D. P. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) THIS matter arises upon forfeiture of surety bonds executed by the petitioners in order to get certain persons arrested in connection with an offence punishable under sec. 104 (1) of the Customs Act released on bail. For the purpose of the question arising for determination in this petition a few facts which are not in dispute may be stated. ( 2 ) 13 persons came to be arrested and were produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class Bulsar for violation of the provisions of the Customs Act 1962 An application for bail was submitted on behalf of accused persons and the learned Magistrate ordered release of each of them on bail on his executing a bond for the sum of Rs. 5000/with a surety in the like amount in the case of each. Before this bond could be executed the Inspector of Customs went in revision to the Sessions Court Bulsar at Navsari against the order releasing these 6 aforesaid persons on bail. That application was Criminal Application No. 20 of 1969. The application challenged the order granting bail both on law and facts and stated that the order was bad. The following order was passed on that application as can be seen from the certified copy thereof produced by Mr. Shethna for the petitioners which has been kept on record. That order came to be passed by the learned Sessions Judge on 14-10-1969 :-HEARD the learned Public Prosecutor for the petitioner and learned advocate for the Opponentsthe application is allowed and the order for bail passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class Bulsar is modified as under:-ALL the opponents are ordered to be released on bail on their each executing a P. R. bond for Rs. 7000/ (rupees seven thousand only) with one surety for each accused for the like amount on condition that they should remain present on each Monday at Bulsar Police Station. The Police Sub-Inspector Bulsar should make a report accordingly. IT is not disputed again that pursuant to this order the present petitioners executed surety bonds and all the 13 accused persons came to be released. One of the conditions imposed was that each accused person should remain present on each Monday at Bulsar Police Station and the Police Sub-Inspector should make a report accordingly. IT is not disputed again that pursuant to this order the present petitioners executed surety bonds and all the 13 accused persons came to be released. One of the conditions imposed was that each accused person should remain present on each Monday at Bulsar Police Station and the Police Sub-Inspector should make a report accordingly. It appears that on 9 the Superintendent of Customs Bulsar applied to the Sessions Court Bulsar at Navsari to take necessary action in the matter because of the failure of the accused persons to remain present at Bulsar Police Station. The said application was sent to the learned Magistrate by the Sessions Court with a direction to take necessary action against the sureties. The learned Magistrate issued notices to the sureties to show cause why the penalty mentioned in the Bail Bond should not be recovered from them. As we can see from the order passed by the learned Magistrate more than sufficient time was given to the sureties to enable them to produce the accused persons before the court but they could not do so. It also appeared to the learned Magistrate as per the report of the P. S. I. Bulsar that the accused had not appeared at Bulsar Police Station on Monday. In view of this fact the learned Magistrate forfeited the surety bonds of the petitioners and ordered each of them to pay a sum of Rs. 5000/on or before 30th June 1970. Against this order the sureties went in appeal to the Sessions Court and the learned Sessions Judge dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order passed by the learned Magistrate. Therefore these sureties have come in revision to this court. ( 3 ) THE petitioners have contested their liability to pay the amount as ordered by the learned Magistrate on the ground that the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge increasing the amount of bail from Rs. 5000/to Rs. 7000/was beyond the powers of the learned Sessions Judge and was illegal and therefore the surety bonds executed in pursuance of such an illegal order have no validity in the eyes of law and could not be enforced. 5000/to Rs. 7000/was beyond the powers of the learned Sessions Judge and was illegal and therefore the surety bonds executed in pursuance of such an illegal order have no validity in the eyes of law and could not be enforced. This was the only contention raised before this court on behalf of the petitioners and therefore we will have to find out whether the order of the learned Sessions Judge increasing the amount of bail as reproduced earlier was an order which he was authorised to pass under any of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code or an order beyond his powers. The learned advocate for the petitioners and the learned Assistant Government pleader were heard at length on this point. As the question involved interpretation of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and had assumed some importance at my request two learned advocates Mr. D. C. Trivedi and Mr. D. K. Shah submitted their arguments. This court is beholden to them for the assistance they readily gave on the question of interpretation of certain provisions of the Code. ( 4 ) BEFORE we go to the provisions calling for interpretation we may take note of one fact. Here was a judicial order passed by the learned Magistrate under sec. 497 of the Code ordering release of each of the accused persons on bail of Rs. 5000. 