This revision petition is directed against the order of the Assistant District Judge, Cachar, Silchar, dated 29-9-69 passed in Misc. Appeal No. 68/69 granting temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiffs in Title Suit No. 89 of 1969, restraining the defendants from taking pos­session over the suit land by reversing the order of the Munsiff rejecting such a prayer. The petitioners' case is as follows:- 2. The suit land originally belong­ed to one Nadia Chand Das and it was in his own possession. Nadia Chand Das mortgaged with possession a part of the land to Must. Sajida Bibi, wife of O. P. No. 1 and another part to one Guleswar Ali. After this, Nadia Chand Das made an agreement with the petitioner Mira Rani and one Sushil Chandra Das for sale of the land on receipt of some advance. As he failed to execute the deed as stipulated, Mira Rani and Sushil Das filed a title suit being T. S. No. 18/64, against Nadia Chand Das and the above two mortgagees for getting a sale deed from Nadia Chand Das and for Khas possession. The said suit was decreed. The two mortgagees received their mortgage money through court and their mortgages were duly re-deem­ed. Nadia Chand Das also got his due share and thereafter executed a sale deed in favour of the decree-holders. After this, the petitioner Khanesh Chandra Das, husband of petitioner Mira Rani, purchased the share of Sushil Chandra Das under a registered kabala and then the petitioners put the decree into execution, for khas possession, in Title Execution Case No. 9/ 68 in the Court of the Assistant District Judge. 3. The O. Ps filed an objection in the said execution case claiming that they are in occupation of the decretal land as tenants under Nadia Chand Das and have acquired occupancy right over the same and that as such the decree-holders were not entitled to get khas possession. Their ob­jection was dismissed Thereafter the O. Ps filed Title Suit No. 89/69 in the Court of the Munsiff, Silchar for declaration of their jote right over the suit land and for a perpetual injunction against the petitioners restraining them from taking possession over the land in execution of the decree obtain­ed in T. S. No. 18/64. They also filed an application for temporary injunction res­training the petitioners from taking such possession till disposal of the suit. They also filed an application for temporary injunction res­training the petitioners from taking such possession till disposal of the suit. The Munsiff granted an ad interim injunction, but. later, after hearing both the parties vacated the interim injunction and dismiss­ed the application for temporary injunction. The O. Ps. took an appeal before the Assis­tant District Judge and obtained a fresh ad interim injunction till disposal of the appeal. It may be mentioned here that during the pendency of the above Misc. Appeal, the petitioners obtained khas possession over the suit land on 10-9-69 in Title Execution Case No. 9/68 and this possession was confirmed by the Court on 16-9-69. 4. On hearing both the parties learn­ed Assistant District Judge, by his order dt. 29-9-69, reversed the order of the Munsiff and allowed the Misc. Appeal and the ad interim injunction, earlier granted by him, was made absolute. In so doing, the learn­ed Assistant District Judge held that the petitioners obtained delivery of possession in Title Execution Case No. 9/68 by sup­pressing the order of temporary injunction granted in the Misc. Appeal and as such, the injunction order must sustain in spite of the delivery of possession. 5. Being aggrieved by the order of the learned Assistant District Judge dated 29-9-69 passed in the aforesaid Misc. Ap­peal, the petitioners, who are respondents in the said appeal, have come up with the present revision petition. 6. The first contention of Mr. Das, the learned counsel for the petitioners was that the learned Assistant District Judge erred in law and acted beyond his jurisdic­tion in granting the temporary injunction restraining the petitioners from executing the decree, which was lawfully obtained by them in Title Suit No. 18/64 and which has not yet been set aside by any compe­tent Court. His next contention was that the petitioners have already obtained pos­session over the suit land through court in execution of the decree as mentioned above and in the absence of any stay order from any superior court, this delivery of posses­sion is valid in law and the learned Assis­tant District Judge erred in law in holding that the O.Ps. must be deemed to be in possession of the suit land in spite of such delivery of possession. His third conten­tion was that in view of the fact that ear­lier the O.Ps. must be deemed to be in possession of the suit land in spite of such delivery of possession. His third conten­tion was that in view of the fact that ear­lier the O.Ps. filed an objection in the exe­cution case which was dismissed, the learn­ed Assistant District Judge should have held that the suit filed by the O.Ps. was barred by the principle of res judicata in view of the provisions of Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 7. The last contention of the peti­tioners mentioned above has got no force at all. Admittedly the O.Ps. were not par­ties to Title Suit No. 18/64. That being so, Section 47 of the Code of Civil Proce­dure cannot be attracted to hold that the present suit is barred by the principle of res judicata even though the O.Ps. filed an objection in the Title Execution Case No. 9/68 and the said objection was dismissed. 