to 5 shall be performed by the Commissioner; and the commissioner shall also conduct the election of the councillor to preside over the council meeting in the absence of the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor. What is urged is that in the present case the Mayor and Deputy Mayor were absent and therefore the duty fell on the Commissioner of the Corporation to conduct the election of the councillor to preside over the council meeting. The 5th respondent presided over such meeting and admittedly it is not by any conduct of election by the commissioner that he was so chosen to preside over. The commissioner was absent at that time. Therefore it is said that the election of the 5th respondent to preside over the meeting was contrary to R.6 and that would mean that the entire proceedings of election would be vitiated. The commissioner was absent at that time. Therefore it is said that the election of the 5th respondent to preside over the meeting was contrary to R.6 and that would mean that the entire proceedings of election would be vitiated. The answer to this is that these rules which are relied on by the petitioners are inapplicable to the case of election of Mayor and Deputy Mayor. S.367 of the Act concerns the rule making power of government. Sub-s.2(b) of S.367 of the Act runs as follows: "(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may -- (b) provide for all matters not expressly provided for in this Act, relating to the elections of the Mayor, Deputy Mayor or Councillors including the determination of the validity of elections and deposits to be made by candidates standing for election as councillors and the conditions under which such deposits may be forfeited; Provided that the deposit required shall not exceed one hundred rupees." Relying on this rule it is said that matters relating to the elections of the Mayor and Deputy Mayor are matters regarding which provision is made under rules to be framed by government. Reading this section along with S.31, according to respondents 3 to 5, it is apparent that in regard to the election of Mayor and Deputy Mayor independent rules are contemplated and such rules have been framed by government styled as "The Kerala Municipal Corporations (Elections of Mayor and Deputy Mayor) R.1962", (hereinafter referred to by me as Election of Mayor rules). In exercise of the powers under the same sub-section another set of rules have also been framed and is the Kerala Municipal Corporations (Decision of Election Disputes) Rules, 1962. These rules, it is submitted govern the conduct of election while the rules in Schedule I refer to meetings of the council in general. With regard to the matters concerning election of the Mayor and Deputy Mayor it is the Election of Mayor rules that apply. Of course, if that be the case, the petitioners cannot succeed in their contention. That is because R.2 of the Election of Mayor Rules reads as follows: "2. (1) The election of Mayor or Deputy Mayor shall be held in the Corporation Office at a meeting of the Council specially convened for the purpose. Of course, if that be the case, the petitioners cannot succeed in their contention. That is because R.2 of the Election of Mayor Rules reads as follows: "2. (1) The election of Mayor or Deputy Mayor shall be held in the Corporation Office at a meeting of the Council specially convened for the purpose. (2) Such meeting shall be convened as soon as possible after the constitution of a new council or after the first day of November in each year or after the occurrence of a vacancy in the office of ? Mayor or Deputy Mayor by the Commissioner of the Corporation. (3) Notice of the day and hour of meeting shall be given at least seven clear days previous to the day of meeting. (4) Such meeting shall be presided over - (a) if held for the election of Mayor by the deputy Mayor or if the Deputy Mayor himself intends to stand as a candidate at the election, or in his absence, by a councillor, not intending (to stand as a candidate at the election, chosen by the meeting to preside for the occasion, and (b) if held for the election of Deputy Mayor by the Mayor, or in his absence by a councillor, not intending to stand as a candidate at the election chosen by the meeting to preside for the occasion. Provided that in the case of the first election of Mayor after the constitution of a new council, the meeting shall be presided over by the Collector or other Officer authorised by him in his behalf." If these rules are to apply, then in the absence of the Mayor and Deputy Mayor the meeting may choose anyone of the Councillors to preside over the function as actually was the case here. It is the meeting of those persons who assembled that chose the 5th respondent to preside and if that be so, it is quite in order. Therefore, what I am concerned with in this petition is the question which of these rules would apply to this case. 10. I have referred earlier to S.31 of the Act. It is indicated in that section that the council and the standing committees shall observe the procedure laid down in Schedule I. R.3 provides that six clear days' notice must be given of a meeting. 