Lodha. J.—This is a second appeal by the plaintiff who has lost his case is both the Courts below. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be stated within a narrow compass. 3. The plaintiff appellant Kanyaiya Lal was posted as a goods clerk at Rly. Station Udaipur. He was prosecuted on a charge of bribery. During the pendency of criminal proceedings against him the plaintiff was suspended by the Assistant Traffic Superintendent ( Western Railway ), Udaipur by the tatters order dated 4 -5-1954 [Ex. 2] with effect from 5 5-1954. He was discharged by the Special Judge, Udaipur on 10-10-1954 for want of proper sanction and was reinstated by the department after considerable delay, on 20-10-1956. During the period of suspension he was paid subsistence allowance, but after his reinstatement, he claimed full salary for the period commencing from 5-5-1954, the date of his suspension, to 20 10-1956, the date of reinstatement and also other benefits amounting in all to Rs. 2437 50 p. The Divisional Superintendent rejected the plaintiffs claim by his order dated 27-5-1957 [Ex. 4] on the ground that he had not been exonerated and as such the period of absence from duty cannot be treated as period on duty, but would be treated as one urder suspention. The plaintiff went in appeal to the Cheif Commercial Supdtt. (Western Railway) but got no relief and ultimately he filed the present suit on 29-9-1959 for recovery of Rs. 2437.50 in the Court of Civil Judge, Udaipur. 4. The defendants viz. the Union of India and the General Manager, W. Rly.opposed the plaintiffs claim and pleaded that the plaintiff had been rightly allowed half pay during the first year of suspension and 3/8 the pay for the rest of the period. 5. The Additional Civil Judge, Udaipur, to whom the case had been transferred, by his judgement and decree dated 10-12-1960, dismissed the plaintiffs suit. The plaintiff filed appeal but the learned District Judge, Udaipur by his judgment dated 27-11 1963 affirmed the decree of dismissal of the suit by the trial Court. Consequently the plaintiff has come in second appeal to this Court. 6. The plaintiff filed appeal but the learned District Judge, Udaipur by his judgment dated 27-11 1963 affirmed the decree of dismissal of the suit by the trial Court. Consequently the plaintiff has come in second appeal to this Court. 6. The learned District Judge, held that the order of suspension did not automatically came to an end on the discharge of the plaintiff by the criminal Court as there was every possibility of his being prosecuted again after obtaining fresh sanction. He also held that the plaintiff was not entitled to get full salary for the period of suspension merely because there was delay in reinstating him. Lastly he held that if the plaintiff thought that the order of the competent authority disallowing full pay to him was bad and erroneous, the remedy for the plaintiff lies under the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, and not by a suit. In this view of the matter he did not give any finding as to whether the plaintiff was afforded a reasonable opportunity to prove his innocence and whether the impugned order disallowing full salary to him during the period of suspension was bad? 7. Learned counsel for both the parties are agreed that on the facts and circumstances of the present case the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 are not attracted. I would, therefore, now deal with the contentions raised by the learned counsel. 8. The following two points have been urged on behalf of the appellant— (1) That the order of suspension (Ex.2) automatically came to an end when the plaintiff was discharged by the Special Judge, Udaipur. (2) That the plaintiff was not given reasonable opportunity to show cause against the action proposed by the impuned order dated 27-5-1957 (Ex. 4) fixing the plaintiffs pay during the period of suspension, and consequently the order is liable to be quashed. 9. On the other hand, Mr. L.R. Bhansali learned counsel for the respondents has urged that the order of suspension enured even after the plaintiff had been discharged by the Criminal Court, in as much as the accusation persisted against the plaintiff even after his discharge and the police may have prosecuted him again after obtaining fresh sanction. 9. On the other hand, Mr. L.R. Bhansali learned counsel for the respondents has urged that the order of suspension enured even after the plaintiff had been discharged by the Criminal Court, in as much as the accusation persisted against the plaintiff even after his discharge and the police may have prosecuted him again after obtaining fresh sanction. He has also contended that the plaintiff has no-where alleged in the plaint that he had not been given opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him in the matter of fixing of pay after reinstatement and consequently the plaintiff is not entitled to rely on this ground. 