Judgment :- 1. These three appeals are against three decisions by three different learned judges of this Court in three writ petitions on the same question. One learned judge considered the question in some detail and dismissed the writ petition; another learned judge just followed the aforesaid decision and dismissed the writ petition before him too; but the third learned judge took a contrary view on the same question without noticing the two earlier decisions and without considering the question in any detail. Consequently, he allowed the writ petition and gave certain directions. Against this last decision, the State has filed an appeal; and against the other two decisions, the petitioners in the respective writ petitions have also filed appeals. 2. The common question in these cases is whether tea is a "food crop" coming under S.20 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1963. S.20 of the Act reads "Where the registered owner or the person having possession or control of a motor vehicle is an agriculturist and that motor vehicle has been designed for agricultural operations relating to food crops and is used solely for such operations in relation to his own land, then, that vehicle shall be exempt from the payment of the tax. Explanation: For the purposes of this section the expression "agricultural operations" includes (i) tilling, sowing, harvesting, crushing of any agricultural produce or any other similar operation carried out for the purpose of agriculture; (ii) transport of manure, seeds, insecticides and other like articles required for work in the land from the market to the land; and (iii) transport of any agricultural produce from the land to the place of storage or from the place of storage to the market." 3. Though some argument has been advanced by the counsel on both sides as to what is "agriculture" and some decisions like Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal, Calcutta v. Bency Kumar Sahas Roy (AIR. 1957 SC. 768) have also been cited, the discussion of Bhagwati J. regarding the meaning of "agriculture" may not be essential in the present cases. Raising and rearing of tea plants is agriculture: and we have only to consider whether tea is a food crop-There is also no dispute that the vehicles are designed and used for agricultural operations. 4. Decisions like A. V. Fernandez v. The State of Kerala (AIR. 1957 SC. 657) and M/s. Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan (Pvt). Raising and rearing of tea plants is agriculture: and we have only to consider whether tea is a food crop-There is also no dispute that the vehicles are designed and used for agricultural operations. 4. Decisions like A. V. Fernandez v. The State of Kerala (AIR. 1957 SC. 657) and M/s. Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan (Pvt). Ltd., Jhansi v. The Excise Commissioner, U. P. (1971 (1) S. C. C. 4) have also been cited, which lay down that, in construing fiscal statutes and in determining the liability of a subject to tax, one must have regard to the strict letter of the law and not to the spirit of the statute or the substance of the law; and that, in interpreting a taxing provision, courts should not ordinarily concern themselves with the policy behind the provision or even with its impact. Basing on these decisions, it has been argued that a taxing provision like S.20 extracted above should be construed strictly (in a way so as not to burden the tax-payer), unless the language of the section clearly warrants the impost. 5. The main decision we have to consider on the question is the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Virkumar Gulabchand Shah (AIR. 1952 SC. 335). In that case, the learned judges were considering whether turmeric was a "foodstuff" within the Spices (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order read with the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act. Bose J., who wrote the main judgment, considered the meaning of the word "foodstuff"; and the learned judge extracted the meaning of the word "food" from Webster's International Dictionary "nutritive material absorbed or taken into the body of an organism which serves for purposes of growth, work or repair and for the maintenance of the vital processes." His Lordship discussed the matter further and observed "So far 33 "food" is concerned, it can be used in a wide as well as a narrow sense and, in my opinion, much must depend upon the context and background." This observation of Bose J. is obvious, because, in statutes like Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, "food" must evidently include every article which is used for human consumption even in small quantities like turmeric, pepper, condiments and even baking-powder. It is equally evident that, in common parlance, in ordinary use, these articles will not be considered as articles of food as rice or wheat, meat or fish. 6. We are not, however, concerned much with this aspect of the discussion in the judgment of Bose J. What is more relevant for us is the discussion of the learned judge relating to two English decisions, which had occasion to consider whether tea was an article of food. The first English decision was Hinde v Allmond ((1918) 67 L. J. K. B. 893); and the question decided in that case was whether tea was an article of food under the Food Hoarding Order Shearman J. observed that he rested his judgment on the commonsense interpretation of the word "food" in the Order, apart from its meaning in any other statute. Darling J. observed that, if it had been intended to include tea as food, it ought to have been expressly so provided in the Order. Darling J. had occasion to explain this case in the later case; and Bose J. observed, considering both these decisions, that the learned judges in Hinde v. Allmond were influenced in their judgment by the fact that the Order was one which affected the, ordinary run of householders and housewives who would not have lawyers at their elbows to advise them regarding their day-to-day marketing, and, in the circumstances, the learned judges decided that the word should be given its ordinary and popular meaning otherwise, many innocent householders, who had no intention of breaking the law, would be trapped. 