00. The Sessions Court Was no doubt a superior court vis- -vis the court of the learned Magistrate. But by that fact alone it could not under the law change or modify the order. There must be some provisions in the Code either by way of appellate jurisdiction or by way of supervisory jurisdiction which would enable the learned Sessions Judge to interfere with the order in such a manner as to increase the amount of the bond to be executed by the accused persons and the sureties. It is not in dispute that no appeal has been provided to the Sessions Court against the order granting bail for a particular sum by the trial court. It is also again not disputed that even though the learned Sessions Judge could call for the proceedings of the learned Magistrate in order to examine for the purpose of satisfying him self as to the correctness legality or propriety of an order of the nature passed by the learned Magistrate. It is also again not disputed that even though the learned Sessions Judge could call for the proceedings of the learned Magistrate in order to examine for the purpose of satisfying him self as to the correctness legality or propriety of an order of the nature passed by the learned Magistrate. It is again undisputed that while exercising his revisional jurisdiction the learned Sessions Judge could not have passed a final order that he did in the present case. In that case his function was to refer the matter to the High Court for necessary orders But this power to pass an order of the nature passed in the present case is sought to be spelt out on behalf of the State from the provisions of sec. 497 (5) and 498 of the Code. Some other provisions would also be relevant and were referred to in the course of arguments. Therefore alongwith the aforesaid provisions those provisions may also be reproduced. They are :-497 When any person accused of or suspected of the commission of any non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a court he may be released on bail but he shall not be so released if there appears reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. PROVIDED that the court may direct that any person under the of sixteen years or any woman or any sick or infirm person accused of such an offence be released on bail. (2) If it appears to such officer or court at any stage of the investigation inquiry or trial as the case may be that there are not reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence but that there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt the accused shall pending such inquiry be released on bail or at the discretion of such officer or court on the execution by him of a bond without sureties for his appearance as hereinafter provided. (5) A High Court or Court of Sessions and in the case of a person released by itself any other court may cause any person who has been released under this section to be arrested and may commit him to custody. (5) A High Court or Court of Sessions and in the case of a person released by itself any other court may cause any person who has been released under this section to be arrested and may commit him to custody. 498 The amount of every bond executed under this Chapter shall be fixed with due regard to the circumstances of the case and shall not be excessive and the High Court or Court of Session may in any case whether there be an appeal on conviction or not direct that any person be admitted to bail or that the bail required by a police officer or Magistrate be reduced. (2) A High Court or Court of Session may cause any person who has been admitted to bail under sub-sec. (1) to be arrested and may commit him to custody. 499 Before any person is released on bail or released on his own bond a bond for such sum of money as the police officer or court as the case may be thinks sufficient shall be executed by such person and when he is released on bail by one or more sufficient sureties conditioned that such person shall attend at the time and place mentioned in the bond and shall continue so to attend until otherwise directed by the police officer or court as the case may be. 500 As soon as the bond has been executed the person for whose appearance it has been executed shall be released and when he is in jail the court admitting him to bail shall issue an order of release to the officer in charge of the jail and such officer on receipt of the order shall release him. (2) Nothing in this section sec. 496 or sec. 497 shall be deemed to require the release of any person liable to be detained for some matter other than that in respect of which the bond was executed. ( 5 ) IN order to determine the legality of the order passed by the learned Sessions judge reproduced earlier we may first notice the character of that order. By that order the learned Sessions Judge in terms says that be was modifying the bail order passed by the learned Magistrate as shown by him. The modification was that instead of releasing each of the accused person on the bail of Rs. By that order the learned Sessions Judge in terms says that be was modifying the bail order passed by the learned Magistrate as shown by him. The modification was that instead of releasing each of the accused person on the bail of Rs. 5000/he was ordered to be released on bail of Rs. 7000. 