( 1 ) THIS petition is directed against the order dated 22-9-1970 passed by the Additional First Class Magistrate, Bangalore, in C. C. No. 2555 of 1970 ordering that A-3 in the case is to be dropped from the proceedings and directing the complainant to proceed against the other accused persons i. e. , A1, 2 and 4 at that stage. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner complainant that this order is on the face of it illegal and unsustainable in law. The few facts that have given rise to this petition may be narrated briefly as follows: petitioner as a complainant filed a private complaint on 17-11-1966 in the court of the City Magistrate, Bangalore, against three persons alleging an office punishable under S. 420 of IPC. Her complaint was that the said three accused persona, of whom the present responaent-1 was not one, and fradulentty secured her L. T. M. to a document which sue came to be miormed was a power or attorney and on the strength or tnat drew its. 10, 000 from the Lite insurance Corporation of india cut 01 the insurance sum insured by her husband. The learned Miagistrate recorded the sworn testimony of the petitioner complaiant and directed enquiry and report under the provisions of S. 156 (3) Cri. P. C. Thereafter, the police enquued into the matter and submitted their report in the form oi a charge-sheet. In that they had involved the present respondent-1 as A-3 and the remaining accused persons mentioned in that complaint as A-1, 2 and 4; on receipt of this report, the learned Magistrate issued process against all the four persons (including the present respondent No. 1 ). The present respondent-1 and two other accused appeared before the learned Magistrate, in response to the summons issued against them on 25-3-1969. The remaining accused was not traced and non-bailable warrant was issued. Ultimately on 23-8-1969 the learned Magistrate proceeded to dismiss the complaint under S. 259 Crl. P. C. on the ground that the complainant was absent on that date. The records go to show that as against that order the petitioner-complainant preferred a revision petition in the Court of the Sessions Judge, Bangalore and that was allowed and the matter was sent back for trial. P. C. on the ground that the complainant was absent on that date. The records go to show that as against that order the petitioner-complainant preferred a revision petition in the Court of the Sessions Judge, Bangalore and that was allowed and the matter was sent back for trial. Ultimately, the case was transferred to the Court of the Additional First Class Magistrate, Bangalore, and there it was numbered as C. C. No. 2555 of 1970. The present respondent-1 continued to appear through his lawyer, and it appears that on 22-9-1970 the counsel appearing on behalf of respondent-1 put forward a contention before the learned Magistrate that in the original complaint filed by the petitioner-complainant, the present respondent-1 had not at all been mentioned as an accused and as such the proceedings against him should be dropped. The matter was argued and then ultimately the learned Magistrate ordered that A-3 be dropped from the proceedings. ( 2 ) THE only reason given by the learned Magistrate, in support of his impugned order, is that the petitioner-complainant had not at all levelled any allegations in her complaint against the present respondent-1. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner vehemently contended that there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure code by virtue of which a Magistrate can pass such an order of dropping proceedings in such matters. The learned Government Pleader supported this contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner. The learned advocate on behalf of Respondent-1 urged that the Magistrate had all powers and he, in the exercise of hip discretion, has passed the impugned order for a substantial reason mentioned by him and as such it cannot be said that the order is illegal. ( 3 ) IN regard to the above contention, it must be observed that there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code empowering a Magistrate to drop proceedings against any oi the accused that too after taking cognizance of the offence complained. In this connection, it is seen that though the learned Magistrate ordered enquiry under S. 156 (3) Crl. P. C. after recording the sworn testimony of the petitioner-complainant and the police submitted charge-sheet after such enquiry, that charge-sheet should be regarded as a report submitted by the police in pursuance of an order passed by the Magistrate under S. 202 Crl. P. C. after recording the sworn testimony of the petitioner-complainant and the police submitted charge-sheet after such enquiry, that charge-sheet should be regarded as a report submitted by the police in pursuance of an order passed by the Magistrate under S. 202 Crl. P. C. , and that in such cases the procedure provided under S. 252 Crl. P. C. , would be applicable in regard to trial of the case. It is so laid down in the decision of this Court in K. V. Subbiah v. State of Mysore, (1968) Mys. L. J. 604 It is, therefore, clear that in law the charge-sheet submitted by the police wherein they had stated that the present respondent-1 was also involved in the commission of the offence of which cognizance had already been taken by the learned Magistrate, is a report submitted by them as called for by the magistrate under S. 202 Crl. P. C. In a trial under the provisions of S. 252 Crl. P. C. , the only orders that can be passed by a Magistrate are: an order of discharge under S. 253 Crl. P. C. , dismissal of the complaint under S. 259 Crl. P. C. or judgment of conviction or acquittal. There is no provision to order dropping of proceedings against any particular accused. The order now in question is evidently not an order of discharge passed by the learned Magistrate by exercising powers vested in him under S. 253 Crl. P. C. , because nowhere has the learned Magistrate stated in his order that for the reasons mentioned by him he has found that the charge against the present respondent-1 who was A-3 before him, is groundless. ( 4 ) IT was nextly contended by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that cognizance of the oftence had already been taken by the Magistrate and that process had not been issued against any of the accused persona mentioned in the complaint filed by the petitioner-complainant and that such an order of issue of process came to be made not only against the three accused persons mentioned by the petitioner-complainant in her complaint but also against the present respondent-1 whose name came to be mentioned in the report submitted by the police and, therefore, the learned Magistrate could not have proceeded to drop the proceedings against the present respondent-1. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent-1 strenuously urged that the learned Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence only as against three accused persons mentioned by the petitioner-complainant in her complaint and, therefore the police had no powers to incorporate one more person as a person involved in the offence, while submitting their report under S. 202 Crlp. C. and as such the Magistrate could not have proceeded against respondent-1. He also urged that having once taken cognizance under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of S. 190 Crlp. C. the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance once again against the present respondent-1 on the basis of the report filed by the police. In my opinion, there is no force in this contention. It would not be legally correct to say that the magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence in regard to particular offenders. Cognizance is not taken of offenders. As per the provisions of s. 190 Crlp. C. , cognizance is taken of an offence. In Fatta v. The State air. 1964 Pun. 351 their Lordships have laid down that the expression takes cognizance of an offence' cannot be equated to take cognizance of an offender and the normal rule is that when a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence he takes cognizance of the case as a whole. The same is the principle laid down in Raghubansh Dubey v. State of Bihar, AIR. 1964 Pat. 487 The decision has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in Raghubansh Debey v. State of Bihar air. 1967 SC. 11c7 The Supreme Court has approved the decision reported in AIR 1964 punjab, 351. It has also approved the decision in Ali Udah v. The State (1963) 2 Cr. L. J. 66. In all these decisions, it has been clearly laid down that taking cognizance of an oftence does not mean taking cognizance of offenders, and that by taking cognizance of an offence, the Magistrate is seized of the whole case and he has powers to proceed even against persons as accused who are not disclosed or mentioned in the challan submitted by the police. In the Punjab case a complaint had been made by the injured to the police that six persons named by them had assaulted them and caused injuries. In the Punjab case a complaint had been made by the injured to the police that six persons named by them had assaulted them and caused injuries. The police after investigation challaned only three out of those six persons for having committed offences punishable under ss. 325, 324 read with S. 34 IPC. When the prosecution witnesses were examined before the Magistrate, the evidence disclosed the complicity of the remaining persons and the learned Magistrate at that stage issued process against the said remaining persons and they challenged the validity of the order so passed by the learned Magistrate. As already mentioned above, it was held that the learned Magistrate had full powers in proceeding against those three persons also and that there was no legal impediment in the way of the trial Magistrate passing an order for summoning them as accused persons even though the police had challanned some other persons. In Raghubansh Debey v. State of Bihar, their lordships have while affirming the decision of the High Court of Patna in AIR 1964 Patna 487, laid down that summoning of additional accused is a part of a proceeding initited by taking cognizance of an offence and that a Magistrate has Pot to proceed against those offenders though not sent up by the police. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent-1 contended in this connection that the matter would be different when a case is instituted on police report and these decisions deal with only procceding" instituted on a police report. I am unable to see any form in this contention because whether cognizance of an offence is taken by a Magistrate on the basis of the report submitted by a police officer or on a complaint or on the information received bv him as provided in Clause (V) of sub-section (1) of S 190 Crl. P. C. the Magistrate express the same powers in proceeding into that proceeding and meting out justice in the case There is no change made, on the basis of the manner in which the information is received by the Magistrate to enable him to take cognizance of an offence in regard to powers exercisable bv a Magistrate while diseharging his duties in trying the case concerned with the offence of which he has taken cognizance. In the case on hand the Magistrate had already taken coraizance of the offence on the complaint instituted by the petitioner-complainant. that would clearly go to show that cognizance had already been taken by the Magistrate as per the powers vested in him under Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 190 crl. PC. Thereafter be became seized of the whole case because he had taken cognizance of the offence Then on receiving the report sent by a police officer he found that on the materials disclosed therein, there were valid reasons to believe that the present respondent-1 was also involved in the commission of the offence of which he had already taken cognizance. ( 5 ) IN the decisions referred to above such information had come to the knowledge of the Magistrate because of the evidence of some of the prosecution witnesses. In mv opinion, the wav in which the information reaches the Magistrate is immaterial as long as he has grounds to rely on that information to enable him to issue process against the persons concerned. In view of these reasons, I am of the opinion that the contention put forward bv the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent-1, is to be rejected. ( 6 ) IT is also seen from the facts narrated in the preceding paragraphs that after issue of summons to respondent-1, he appeared through a counsel and attended the Court and he was also a party in the revision petition filed by the Petitioner complainant in the Court of Session while challenging the order of dismissal of the complaint passed by the learned magistrate under S. 259 Crl. P. C. , and he contested that revision petition. It is as late as 22-9-1970 that this objection was raised by respondent-1. ( 7 ) IN view of the foregoing reasons, I find that the order in question passed by the learned Additional First Class Magistrate, Bangalore is clearly unsustainable in law, and as such is liable to be set aside. Therefore this petition is allowed and the order passed by the Additional First class Magistrate, Bangalore, on 22-9-1970 in C. C. No. 2555 of 1970 dropping the proceedings against the present respondent-1 who was A-3 before him, is set aside. --- *** --- s