10. I have referred earlier to S.31 of the Act. It is indicated in that section that the council and the standing committees shall observe the procedure laid down in Schedule I. R.3 provides that six clear days' notice must be given of a meeting. But that is not sufficient with regard to the meeting to be held for the election of Mayor and Deputy Mayor because R.2 provides that 7 days notice must be given. It is the Mayor who is to convene the ordinary meetings under R.3 of Schedule I. Even special meetings is to be convened by him as provided for in R.5. R.6 applies only to cases where offices of Mayor and Deputy Mayor are vacant and not where the Mayor and Deputy Mayor are absent. 11. In view of this specific provision in S.367(2)(b) enabling the government to frame rules in regard to the conduct of election of Mayor and Deputy Mayor and in view of the rules framed in this behalf, it is evident that it is those rules which govern the election of Mayor and Deputy Mayor and if that be the case the contention that there has been a violation of R.6 to Schedule I cannot stand. 12. It is next urged by the petitioners that the commissioner could not have convened the meeting and being a statutory authority who is to convene the meeting and having been restrained by a court from doing so, the meeting could not have commenced. It is said that the process of convening the meeting precedes the holding of the meeting and upto the time the meeting is commenced it could not be said that the stage of convening the meeting is over and therefore, if, by a court's order the Commissioner who is to convene the meeting is effectively restrained from doing so, the convening of the meeting becomes impossible, and therefore, the meeting held could not be said to be valid or regular. I must notice here that the contention in these terms have not been urged in the original petition. It was urged at the hearing and I have permitted counsel to urge the same. In considering this question several matters have to be taken notice of. I must notice here that the contention in these terms have not been urged in the original petition. It was urged at the hearing and I have permitted counsel to urge the same. In considering this question several matters have to be taken notice of. It is said that the order of injunction was directed only to the Commissioner of the Corporation and therefore could restrain only the Commissioner who is a statutory authority under the Kerala Municipal Corporations Act from acting. S.4 of the Act enumerates the Municipal authorities charged with carrying out the provisions of the Act. They are: (a) the council, (b) standing committees of the Council, and (c) the Commissioner. It is therefore said that the Commissioner is an authority independent of the council and therefore, any order of injunction issued to the Commissioner even assuming that it becomes known to others, is not binding on them. It is further said that in this case it is not the council which ought to be restrained if at all but the members of the council. Whatever that be the order in terms is only against the Commissioner of the Corporation and not against the council or its members. Reference has again been made to R.2 of the Election of Mayor Rules to which I have already adverted. It is said that the rule deals with both the convening of the meeting and the holding of the meeting. Sub-r.(2) of R.2 and R.3 deals with convening of the meeting while sub-r.(4) deals with holding of the meeting. It is pointed out that no functions are assigned to the Commissioner in the matter of holding a meeting. He does not come into the picture at all in the matter of holding the meeting. His statutory function is only to call together the members of the council by issuing them a notice appointing the time and date of the meeting. Once such a meeting is convened by him the holding of the meeting is inevitable and it is not in his hands to cancel the meeting or adjourn it. No power is given to the Commissioner in this regard and therefore the mere fact that he has been restrained even assuming that such restraint is against the convening of the meeting will not in any way debar the convening of the meeting. No power is given to the Commissioner in this regard and therefore the mere fact that he has been restrained even assuming that such restraint is against the convening of the meeting will not in any way debar the convening of the meeting. That, in short, is the stand taken by the respondents here. The injunction order does not in terms prohibit the convening of the meeting by the commissioner but prohibits only the holding of the meeting as if the commissioner has statutory functions in regard to the holding of the meeting. It is therefore said that the order of injunction apart from the fact that it is net directed against the councillors of the Corporation who are to hold the meeting, is also not directed against the 1st respondent to restrain him from exercising those duties, which under law he is bound to exercise. In other words, it is pointed out that the injunction if at all could have been only in regard to the convening of the meeting by the 1st respondent and not in regard to the holding of the meeting. In the counter affidavit filed by the Commissioner it is said that the injunction order did not direct him to call off the meeting and therefore he did not call it off. I do not think that even if the injunction order directed the Commissioner to call off the meeting he could have done so unless there be a power in him to that end. Such a power is not indicated in any of the provisions of the Act or the rules. 