Judgment :- 1. These are petitions in which identical reliefs are sought for. O.P. No. 6059 of 1970 is by a person who was a teacher in the school of which the 4th respondents is the manager and the O.P. No 6113 of 1970 is by the said manager. The petitioner in O.P. No. 6059 of 1970 was working as a High School Assistant in the 4th respondent's school till 313 1967. She resigned her post on 141967 in order to join her husband who was working in Bombay and having so resigned she proceeded to Bombay. But she had to return soon thereafter when she lost her husband. Thereupon she claimed appointment in the school and then she had to face a competing claim from the 3rd respondent, who, under R.51A of Chapter XIV-A claimed that he was entitled to preference. That rule runs as follows: "51-A. Qualified teachers who are relieved as per R.49 or 52 or on account of termination of vacancies shall have preference for appointment to future vacancies in schools under the same educational agency provided they have not been appointed in permanent vacancies in schools under any other Educational Agency." The 3rd respondent was one of those who came within the scope of the rule. The petitioner, having resigned from the school, could not claim that she was either relieved in accordance with R.49 or in accordance with R.52 or on account of termination of vacancy, and therefore, she was not one entitled to the benefit of R.51A. But when the manager preferred her to the 3rd respondent, a complaint was made by the 3rd respondent to the 2nd respondent, the District Educational Officer, Ernakulam. Her claim was based upon having worked in the school as a High School Assistant from 27 111967 to 15-2-1968. The second respondent passed orders upholding the 3rd respondent's claim and declining to approve the petitioner's appointment This was by Ext. P-1 order-Both the Manager as well as the teacher thereupon filed revisions to the Government which passed Ext. P-2 order dismissing the revision petitions. These orders are challenged in the Original Petitions and the only ground urged is that R.51A is violative of the guarantee under Art.30 (1) of the Constitution of India and for that reason should be held to be unconstitutional. P-2 order dismissing the revision petitions. These orders are challenged in the Original Petitions and the only ground urged is that R.51A is violative of the guarantee under Art.30 (1) of the Constitution of India and for that reason should be held to be unconstitutional. It is contended by the Manager in O. P. 6113 of 1970 that the school is a minority school having been established by a Muslim and being intended to impart education to the members of the Muslim Community. For the purpose of this petition, I am assuming that the school is a minority school without going into the correctness of that contention. If that be so, whether R.51A could be challenged is the question that arises for decision here. 2. I do not think it is necessary for me to go into this question in detail in view of the Division Bench decision in Writ Appeal No. 44 of 1970. The learned judges said thus; "We see little sutance in the contention that R.51A is ultravires Art.30(1) of the Constitution. That a fully qualified person who has once been appointed by the Manager and discharged for want of vacancy should be re-appointed unless he has meanwhile disqualified himself in some way or other and there is no such allegation here is, if it at all-affects the right to administer, only regulatory and not restrictive of that right. We see even less in the further contention that the rule is beyond the rule-making power conferred by the Kerala Education Act. S.11 of the Act, it seems to us, clearly contemplates rules being made regulating the appointment of teachers-" 3. But counsel contends before me that the Division Bench has apparently not noticed the observations of the Supreme Court in several of its decisions and therefore it is open to me to go into that question afresh. Particular reference is made to a passage wherein Justice Shah in Sidhrajbhai v. State of Gujarat (AIR. 1963 SC. 540) observed thus: "The right established by Art.30 (1) is a fundamental right declared in terms absolute. Unlike the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Art.19 it is not subject to reasonable restrictions. It is intended to be a real right for the protection of the minorities in the matter of setting up of educational institutions of their own choice. 1963 SC. 540) observed thus: "The right established by Art.30 (1) is a fundamental right declared in terms absolute. Unlike the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Art.19 it is not subject to reasonable restrictions. It is intended to be a real right for the protection of the minorities in the matter of setting up of educational institutions of their own choice. The right is intended to be effective and is not to be whittled down by so called regulative measure-conceived in the interest not of the minority educational institution, but of the public or the nation as a whole. If every order which while maintaining the formal character of a minority institution destroys the power of administration is held justifiable because it is in the public or national interest, though not in its interest as an educational institution the right guaranteed by Art.30(1) will be but a 'teasing illusion', a promise of unreality. Regulations which may lawfully be imposed either by legislative or executive action as a condition of receiving grant or of recognition must be directed to making the institution while retaining its character as a minority institution effective as an educational institution. Such regulation must satisfy a dual test the test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution and is conducive to making the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who resort to it," My attention has also been drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in D. A.V. College, Jullundur v. State of Punjab (AIR. 1971 SC. 1737). In that case, their Lordships reiterated what was said is their earlier decision. 4. I do not see anything in the decisions of the Supreme Court which compels me to hold that the decision of this Court has been contrary to the decisions of the Supreme Court. When in Sidhrajbhai's case the Supreme Court held that regulative measures conceived in the interests not of the minority educational institution, but of the public or the nation as a whole, may not be valid and may not justify the curtailment of the fundamental right guaranteed under Art.30(1) of the Constitution, they did conceive of such regulatory measures in the interests of the institutions themselves. Therefore, regulatory measures if they are in the interests of the minority institutions may have to be upheld and what this Court said was only that R.51A does not affect the right to administer but is only regulatory and not restrictive of that right. 5. Another contention has been urged before me and that is that R.7 and 8 of Chap.14A of the Kerala Education Rules are also equally bad being violative of the fundamental right under Art.30 (1) of the Constitution. These rules may be extracted here: 7. As soon as a teacher is appointed in a school the Manager shall immediately issue an appointment order to the teacher in form 27 and the appointment shall be effective from the date on which the teacher is admitted to duty, provided the appointment is duly approved. 