7. The later English decision involving tea was Sainsbury v. Sounders ((1919188 Q. K.B. 441). Two of the learned judges who decided the earlier case Darling and Avory JJ.,were parties to this decision as well; and Salter J. was not a party to the earlier decision. Of these, Salter and Avory JJ. held that tea was an article of food within the meaning of that expression as used in the Defence of the Realm Regulations read with the New Ministries and Secretaries Act, while Darling J. preferred to adhere to his earlier view that tea was not an article of food. From the discussion in the two decisions, what appears is that tea was considered as an article of food under one statute and not so considered under another statute. From the discussion in the two decisions, what appears is that tea was considered as an article of food under one statute and not so considered under another statute. Bose J. has also warned that the comparison of one Act with another Act is dangerous. This we point out, because Dr. Kochu Thommen, who appeared for the respondents in the appeal by the State, has drawn our attention to the definition of "food crops" in some other Acts and Orders, for instance, the Kerala Land Utilisation Order, 1967, where the expression "food crops" is defined to include paddy, Sugarcane, vegetables, tapioca, yam, tea, coffee, cardamom, pepper, groundnut and banana plantain. We repeat that tea is also an article of food in the wider sense; but, the question is whether the wider interpretation could be had in interpreting S.20 of the Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. 8. The other word which might require some consideration is the word "crop". "Crop", has the meaning "The head of a herb, flower, tree, etc; a cyme" in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. But the Dictionary says that this meaning is now obsolete. The Dictionary gives the current meaning as "The annual produce of plants grown or gathered for food; the produce of the field either while growing or when gathered." In this connection, the decision of this Court in Rev. Father K. C. Alexander v. State of Kerala (AIR. 1966 Ker. 72) has also been brought to our notice A Division Bench of this Court was considering in that case the effect of S.9 of the Travancore Land Conservancy Act; and Their Lordships pointed out that, according to Black's Law Dictionary, the word "crop" or emblements" meant "Such products of the soil as are annually planted, servered, and saved by manual labour, as cereals, vegetables, grass maturing for harvest or harvested etc., but not grass on land used for pasturage." From this the Government Pleader has attempted to argue that "crops" could mean only such products of the soil as are annually planted, severed, etc. as cereals: the argument is that tea-leaves will not come within the word "crop". 9. We do not propose to decide this question in the present cases, because, in our opinion, it is unnecessary, since the decision of these cases will turn on our interpretation of the word "food". as cereals: the argument is that tea-leaves will not come within the word "crop". 9. We do not propose to decide this question in the present cases, because, in our opinion, it is unnecessary, since the decision of these cases will turn on our interpretation of the word "food". We feel - and we feel fairly strongly too - that the legislature could not have used the expression "food crops" in a provision like this in any meaning other than in the common sense use or in its use in common parlance there is no indication or circumstance to show that the legislature could have used it in the wider meaning. In our opinion, this expression, in this statute, could have meant only crops of staple food articles and not crops of food articles like pepper, turmeric, condiments, etc. The nature or purpose of the Act does not also give any indication contra. And we also wish to point out that this interpretation does not go against the principle laid down by the Supreme Court that in taxing statutes there is no room for intendment, there is no equity about a tax, there is no presumption about a tax, nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied, one can only look to the language used, etc: the interpretation we have adopted is only the natural and common sense interpretation. 10. In this view, we agree with the learned judges who held that tea was not an article of food, not a "food crop" coming within S.20, and dismissed two writ petitions; and we disagree with the learned judge who held otherwise and allowed the third writ petition. 11. W. A. Nos. 912 and 913 of 1969 are dismissed; and W. A. No. 263 of 1971 is allowed and the writ petition therein is dismissed. In the circumstances, we pass no order regarding costs.