00. Therefore in substance the order was in modification of the order passed by the learned Magistrate by increasing the amount for which the accused persons were to be released on bail. The question is whether the Sessions Judge exercising powers under sec. 497 (5) or under sec. 498 could enhance the amount of bond to be executed as fixed by the learned Magistrate. ( 6 ) A bare look at sec. 498 will make it clear that the Legislature contemplated only one contingency where a superior court may interfere with the amount of bail fixed by the lower court. In order to provide for that contingency power in terms was conferred by sec. 498 (1) to reduce the amount of bail required by a police officer or a Magistrate. While conferring this power another power was given and that power was to direct that any person be admitted to bail. If we read the entire sub-sec. (1) of sec. 498 it can be divided into three parts. The first part gives a direction to the court ordering release of a person on bail to fix the amount of bail with due regard to the circumstances of the case so that it may not be excessive. The second part confers a power to direct any person to be admitted to bail. And the third part confers power to reduce the bail required by a police officer or a Magistrate. Exfacie the second part relating to the direction that any person be admitted to bail applies to a case where bail has been refused by the trial court or the person has not obtained any order of bail in his favour and is in custody and wants to be released on bail by the superior court. It is difficult to conceive of a direction to admit a person on bail which can be given in case of a person already admitted to bail by the trial court Therefore in terms sub-sec. (1) of sec. 498 confers two distinct powers on the superior courts. It is difficult to conceive of a direction to admit a person on bail which can be given in case of a person already admitted to bail by the trial court Therefore in terms sub-sec. (1) of sec. 498 confers two distinct powers on the superior courts. These powers are to admit any person to bail or to reduce the amount of bail required from any person by a police officer or a Magistrate. The point to be emphasised is that even though the Legislature provided for the power to reduce the amount of bail required from a person in specific terms it did not provide for the power to increase the amount of bail required by a police officer or a Magistrate. If therefore the power to increase the amount of bail was required to be conferred on the Sessions Court specific provision was expected to have been made by the Legislature. We are not concerned with the High Courts power to increase the amount of bail required from a person by a police officer or a Magistrate at this stage but even with regard to that power it can be said that that power was not provided for under sec. 498 because at Another place the Legislature had made provision for this. This provision would be found in secs. 439 and 561a of the Code. ( 7 ) THE attempt on behalf of the State was to spell out the power to increase the amount of bail as granted by the learned Magistrate from the provisions of sub-sec. (5) of sec. 497 of the Code. In view of the provisions of sec. 498 (1) discussed above and the language employed by sub-sec. (5) of sec. 497 it is not possible to agree with the contention that there exists power in the Sessions Court to increase the amount of bail ordered by the trial court. That sub-section as will be shown hereafter was designed to cover different contingency altogether but then in the alternative the learned Assistant Government Pleader submitted that the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge can be justified as a legal order on another ground. He urged that under sec. 497 (5) of the Code the Sessions Court has power to cancel an order of bail. He urged that under sec. 497 (5) of the Code the Sessions Court has power to cancel an order of bail. He then urged that having cancelled the order of bail it was within the power of the Sessions Court to admit the accused person on bail under sec. 498 and fix the amount of bail on its own consideration irrespective of the amount fixed by the learned Magistrate. But here again in the peculiar circumstances of this case one difficulty faces the prosecution. That difficulty is that the original accused persons were not actually released by execution of the bail bonds for the sum of Rs. 5000/and by an order of release under sec. 500 of the Code before the learned Sessions Judge took the matter in revision and passed the impugned order. These persons were in custody on the date of passing of the impugned order and it was pursuant to the impugned order that they came to be released. With a view to seeing that this difficulty does not come in the way of the prosecution. Mr. Vidhyarthi contended for what he called a wider interpretation of the said sub-sec. (5); That will enable to Sessions Court to have recourse to sub-sec. (5) even in case of a person who continues in custody and is not actually released so that the Sessions