JUDGMENT Gur Sharan Lal, J.- This second appeal is being heard for admission on its presentation with the consent of the appellant's learned counsel because of there being an application for grant for interim relief. The appellant Narain Das in this second appeal was the tenant of a shop from a time prior to 1-1-1951. The landlord wanted to demolish the old shops and to construct new ones in their place. There was a written agreement between the landlord and Narain Das which enabled the landlord to demolish the old shop and to erect a new one in its place. One newly erected shop was given to Narain Das on a rent of Rs. 35/- per month though he was holding the old shop at the rate of Rs. 22/- per month. Sometime in 1968 the respondent who is the successor of the landlord of 1952, served one month's notice on the appellant to vacate the shop. On the shop not being vacated she instituted a suit for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent. The suit was based on the allegation that the shop having been built after 1-1-1951, the provisions of U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 were not applicable and, therefore, the suit for ejectment could be instituted after terminating the tenancy. 2. Though originally the re-construction of the shop was not admitted but after a statement made under Order 10-C.P.C., it came to be admitted that the shop to which the suit related had been built a new in plane of the old shop and given to Narain Das on the enhanced rate of Rs. 35/- p.m. The pleas on behalf of Narain Das were that he continued to be the tenant of the plaintiff during the re-construction of the shop in suit and thereafter it was not a case of surrender of an old tenancy and acquisition of a new one. According to him, therefore. the tenancy was governed by the aforesaid Act and in the absence of permission of the District Magistrate, the suit could not be entertained. 3. The trial court found that in view of the provisions of Section 1-A of the aforesaid Act the Act was not applicable to the shop in question which was re-constructed after 1st January, 195l. the tenancy was governed by the aforesaid Act and in the absence of permission of the District Magistrate, the suit could not be entertained. 3. The trial court found that in view of the provisions of Section 1-A of the aforesaid Act the Act was not applicable to the shop in question which was re-constructed after 1st January, 195l. It also held that the old tenancy bad been surrendered and in respect of the new shop a new tenancy had been created on a new rate of rent. The suit was, therefore, decreed On appeal by Narain Das the judgment and decree of the trial court were upheld by the Civil Judge of Sitapur. The learned Civil Judge a so held that the shop was constructed after 1-1-1951 and, therefore, the Act aforesaid did not apply and it was not the o,d the tenancy which was continuing. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant appearing before me has raised a number of points. His contention is that the site of the old shop did not change and, therefore, if the shop was re-built on the old site then it was not a case of construction after 1-1-1951 as contemplated in Section 1-A of the Act. According to him the Act would conrnue to apply to the new shop. The second point is that there was no surrender of the old tenancy and no creation of a new tenancy and on the other hand, as the agreement between the parties old show, the old tenancy continued with the result that be applicability of the Act to the tenancy before the re-construction of the shop would continue to operate even after re-construction. The third ground raised is that the tenancy was not validly terminated. 5. Taking up the first point. it may be stated that, firstly, there is no determination by the courts below that the site of the existing shop is exactly the site of the old shop which was in the tenancy of Narain Das. But irrespective of that, the plea that because the site is the same, therefore even if the shop has been re-constructed in full it could not be a case covered by section 1-A of the Act appears to be wholly unacceptable. Section 1-A does not concern itself with the question of site or land at all. But irrespective of that, the plea that because the site is the same, therefore even if the shop has been re-constructed in full it could not be a case covered by section 1-A of the Act appears to be wholly unacceptable. Section 1-A does not concern itself with the question of site or land at all. What it states is that nothing in this Act shall apply to any building or part of a building which was under erection or was constructed on or after 1st January, 1951. "It makes no exception in favour of a building where an old building had existed prior to 1-1-1951. Therefore this section would make the Act inapplicable to the shop in question unless anything else is found in the agreement between the parties to continue the application of the Act to the re-constructed shop. 6. Coming to the second point it may be stated that what is material for the purpose of the application of the Act is not the fact whether the tenancy has been continuing from before 1-1-1951 or a new tenancy has been created after that date. When the question arises if the Act is applicable then the provision of section 1-A will have to be taken into account. Under that section, if the building about which the controversy arises was under erection on 1-1-1951 or was constructed after 1-1-1951, then the Act would not apply at all. It will not, therefore, matter for the purpose of the case whether the old tenancy was surrendered and a new one was created later on or that the old tenancy continued with a variation in the matter of the rate of rent and the subject-matter of the tenancy. The contents of the agreement as discussed in the judgment and as read out by the learned counsel for the appellant from the copy with him would show that against promise to let out the re-constructed shop on a rent of Rs. 35/- p.m. the appellant agreed to have his shop demolished The agreement goes no further to make out that his old tenancy was to continue upon the re-constructed shop being put in his possession and there would only be a variation in rent. 35/- p.m. the appellant agreed to have his shop demolished The agreement goes no further to make out that his old tenancy was to continue upon the re-constructed shop being put in his possession and there would only be a variation in rent. It is next to be noticed that this agreement contains no hing which has the effect of continuing to vest in the appellant the privileges conferred by the U P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 even though re-construction of the shop was to take place in the absence of any such agreement, the law as it was had to operate. In other words, the provisions of the Act were to cease applicable to the re-constructed shop in view of the provisions of section 1-A of the said Act. The agreement too did not retain to the appellant the privileges untter the old Act. 7. Corning to the last plea about the validity of notice, it may be firstly pointed out that no such plea was raised either before the trial court or before the first appellate court. Such a new plea should not be allowed to be raised for the first tine in the second appeal. But apart from that, from the contents of the notice which the learned counsel for the appellant has read out, no invalidity can be inferred. The notice expressed the fact of the appellant being a tenant of the respondent in the shop and the shop being a new construction with the U P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act inapplicable to it. It then stated the fact that the respondent needed the ,hop for herself and did not want to continue the tenancy of the appellant. it was next stated that in consequence notice was being given to the appellant to vacate the shop on the expiry of thirty days. It will appear that there was no immediate termination of tenancy. Accordingly the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Hakim Ziaul Islam v. Mohd. Rafi, AIR 1971 Allahabad 302. which dealt with the case of immediate termination of tenancy is inapplicable to this case. 8. For the above reasons the appeal is found to have no force and is dismissed summarily.