JUDGMENT J.S. Trivedi, J.- This defendants' second Civil Appeal and the Cross objection are directed against the judgment and decree of the First Additional Civil Judge, Meerut and arise out of regular suit no. 433 of 1962. The plaintiff-respondents filed the suit for possession of Khasra plot no. 143 with allegation that Khubi Mal, ancestor of the defendant-appellants was permitted to construct a well over a portion of the land for the benefit of the general public and was only entitled to repair the well. The defendants were alleged to have no proprietary interest, but they illegally constructed four shops adjoining the well with the result that the plaintiffs' right has been affected. It was further alleged that in earlier litigation between the parties the ownership of the plaintiffs over the disputed land was decided by the Hon'ble High Court. 2. The defendant-appellants contested the suit and contended that in the earlier litigation the defendants were held to be owners of the constructions and the present suit was, therefore, barred by Section 11 C.P.C. The defendants denied that their status was that of a licensee and claimed themselves to be full owners of the land in dispute. In the alternative it was pleaded that even if they were deemed to be the licensees, their license had become irrevocable by the construction of the well and they were entitled to construct the shops. Lastly it was pleaded that the suit was barred by Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure because the well and the land appurtenant to it was constructed for the benefit of the general public and the plaintiff alone, therefore, was not entitled to file a suit 3. The trial court decreed the plaintiff's suit for mandatory injunction directing the defendant-appellants to remove the shops and bring the plot to its original position. Aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court, an appeal was filed by the defendant-appellants. A cross objection was also filed by the plaintiff-respondents against the order of the trial Court refusing delivery of possession to him. The lower appellate Court confirmed the decree of the trial court and dismissed the appeal and the Cross objection, hence this appeal by the defendant-appellants and a Cross objection by the plaintiff-respondents. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants has re-iterated his submissions. The lower appellate Court confirmed the decree of the trial court and dismissed the appeal and the Cross objection, hence this appeal by the defendant-appellants and a Cross objection by the plaintiff-respondents. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants has re-iterated his submissions. According to his interpretation of the earlier litigation, the defendant-appellants became entitled to the land in dispute and were free to make any constructions. He has further contended that the licence having become irrevocable, the constructions could not be challenged by the plaintiff-respondents. Lastly the bar of Section 92 C.P.C. is also pleaded. Learned counsel for the plaintiff in support of his cross objection has contended that he being the owner of the plot no 143, over some portion of which the well stood, was entitled to actual possession and revocation of the license, because the appellant was not entitled to construct shops under the terms of the licence granted to him. 5. It is not disputed that the plot in dispute is plot no. 143. The agreement under which Khubi Mal, ancestor of the defendant-appellants was authorised to construct the well is dated 10th April, 1878 and is on record. This agreement was executed by Khubi Mal, predecessor-in-interest of the defendant-appellants in favour of John Michal who was then the Zamindar and predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff-respondents. The relevant portion of the agreement is as under :- "Mal ki Khoobi Mal Pisar Gulzari Mal Zat Mahajam Sakin Qasba Pilakhuwa Pergana Dasna Tahsil Ghaziabad Zila Meerut ka hoon joki mukir neek chah pukhta waste aabnoshi awamulnawas andar abadi Qasba Pilakhuwa Patti Badshahpur arazi uftada no 145 me Ba Ijazat Jshab Mister John Michal Shahib Bahadur Zamindar Malik ke bad adai Mublic 5/- hak Zamindari ke tayyar karana chahta hoon is waste Iqrar karta hoon aur likhe deta hoon ki yah waste feeda awam wa abnoshi ke tayyar karta hoon usmen dawa milikat mummukir aur warsan mukir aur haqe Intaqal kabhi na hoga aur marammat chah wa katkar ke zimme mukir aur janashin mukir ke rahegi........" 6. It is admitted and proved that plot no. 145 was wrongly written for no. 143. This document clearly goes to show that Khubi Mal was only permitted to construct a well for the use of the general public. The record also shows that the well was duly constructed thereafter. In the year 1942 original no. It is admitted and proved that plot no. 145 was wrongly written for no. 143. This document clearly goes to show that Khubi Mal was only permitted to construct a well for the use of the general public. The record also shows that the well was duly constructed thereafter. In the year 1942 original no. 1226 of 1942 was filed by the plaintiffs for possession of the plot no. 143 and for an injunction restraining the appellants from interfering with the plaintiff's proprietary possession The suit was contested by the appellants. The defence was denial of plaintiff's right of ownership. The learned Additional oral Munsif who tried the suit held that the plaintiff were not owners of the plot in suit and that he had been out of possession for over 12 years The defendant was also held to be a permanent licensee. In appeal, the learned First Civil Judge allowed the appeal holding that the plaintiffs, were owners of the plot no. 143. It was also held that the defendants had right to use the well and to repair the same. The Civil Judge decreed the plaintiff's suit for a declaration that he was the owner of the land in suit and for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the ownership right of the plaintiff. The plaintiff's suit for actual possession over the well, however, was dismissed. A second appeal was filed in this Court. This Court remitted two issues for disposal by the lower appellant court. The two issues were as under :- (1) What is the area in plot no. 143 which issued for the well ? (2) What is the area used as an adjunct to the well ? 