10. I would first take up the question whether the order of suspension automatically came to an end on the discharge of the plaintiff by the Criminal Court. R. 1711 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules (for non Gazetted Staff) as it stood at the relevant time deals with suspention and provides as under— "1171. Suspension—(a) A railway servant shall be placed under suspension in the circumstances detailed in sec. III of Appendix 31, R. II. (b) A Railway servant whose conduct is undergoing (i) departmental investigation on a charge the maximum penalty for which is dismissal or removal from service or (ii) police investigation, may also he placed under suspension at the discretion of the competent authority until his case has been finally decided. The period of suspension under this sub-rule should not normally exceed four months except with the approval of the authority next above that ordering the suspension." Para (2) of sec. 3 of appendix 31, R. II as it stood at the relevant time provides as under— "A Railway servant against whom a criminal charge or a proceeding for arrest for debt is pending should also be placed under suspension by the issue of specific orders to this effect during periods when he is not actually detained in custody or imprisoned e.g., whilst released on bail), if the charge made or proceeding taken against him is connected with his position as a Government servant or is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties as such or involves moral turpitude. In regard to his pay and allowances the provisions of paragraph 1 above shall apply." The learned counsel for the appellant urged that the plaintiff should be deemed to have been suspended under para (2) (extracted above) as at the time of suspension, a criminal charge was pending against him. By relying on Narayan Prasad Rawany vs. State of Orissa (1) he submitted that the pending criminal charge expired when the case against the plaintiff was terminated and the contingency that he may stand for trial for the very same charge after obtaining a fresh sanction would not prolong the life of the suspension. Learned counsel also relied on Hemanta Kumar Bhatta-charjee vs. N. N. Sen Gupt (2) in support of his contention. 11. On the other hand learned counsel for the defendant respondents placed strong reliance on Balvantrai Ratilal Patel vs. State of Maharashtra(3), M. Gopal Krishna Naidu vs. State of M.P,(4) and Nrishingha Murari Chakravatty vs. District Magistrate & Collector, Hoogly(5). 12. In M. Gopalkrishan Naidu vs. State of M. P.(4), it was held on the language of C. P. and Berar Fundamental Rules, Appendix 25, Part E, para 2—that the suspension of the appellant did not depend upon the sanction or upon the fact that there was a trial. It was observed that the suspension was based upon the fact that there was an accusation of a criminal offence and that the accusation persisted even after the acquittal of the applicant for want of proper sanction. In that case a fresh sanction was accorded by the Government which showed that the Government intended to commence criminal proceedings against the applicant. I may state, here that the language of paragraph (2) of Appendix 25, Part E which was under consideration before the Nagpur High Court is similar to the language of sub-rule 2 under consideration in the present case. 13. In Nrishingha Murari Chakravarty vs. District Magistrate and Collector, Hoogly (5), while interpreting rule (7) (v) of Bengal Subordinate Civil Services Rules the learned Judge observed that the rules expressly exclude the case of suspension pending the proceedings even though the right of suspension pending the determination of criminal proceedings against the servant concerned is the inherent right of the Government in respect of its servants. He also held that the word "Criminal Charge" in such a rule does not necessarily mean a charge as framed by the Court. It refers to the accusation and must have a broader meaning and that when F.I.R. was filed, there was an accusation and the suspension did not depend on any complaint, formal or otherwise, but on the fact that an information had been lodged against the petitioner, which resulted in criminal proceedings. 14. In Balvantrai Ratilal Patel vs. State of Maharashtra (3) their Lordships were pleased to hold that where order of suspension passed pending enquiry into alleged misconduct recited that the servant should be suspended with immediate effect "pending farther orders" and the proceedings connection with the charge ended in his acquittal by the High Court the servant is not entitled to the full pay for the period from the date of decision of the High Court to the date when he was ultimately dismissed by the Government. Their Lordships were further pleased to observe that the order of suspension could not be automatically terminated but, it could have only been terminated by an order of the Government. It was further held that until therefore a further order of the State Government was made terminating the order of suspension the had no right to be reinstated to service. It may be stated here that the order of interim suspension passed in the S. C. case was not under any express provision of any statute or statutory rules. The counsel for the appellant in that case placed strong reliance on Narayan Prasad Rewany vs. State of Orissa (1) but their Lordships held that the decision of the Orissa High Court had no relevance inasmuch as the facts of that case could clearly be distinguished. The order of suspension in the Orrissa case did not contain the phrase "pending further orders" as in the Supreme Court case. Further more, the order of suspension was passed in the Orissa case under R. 93-A of the Orissa Service Code, Vol. 1 under which the Government servant could be suspended during the period when he was not actually detained in custody or imprisoned. 15. Further more, the order of suspension was passed in the Orissa case under R. 93-A of the Orissa Service Code, Vol. 1 under which the Government servant could be suspended during the period when he was not actually detained in custody or imprisoned. 