Mahabir Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh — 1971 DIGILAW 336 (ALL)

JUDGMENT K.N. Singh, J. - The present petition is directed against an order of the District Land Requisitioning Officer, Bijnor dated 4th January, 1971 whereby he requisitioned petitioner's land having an area of 6 Biswas 10 biswansis under Section 3 of the U.P. Rural Development (Requisitioning of Land) Act, 1948 for purposes of providing pathway for transporting the sugarcane of the cultivators of the area in question to the purchasing centre. 2. The learned counsel has challenged the requisition order on four main grounds : The first contention raised by the learned counsel is that the order of requisition dated 5th of January, 1971, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure `A' to the writ petition is illegal as it does not mention the purpose for which the petitioner's land was requisitioned. The order in question has been passed under Section 3 of the U.P. Rural Development (Requisitioning of Land) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) . Sec. 3 of the Act confers power on the requisitioning authority to requisition any land by serving on the owner or occupier thereof an order in writing provided the requisitioning authority is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient to do so for public purpose. Neither the Act nor the Rules framed thereunder require that public purpose must be mentioned in the order itself. It is, therefore, not necessary to set out the purpose of the requisition in the order itself. No doubt, it is desirable to mention the purpose in the order itself so that the person affected may know the purpose for which the land was acquired, but in its absence the impugned order cannot be held illegal. See State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 41. 3. The learned counsel has urged that the purpose of requisition was not a public purpose. Public purpose has been defined in sub-sec. (2) of Section 2 of the Act. Under Clause (5) of sub-sec. (2) State Government is empowered to declare any purpose after publication in the Gazette that the same was essential for the development of agriculture or improvement of the life of Community in Rural Areas. The State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Clause 5 of sub-sec. (2) of Section 2 of the Act. Under Clause (5) of sub-sec. (2) State Government is empowered to declare any purpose after publication in the Gazette that the same was essential for the development of agriculture or improvement of the life of Community in Rural Areas. The State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Clause 5 of sub-sec. (2) of Section 2 issued a Notification dated 7th of December, 1951 declaring "the land for a village path and roads" as one of the objects essential for the development of agriculture and improvement of the life of Community in Rural Areas. This notification declares that requisitioning of land for laying of village path and roads is a public purpose within the meaning of the Act. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent the purpose for which the petitioner's land was requisitioned has been disclosed. According to the respondents, a large quantity of sugarcane was lying in the area and for want of a pathway and road the sugarcane could not be transported to the purchasing centres. In the absence of road, the sugarcane was likely to go waste which would not be in public interest. The requisitioning authority, requisitioned the petitioner's land to provide pathway for the transport of cultivators' sugarcane to the purchasing centre. The village path and road provide facility to the cultivators of the locality, which is essentially a step towards the development of agriculture and improvement of life of community in rural areas. In my opinion, therefore, the purpose disclosed was a public purpose and the order of requisitioning authority is legal and valid. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has then contendent that District Planning Officer was not the competent authority to apply for requisitioning the petitioner's land. He has referred to Rule 4 which enumerates the authorities which are competent to apply for requisitioning of land. In the impugned order dated 5th January 1971, the requisitioning authority stated that the District Planning Officer, Bijnor has made an application for the requisitioning of the petitioner's land and on consideration of the circumstances the requisitioning authority was of the opinion that it was necessary to requisition the petitioner's land. Thus it appears that the District Planning Officer had made an application before the requisitioning authority for the requisitioning of the petitioner's land. Thus it appears that the District Planning Officer had made an application before the requisitioning authority for the requisitioning of the petitioner's land. Rule 4 of the U.P. Rural Development (requisitioning of land) Rule, 1948 provides procedure and manner for making an application for requisitioning of land. The District Planning Officer is not mentioned as one of the authorities authorised to make application for requisitioning of land. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State it has, however, been asserted in paragraph 24 of the counter-affidavit that Clause 1 of proviso to Rule 4 has been amended and the District Planning Officer has been prescribed as one of the authorities competent to make an application for requisitioning land under the Act. The petitioner is not in a position to deny this allegation. Under that the District Planning Officer was an officer competent to make an application for the requisitioning of the land, therefore, there is no illegality or defect in the impugned order. 