Court can increase the amount of bail or fix that amount on its own. If we read subsec. (5) of sec. 497 exfacie it appears quite clear that the word released used in that sub-section refers to a person who is free and not in actual custody either of the court or of police. It refers to a person who has been actually released pursuant to an order of releasing him on bail made by the trial court under sec. 497. If that is the meaning to be given to the word released then the contention on behalf of the state will not hold good. But says Mr. Vidhyarthi he is supported in his interpretation of the word release by a decision of the Delhi High Court. He relied upon Bakshi Sardari Lal v. Superintendent Tahar Central Jail Delhi and others (1968 Cri. L. J. 675 ). But says Mr. Vidhyarthi he is supported in his interpretation of the word release by a decision of the Delhi High Court. He relied upon Bakshi Sardari Lal v. Superintendent Tahar Central Jail Delhi and others (1968 Cri. L. J. 675 ). In that case the learned Judges of the Division Bench were considering a writ petition for Habeas Corpus of a person who was ordered to be released on bail by the trial court but whose release for one reason or another was delayed till the date of the petition. The learned Judges of the Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition inter alia on the ground that the petitioner was committed to judicial custody under orders made by competent courts seized of. complaints against the petitioner for alleged commission of at least two non-bailable offences. The order for release on bail it appears pertained to offences other than the aforesaid two non-bailable offences. It appears that the same order granting hail was cancelled by the learned Sessions Judge. This I say from para 4 of the judgment where it is slated:-IN so far as the question of jurisdiction of respondent No. 3 or of the learned Sessions Judge to cancel the bail order is concerned the respondents learned counsel has drawn our attention to sec. 497 (5) Code of Criminal procedure according to which a High Court or a Court of Sessions and in the case of person released by itself any other court may cause any person who has been released under this section to be arrested and may commit him to custody. THE contention urged was that the word released occurring in this section means actual release in the sense of a person being actually set at liberty and that till he so released in fact the courts mentioned in this subsection cannot invoke their jurisdiction to arrest and commit to custody a person who is merely ordered to be released. The learned Judges expressed no opinion on this submission though speaking with respect the petition could have been dismissed and was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner was in custody in respect of alleged commission of at least two non-bailable offences. The learned Judges while dealing with this contention made the following observations on which Mr. Vidhyarthi for the State heavily leaned:-THIS submission ingenious though it is does not commend itself to us. Subsec. The learned Judges while dealing with this contention made the following observations on which Mr. Vidhyarthi for the State heavily leaned:-THIS submission ingenious though it is does not commend itself to us. Subsec. 65) of sec. 497 is really designed to protect the interest of administration of justice and to prevent its being hampered in any manner. In case an order has been made for releasing a person on bail and it is later found that such order is either based on some misapprehension or being otherwise infirm is likely to prejudice the interest of administration of justice then this provision of law seems to us to amply empower the courts mentioned therein to make a suitable order canceling the order of release on bail so as to protect and safeguard the cause of justice. This provision in oar opinion necessarily implied jurisdiction in the court concerned to cancel an order even before the person in question has been actually released and it is not intended to prohibit the court from canceling the order of release on bail before it is executed. This seems to us to be just commonsense. This provision must be construed in a practical manner for the purpose of achieving the general purpose and object which the Legislature can reasonably be presumed to have in view. The argument that being a penal statute the sub-section should be construed strictly seems to be wholly misconceived. SIMILARLY any reference to the dictionary for the purpose of controlling the meaning of the word release used in sec. 497 (5) would be misleading. We have to construe this section in the background of its purpose and object and so construed it does not seem to us to have been intended to restrict the exercise of the power of the court only after an accused person is actually released. It is in our view within the competence of the court to cancel an order of release on bill even before its execution if protection of the interests of administration of justice so demand. It is in our view within the competence of the court to cancel an order of release on bill even before its execution if protection of the interests of administration of justice so demand. Granting of bail in a non-bailable offence is from one point of view a concession allowed to an accused person