JUDGMENT Gursharan Lal, J. - This petition relates to a matter under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act'). 2. There is a house with compound on Jopling Road, Lucknow, which is waqf property belonging to waqf Sohani Begam, opposite party no. 4. The present Mutwalli of the waqf is one Siddiq Ahmad Khan, elder brother of opposite party No 2. Khalil Ahmad Khan. The appointment of Siddiq Ahmad Khan took place under a decree which has been appealed against by Khalil Ahmad Khan. Siddiq Ahmad Khan is said to have become insane after the passing of the decree and the Court has, therefore, appointed Sri Iqbal Ahmad, Advocate as Receiver possessing the powers of the Mutwalli. 3. The house in question was in the tenancy of one Singhal who vacated it on 15. 9. 1959 whereupon Khalil Ahmad Khan occupied that house. According to the allegations in the petition he, however, let out the northern half portion of the house to one Rahmatullah Khan, retaining the remaining southern half with himself. Rahmatullah Khan applied for allotment of the whole house in his favour while Khalil Ahmad Khan applied for the release of the entire house in his favour. An allotment order was pissed in favour of Rahmat Ullah Khan for the entire house. Khalil Ahmad Khan filed two suits against Rah mat Ullah Khan but they were dismissed. However, according to the petitioner, during the pendency of the civil suits Khalil Ahmad Khan illegally let out the southern portion of the house which was in his possession and of which he did not deliver possession to Rahmat Ullah Khan, to a number of persons, opposite party No. 3 K. K. Sharma being one of them. According to the petitioner, Khalil Ahmad Khan did not himself continue in possession of any part of the southern half of the house after sublettings. The petitioner himself claims to have been the general agent of Rahmat Ullah Khan and to have been living with him in a portion of the half house which was in his occupation. Rahmat Ullah Khan later decided to go to Meerut on his retirement and vacated the northern portion of the house which was in his occupation, allowing the petitioner to take the whole of it in his possession under a authority in writing. Rahmat Ullah Khan later decided to go to Meerut on his retirement and vacated the northern portion of the house which was in his occupation, allowing the petitioner to take the whole of it in his possession under a authority in writing. The petitioner applied for allotment of that northern half house on 31.10.1969, with the consent of the Receiver. One Sri B.M.N. Kacher Advocate and Khalil Ahmad Khan also applied for allotment of that portion but Khalil Ahmad Khan, however, made an endorsement of 'no objection' on the application of Sri Kacher. The portion in question was allotted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to the petitioner by order dated 16. 2. 1970. The case of the petitioner is that in pursuance of the said order opposite party No. 4 (Waqf Sohani Begam) let out the portion to him and accepted rent which the petitioner continued to pay regularly later on. 4. Khalil Ahmad Khan, however, filed a revision before the State Government under section 7-F of the Act upon being aggrieved by the allotment order aforesaid. K. K. Sharma, opposite party No. 3 also filed a revision though he bad not filed any application for allotment of the portion allotted to the petitioner. In none of the revisions was the landlord, that is the waqf (opposite party No. 4), impleaded as an opposite party. By order dated 2.12.1970 (Annexure 3 to the writ petition) the State Government allowed the revisions, can called the allotment in favour of the petitioner and made the allotment in favour of Khalil Ahmad Khan. According to Paragraph 17 of the petition, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in pursuance of the Government order passed an order dated 2.12.70 (Annexure 4) cancelling the allotment in favour of the petitioner made on 16.2.1970 and allotting the same portion of the house to Khalil Ahmad Khan. By another order dated 24.12.1970 purporting to be issued under Section 7-A (1) of the Act he directed the petitioner to show cause on 30.12.1970 why he should not be evicted from the accommodation. The petitioner thereupon filed the writ petition under judgment in this Court on 31.1.1971. By another order dated 24.12.1970 purporting to be issued under Section 7-A (1) of the Act he directed the petitioner to show cause on 30.12.1970 why he should not be evicted from the accommodation. The petitioner thereupon filed the writ petition under judgment in this Court on 31.1.1971. He has prayed for the issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the aforesaid orders of the State Government and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer contained in Annexures 3 to 5 as also the proceedings under Section 7-A (1) and (2) of the Act. 5. The writ petition has been contested by only Khalil Ahmad Khan opposite party No. 2, by Ming a counter affidavit. A rejoinder affidavit has been filed by the petitioner. A supplementary counter affidavit has also been filed by Khalil Abmad Khan and similarly a supplementary rejoinder affidavit has been filed by the petitioner. Learned counsel for both sides have been beard by me. 6 The main challenge in the grounds of the writ petition is to the order of the State Government contained in Annexure 3 to the writ petition though in the course of arguments the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under Section 7-A (l) has been the principal target of attack. In regard to the order of the State Government it has been firstly said that it does not indicate that it was passed in the interest of justice and so the order was passed without jurisdiction. A perusal of the order shows that it purports to base itself on considerations of justice. Section 7-F does not require that it should be stated specifically in the order that it appears to the State Government necessary for the ends of justice to pass the particular order which is proceeds to pass. It is next said that the order passed is perverse as it is based on incorrect appraisal of facts which are negatived by the record itself An instance is given that it is incorrectly