15. A closer examination of the Orissa case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant land distinguished by their Lordships of the Supreme Court would show that the order of suspension was passed therein under R. 93-A of the Orissa Service Code, Vol.I which is similar to para 2 of sec. 3 of Appendix 21, R. 2. In that case the applicant was suspended under R. 93 A of the Orissa Service Code, Vol. I. The applicant, being the approver, was one of the principal witnesses in the criminal case against the accused Dimbadhar Pradhan who was acquitted by the Criminal Court with some adverse comments on the applicant made representation for his reinstatement on the ground that he was helping the department by becoming a key witness. However, about three years after the termination of the criminal case the applicant was asked to show cause why he may not be dismissed from service. Before any final order of punishment was passed against the applicant, he filed a writ application in the High Court of Orissa in which one of the questions for consideration was as regards the duration of the order of suspension passed under R. 93- A against the applicant and the learned Judges of the High Court of Orissa held that the interim order of suspension remained in force during the pendency of the criminal proceeding only, even though R. 93-A did not contain express words like until the final termination of the proceedings taken against him. It was observed that the contingency that the applicant may still be placed on trial for the very same charge under sec. 339 Cr. P. C. would not prolong the life of the order of suspension, and the criminal charge against the applicant must be held to have terminated long ago because though nearly five years had elapsed after the passing of the judgment by the Sessions Court, no steps had been taken to prosecute the applicant under sec. 339 of the Cr. P. C. 16. 339 of the Cr. P. C. 16. I have narrated the facts of the Orissa case in some detail in order to indicate that the facts of that case are quite distinguishable. In the present case plaintiff was discharged for want of proper sanction. It appears from Ex. A. 8, a copy of the latter dated 19th November, 1954 addressed by the Regional Traffic Superintendent to the Superintendent of Police whether the latter was contemplating to file a fresh challan against the plaintiff after obtaining proper sanction from the competent authority or whether the plaintiff may be taken back on duty? It further appears from another letter dated Ist October 1936, addressed by the department to the police (Ex A. 7) that several reminders were sent to the Superintendent of Police Udaipur; but no reply had been received and that as considerable time had elapsed the applicant would be reinstated with effect from 15 101956, unless anything to the contrary was heard. From the aforesaid letters it thus appears that the department was constantly in touch with the police whether the latter had an intention to put the plaintiff again for trial after obtaining a fresh sanction. Ultimately the police informed the department by its letter dated October 31, 1956 that they had given up the idea to prosecute the accused again for want of necessary material. The question then arises whether in these circumstances the criminal charge against the plaintiff had come to an end and whether the order of suspension was automatically terminated? 17. In my opinion the phrase Criminal Charge used in para 2 of sec. III of Appendix XXX R. II should not be given a narrow meaning and must refer to the accusation brought against the person concerned. 1 am further of the opinion that the accusation against the plaintiff persisted till the police communicated to the department that they did not contemplate to put the accused on trial after obtaining fresh sanction. This interpretation would not lead to anomaly. The interpretation, on the other hand, which the learned counsel for the appellant seeks to put on the language of para 2 extracted above in the first place, does not directly flow from the language of the Rule and would also lead to certain anomalies. This interpretation would not lead to anomaly. The interpretation, on the other hand, which the learned counsel for the appellant seeks to put on the language of para 2 extracted above in the first place, does not directly flow from the language of the Rule and would also lead to certain anomalies. I am, ofcourse, alive to the fact that in some cases undue delay caused to reinstatement of the person concerned may result in undue hardship to him but in the first place it is expected that neither the police nor the department would deliberately act in that manner and in case they do so the remedy of the aggrieved party lies in getting the order of suspension revoked or struck down by appropriate proceedings. However, I find myself unable to come to the conclusion that the order of suspension should be held to be automatically terminated even though the criminal charge meaning thereby the accusation in the broad sense of the term persists against the servant. 18. The Calcutta case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant Hemants Kumar Bhattacharjee vs. N.N Sen Gupta (2) need not detain me long inasmuch as it turns upon the language of R. 17 of the General Regulations contained in Post and Telegraphs Manual; Vol. II which provides that — "An employee whose conduct is undergoing investigation on a serious charge may be placed under suspension pending the result of enquiries into his alleged misconduct" In that case the petitioner was discharged as no report had been received from the Investigating Officer nor any prayer was made for remand. It was held that the pendency of enquiry is a condition precedent to the employee being kept under suspension and therefore, the moment the petitioner was discharged the order of suspension came to an end. Thus on a careful examination of the relevant rules and the law bearing on the subject 1 have come to the conclusion that the order of suspension in the present case cannot be said to have come to an end automatically on the discharge of the plaintiff by the Criminal Court. 