8. So far as the other two conten­tions are concerned, I am however of the opinion that these have got sufficient force. The provisions of Rule 1 of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure are evidently not attracted in the present case. The only question is whether the execution of a lawful decree which has not been set aside by any superior and competent court can be said to be an injury within the meaning of Rule 2 of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to two earlier decisions of this Court having direct bear­ing on this point, namely- (1) Mt. Ladi Agarwallani v. Kewalraj Sethi, AIR 1955 Assam 174 and (2) Upendra Chandra Barua v. Nabin Chandra Sutradhar, Assam Law Report (1970) Vol. II, Pt. IX & X 272 = (AIR 1971 Assam 95). The facts of both the cases are similar with those of the pre­sent case. In both these cases, it was held that the execution of a lawful decree is in exercise of a legal right cannot be re­garded as an injury within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, for granting a temporary injunction. The facts of both the cases are similar with those of the pre­sent case. In both these cases, it was held that the execution of a lawful decree is in exercise of a legal right cannot be re­garded as an injury within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, for granting a temporary injunction. In respectful agreement with the reason­ings given in these two cases, I hold that execution of a lawful and subsisting decree cannot be restrained by a temporary in­junction under Rule 1 or 2 or Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In my opinion, the learned Assistant District Judge acted illegally and beyond his juris­diction in restraining the petitioners from taking possession over the land in execu­tion of the decree which was lawfully ob­tained by them and which has not yet been set aside by any competent court. 10. I now come to the next con­tention. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner got possession over the land through court in Title Execution Case No. 9/68 on 10-9-63 and that this delivery of possession was confirmed by the court by order dated 19-9-69. In this connection, the learned Assistant District Judge has observed as follows:- "The defendants while obtaining the delivery of possession on 16-9-69 suppress­ed the fact that there was injunction order against them in the land. The injunction order must sustain in spite of the delivery of possession and the plaintiffs must be deemed to be in possession and they will have actual possession over the same as they have been possessing and the defen­dants must be restrained from entering the land." 11. Even if it is assumed that the petitioners obtained delivery of possession in the above execution case suppressing the fact that there was a temporary injunc­tion against them (which they have denied), that would not make the delivery of posses­sion ineffective and a nullity in law. In this connection I may conveniently quote the observation of the Supreme Court in Mulraj v. Murty Raghunathji, AIR 1967 SC 1386 which runs as follows:- "In effect therefore a stay order is more or less in the same position as an order of injunction with one difference. An order of injunction is generally issued to a party and it is forbidden for doing certain acts. An order of injunction is generally issued to a party and it is forbidden for doing certain acts. It is well settled that in such a case, the party must have knowledge of the injunction order before it could be penalised for disobeying it. Further it is equally well settled that the injunction order not being addressed to the court, if the court proceeds in contravention of the injunction order, the proceedings are not a nullity. In the case of a stay order, as it is addressed to the court and prohibits it from proceeding further, as soon as the court has knowledge of the order it is bound to obey it and if it does not, it acts illegally, and all proceedings taken after the knowledge of the order would be a nullity." 12. In the present case, it is an admitted fact that there was no stay order from any competent court. Under the circumstances, when the delivery of posses­sion over the suit land has already been effected in the execution case and the said delivery of possession is not a nullity in law, there was no further scope for any temporary injunction restraining the peti­tioners from taking possession. If the petitioners have violated the temporary injunction, they may be dealt with in an appropriate proceeding for that purpose, but that would not go to invalidate the action of the court in granting delivery of possession. There is no provisions in law under which the O.Ps. can be deemed to be in actual pos­session in spite of the delivery of posses­sion given to the petitioners in the execu­tion case. In my opinion, the learned Assistant District Judge went beyond his Jurisdiction in granting the temporary in­junction and in treating the O.Ps. to be In actual possession of the land ignoring the delivery of possession given by a com­petent court in execution of a lawful decree. 13. In the result, the petition must be allowed and I do accordingly. The impugned order of the learned Assistant District Judge is set aside and the order of the Munsiff is restored. In the circum­stances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.