13. I have already indicated that the order of injunction was not directed against the councillors of the Corporation and the order being not one restraining the convening of the meeting but the holding of the meeting, if the Commissioner of the Corporation had no functions to perform in regard to such holding, the meeting could not in any manner be held to be illegal. It is attempted to be argued that though the order of injunction in terms refers only to restraint on the holding of the meeting by the Commissioner, what was really meant was to restrain him from exercising his statutory duties in regard to the meeting for election of the Mayor and Deputy Mayor and if the statutory duties concern only the convening of the meeting then the order must be read as a restraint on the convening of the meeting. It is further argued that if the restraint to the Commissioner is in the matter of convening the meeting, the stage of convening would not be over till the meeting commences, and therefore, when once the Commissioner is restrained from convening the meeting it could not be commenced. This argument requires many assumptions to be made. Firstly the order which in terms prohibits only the holding of the meeting has to be read as referring to prohibition on the exercise of such statutory functions as are provided for in the relevant rules. But this may not be of any help to the petitioner because in terms the statutory functions are exhausted by the calling of the meeting by the Commissioner. The contention apparently is that the Commissioner is to 'convene' the meeting and in doing so he has functions to perform upto the time the meeting actually commences. Even assuming that the order of injunction is neither one restraining the Commissioner from 'holding' the meeting nor one restraining him from exercising such functions as are assigned to him by the rules relating to election, but has to be read as restraining the 'convening' of the meeting as counsel contends I do not think, the petitioner's case could be sustained. Though in a general sense it could possibly be said that until the meeting commences the stage of convening is not over and therefore when the authority who is to convene is restrained from convening the meeting, the meeting cannot commence, in relation to the provisions of the Kerala Municipal Corporations Act and rules thereunder this cannot be said. That is because the functions of the Commissioner in this regard have been very clearly defined and the functions of the councillors in the matter of holding the meeting have also been defined. That is because the functions of the Commissioner in this regard have been very clearly defined and the functions of the councillors in the matter of holding the meeting have also been defined. When once in compliance with the Election of Mayor Rules notice has been issued by the Commissioner to convene the meeting on a particular day the holding of meeting is inevitable and cannot be prevented by the Commissioner. In this connection I may have to advert to the general law of meetings. It appears to be more or less accepted that when a meeting is convened the proper procedure would be to hold the meeting as convened and adjourn it to a desired date. Shackleton in the treatise on The Law and Practice of Meeting at page 144 observes thus: "When once a general meeting has been convened it is questionable whether it can be cancelled. The correct procedure, where a postponement of a meeting is desired, is to hold the meeting as convened, and adjourn it to the desired date. This procedure would not, of course, apply where the interests of only a few are concerned, and there is unanimity in the matter." The High Court of Orissa in Govinda Chandra v. S. D. O. Sadar ( AIR 1965 Ori. 94 ) was considering the validity of orders passed by the Sub divisional officer in the light of sub-s.2 of S.46(B) of the Orissa Zilla Parished and Panchayat Samiti Act, 1959. The procedure for convening a meeting and the conduct of business of such meeting was laid down by the said sub-section. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) related to the conditions under which a meeting has to be called off, how the request for the purpose was to be submitted and how notice of the decisions to convene the meeting was to be communicated. Clauses (d), (e) and (f) related to the conduct of the meetings. In considering this the court held that all actions taken by him prior to his presiding over the meeting which are dealt with in clauses (a), (b) and (c) must be held to relate to the 'convening' of such meeting and all matters dealt with in (d), (e) and (f) must be held to relate to the holding of the meeting. In that case though no power of altering the date was conferred the court held that there was such a power by virtue of S.22 of Orissa General Clauses Act, applicable to the instant case. In the absence of any such clause the power of convening must be held to be limited to the power which is conferred under the relevant rules and that is exhausted by the convening of the meeting and the service of notice on the persons concerned. 