and if For certain reasons the court comes to the conclusion that for substantial reasons it was not a fit case for making an order of release on bail we are aware of no principle which would divest the court of the jurisdiction to cancel that order. In any event sub-sec. (5) of sec. 497 does not imply the negative as seems to be suggested by the petitioners counsel. If that jurisdiction to cancel such an order exists then in the present proceeding we are not concerned with the question as to whether or not the court should cancel the order. (Emphasis supplied ). THE aforesaid observations no doubt support the contention of Mr. Vidhyarthi that even if a person is not actually released on bail and is still in custody bail of such a person can be cancelled by the superior court under sub-sec. (5) of sec. 497. ( 8 ) AS against the aforesaid view of the Delhi High Court there is a recent decision of the Rajasthan High Court reported as Dewan v. State (A. I. R. 1971 Raj. 77 ). In that case the trial court ordered release of the accused on bail but before they could be so released the Additional Public Prosecutor moved the Additional Session Judge under sec. 497 (5) to cancel the bail. The learned Judge cancelled the bail granted by the trial court and directed that the accused petitioners shall continue to remain in custody hitherto fore. The High Court had occasion to consider the legality of that order. In construing sub-sec. (5) the learned Single Judge of the High Court said:-THIS sub-section can be invoked only when the stage is reached that the person has been released in pursuance of the bail order and is a free man. The use of the expression release and ordering the arrest implies that the person is not in custody. If the bail order is considered to be wrong before it has actually been carried out then the Sessions Judge could act only under see. 435. The use of the expression release and ordering the arrest implies that the person is not in custody. If the bail order is considered to be wrong before it has actually been carried out then the Sessions Judge could act only under see. 435. Criminal procedure Code and he will have to make a reference under sec. 438 Criminal Procedure Code if he were of the opinion that the bail order is wrong. While calling for the record the Sessions Judge may in an appropriate case suspend the execution of the order but it will not be open to the learned Sessions Judge to pass a final order in the case. THE distinction has thus to be made in the two stages. Where only a bail order has been passed and the accused had not been released the Sessions Judge could act only under sec. 435 Criminal Procedure Code and if he finds that the bail order is wrong then he will have to make a reference to this Court under sec. 438 Criminal Procedure Code. On the other hand if in pursuance of the bail order the accused have been released then it will be open to the learned Sessions Judge to exercise his powers under sec. 497 (5) Criminal Procedure Code. THIS view is directly contrary to the view of the Delhi High Court. The question is which of the two views is preferable keeping in mind not only the language of sub-sec. (5) of sec. 497 but the other provisions namely secs. 498 499 and 500 of the Code which occur in the same Chapter and which also deal with the question of bail. We must examine this question in view of the aforesaid direct conflict on the basis of the provisions of various sections themselves in the first instance. Now what is the meaning to be given to the word released occurring twice in sec. 497 (5) For finding this meaning reading of sec. 500 (1) will be immensely helpful When we read the provisions of that section in the context of the requirements of sec. 499 (1) it appears that a person can be said to be released on bail if he comes to be released under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 500 after complying with the provisions of sec. 499 (1 ). Now nobody can suggest that the word release as occurring in sec. 499 (1) it appears that a person can be said to be released on bail if he comes to be released under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 500 after complying with the provisions of sec. 499 (1 ). Now nobody can suggest that the word release as occurring in sec. 500 would include a person who is ordered to be released only and not one who is actually set free. The meaning of the word release in sec. 500 is clear. ( 9 ) IN Websters New 20th Century Dictionary one of the meanings given to the word release is The act of realising liberating or freeing from restraint confinement or servitude the state of being released liberation. In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary the same word is defined to mean inter alia To set or make free to liberate deliver or (now rare) or from pain bondage obligation etc. A person who has not yet executed the bail bond as required by sec. 499 (1) and therefore who has not been set at liberty as contemplated by sec. 500 of the Code cannot be said to be a person released as contemplated by sec. 497 (5) whether we go by the other provisions namely sec. 499 (1) and 500 or by the dictionary meaning of the word release in order to find out the meaning of that word. ( 10 ) APART from this there is indication in sub-sec. (5) itself that the meaning to be given to the word release