JUDGMENT Shivdayal, J. - 1. This second appeal arises from a suit for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent. The suit was instituted by Kanmal impeading his son Indermal as proforma defendant. Initially the tenancy commenced from November 1, 1951 under a rent-note which was executed by Shankar Sahai appellant in favour of Kanmal and Indermal. 2. Notice to quit was given by Kanmal alone and the suit was also instituted by Kanmal alone. The defendant raised an objection that Kanmal alone could not bring the suit nor was the notice valid. 3. The matter went up to the High Court in Second Appeal (Second Appeal No. 55/62). The defendant's appeal was allowed. The decrees passed by the courts below were set aside and the case was remanded to the trial Court with a direction to give the plaintiff an opportunity to produce in evidence the registered deed of partition. 4. A deed of partition was executed by Kanmal and Indermal on June 4, 1957. It is styled as deed of relinquishment. Under that document admittedly the suit property went to the share of Dashrathmal. Kanmal and Indermal relinquished their rights and interests to the suit property. 5. The defendant made an application on October 30, 1964 contending that the suit property had already been transferred to Dashrathmal. The plaintiff accepted this fact and also produced the document. The trial Court, therefore, held that the question of ejectment did not survive and decided the suit only as regards the arrears of rent. The trial Court passed a decree for rent for a period from June 4, 1957 to October 31, 1963 in favour of Kanmal plaintiff. 6. The defendant appealed. The learned Additional District Judge, Shivpuri, dismissed his appeal. In this second appeal Shri Dvivedi, learned counsel for the appellant contends that no decree could be passed in favour of Kanmal for any rent subsequent to June 4, 1957. Reliance is placed on section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act and Pyarelalsa v. Garanchandsa 1964 JLJ 436 and also on Jagannath v Ramzan 1962 JLJ SN 331. 7. It is an admitted fact that on June 4, 1957, Kanmal ceased to have any right, title or interest in the suit property and the same was relinquished in favour of Dashrathmal. 7. It is an admitted fact that on June 4, 1957, Kanmal ceased to have any right, title or interest in the suit property and the same was relinquished in favour of Dashrathmal. That being so, the principle laid down in section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act will apply and Dashrathmal alone became the owner of the property and also the landlord in relation to the appellant. The principle underlying section 109 of the Act is that the rights attached to property which arise out of possession and control of property will pass with the property. Qui in jus deminiumve alterius succedit jure ejus uti debet. When Kanmal ceased to have any right, title or interest in the suit property he ceased to be the defendant's landlord and it is Dashrathmal who became the landlord, and the right to recover rent vested in Dashrathmal with effect from June 4, 1957. 8. Shri Patankar's contention is that attornment is not automatic. A change of relationship of landlord and tenant will require an act of the lessee to so elect. The learned counsel reads the words "and, if the lessee so elects, be subject to all the liabilities of the lessor as to the property or part transferred so long as he is the owner of it" as to mean that a tenant of the transferee continues until the lessee so elects to become tenant of the transferee. In my opinion that is not a correct reading of the section. The words just now quoted relate to the liability of the lessor. The rule is that obligations without the consent of him to whom they are owed can not be assigned. Therefore, if an obligation is transferred by the lessor, even so, the liabilities of the lessor continue until the lessee so elects that the transferee be subject to such liabilities. There is nothing in section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act which makes it dependent on the election of the lessee to continue to be the lessee of the transferor and not become the lessee of the transferee. This view was also taken in Pyarelalsa v. Garanchandsa (supra) and is supported by the decision in Jagannath v. Ramzan (supra). 9. If this was not the law the position would be anamolous. This view was also taken in Pyarelalsa v. Garanchandsa (supra) and is supported by the decision in Jagannath v. Ramzan (supra). 9. If this was not the law the position would be anamolous. On the one hand the transferor would continue to exercise the rights of the landlord against the tenant so as to entitle him to sue for ejectment and arrears of rent even after the transfer; and on the other hand the transferee will also have the same rights. 10. There is yet another ground on which the decree of the Court below must be set aside. As said above, although the suit was initially both for ejectment and arrears of rent the decree was passed only for arrears of rent and the suit for ejectment was dismissed because the plaintiff was held to have no right to ejectment after June 4, 1957. That being the position the plaintiff could not get a decree in this suit for rent for any period after the date of the suit. It is plain enough that in a suit for arrears of rent a decree can be passed only for the rent which has accrued due upto the date of the suit. No decree can be passed for future rent accruing from the date of the suit, and not even during the pendency of the suit. Here the suit was instituted on January 28, 1957, but the decree has been passed for rent from June 4, 1957 to October 31, 1963. This decree is contrary to law. 11. The appeal is allowed. The judgments and decrees of the Courts below are set aside. The suit is dismissed with costs throughout.