( 1 ) IN this case, the accused was a Railway Station Master at Hospet on 27-7-1970 and on that day when the passenger train arrived from Guntur on the Railway Platform at Hospet at 6-20 P. M. the accused is said to have abused Veerabhadraiah PW. 1 and Nanjundiah PW. 2 Police Constables. He was convicted by the First Class Magistrate, Hospet, for offence punishable under S. 120 (b) of the Indian Railways Act (IX of 1890) (which will hereinafter be referred to as the Act) and was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 50 or in default to suffer seven days Simple Imprisonment. It is against that decision that the petitioner (accused) has preferred this revision petition. ( 2 ) MR. Achar the learned Counsel for the petitioner advanced two contentions before me Firstly, he argued that the trying Magistrate has erred in coming to the conclusion that the offence under S. 120 (b) of the Act is established against the petitioner. He submitted that the prosecution witnesss had not understood what the petitioner is alleged to have said and the manner in which they made out the meaning of the words alleged to have been used by the petitioner indicates that the case is a put up one. PW. 1 Veerabhadriah and PW. 2 Nanjundiah are the railway police constables. They have deposed to the fact that they were on duty when the passenger train from Guntur to Gadag arrived at the Railway Platform at Hospet on 27-7-1970 at about 6-20 P. M. They noticed that some fire-wood bundles were being kept in the door-way in the third class compartment which were causing inconvenience to the police to board the train. While they were enquiring the passengers who were there about the person who had kept the fire-wood bundles in the entrance of the compartment, the accused (petitioner) station master interfered and abused them in indecent language by calling them. "shut up-Rascal police Black Guards-Bloody Mysore Police. They are corroborated by the testimony of PWs. 3 and 4 who were present at the spot. Therefore, it cannot be said that the conclusion arrived a by the trying Magistrate does not find any support in the material in record. I do not intend to go behind that finding because there is evidence to support it. ( 3 ) MR. Achar contended that the evidence oi PW. 3 and 4 who were present at the spot. Therefore, it cannot be said that the conclusion arrived a by the trying Magistrate does not find any support in the material in record. I do not intend to go behind that finding because there is evidence to support it. ( 3 ) MR. Achar contended that the evidence oi PW. 1 Veerabhadriah and pw. 5 Head Constable Habibulla Khan shows that PW. 1 had given a written report to PW. 5, but that report has not been produced in the case and this circumstance raises suspicion against the prosecution. But the learned public Prosecutor urged that inasmuch as this point was not raised before the Court below the petitioner is precluded from raising the Same for the first time here in revision. T think he is right in his submission. Even otherwise the evidence of PWs. 1 and 2 is fully supported by the testimony of PWs. 3 and 4. PWs. 3 and 4 are absolutely disinterested witnesses. The Court below has believed their evidence. I do not see any reason to disbelieve them. If it is so believed, then the circumstance relied upon on behalf of the petitioner cannot have any material effect in the case. ( 4 ) THE second contention advanced by Mr. Achar the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that S. 120 of the Act does not apply to Railway servants, particularly on duty. My attention has been invited to the provisions of the Act, that is, to the fact that Ss. 87 to 98 refer to the forefeitures by Railway; Ss. 99 to 105 to offences committed by Railway servants, and ss. 106 to 130 to other offences, and it was argued that the sections falling under the heading "other offences" deal with offences by passengers and other persons using a railway property but not with offences committed by railway servants acting as such. ( 5 ) THE question, therefore, for determination is whether S. 120 applies to Railway servants particularly on duty. This is a question which is not free from complexity and has produced conflicting opinion. S. 120 is couched in general terms. ( 5 ) THE question, therefore, for determination is whether S. 120 applies to Railway servants particularly on duty. This is a question which is not free from complexity and has produced conflicting opinion. S. 120 is couched in general terms. It reads:"if a person in any railway carriage or upon any part of a railway- (a) is in a state of intoxication, or (b) commits any nuisance or act of indecency, or uses obscene or abusive language, or (c) wilfully and without lawful excuse interferes wtih the comfort of any passenger or extinguishes any lamp, he shall be punished with fine which may extend to fifty rupees, in addition to the forfeiture of any fare which he may have paid and of any pass or ticket which he may have obtained or purchased, and may be removed from the railway by any railway servant," ( 6 ) IN Mulchand v. Emperor , AIR. 1929 Sind 249. the view taken that this section was inapplicable to railway servants was based on the fact that its concluding portion contained a reference to the forfeiture of fares and of passes or tickets and to the removal of the offender from the railway by any railway servant. This view was followed by the Bombay High Court in Gurunath shankar v. Emperor, AIR. 1937 Bom. 357. in which Beaumont CJ. as he then was, observed: "the offences specified in S. 120, if committed by railway servants, can well be dealt with by departmental action. " ( 7 ) THE Allahabad High Court in Vishwanath Pandey v. State, AIR. 1960 All. 721. and the Bench decision of the Punjab High Court in Hazara Singh v. State, AIR. 1963 Pun. 362. have also taken the same view. On the other hand the division bench of the Madras High Court in cuffli v. Md. Ibrahim, AIR. 1919 Mad. 971 took the opposite view and rejected the contention that s. 120 of the Act is inapplicable to railway servants and made the following observations (at page 972 of the Report ). "the word used in S. 120 is 'person' and there is nothing in the section to indicate that a railway guard or other railway officials are intended to be excluded from the purview of the section. "the word used in S. 120 is 'person' and there is nothing in the section to indicate that a railway guard or other railway officials are intended to be excluded from the purview of the section. It is perfectly true that there are special classes of offences dealt with in the Act which may be committed by railway servants. But that does not at all lead to the inference that the other