is as suggested above namely to set a person free from confinement It is clear that the power conferred by sub-sec. (5) is a composite power which consists of two steps to be taken in exercise thereof. It is a power to cause a person who has been released under sec. 497 to be arrested and to commit him to custody. The very idea of arresting a person and committing him to custody as found in sub-sec. (5) itself suggests the meaning to be given to the word release occurring in that sub-section. It is a power to cause a person who has been released under sec. 497 to be arrested and to commit him to custody. The very idea of arresting a person and committing him to custody as found in sub-sec. (5) itself suggests the meaning to be given to the word release occurring in that sub-section. It is obvious that there is no point in providing for arrest of a person and his commitment to custody in case of a person who though ordered to be released on bail still is in the custody of the court or police officer till the bail bond is executed and till he comes to be released pursuant to the bail bond executed under sec. 500 of the Code. We cannot conceive of such a person as a free man so long as bail bond is not executed and he is not released. Suppose the bail bond is for such a sum that the person ordered to be released on bail cannot find a surety for that amount of the bail. It is not understood by what stretch of imagination this court is asked to interpret the word released in sub-sec. (5) as meaning a person who is ordered to be released on bail but who could not find a surety and how can we say that such a person is a free person because of the existence of the order of release on bail in his favour. There is no question of giving a wider or narrower interpretation to the word release as contended by Mr. Vidhyarthi for the State. The word itself is quite clear and has been made more clear by the provisions of secs. 499 (1) and 500. It should not be overlooked that the power conferred by sub-sec. (5) is the power to cause a person to be arrested and to commit him to custody. It is exercisable in respect of a person who has been released under sec. 497. Therefore in order that the power to arrest and commit can be exercised in respect of such a person he must be a person who is released under sec. 497. He cannot be said to be a person released under sec. 497 unless he has executed the bail bond in accordance with sec. 499 (1) and has been released as contemplated by sec. 500. 497. He cannot be said to be a person released under sec. 497 unless he has executed the bail bond in accordance with sec. 499 (1) and has been released as contemplated by sec. 500. Therefore the power of arrest and commitment to custody cannot be exercised with reference to a person who is already in custody inasmuch as he cannot be released unless he executes a bail bond as ordered by the court. The power conferred by sub-sec. (5) of sec. 497 is exercisable with reference to a particular type of person and that person contemplated is a person who has been released under this section. Therefore the court can exercise power under sub-sec. (5) only if it finds that the person has been released under sec. 497. If the person is not released and is in custody and if the interest of administration of justice requires that he should be continued in custody and the order granting him bail should be cancelled then there is sufficient provision contained in the Code itself in that connection. Under sec. 435 of the Code the Sessions Judge can suspend the operation of the order granting bail and can make a reference to the High Court under sec. 438. At the time of making the reference also he can suspend the operation of the order as provided by sec. 438. Thus sufficient provision has been made in secs. 435 and 438 of the Code for protecting the interest of justice where law requires that a person ordered to be released on bail by the trial court should not have been released and should be continued in custody. ( 11 ) MR. Vidhyarthi then urged that for the exercise of the power under sub-sec. (5) it is not necessary that the person in respect of whom that power is exercised has to be arrested in every case. He laid emphasis on the word may occurring in sub-sec. (5) in connection with the power of arrest. He submitted that this word shows that the person who is to be dealt with under sub-sec. (5) may as well be not arrested and may be committed to custody. Now that person is already in custody of the Magistrate because he has not executed the bail bond and has not been released. Therefore no question of committing him to custody would arise. But then Mr. (5) may as well be not arrested and may be committed to custody. Now that person is already in custody of the Magistrate because he has not executed the bail bond and has not been released. Therefore no question of committing him to custody would arise. But then Mr. Vidhyarthi urged that this provision about committing the accused person to custody has been made in order that he may be brought within the custody of the Sessions Court and may be dealt with under sub-sec. (5) of sec. 497. The argument if I understood it correctly was that before canceling the bail of a person the Sessions Judge would transfer him from the custody of the Magistrate to his own custody. This it appears to me would