14. It has been argued that even when a meeting is commenced it is not open to the Chairman of the meeting to adjourn the meeting without the consent of the majority of the members participating at the meeting. Any such adjournment by the Chairman being improper it is open to those who are left behind to continue the meeting by electing one among them to be the Chairman of the meeting and conclude the business for which the meeting was called. Of course, to this exceptions are recognised such as where due to the conduct of the members it becomes impossible for the chairman to proceed with the meeting. Subject to all such just exceptions the power of a person presiding at a meeting does not extend to adjourning the meeting arbitrarily to another day while the business of the meeting remains unfinished. In support of this counsel for respondents 3 to 5 brought to my notice the decisions in Deodutt Sharma v. Z. A. Zaid ( AIR 1960 Raj. 25 ) and in B. Gnanaraj v. A. M. Vedanayagam ( AIR 1966 Mad. 372 ). Crew, on the Conduct of and Procedure at Public, Company and Local Government Meetings at page 39 of his book deals with this question in the following words: 'If the chairman leaves the meeting before the business is completed, apparently any business done after his departure is void (R. V. Buller, 1807, 8 East. 389), but if he does so depart or if he purports to adjourn the meeting without authority, the meeting may appoint another chairman and proceed with the business, for he has no right to adjourn the meeting without the consent of the meeting itself unless the business for which it was convened has been done or an express power in that behalf is given him by the relevant rules. Similarly, in R. v. Winchester (1806, 7 East. Similarly, in R. v. Winchester (1806, 7 East. 573), where there was no regular presiding officer at an election, it was held that the control thereof devolves at common law upon the electors themselves. 'In my opinion the power which has been contended for is not within the scope of the authority of the chairman namely, to stop the meeting at his own will and pleasure. The meeting is called for the particular purposes of the company. According to the constitution of the company, a certain officer has to preside. He presides with reference to the business which is there to be transacted. In my opinion he cannot say after that business has been opened, 'I will have no more to do with it; I will not let this meeting proceed; I will stop it; I declare the meeting dissolved; and I leave the chair'. In my opinion that is not within his power. The meeting by itself can resolve to go on with the business for which it has been convened, and appoint a chairman to conduct the business which the other chairman, forgetful of his duty or violating his duty, has tried to stop because the proceedings have taken a turn which he himself does not like'. (National Dwellings Society v. Sykes, 1894, 3 ch. 159.) A Chairman is unwise to adjourn improperly a meeting, even if supported by a majority, since it may result in the minority validly carrying on the business of the meeting, provided it is J sufficient to constitute a quorum. It may, therefore, sometimes be advisable in standing orders to give the chairman specific power to adjourn a meeting at his discretion for a short period in the interests of order." The question which I have discussed above in regard to the adjournment of meeting may not have a direct bearing on the question before me. But counsel wants me to apply the same rule in the case of convening of a meeting and holding thereof. According to him if a meeting which has been convened and which commences cannot be called off by the chairman by himself, it must be more so with a person who is to convene the meeting. Such a person, it is said, cannot call off the meeting at his own discretion. There is considerable force in this contention. According to him if a meeting which has been convened and which commences cannot be called off by the chairman by himself, it must be more so with a person who is to convene the meeting. Such a person, it is said, cannot call off the meeting at his own discretion. There is considerable force in this contention. I think there is the further fact that unless the statutory function of the commissioner provided 1 for in the Act or the rules, which specifically enumerate these include the power to call off a meeting convened by him he cannot exercise any such power. I see no provision which enables him to call off the meeting when once he convenes the meeting and therefore nothing remained for the 1st respondent to do when he received the order of injunction. And the order against him will not be effective so as to prevent the holding of the meeting under the provisions of Election of Mayor Rules. 