offences dealt with in the Act may not be committed by railway servants where the offence is defined in general terms. It may also be pointed out that there are a number of sections which deal with offences bv passengers travelling in a railway train. But in all these sections, the word "passenger" is specifically used. Contrary to that the word used in S. 120 is 'person' and not 'passenger'. We think that S. 120 applies to an act mentioned in that section if committed by a railway servant. " ( 8 ) THIS decision was relied on by Saunders J. in Appalaswamy v. Emperor ,air. 1934 Pat. 52. . The Nagpur High Court has taken a similar view in gajdhar Singh Radhakishan Singh v. Emperor, AIR. 1946 Nag. 200, and held that the word 'person' used in S. 120 of the Act includes railway servants whether on duty or off duty. With due respect I am unable to hold that S. 120 does not apply to railway servants. Ss. 99 to 105, it is true, are headed by 'offences by Railway Servants' and Ss. 106 to 130 deal with other offences, but not with 'offences by others'. It is true that S. 120 (a) provides penalty for the offence of intoxication and that S. 100 also provides penalty for it so far as railway servants are concerned but S. 100 relates to such servants while on duty and S. 120 to persons in a railway carriage or upon any part of a railway who are in a state of intoxication. Further there is highly cogent and valid consideration that the words "a person" in S. 120 are unqualified and therefore wide enough to include railway servants as well as all other individuals. The words "any person" have the same meaning as 'a person'. In Narayanaswami v. Emperor, AIR. 1939 PC. 47. Further there is highly cogent and valid consideration that the words "a person" in S. 120 are unqualified and therefore wide enough to include railway servants as well as all other individuals. The words "any person" have the same meaning as 'a person'. In Narayanaswami v. Emperor, AIR. 1939 PC. 47. their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that it seemed nlain that the words "any person" in their ordinary meaning would include any person though he may thereafter be accused. It was also held that where the meaning of words in a Statute is plain, it is not the duty of the Courts to busy themselves with the supposed intentions of the Legislature. ( 9 ) IN Jugal Kishore v. Raw Cotton Co. , AIR. 1955 SC. 376 their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed at page 381 of the report:"the cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally, that is by giving to the words used by the legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning the Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. " ( 10 ) IT was, however, contended by Mr. Achar that S. 100 punishes a railway servant for being in a state of intoxication while on duty, there would be some duplication if he were also made liable under S. 120, i. e. , if S. 120 applies to railway servants also it will apply to him whether he is on duty or not and as regards railway servants on duty duplication will result. Similarly S. 101 imposes penalty on railway servant who disobeys any general rule made by or under the Act or any general rule which arises out of the terms of his employment or any rash or negligent act or omission, if a railway servant were punishable under S. 129 for certain acts, he would be liable to be punished both under S. 101 and S. 129. ( 11 ) IT is true that there is some overlapping in the Act, but there can be no justification for not giving full effect to the language used by the legislature. ( 11 ) IT is true that there is some overlapping in the Act, but there can be no justification for not giving full effect to the language used by the legislature. Further, so far as S. 100 is concerned, I think the object is to make clear that it is still an offence for a railway servant to be intoxicated when on duty, though not as serious as one committed in that state which is likely to endanger the safety of any person travelling or being upon a railway. So also distinction between 101 and 129 is clear. S. 101 creates a more serious offence and can only come into play when the railway servant is on duty. Moreover Ss. 100 and 101 if analysed go in support of the view that s. 120 does apply to a railway servant. Analysing S. 100 one finds that it is an offence for a railway servant who is in a state of intoxication while on duty to perform his duty so improperly as to be likely to endanger "the safety of "any person" travelling or being upon a raiiwav". Surely the word 'person' as used there includes other railway servants whether on duty or not if he i. e. , a railway servant, does actually endanger their safety, then, he comes under S. 10t but there again the language is "endangers the safety of any person". Evidently, "any person" as used there must include other railway servants also. If words of same import are used in other sections of a Statute, they cannot be intended to have different connotations. ( 12 ) THEREFORE the words "a person" in S. 120 must be intended to convey the same meaning as "any person" in other sections of enactment. When the language of a Statute is free from ambiguity no duty is cast upon the court to do anything more than to give effect to the word or words used. It was then contended by Mr. Achar that the additional provision in s. 120, namely, forfeiture of any fare or of any pass or ticket is mandatory and not discretionary. He maintained that it cannot be imposed upon a railway servant if he is not a passenger because there would arise no question of forfeiture of any fare paid by him or of any pass or ticket obtained or purchased by him. He maintained that it cannot be imposed upon a railway servant if he is not a passenger because there would arise no question of forfeiture of any fare paid by him or of any pass or ticket obtained or purchased by him. I can hardly think that the last paragraph indicates that S. 120 is limited to passengers and those who have paid iares or have tickets or passes. The words "fare which he may have paid and of any pass or ticket he may have obtained or purchased" contemplate cases in which there are neither fares nor passes nor tickets. Many persons frequent railway premises who are neither railway servants nor passengers and who have "neither passes nor tickets and who pay no fares. Obviously these persons are not excluded. Therefore, on the reasons stated above, I hold that S. 120 does apply to railway servants whether on duty or off duty. The conviction of accused (petitioner) was therefore justified and there is no reason to interfere with the sentence. In the result, this revision petition fails and the same is dismissed. --- *** --- .