amount to putting the cart before the horse. The power to commit the accused person to custody under sub-sec. (5) is exercisable after his bail bond has been cancelled. If that person is not released then the question of canceling his bail bond cannot arise. There is no question of canceling the bail of a person who has not yet furnished bail bond under sec. 499 (1 ). The very idea of canceling the bail presupposes execution of bail bond by the person ordered to be released on bail. If that is so it is clear that it is indicative of the meaning of the word release occurring in sub-sec. (5 ). Therefore a person who has not executed bail bond is not a person who has been released within the meaning of sub-sec. (5) nor is he a person in respect of whom any change of custody is required. It is also not possible to agree with Mr. Vidhyarthi when he says that the word may occurring in sub-sec. (5) will enable the Sessions Judge to commit a person to custody without arresting him. As observed earlier the sub-section confers a composite power on the Sessions Judge and that is the power to arrest and commit a person to custody. If that is so then the provisions as regards arrest and custody cannot be read divorced from each other. ( 12 ) MR. Vidhyarthi then contends that to give a narrower meaning to the words release would defeat the provisions of the Code. If that is so then the provisions as regards arrest and custody cannot be read divorced from each other. ( 12 ) MR. Vidhyarthi then contends that to give a narrower meaning to the words release would defeat the provisions of the Code. As observed earlier the question of giving narrower or wider meaning to the word release does not arise in the present case because its meaning is clear and indisputable. There is no question of defeating the provisions of the Code because as pointed out earlier there are sufficient provisions in secs. 435 and 438 of the Code to deal with a person who has not been released and who continues in custody inspite of an order to release him on bail. It was also urged by Mr. Vidhyarthi that by sub-sec. (5) power is conferred on the superior court as the original court and that is exercisable in cases where superior courts do not have season of the matter. It was urged if I again understood the argument correctly that for having seizing of the matter it is necessary to bring a person within the custody of the superior court which would enable it to exercise the powers under sub-sec. (5 ). Here again the argument if accepted would amount to putting the cart before the horse. ( 13 ) MR. Vidhyarthi then wanted to urge his submission based upon what is Known as constructive custody and submitted that if a person is actually released on bail constructive custody of the court remains over him to do not think that has any relevance in the present case. We are deciding the question raised before us on the facts of this case namely whether the power conferred by sub-sec. (5) can be exercised in respect of a person who is in actual custody of the court and not yet released even though in whose favour an order for releasing him on bail has been passed by the trial court. ( 14 ) LASTLY Mr. Vidhyarthi urged that sec. 498 confers a concurrent power on the Sessions Court to admit a person to bail vis- -vis a power conferred on the trial Magistrate. He urged that in the same manner concurrent power to cancel the order of bail should also be held to have been conferred by sub-sec. (5) of sec. 497. Vidhyarthi urged that sec. 498 confers a concurrent power on the Sessions Court to admit a person to bail vis- -vis a power conferred on the trial Magistrate. He urged that in the same manner concurrent power to cancel the order of bail should also be held to have been conferred by sub-sec. (5) of sec. 497. Frankly speaking I could not follow this argument. It has been made clear more than once that the power to cancel bail as vesting in the Sessions Court under sub-sec. (5) has not been denied. The question is whether such a power can be exercised in respect of a person who is not yet released but who is in the custody of the court on the date when the power is sought to be exercised. It is not understood why resort should be had to sec. 498 for canvassing the aforesaid propositions. Sub-sec. (5) of sec. 497 in terms says that the power of the Sessions Court in respect of cancellation of bail is concurrent with the power of the trial court exercisable by the trial court in case of a person released by itself on bail. It was submitted by Mr. Vidhyarthi that the power to increase the amount of bail fixed by the trial court is impliedly included in the power of cancellation of the bail. This again is not a relevant consideration for our purpose. The question raised and to be decided in the present case is a limited one. It does not relate to the power of the Sessions Court to cancel the bail of a person who has been released that is set free and to arrest him and commit him to custody. The limited question is whether the Sessions Court can do so in respect of a person who has not been released. ( 15 ) NOW coming to the decision of the Delhi High Court 1 must regret my inability to agree with the view taken by the learned Judges of that High Court of the provisions of sub-sec. (5) of sec 497. Speaking with respect the learned Judges it appears were impressed