7 The finding of the Civil Judge was that "the well enclosed by red line ABDEFC was the area used for the well as well as an adjunct to the well. The rest of the area was lying vacant and was not adjunct to the well." After the findings were received, the operative portion of the High Court's judgment was in these words. "I, however, feel that the learned First Civil Judge went very carefully into the matter, has weighed the entire evidence, considered every aspect of the case and the findings are eminently satisfactory. I, therefore, allow the appeal and modify the decree of the court below in the following terms. "I, however, feel that the learned First Civil Judge went very carefully into the matter, has weighed the entire evidence, considered every aspect of the case and the findings are eminently satisfactory. I, therefore, allow the appeal and modify the decree of the court below in the following terms. Along with the area actually covered by the well, the claim shall stand dismissed with regard to the land covered by the cesspool, water-trough, the nail, the steps and the platforms adjoining the well, enclosed by the red line ABDEFC, as indicated on the map prepared by Parmatma Saran, overseer on the 27th April, 1947....." The effect of the Judgment of the High Court was that actual possession over the land occupied by the well and land appurtenant to it and enclosed by red line ABDEFC was refused. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the rejection of the relief of possession entitled him to make constructions of whatever nature appellant chooses. His further contention is that the status of the appellant was that of an irrevocable licensee. In the alternative, he contends that the general public had only an easementary right of approach to the well and if that right was not interfered with, no cause of action accrued for the suit. 9. I am not prepared to accept that permission to construct a well entitled the appellant to make constructions of the shops over the Land in dispute. The rights of the parties will be governed by the agreement on record. All that the earlier suit decided was that the plaintiff exclusively was not entitled to possession over the disputed land, he having permitted the construction of a well for the use of the general public. A license is merely a right granted to another person to do or not to do certain acts upon the immovable property of the grantor. It does not amount to an easement or interest in the property. An easement is a right possessed by the occupier of certain land for the beneficial enjoyment of the land and contemplates the existence of a claimant heritage and a survient heritage. The ownership is a bundle of rights and the owner is at liberty to dispose of or grant the use of any of these right to anybody. An easement is a right possessed by the occupier of certain land for the beneficial enjoyment of the land and contemplates the existence of a claimant heritage and a survient heritage. The ownership is a bundle of rights and the owner is at liberty to dispose of or grant the use of any of these right to anybody. The agreement shows that the defendant-appellant was only permitted to construct a well for the use of general public and the license which was only for the construction of a well for the use of general public cannot be inferred to include the transfer of all interest in the land, nor can it amount to grant of license for the construction of buildings other than the construction of a well. The license in the instant case was for a definite purpose and the nature of license as will be evident from the agreement itself could not be charged and converted for other purposes. Under the decree of High Court also, the right granted to the appellant was limited to the use of well. The lower appellate court was, therefore, right in holding that the shops could not be allowed to be constructed and the plaintiff was entitled to sue for their demolition. 10. The bar of Section 92 C.P.C. contended by the learned counsel for the appellant is a so misconceived. The land admittedly belonged to the plaintiff. Under a license granted to the defendant a well only was allowed to be constructed for the use of general public. The personal right of the grantor will not be curtailed because the license is granted for the benefit of general public. 11. Coming next to the question whether the plaintiff was entitled to actual possession or not, I think the judgment of the lower appellate court on that point as well is correct. Once the license is granted for the construction and use of the well for the general public, the grantor cannot claim actual possession of the well and the land appurtenant to it. His right to revoke the license will be limited to the extent the terms of the license have been varied. 12. The appeal and the Cross Objection, therefore, have no force and are accordingly dismissed. As the appeal and the Cross Objection have been dismissed, costs shall be on parties.