Lal Behari Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation
1971-07-26
K.B.SRIVASTAVA, S.K.VERMA
body1971
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT S. K. Verma, C. J. - Three writ petitions were dismissed in limine by a Division Bench of this Court giving rise to three review applications. Each review application was filed on a Court fee of Rs. 5/- under Schedule II, article 1 (e) (5) of the Court Fees Act, as amended in its application to Uttar Pradesh. There was some controversy whether the Court fee was sufficient. There upon, the matter was referred to the Taxing Officer who wrote a long, well considered order and he was of the view that if proceedings arising out of an application under Article 226 of the Constitution were of a civil nature then the provisions of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be attracted and Court fee would be payable under article 4 or 5, as the case may be, of Schedule I of the Court Fees Act. He, however, referred the matter for adjudication to the Taxing Judge. The latter also concentrated his attention on the question whether the proceedings arising out of a petition under article 226 of the Constitution were of a civil nature and he was of the view that the matter had been set at rest, so far as this Court was concerned, by a Full Bench decision of this Court in Mall Singh and others v. Smt. Laksha Kumari Khaitan, 1968 A.L.J. 210. In that case it was held that the proceedings arising out of an application under Article 226 of the Constitution were of a civil nature and the provisions of Order 1, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to such petitions. The learned Taxing Judge, however, thought that the matter was of some importance, and he referred it for decision to a Division Bench and that is how this matter has been laid before us. 2. It appears to us that it is not at all necessary to enter into the controversy whether the proceedings arising out of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution are of a civil nature or not. The Full Bench decision, therefore, mentioned above, cannot be of any assistance.
2. It appears to us that it is not at all necessary to enter into the controversy whether the proceedings arising out of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution are of a civil nature or not. The Full Bench decision, therefore, mentioned above, cannot be of any assistance. We have got to interpret the exact words used by articles 4 and 5 of Schedule I and article I of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act, which read as follows :- Article 4 and 5 of Schedule I "4. Application for review of judgment, if presented on or after the ninetieth day from the date of the decree. The fee leviable on the plaint or memorandum of appeal. 5. Application for review of judgment, if presented before the ninetieth day from the date of the decree. One-half of the fee liveable on the plaint or memorandum of appeal." Article 1 (e) (2) and (5) of Schedule II " 1. Application or petition. (e) When presented to a High Court- (1) ................ (2) Under article 226 or article 227 of the Constitution, or by way of special appeal against a judgment or order including a judgment or order passed on a petition filed before the commencement of the Court Fees (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1970, passed by a Single Judge of the High Court thereon. One hundred rupees. (3) ................................... (4) ................................... (5) in any other case not otherwise pro-Five rupees. provided for; ..................." 3. At first, we were inclined to attach great importance to the word "judgment" in article 4 and 5 of Schedule I. It was, however, pointed out to us that that word alone does not fall for interpretation. The other words upon which emphasis was laid by the learned counsel for the applicants are "decree" and "plaint" and "memorandum of appeal". It is obvious that the meaning to be given to these words would be the meaning that is given to them in the Code of Civil Procedure. According to the Code of Civil Procedure a `plain' has to fulfil the requirements of Order VII. Chapter XXII of the Rules of the Court, on the other hand, provides that proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution shall be initiated by means of an "application". What the contents of such an application should be are mentioned in Chapter XXII.
According to the Code of Civil Procedure a `plain' has to fulfil the requirements of Order VII. Chapter XXII of the Rules of the Court, on the other hand, provides that proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution shall be initiated by means of an "application". What the contents of such an application should be are mentioned in Chapter XXII. They are quite different from the contents of a "plaint" as required by Order VI I of the Code of Civil Procedure. "Decree" is defined in Section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order XX, rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribed the contents of a decree. A decree is appealable, according to the nature of the case, either under Section 96 or under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Orders are appealable under Section 104 and Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is obvious that judgments in civil suits and appeals are followed by decrees. A judgment in a writ petition is not followed by a decree but by a formal order. It is, therefore, very difficult to accept the contention of the learned Standing Counsel that the formal order which follows the judgment in a writ petition must be deemed to be a decree. We should also like to emphasise the fact that the Court Fees Act is a fiscal statute and, therefore, it must be construed strictly and if such a construction is put upon the provisions of the Court Fees Act, no decision can be given against the subject by the process of "deeming." 4. We are, therefore, of the view that the Court fee on review applications arising out of writ petitions is payable under Schedule II, article I (e) (5) of the Court Fees Act as amended in its application to Uttar Pradesh.