with the need to protect the interests of administration of justice in giving the meaning to the provisions of the said sub-sec. (5 ). (5) of sec 497. Speaking with respect the learned Judges it appears were impressed with the need to protect the interests of administration of justice in giving the meaning to the provisions of the said sub-sec. (5 ). Speaking again with respect as observed earlier sufficient provision has been made by the Legislature for protection of the interests of administration of justice by enacting sec. 435 438 and 439. In any case the High Court can also resort to its powers under sec. 561a of the Code so far as cancellation of a bail granted to a person by the trial court is concerned. In a case falling under sec. 496 of the Code the inherent power of the High Court is in term recognized by the Supreme Court in Ratilal Bhanji v. Asstt. Customs Collector Bombay (A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1639 ). ( 16 ) REVERTING to the decision of the Delhi High Court we also find that the phrase may cause any person who has been released under this section to be arrested and may commit him to custody was not considered while giving meaning to the word released occurring in sub-sec. (5 ). Similarly speaking with respect the provisions of sec. 499 (1) and 500 of the Code were also not considered. As against this the view expressed by the Rajasthan High Court in the decision above referred to is preferable. I would therefore hold that in a case of a person who has been ordered to be released on bail by the trial court but who has not been yet released because of non-execution of the bail bond. the Sessions Court has no power to interfere with the order under sub-sec. (5) of sec. 497. That power is confined to the case of a person who is set free after execution of the bail bond under sec. 499 (1) and in case of a person who is released in this manner under sec. 497. If the Sessions Court thinks that the order releasing a person on bail passed by the learned Magistrate is improper or illegal and the person is not actually released the proper course for it is to take the matter in revision under sec. 499 (1) and in case of a person who is released in this manner under sec. 497. If the Sessions Court thinks that the order releasing a person on bail passed by the learned Magistrate is improper or illegal and the person is not actually released the proper course for it is to take the matter in revision under sec. 435 of the Code to stay the operation of the order granting bail and if sufficient cause is found to make a reference to the High Court under sec. 438. While referring the matter to the High Court tinder sec. 438 the Sessions Judge can again order suspension or stay of the execution of the order granting bail. The High Court will then deal with the question of cancellation of the order granting bail in exercise of the power conferred upon it by the Code. ( 17 ) IN the position case the learned sessions Judge has done something which does not amount to cancellation of the bail. He has interfered in his revisional jurisdiction and modified the final order passed by the learned trial Magistrate. The modification was made by increasing the amount for which bail bond was to be furnished. Such a course is not contemplated by any of the provisions considered in this judgment. Clearly therefore the order passed by the learned sessions judge increasing the amount of bail bond to be executed by the sureties of the original accused was illegal and without jurisdiction. ( 18 ) IF this is the position then it cannot be disputed that the surety bonds in question are not valid and therefore a court of law cannot enforce such instruments in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by the Code. The result would be that the order passed by the trial court and confirmed by the Sessions Court against the present petitioners will have to be set aside. ( 19 ) MR. Vidhyarthi contended that assuming that the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge releasing the original accused on executing the bail bond for the higher sum of Rs. 7000/is illegal the accused persons and the present petitioners have taken advantage of that order and have executed the surety bonds and therefore they cannot now be permitted to challenge the legality or otherwise of the order made by the learned Sessions Judge. 7000/is illegal the accused persons and the present petitioners have taken advantage of that order and have executed the surety bonds and therefore they cannot now be permitted to challenge the legality or otherwise of the order made by the learned Sessions Judge. It is not possible to agree with this contention The petitioners executed the surety bonds because they had no other alternative left but to comply with the illegal order passed by the learned Sessions Judge. Apart from that if the order was illegal and if the surety bonds executed in pursuance of such an order are not Valid there is no reason why the petitioners should not be permitted to say that the amount of such surety bonds cannot be recovered from them. ( 20 ) IN the result the petition succeeds. The order passed by the trial court forfeiting the surety bonds of the petitioner and ordering them to pay penalty of Rs. 5000/as confirmed by the learned Sessions Judge in appeal is set aside. Rule made absolute. .