5. There is yet another reason to reject petitioner's argument. Under Section 3 of the Act the requisitioning authority is to satisfy itself whether the land in question is necessary for a public purpose and if he forms that opinion and passes an order of requisition it is immaterial as to who brought the matter to his notice, the District Planning Officer or any other authority. The formation of the opinion about the existence of the public purpose and its necessity and expediency by the requisitioning authority is the most relevant factor. Once the necessary opinion was formed and the purpose for which land was sought to be acquired was a public purpose, the order cannot be vitiated merely because the matter was brought before the requisitioning authority by some person other than those mentioned in Rule 4. The petitioner's contention, therefore, must fail. 6. The learned counsel has finally urged that Section 3 of the Act is ultra vires as it violates principles of natural justice inasmuch as there is no provision in the Act for giving notice to the affected person whose land or property is requisitioned. Absence of opportunity of hearing, according to the learned counsel, violates principles of natural justice and, therefore, Act must be declared an unreasonable piece of legislation. There is no substance in this contention also. The Act in question is an emergency legislation. Absence of opportunity of hearing, according to the learned counsel, violates principles of natural justice and, therefore, Act must be declared an unreasonable piece of legislation. There is no substance in this contention also. The Act in question is an emergency legislation. The legislature thought it fit not to give any prior notice to the affected person so that no delay may be caused in requisitioning the land which is urgently required for a public purpose. The interest of the affected person has, however, been well safeguarded in the Act itself. Under Section 9, compensation is paid to the affected person. The requisitioning is for a limited period i.e. during the existence of the public purpose for which the land is requisitioned, the owner of the land is entitled to apply for the release of his land under Section 10 of the Act. Further an aggrieved person has an alternative remedy for filing an application before the State Government or the Commissioner, the Prescribed Authority for the review of the order of requisition and also for the grant of additional compensation. The affected person has a right of hearing at that stage and if he makes out his case the authority concerned may cancel, withdraw or modify the order of requisition or compensation. In view of the safeguards provided in the Act, it is not possible to hold that the Act places unreasonable restrictions on the right of a citizen to hold property. 7. Learned counsel has urged that Section 3 of the Act is ultra vires as it is derogatory to the principles of natural justice, inasmuch as a citizen's property is taken away without giving any opportunity of hearing to him. According to the learned counsel such a piece of legislation is ultra wires. As already observed, the Act in question is an emergency legislation, powers under which are to be exercised for requisitioning land and other property in case of an urgency for a temporary period. The Act provides ample safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of powers and the affected person has a right to challenge the requisitioning order before higher authorities. Opportunity of hearing is contemplated under the Act itself to the aggrieved person. Therefore, the argument that the Act is in derogation of principles of natural justice is without any force. 8. The principles of natural justice are not static. Opportunity of hearing is contemplated under the Act itself to the aggrieved person. Therefore, the argument that the Act is in derogation of principles of natural justice is without any force. 8. The principles of natural justice are not static. They vary according to the provisions contained in an enactment. See The New Prakash Transport Co. Ltd. v. The New Suwarna Transport Co. Ltd. A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 232, and Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commrs. of Hills Division, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 398. Under our Constitution, Legislature has power to enact a law if the subject-matter falls within its legislative sphere. No doubt such a law has to be inconformity with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution, apart from this there is no other restriction on the power of Legislature. The Legislature may, in a particular case, not think it advisable to provide for opportunity of hearing to an affected person at a particular stage. The wisdom of Legislature cannot be questioned on the ground that principles of natural justice are violated. There is no limitation on the power of legislature that it will not enact a law contrary to the principles of natural justice. See Jai Kishan v. Income Tax Officer, A.I.R. 1960 Alld. 19 (Full Bench). The petitioners' contention, therefore, has no substance. 9. In the result, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Under the circumstances of the case I direct the parties to bear their own costs.