mentioned in the order that Khalil Ahmad Khan is in occupation of the southern portion and the petitioner is an unauthorised occupant and opposite party no 5 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, allotted the accommodation in depute to him without considering the case of the other parties. The petitioner claimed to be in occupation of only the northern half whereas he sought for allotment and was allotted the whole house. It is, therefore, not incorrect to say that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had not considered the case of other parties in allotting the whole house to the petitioner. Similarly since Khalil Ahmad Khan had only sublet the southern half portion of the house he could have been regarded as being in formal possession. The order is no doubt open to the further criticism that the claim of Khalil Ahmad Khan who had illegally sublet the southern half of the house was still entertained for the northern half of the house of which the petitioner was in occupation from the time of Rahmat Ullah Khan, the regular tenant, and for which an allotment order had been passed in favour of the petitioner with the consent of the landlord waqf. There would appear to be no justification for preferring Khalil Ahmad Khan to the petitioner in the matter of the allotment of the northern portion of the house of when even an illegal occupant like K. K. Sharma was allotted under the impugned order of the Government the southern portion on the basis of his actual occupation only. However, this is not a matter which can be raked up in this court as it is not sitting in appeal over the discretion exercised by the State Government. There is no case of any manifest error of law. 6. Another ground taken is that after the accommodation had been let to the petitioner by the landlord in pursuance of the allotment order dated 16-2-1970, the State Government could not disturb the relationship of landlord and tenant which came to exist between the petitioner and opposite party No. 4 and no action could, therefore, have been taken in pursuance of the order of the Government in revision. This ground will appear to have no substance. No doubt when the Rent Control and Eviction Officer allots an accommodation and letting takes place in pursuance thereof and the allottee enters into possession the order exhausts itself and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer himself cannot cancel the allotment unless the same has been procured be fraud or misrepresentation. This ground will appear to have no substance. No doubt when the Rent Control and Eviction Officer allots an accommodation and letting takes place in pursuance thereof and the allottee enters into possession the order exhausts itself and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer himself cannot cancel the allotment unless the same has been procured be fraud or misrepresentation. But Section 7-F of the Act confers unconditional power on the State Government to call for the record of any case in which an order under Section 7 has been passed requiring any accommodation to be let or not to be let and, therefore, the fact that the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has been given effect to can be no bar to the State Government revising the order. If the order is revised, the consequences flowing from the order in revision will follow and action if not otherwise barred, will have to be taken to effectuate those consequences. In this case the State Government cancelled the allotment in favour of the petitioner and allotted the accommodation to Khalil Ahmad Khan, opposite party no. 2. Since the petitioner is in possession action has been initiated by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under Section 7-F of the Act in order to have the accommodation vacated by the petitioner so that it could be occupied by opposite party No. 2. It has to be examined whether the action according to law or there is something which stands as a bar to such action. 7. It has to be examined whether the action according to law or there is something which stands as a bar to such action. 7. Sub-section (1) of Section 7-A of the Act reads :- "11(1) Where in pursuance of an order of the District Magistrate under sub-section (2) of Section 7, the vacancy of any accommodation is required to be reported and is not so reported, or where an order requiring any accommodation to be let or not to be let has been duly passed under sub-section (2) of Section 7 and District Magistrate believes or has reason to believe that any person has, in contravention of the said order, occupied the accommodation or any part thereof, he may call upon the person in occupation to show cause, within a time to be fixed by him, why he should not be evicted therefrom : Provided that no order under this section shall be passed if the District Magistrate is satisfied that there has been undue delay or it is otherwise inexpedient to do so." The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is, firstly, that the occupation of the accommodation by the petitioner had taken place much before the order passed by the State Government and therefore, he cannot be said to have occupied the accommodation in contravention of the order of the State Government. According to him the language of the above quoted provision means that the occupation should have taken place after the passing of the order under Section 7(2), The contention is however not sound. No doubt in the Division Bench case Ram Lal v. Shiv Mani Singh, 1962 A.W.R. 220 (H.C.) it was held that if a person has already antered into occupation of an accommodation under a contract of lease with the landlord before an order under sub-section (2) of Section 7 has been passed by the District Magistrate, he cannot be said to be in occupation of an accommodation in contravention of the order passed under Section 7(2) and cannot be called upon to show cause under Section 7-A(l) why he be not evicted from that accommodation. But a different view was taken later by another Division Bench (of which M.C. Desai, C J., who was a member of the Bench deciding Ram Lal's case, was also member) in R.K. Khandelwal v. M.L. Chawla, 1964 A.L.J. 20. But a different view