GOSWAMI, C. J.: This application under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against an order dated 22nd Nov­ember, .1969 of the Conservator of Forests. Assam (Respondent No. 3) settling the Jatinga Damcherra Combined Stone Quarry with the 5th Respondent for the year 1969-71. 2. The Divisional Forest Officer. Silchar (Respondent No. 4) invited ten­ders for Sand and Stone Mahals under Cachar Division for the vear 1969-71 by a Sale Notice dated 31st July. 1969 pub­lished in the Assam Gazette on 8th Octo­ber. 1969. For the Stone Quarry in Ques­tion, there were only two tenderers, viz.. the petitioner and the 5th respondent. When the tenders were opened on 27th October. 1969. it was found that the peti­tioner's offer was Rs. 43.77S/- and that of the 5th respondent was Rs. 26.501/-. The 5th respondent belongs to the Namasudra community which is a recognised Sche­duled Caste and this fact is not Question­ed before us. Under the Assam Delegation of Financial Powers Rules. 1960. read with clause 4 of the Sale Notice, as the value of the accepted tender exceeds Rs. 10,000 but does not exceed Rs. 50,000. the Conservator of Forests is the compe­tent authority to settle this Mahal. The 3rd respondent, on receipt of the tenders and reports from the 4th respondent, set­tled the Mahal with the 5th respondent giving him preference under Rule 11(1) (b) of the Assam Settlement of Forest Coupes and Mahals by Tender System Rules, 1967 (hereinafter called the 'Ten­der Rules', for brevity), under which the settlement has taken place. The peti­tioner appealed to the Governor under Rule 9 and the same was rejected on 24th February. 1970 and he obtained the pre­sent 'Rule on 24th March, 1970. Since the petitioner challenged the validity of Rule 11 of the Tender Rules, notice was given to the Advocate-General. Assam who has made his submissions be­fore us. 3. The petitioner submits that Rule 11 is ultra vires the provisions of Article 15 (1) and Article 14 of the Con­stitution and is not sayed by the provi­sions of Article 15 (4). It is contended that by Rule 11. there is a total exclusion of all others except the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes or other Backward Classes recognised by the State Govern­ment in settlement of coupes and mahals. It is contended that by Rule 11. there is a total exclusion of all others except the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes or other Backward Classes recognised by the State Govern­ment in settlement of coupes and mahals. Such a total exclusion, according to him cannot be considered as a special provi­sion to enjoy the protection of Article 15(4) of the Constitution. The learned counsel relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1963 SC 649 , M. R. Balaji v. State of Mysore and draws our attention to the following observa­tions at paragraph 31 of the Report: "It is because the interest of the socie­ty at large would be served by promoting the advancement of the weaker elements in the society that Art. 15 (4) authorises special provision to be made. But if a provision which is in the nature of an ex­ception completely excludes the rest of the society that clearly is outside the scope of Art. 15. It would be extremely un­reasonable to assume that in enacting Article 15 (4) the Constitution intended to provide that where the advancement of the Backward Classes or the Schedul­ed Castes and Tribes was concerned, the fundamental rights of the citizens con­stituting the rest of the society were to be completely and absolutely ignored." The case before the Supreme Court was with regard to the constitutionality of an executive order of the Government of Mysore reserving 68% of available seats for admission to the Engineering and Medical Colleges and to the other techni­cal institutions specified in the order. It is in that context that the above observa­tions were made by the Supreme Court. The Court also observed as follows: "In this matter again, we are reluct­ant to say definitely what would be a pro­per provision to make. Speaking gene­rally and in a broad wav. a special pro­vision should be less than 50 per cent; how much less than 50 per cent would depend upon the relevant prevailing cir­cumstances in each case". The Court also held that the provisions of Article 15 (4) are similar to those of Arti­cle 16 (4) which fell to be considered in the case of General Manager. Southern Railway v. Rangachari, AIR 1962 SC 36. The Court held that what is true in re­gard to Article 15 (4) is equally true in regard to Article 16 (4). 4. Southern Railway v. Rangachari, AIR 1962 SC 36. The Court held that what is true in re­gard to Article 15 (4) is equally true in regard to Article 16 (4). 4. The learned Counsel referred to another decision of the Supreme Court reported in Devadasan v. Union of India. AIR 1964 SC 179 and relied upon the fol­lowing passage: "Where, therefore, the State makes a rule providing for the reservation of appointments and posts for such back­ward classes it cannot be said to have violated Art. 14, merely because mem­bers of the more advanced classes will not be considered for appointment to these posts even though they may be equally or even more meritorious than the members of the backward classes, or merely because such reservation is not made in every kind of service under the State. Where the object of a rule is to make reasonable allowance for the back­wardness of members of a class _by reserving certain proportion of appointments for them in the public services of the State what the State would in fact be doing would be to provide the members of backward classes with an opportunity equal to that of the members of the more advanced classes in the matter of appointments to public ser­vices. If the reservation is so excessive that it practically denied a reasonable opportunity for employment to members of other communities the position may well be different and it would be open then for a member of a more advanced class to complain that he