15. Lastly, an independent attack is made to the Election of the Deputy Mayor. The meeting to elect the Deputy Mayor was fixed for 5 p.m. It is the petitioners' case that it started at 5 p.m. with the 3rd respondent who had not been administered the oath of office at that time in the chair. It is therefore said that the said meeting was not regular even assuming that the 3rd respondent's election was regular. That meeting continued for sometime and it was later that the 3rd respondent was administered oath of office. The answer to this is that there had been no second election at 7 p. m. but that the first meeting continued upto 7 p. m. and by that time the 3rd respondent was administered oath of office. Here again necessarily a dispute on a question of fact arises, and if I accept the counter affidavit of respondents 3 to 5 there is no irregularity in the election of Deputy Mayor. I therefore see no reason to hold that the Section was irregular. 16. Before leaving this matter I must necessarily notice a contention raised that I need not go into the merits of the case as the petitioners could not properly approach this court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. I therefore see no reason to hold that the Section was irregular. 16. Before leaving this matter I must necessarily notice a contention raised that I need not go into the merits of the case as the petitioners could not properly approach this court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. The remedy of a writ in the nature of quo warranto is according to the respondents, a discretionary remedy and if that be the case, since there is an alternative remedy under the Election Disputes Rules in which all questions of fact could also be adjudicated, this Court should not normally interfere. I have gone into the merits of the case only because petitioners would contend that though in regard to the petitioners it could be said that there was an alternative remedy available by way of election petition such a remedy is not open to those who are not councillors and in their cases the resort to this court could be made as it is open to any citizen to challenge the legal title of persons who hold public office without an authority. There is another reason also why I have adverted to this contention. I will mention it in due course. 17. Unlike in the case of writs of habeas corpus and prohibition which were issued ex debito justitiae, the issue of writ in the nature of quo warranto was in the discretion of the court. I am referring to this because at one point of time there was some controversy before me on this question. Dealing with this S.A. de Smith on the Judicial Review of Administrative Action (2nd Edition) at page 371 says thus: "The fact that some of the prerogative writs were discretionary came to be directly linked with their designation as prerogative writs. Thus, in one case, it was said: 'An application for mandamus is an application to the discretion of the court; a mandamus is a prerogative writ and is not a writ of right'. But although none of the prerogative writs is a writ of course, not all are discretionary. Prohibition, for example, issue as of right in certain cases, and habeas corpus and subjuciendum, the most famous of them all, is a writ of right which issues ex debito justitiae when the applicant has satisfied the court that his detention was unlawful. But although none of the prerogative writs is a writ of course, not all are discretionary. Prohibition, for example, issue as of right in certain cases, and habeas corpus and subjuciendum, the most famous of them all, is a writ of right which issues ex debito justitiae when the applicant has satisfied the court that his detention was unlawful. These two writs, therefore, are not in the fullest sense writs of grace." In England even before 1938 the writ in the nature of quo warranto had been replaced by information in the nature of quo warranto. In 1938 this information in the nature of a quo warranto was abolished, and it was provided that in any case where a person acted in an office to which he was not entitled to act and a quo warranto information would formerly have been maintainable against him, the High Court could grant an injunction restraining him from so acting and, if necessary, declare the office to be vacant. The procedure on an application for an injunction was the same as on an application for mandamus and as S. A. de Smith says at page 480 of his book -- "The application may be refused for undue delay; and is in any event not to be brought if the respondent has acted in the office for six years." I am referring to this only to show that it is not a writ ex debito justitiae or a writ of course. It has been observed by the same author dealing with the question of writs in the nature of quo warranto that there does not appear to be a single reported case in which the new procedure has been employed in English Courts and this has been explained as in part due to public apathy or, alternatively, by a "commendable absence of the litigous spirit". But the more common explanation appears to be -- "...........different statutory procedures have been prescribed for challenging the right to act as a member of a local authority, which was formerly the most prolific source of quo warranto informations." In other words, the alternative remedy available by statute has been found to be effective enough as not to cause any proceedings of this nature before the High Court to be instituted. 18. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 18. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 11 (third edition) at page 148, Para.281, informations in the nature of quo warranto have been dealt with in the following words: " Discretion of the Court. An information in the nature of quo warranto was not issued and an injunction in lieu thereof will not be granted, as a matter of course. It is in the discretion of the Court to refuse or grant it according to the facts and circumstances of the case. The Court would inquire into the conduct and motives of the applicant, and the Court might in its discretion decline to grant a quo warranto information where it would be vexatious to do so, or where an information would be futile in its results, or where there was an alternative remedy which was equally appropriate and effective. It is conceived that the Court will follow similar principles in determining whether to grant injunction in lieu." 19. Having thus seen that the issue of a writ in the nature of quo warrants is discretionary, I have to consider whether in this case it could be successfully urged that any alternative equally efficacious remedy is available. It is not stated in the original petition why the alternative remedy is not efficacious. Rules have been made under S.367(2)(b) in regard to decision of election disputes and these rules are styled as Kerala Municipal Corporations (Decision of Election Disputes) Rules, 1962. R.2 provides as follows: "Save as otherwise provided, no election held under the Act whether of a councillor Mayor or Deputy Mayor shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with these rules to the District Judge by any candidate or elector, against the candidate who has been declared to have been duly elected (hereinafter called the returned candidate or if there are two or more returned candidates against all or any of such candidates." R.3 provides that the petition shall be presented within 15 days of the date of the declaration of the result of the election. 20. The Supreme Court in the decision in University of Mysore v. C. D. Govinda Rao ( AIR 1965 SC 491 ) stated the principles which generally govern the issue of a writ in the nature of quo warranto. 20. The Supreme Court in the decision in University of Mysore v. C. D. Govinda Rao ( AIR 1965 SC 491 ) stated the principles which generally govern the issue of a writ in the nature of quo warranto. The Court said: "Broadly stated, the quo warranto proceeding affords a judicial enquiry in which any person holding an independent substantive public office, or franchise, or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty; if the inquiry leads to the finding that the holder of the office has no valid title to it, the issue of the writ of quo warranto ousts him from that office. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions, it also protects a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he may have a right. It would thus be seen that if these proceedings are adopted subject to the conditions recognised in that behalf, they tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office, in some cases, persons not entitled to public office may be allowed to occupy them and to continue to hold them as a result of the connivance of the executive or with its active help, and in such cases, if the jurisdiction of the courts to issue writ of quo warranto is properly invoked, the usurper can be ousted and the person entitled to post allowed to occupy it. It is thus clear that before a citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto he must satisfy the court, inter alia, that the office in question is a public office and is held by usurper without legal authority, and that necessarily leads to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the said alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not." 21. Reference has been made by counsel Sri. K. Velayudhan Nair to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Bhairulal Chunilal v. State of Bombay ( AIR 1954 Bom. 116 ). It may be useful to refer in brief to the facts of that case. Reference has been made by counsel Sri. K. Velayudhan Nair to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Bhairulal Chunilal v. State of Bombay ( AIR 1954 Bom. 116 ). It may be useful to refer in brief to the facts of that case. In that case the petitioner sought a writ of quo warranto against the 3rd respondent contending that the general election held on 2-3-1953 by which the councillors of the Amalner Borough Municipality has no power or authority to discharge the duties under the Municipal Boroughs Act. The councillors of the Amalner Municipality were elected in 1949 for a period of three years, ending on 15-1-1952. Under the relevant Act the term of office of a councillor could be extended by an order of the State Government to a term not exceeding in the aggregate to four years. On 18-9-1951, the State government by an order passed extended the life of the Municipality upto 31-3-1952. A further notification was issued