7A. (1) No appointment shall be made in anticipation of sanction of posts except in the case of new schools opened or existing school upgraded. (2) Posts that may fall vacant on the closing date shall not be filled up till the reopening date. 8. (1) Three copies of appointment order all signed by the Manager and the teacher; shall be forwarded by the Manager to the Educations I Officer for approval together with such details, particulars and documents as may be required by the Director within one week from the date of receipt of the fixation order or one week from the date of joining duty of the candidates whichever is later in the manner prescribed by the Director. (2) The Educational Officer on receipt of the appointment order and other records mentioned in sub rule (1) may approve the appointment if it is in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the Rules and orders issued by the Government or the Director from time to time. After approval one copy shall be forwarded by the Educational Officer to the teacher through the Manager and another copy forwarded to the Manager to be filed in the school records. The approval may be given as expeditiously as possible. (3) If the approval of appointment is declined for any reasons the order declining approval showing reasons thereof shall be communicated to the teacher through the Manager. The approval may be given as expeditiously as possible. (3) If the approval of appointment is declined for any reasons the order declining approval showing reasons thereof shall be communicated to the teacher through the Manager. (4) If the appointment order and other required particulars are not forwarded in the manner prescribed by Director within the time specified in sub rule(1), it shall be deemed that such appointment has taken effect. (5) An appeal shall lie against the order declining approval of appointment issued by the Assistant Educational Officer, or the District Educational Officer to the District Educational Officer, or the Regional Deputy Director as the case may be. The decision of the appellate authority shall be final. (6) No appeal shall be entertained unless it is preferred within 15 days from the date of receipt of the order appealed against. (7) The manager shall give effect to the orders passed by the appellate authority forthwith. (8) The violation of these provisions will be one of the grounds for withdrawal of recognition under R.23 of Chapter V and action under R.7 of Chapter III of the Kerala Education Rules " These rules require approval for the appointment of a teacher and that approval is to be by the Educational Officer. It is open to him to withhold approval of an appointment which is not in accordance with the Act, the rules and the orders issued by the Government or the Director from time to time. The field of choice of the teacher is left to the manager. No interference is made with appointments made by him unless it be that the appointment violates the Act, rules or orders. That will be the case where, say, an unqualified teacher is appointed or a teacher is appointed ignoring the legitimate claim of another who by reason of his previous service is entitled to preference. Those are regulatory measures not intended in any manner to curtail the right of administration of the institution but only intended to see that the excellence of the institution is maintained in its own interest. Reference is made in this connection to the decision in D. A. V. College, Jullunclur v. State of Punjab (AIR. 1971 SC. 1737). Those are regulatory measures not intended in any manner to curtail the right of administration of the institution but only intended to see that the excellence of the institution is maintained in its own interest. Reference is made in this connection to the decision in D. A. V. College, Jullunclur v. State of Punjab (AIR. 1971 SC. 1737). One of the clauses which arose for consideration in the context of the contention as to infringement of the guarantee to the minorities under Art.30(1) of the Constitution was Clause.17 of the relevant statute. That clause read thus: "17. The staff initially appointed shall be approved by the Vice Chancellor. All subsequent changes shall be reported to the University for Vice Chancellor's approval In the case of training institutions, the teacher pupil ratio shall not be less than 1 : J2. Non-Government Colleges shall comply with the requirements laid down in the Ordinance governing service and conduct of teachers in non-Government colleges as may be framed by the University." The requirement that the staff initially appointed shall be approved and all subsequent changes shall be reported to the University for Vice Chancellor's approval was found to be one which interfered with the right of management of the College of the petitioner therein. Therefore the Supreme Court found that this cannot be made a condition for affiliation. Consequently the clause was struck down as offending Art.30(1) of the Constitution of India Counsel for the petitioners urges that R.7 and 8 in Chapter X1VA of Kerala Education Rules more or less compare with Clause.17 of the statute with which the Supreme Court was concerned in that case and therefore the requirement of approval has to be struck down for the same reason. I see an essential difference between the provision which engaged Their Lordships' attention in the case adverted to and the provisions, the validity of which has been canvassed before me. Though in both the cases the right of approval of the appointment is reserved in an authority, in the case before the Supreme Court there was no rule of guidance as to how approval should be made and as to what should be the criteria for such approval. That is not the case in R.7 and 8 in Chapter XIVA of the Kerala Education Rules. That is not the case in R.7 and 8 in Chapter XIVA of the Kerala Education Rules. Not only guidelines are furnished but it is evident from these provisions that the educational authorities have no discretion whatsoever to refuse appointment if the appointment has been made in accordance with the provisions of the Act, rules and orders. If the said provisions in the Act, rules and orders are valid and constitutional necessarily the management is bound to comply with them and if for the purpose of seeing that there is such compliance authority is given to the educational officers, it could in no way be spelt as imposing restrictions on the right to administer the educational institutions. On the other hand, it will be only in the nature of regulation intended to enforce the provisions in the Act and rules which, if good in themselves, are necessary to be enforced. Therefore, I see no substance in the attack to R.7 and 8. 6. Though there was an omnibus attack to S.11 and 12 also, nothing has been urged before me in support of such an attack and I see no reason to bold that these sections infringe Art.30 (1) of the Constitution. In these circumstances, I see no merit in either of these Original Petitions. Both the Petitions are dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to suffer costs.