has been denied equality by the State". (Para 12) 5. Bearing in mind the above prin­ciples, we do not find any substance in the contention that rule 11 of the Tender Rules is discriminatory and is violative of Article 14 or Article 15 (1) of the Con­stitution. We may now read that Rule: "(1) Subject to suitability and ability1 of the tenderer to perform the work satis-' factorily. preference and concession in settlement of a coupe or mahal shall be admissible in the following manner to a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes. Scheduled Tribes, or other Back­ward Classes recognised by the State Government, provided the recognised highest offer for the coupe or the mahal does not exceed Rs. preference and concession in settlement of a coupe or mahal shall be admissible in the following manner to a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes. Scheduled Tribes, or other Back­ward Classes recognised by the State Government, provided the recognised highest offer for the coupe or the mahal does not exceed Rs. 50.000: (a) If the offer from a member of the abovementioned categories of persons is not below 92^ per cent of the recognised highest offer, the coupe or the mahal shall be settled with such person at his own offer. (b) Even if the offer from a member of the aforementioned categories of per­sons is below 92i per cent of the recognis­ed highest offer, the coupe or the mahal may at the discretion of the competent authority be settled with such person at an amount 7i per cent less than the re­cognised highest offer. (2) x x x x." This rule is dealing with tenders of per­sons belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or other Backward Classes, provided the recognised highest offer for the coupe or the mahal does not exceed Rs. 50.000/-. The preferential of­fer and concession is confined only to a particular category of mahals while the rest are free for open competition without any limitation. Then again, the settlement is subject to suitability and ability of the tenderer to perform the work satisfacto­rily, which is again another limitation. Thirdly, under Rule 11 (1) (a1), the offer of a member of the abovementioned catefiories of persons must not be below 92i per cent of the recognised highest offer. That is to say. the persons are getting only 74 per cent preference under Rule 11 (1) fa) in an appropriate case. It is true that under Rule 11 (1) (b), even if the offer is below 92i per cent of the re­cognised highest offer, the mahal may be settled with such a person, but at an amount 74 per cent less than the recognis­ed highest offer. Under Rule 11 (1) (b). however, there is a discretion given to the competent authority to settle with such a person offering below 92i per cent of the recognised highest offer. Reading Rule 11 (1) (a) and (b). we do not find that there is any such reser­vation in favour of the Scheduled Castes. Under Rule 11 (1) (b). however, there is a discretion given to the competent authority to settle with such a person offering below 92i per cent of the recognised highest offer. Reading Rule 11 (1) (a) and (b). we do not find that there is any such reser­vation in favour of the Scheduled Castes. Scheduled Tribes or other Backward Classes with regard to settlement of mahals and coupes which would totally exclude all coupes and mahals from being settled in favour of other persons. The rule cannot strictly be called a reserva­tion rule with all the limitations provided therein and discretion given to the com­petent authority subject always to suit­ability and ability of the tenderer to per­form the work satisfactorily. There is, therefore, no total exclusion which is complained of by the petitioner in this case, nor is the preferential treatment so unreasonable as to attract the ratio decidendi of Balaji's case. AIR 1963 SC 649 (supra). We are, therefore. clearly of opinion that Rule 11 (1) (a) is not viola-tive of Article 15 (1) or Article 14 of the Constitution. The submission of the learned counsel, therefore, fails. 6. It is next contended that the tender of the 5th respondent is no ten­der in the eye of law for non-compliance with Rule 6 (4) (v) of the Tender Rules. The relevant rule may be read: "4. The tender shall be accompanied with the following documents, namely- (v) Documents evidencing financial soundness of the tenderer: Provided that such documentary evi­dence shall not be necessary in case of a tenderer who has been registered under any rule prescribed by the State Govern­ment for registration of forest contractors but in such case he shall furnish the par­ticulars of his registration". The proviso to the rule clearly shows that such documentary evidence is optional in a particular case. Besides this, by Rule 7 the Authority calling for tender may call for any other particulars from the intend­ing tenderer with a view to identifying the tenderer or to eliciting information about his financial soundness. Reading rule 6 (4) (v) with the proviso and Rule 7 it is clear that Rule 6 (4) (v) is not mandatory and only directory. That being the posi­tion, there is no substance in the argument that the tender in absence of the documents evidencing financial soundness could not be considered by the settling authority in this case. Reading rule 6 (4) (v) with the proviso and Rule 7 it is clear that Rule 6 (4) (v) is not mandatory and only directory. That being the posi­tion, there is no substance in the argument that the tender in absence of the documents evidencing financial soundness could not be considered by the settling authority in this case. It is stated by the 2nd res­pondent in his counter-affidavit that the 5th respondent is financially sound and he furnished a security bond on 5th De­cember, 1969 for Rs. 40,491. Even the appellate authority has not considered him to be financially unsound. Both the contentions of the Petitioner fail. 7. The application is dismissed. We will, however, make no order as to costs. M.C.Pathak, J.: 8. I agree. Petition dismissed.