on 26-3-1952, extending it till 31-10-1952, and a further notification was issued on 27-9-1952, extending the life till 31-3-1953. The test of these notifications extending the live of the Municipality beyond the aggregate period of four years was contended to be without authority of law and therefore there was no Municipality in existence after 31-10-1952. Though the government contended that they had power to extend the period under S.25(1) of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, the court held that the argument was clearly fallacious, The invalidity of the order of government extending the life of Municipality was important because under the Bombay Municipal Borough Elections R.1950 the ballot box or boxes shall be opened and the voting papers shall be scrutinised at a special general meeting of the Municipality in the presence of such candidates or their representatives duly authorised in writing as may be present, and as the Municipality had ceased to exist on 31-10-1952, when the election was held, there was no Municipality which could discharge the functions and carry out the duties entrusted to it under the Election Rules. That is how the election that took place was contended to be invalid. The President of the Municipality had certain duties in regard to the general supervision of the conduct of the election. That is how the election that took place was contended to be invalid. The President of the Municipality had certain duties in regard to the general supervision of the conduct of the election. One Brahme was elected during the middle of the term of the previous president when the latter resigned his office on 16-1-1951. The new president would have normally been president for the unexpired period which apparently was till 15-1-1952. On 16-3-1952 Brahme resigned. It appeared that the view taken was that in as much as the life of Municipality had been extended to 31-3-1952 automatically Brahme continued to be the President until he resigned. He having resigned on 16-3-1952 one Deshmukh was elected President, and the resolution electing him as President stated that he had been elected President for the unexpired period of the term for which Brahme was elected as President. In any view of the case it expired on 31-3-1952. The Election of Deshmukh as President was challenged and the court found that his election was not according to law. The contention in regard to the election which was held to the Municipal Council was that on the date of election there was no Municipality in existence as the life of Municipality had come to an end on 31-3-1952 and the President elected on 28-3-1952 was not elected in accordance with law. Since the Municipality and President had certain functions to perform in regard to the election it was contended that the election of the councillors was illegal. The Bombay High Court found that there was irregularity or illegality in as much as the President could not have validly acted as President. How far this question should be considered as vitiating the election in a challenge made to those elected a petition in the nature of quo warranto was one of the questions considered in that case and in dealing with this, Chief Justice Chagla said: "In our opinion the grievance made by the petitioner with regard to the conduct of the election is at best nothing more than an irregularity. The President who was in charge of the election under the rules was a person who was elected by the councillors and in whom the councillors had confidence. If he was not the 'de jure' president, he was certainly the 'de facto' President. The President who was in charge of the election under the rules was a person who was elected by the councillors and in whom the councillors had confidence. If he was not the 'de jure' president, he was certainly the 'de facto' President. There is not even a suggestion that in acting as the President under the rules he did anything which is contrary to the rules. It is not suggested that if anyone else had been in charge of the election he would have done any better than this 'de facto' President. Therefore, putting it at the highest, the grievance of the petitioner amounts to this that a person who was elected by the councillors as President discharged the functions under the rules when he was not in law authorised to do so because his election by the councillors was not a proper and valid election. Now the writ of 'quo warranto' is not issued as a matter of right. It is discretionary relief and the court has always to ask itself whether under the circumstances of each case the petitioner should be given the relief in the nature of quo warranto which he seeks. In this particular case every factor which can be taken into consideration weighs against the petitioner being entitled to this relief. x x x x Courts must always be reluctant to interfere with elections except on the clearest and strongest of grounds. An election is a luxury which a democracy cannot be expected to indulge in too frequently, and once the people have recorded their votes and expressed their confidence in their representatives, the court should be loath to interfere with the decision of the people merely because some