was taken later by another Division Bench (of which M.C. Desai, C J., who was a member of the Bench deciding Ram Lal's case, was also member) in R.K. Khandelwal v. M.L. Chawla, 1964 A.L.J. 20. It was clearly laid down that if a person occupies an accommodation before an allotment order is passed and continues to be in occupation after it is passed be can be said to have occupied it in contravention of it if it is not passed in his favour. It was observed that "continuing in occupation" is occupying and occupation may thus become an occupation in contravention of an allotment order after it has commenced. A learned Single Judge of this Court took the same view in Sheo Math Das v. Babu Lals, 1965 A.L.J. 419. That is to my mind a more rational view because otherwise as soon as the accommodation is vacated, any person may be given possession by the landlord or may himself manage to take possession and then if an allotment order is passed subsequently in favour of another person, it will remain in fructuous. Accordingly the fact that the petitioner was in possession already when the State Government passed the order of allotment in favour of opposite party No. 4 is no ground for the non-applicability of Section 7-A of the Act. 8. Another ground taken by the petitioner against the applicability of Section 7-A(i) is that no order under Section 7(2) of the Act is being contravened by his occupation of the accommodation. According to him, as a matter of fact, his occupation is in conformity with the only order that was passed under that section, being the allotment order in his favour. It is pointed out by his learned counsel that the order which the State Government has passed is under Section 7-F and not under Section 7(2) of the Act. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer, as already stated, passed the order Annexure 4 on 21-12-1970 stating that according to the order of the Government the allotment order dated 16-2-1970 was being cancelled and the accommodation was being allotted to Khalil Ahmad Khan. The State Government's order (Annexure-3) was that the allotment order in favour of the petitioner was cancelled and the accommodation was allotted to Khalil Ahmad. The State Government's order (Annexure-3) was that the allotment order in favour of the petitioner was cancelled and the accommodation was allotted to Khalil Ahmad. It did not contain any direction to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to pass any order under Section 7(2) of the Act in favour of Khalil Ahmad, nor even to pass any order for cancellation of the allotment order in favour of the petitioner. The order Annexure 4 is nothing but a voluntary act of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. If it were his own independent order then it could have been incapable of being carried out because his order of allotment dated 16-2-1970 had been effectuated and there was nothing to cancel. It avowedly is an order in pursuance of the order of the Government, but, as pointed out above, the Government did not make any direction in its own order (Annexure 3) for any such order being passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. So it has to be examined whether Section 7-A(1) will cover the present case where the State Government has cancelled the allotment and itself passed an order of allotment in favour of opposite party No. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the manner in which the State Government has passed the order, that is to say, allotting the accommodation to opposite party No. 2, is wrong for even an order under Section 7(2) of the Act contemplates nothing more than an order to the landlord to let the accommodation to any particular person. I need not however discuss this controversy which can be regarded as relating to the form and not the substance of the matter. But it has to be seen whether Section 7-A on its wordings has within its scope a case where a person is in occupation in contravention of an order of allotment of the State Government under Section 1-F of the Act. There is a Division Bench decision of this Court on the subject, being Krishna Chandra Sharma v. State of U.P., 1962 A.W.R. 304 (H.C.). There is a Division Bench decision of this Court on the subject, being Krishna Chandra Sharma v. State of U.P., 1962 A.W.R. 304 (H.C.). It was laid down therein that where a person is in occupation of an accommodation under an order passed under Section 7(2) and that order is subsequently set aside by the Sate Government under Section 7-F, such a person is not in occupation of the premises in contravention of an order under Section 7(2). Section A mentions contravention of an order under Section 7(2) only and not an order under Section 7-F. It was accordingly held that Section 7-A(l) could not be availed of to oust a person from occupation of an accommodation in pursuance of an allotment order which is subsequently set aside by the State Government. No decision taking a different view has been cited by the learned counsel for opposite party No. 2. The decision Just mentioned is not only binding but also lays down what is the obvious inference from the language of Section 7-A(1). 9. Learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 has pointed out that the petitioner has filed a revision before the Commissioner against an order passed under Section 7-A(3) of the Act and he should not be given any relief by this Court. I do not think so. The petitioner has challenged the order of the State Government also in the writ petition which he could not have done before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the Commissioner. While challenging that order in the writ petition he could suitably claim a relief in respect of the developments which had taken place as a consequence to the passing of the order by the State Government. 10. In the result the writ petition is allowed in so far as it is directed against the proceedings under Section 7-A(l) of the Act. Annexure 5 and further proceedings taken in pursuance of that order are quashed. Annexure 4 is in fructuous and there is no ground for passing any order for quashing it. Costs will be borne by the parties themselves in view of the partial success of the petitioner.