19. This brings me to the consideration of the second contention on behalf of the appellant. In M. Gopalkrishna Naidu vs. The State of M.P. (4), while dealing with Fundamental R 54 which is similar to para 2044 of Indian Railway Establishment Code Vol. 19. This brings me to the consideration of the second contention on behalf of the appellant. In M. Gopalkrishna Naidu vs. The State of M.P. (4), while dealing with Fundamental R 54 which is similar to para 2044 of Indian Railway Establishment Code Vol. II under which the impugned order has been passed, their Lordships were pleased to hold that such as such an order resulting in pecuniary loss to the government servant must be held to be an objective rather than a subjective function. Their Lordships said— "The very nature of the function implies the duty to act judicially. In such a case if an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed is not afforded as admittedly it was not done in the present case, the order is liable to be struck down as invalid on the ground that it is one in breach of the principles of natural justice." 20. For a correct appraisal of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties it would be proper to reproduce here the relevant portion of para 2044 (F.B. 54) Pay after Reinstatement — "(1) When a railway servant who has been dismissed removed, compulsorily retired or suspended is reinstated, the authority competent to order the reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order— (a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the railway servant for the period of his absence from duty ; and (b) whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty. (2) Where the authority mentioned in sub-rule (1) is of the opinion that the railway servant has been fully exonerated or, in the case of suspension, that it was wholly unjustified the railway servant shall be given the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled, had he not been dismissed, removed, compulsorily retired or suspended, as the case may be." 21. Learned counsel for the respondents urged that the plaintiff and a few other witnesses were examined by the competent authority which passed the order under the aforesaid Rule and therefore, there was due compliance with the principle of natural justice. It appears to me that both the plaintiff as well as the department were under some sort of misapprehension as to the procedure to be followed in such matters. It appears to me that both the plaintiff as well as the department were under some sort of misapprehension as to the procedure to be followed in such matters. The plaintiff thought, as would be clear from the averments made by him in paras Nos. 7, 11, 12 and 13 of the plaint, that the procedure prescribed in the Discipline & Appeal Rules should have been followed. The Department also tried to justify its act by replying in para No. 9 of the written statement that the enquiry was according to the relevant department rules and even if there was a violation of any departmental rules, it gave no cause of action to the plaintiff to go to the Civil Court. Here I may point out that there is admittedly no provision in the departmental rules regarding the procedure to be followed before passing an order under para 2044. But as pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M. Gopal Krishna Naidus case, when there has been no departmental proceeding against the servant the factual finding under fundamental R. 54 ( which is equivalent to para 2044 in the present case) must be held to be an objective rather than a subjective function, and that in such a case an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed must be afforded to the servant concerned. The plaintiff has alleged in para No. 12 of the plaint that no chance was given to him to explain the doubt entertained against him by the competent authority. Learned counsel for the respondents expressed his inability to point out from the record anything which may indicate that a show cause notice or an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed was given to the plaintiff. Consequently I hold that the impugned order Ex. 4 dated 27-5-1957 is liable to be struck down being invalid, on the ground that it was passed in disregard of the principles of natural justice. However, it is a matter for the competent authority to decide as to what pay and allowances the plaintiff is entitled to get during the period of suspension. It will be for him to decide this matter, after giving due opportunity to the plaintiff as stated above. However the plaintiff cannot get a decree for full salary during the period of suspension in this suit. 22. It will be for him to decide this matter, after giving due opportunity to the plaintiff as stated above. However the plaintiff cannot get a decree for full salary during the period of suspension in this suit. 22. The result is that I partially allow this appeal, set aside the judgments and decrees of the Courts below and decree the plaintiffs suit to this extent that the order of the Divisional Superintendent (Western Railway) dated 27-5-1957 (Ex. 4) and also the order of the Divisional Commercial Supdtt dated 13-9-1957 (Ex. 5) confirming the order dated 27-5-1957 are void and are consequently struck down. The authority competent under para 2044 will now pass a fresh order in accordance with law. The rest of the suit is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case I direct that the parties be left to bear their own costs through out. 23. Learned counsel for the appellant prays for leave to appeal to Division Bench. Leave is refused.