technicality has not been observed or some irregularity has been committed. The matter would be entirely different if the irregularity has resulted in the people not being able to express their views properly, or if there was any corrupt practice which has materially affected the result of the election. It might have also been different if the election itself was held without any authority of law. The matter would be entirely different if the irregularity has resulted in the people not being able to express their views properly, or if there was any corrupt practice which has materially affected the result of the election. It might have also been different if the election itself was held without any authority of law. But once it is conceded that the collector had the authority to fix the dates of the general election and the general election took place according to law, any irregularity committed in the course of the election cannot be a ground for the issue of a writ of 'quo warranto'. Earlier the learned Judge said: "It is well settled that where you have statutory provisions dealing with the conduct of an election, the writ of quo warranto is displaced. An election then can only be challenged in the manner laid down by the statute." I am referring to this decision in particular to show that adopting the view expressed by Chagla, C. J., with which I am in respectful agreement, on the facts of this case it may not be proper to invoke the jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution of India in regard to the prayers mentioned in the petition. Even assuming that there was some irregularity in the election of the Mayor or in that of the Deputy Mayor it is not a matter for the issue of a writ in the nature of quo warranto in the circumstances of the case as pointed out by Chagla, C. J. in the above decision. In this connection it is relevant to notice that on the date of election 23 out of 45 members had been present and all the 23 were of one voice in the matter of election of the Mayor and Deputy Mayor. Not that this is sufficient if the meeting for the election was not validly convened, but this is relevant in considering whether the discretion should be exercised in favour of the petitioners. Even in the original petition there is no averment which would indicate that the majority which was with respondents 3 and 4 on the date of election was artificial or was temporary. Even in the original petition there is no averment which would indicate that the majority which was with respondents 3 and 4 on the date of election was artificial or was temporary. In a similar case which arose before the Patna High Court in Sukhdeo Narayan v. Mahadevanda (AIR 1961 Patna 475) the learned Judges referring to the passage in Halsbury's Laws of England to which I have already adverted said thus: "In view of the facts stated in the last affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent on 4-4-1961 it is further clear that he still commands a majority of votes and is bound to be elected as the chairman of the municipality even if a fresh election is held. In that view of the matter, to grant a quo warranto information would be 'vexatious to do so' or it would be 'futile in its results'. Further, as I have said above, there was an 'alternative remedy which was equally appropriate and effective'. The learned Judges apparently applied the rule indicated in the passage in Halsbury's Laws of England to the facts of the case. What was said in that case could very well be said here. My attention has been drawn to a decision of the Punjab High Court in Nitya Nand v. Khalil Ahmed (AIR 1961 Punjab 105) by counsel for the petitioners. That was a case where it was found that the electoral roll had not been properly prepared and the parliamentary electoral roll was adopted as the basis for the electors in the Municipality. It was found that the entire election based on such rolls was invalid. The learned Judge who decided the case referred to circumstances under which a writ in the nature of quo warranto was to be issued. The Principle there indicated was the principle later enunciated by their Lordships in University of Mysore v. C. D. Govinda Rao ( AIR 1965 SC 491 ). The counsel relies on this decision to show that even though alternative remedy was available the court exercised the power to issue a writ in the nature of quo warranto in that case. That of course was a matter depending upon exercise of discretion of the court in the particular circumstances of that case. The counsel relies on this decision to show that even though alternative remedy was available the court exercised the power to issue a writ in the nature of quo warranto in that case. That of course was a matter depending upon exercise of discretion of the court in the particular circumstances of that case. What has been attempted to be shown in this case, is at best an irregularity and in the circumstances of the case, even assuming there is any such irregularity, no interference is called for by this court in exercise of the jurisdiction to issue a writ in the nature of quo warrant under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. The original petition is therefore dismissed with costs.