JUDGMENT S. K. Verma, C. J.. - This special appeal is directed against the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court dated February 3, 1970 whereby the appellant's writ petition (No. 594 of 1968) was dismissed. 2. Briefly stated, the facts are these. The appellant was a Boiler Maker in the Loco Workshop of the Northern Railway and, at the relevant time, was posted at Lucknow. The allegation against him was that on the 7th of December, 1964 when he was going out of the Workshop a piece of brass, which was the property of the Railway, was recovered from his possession. On the 16th of December, 1964 he was suspended and on the 9th of January, 1965 a charge sheet alleging misconduct against him was served upon him. Shri B. L. Wadhawan, Assistant Works Manager of the Loco Workshop was appointed as an Enquiry Officer. The result of the enquiry was that the appellant was found to be guilty of the charge framed against him. Thereafter the General Manager of the Northern Railway served a show cause notice dated April 28, 1966 on the appellant. The appellant furnished an explanation which was not accepted and by an order dated the 24th of September, 1966 the appellant was removed from service. He filed an appeal which was disposed of by the Railway Board. The appeal having been unsuccessful, the appellant filed the writ petition mentioned above. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant has raised no less than five contentions before us. In our opinion, the first, third and the fifth contentions are enough for the disposal of this appeal. 4. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant was that the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer is one which no reasonable person could have arrived at. At first, we were not inclined to assess the evidence as in an appeal, but on an examination of the evidence we came to the conclusion that the contention of the learned counsel was correct. We shall, briefly, give our reasons. The most important witness examined before the Enquiry Officer was Dasrath Lal Sainik. According to his statement, he was on duty at the gate through which the appellant was passing. It was the witness's duty to search any person whom he suspected to be carrying away Railway property stealthily. We shall, briefly, give our reasons. The most important witness examined before the Enquiry Officer was Dasrath Lal Sainik. According to his statement, he was on duty at the gate through which the appellant was passing. It was the witness's duty to search any person whom he suspected to be carrying away Railway property stealthily. The witness searched the appellant and he felt something hard "just under his abdomen". The appellant had a bicycle with him and there were two other persons with him; one was going ahead and the other was behind him. According to the witness, the appellant turned the handle of the bicycle towards him. Thereafter a scuffle followed in the course of which the appellant's Dhoti was undone and had fallen down. His coat was also taken off his person. According to the witness the appellant tied his Dhoti with his own hands. The witness blew his whistle in response to which two other persons arrived. They were Shobnath Pandey Sainik and Rama Kant Pandey Head Rakshak. The witness stated, further, that the coat of the appellant which had fallen down was bundled up and when it was being handed over to the appellant, he disowned its ownership. Eventually, it was put on his person. Through the left sleeve of the coat the appellant's left arm was put through but the right sleeve of the coat remained hanging. Thereafter the appellant was taken to the room of the Sub-Inspector, Railway Protection Force. According to Dasrath Lal he was searched there. The exact description of what was recovered and how it was recovered had better be quoted in Dasrath Lal's own words :- "Sri Dhanau was searched and nothing was recovered from underneath his adbomen but one brass piece bearing some Rly. mark was recovered from the right area of his coat." (Italicised is ours) . The witness went on to state that thereafter a recovery memo was prepared which was thumb marked by the appellant and witnesses. The further allegation against the appellant was that he made a confession of his guilt which was recorded in writing and was thumb marked by him. 5. The witness went on to state that thereafter a recovery memo was prepared which was thumb marked by the appellant and witnesses. The further allegation against the appellant was that he made a confession of his guilt which was recorded in writing and was thumb marked by him. 5. Before dealing with the statements of the other witnesses we should like to point out that the statement of Dashrath Lal to the effect that the piece of brass was found in the right arm of the appellant's coat is, on the face of it, impossible of acceptance. It has come in the evidence that the weight. of the piece of brass was 1 Seer and 11 Chhataks. Considering the manner in which the appellant was arrested, we fail to understand how the piece of brass remained in the right arm, of the appellant's coat without falling down on the ground. When we consider this aspect of the matter in the light of the statements of the other witnesses against the appellant, the allegation that the piece of brass was recovered from the appellant's possession becomes still more incredible. According to Shobhnath Pandey the piece of brass was recovered from the right arm-pit of the appellant and he was wearing a coat over it Shobhnath Pandey was asked whether the coat that the appellant was wearing was a cotton or a woolen one. His answer was that he did not remember. The following question was put to him : "Q. A material having a weight one seer 11 Chhataks cannot be kept in an arm-pit without being it (sic) tied up with the body or it should have some support, otherwise it will definitely fall down specially when a struggle took place between the alleged thief Dhanau and a RPF staff it should have fallen down. Please show some light over it ?" The witnesse's answer was :- "A. I noticed that RK. Sri Dashrath Lal kept Sri Dhanau held him with his both hands on Dhanau's both arms and Sri Dhanau kept his both arm pressed against his arm pits while trying to run away when apprehended. I cannot say further why the material did not drop." 6. Two things become patently obvious. Sri Dashrath Lal kept Sri Dhanau held him with his both hands on Dhanau's both arms and Sri Dhanau kept his both arm pressed against his arm pits while trying to run away when apprehended. I cannot say further why the material did not drop." 6. Two things become patently obvious. How and when did the piece of brass travel "from underneath the abdomen of the appellant" to the right arm of the appellant's coat or to his right arm-pit? Shobhnath Pandey apparently realised the absurdity of the statement made by Dasrath Lal that the piece of brass was recovered from the right arm of the appellant's coat. He, therefore, introduced the story that the appellant kept the piece of brass in his arm-pit and kept it pressed while running and, in order to make it doubly sure, he went on to state that Rakshak Dashrath Lal held the appellant with both his hands round his arms. In other words Dashrath Lal held the appellant in a close embrace lest the piece of brass should fall to the ground. Rama Kant Pandey Head Rakshak stated:- "As a result of search a brass piece was recovered from underneath right arm which was covered with a coat." The questions put to the witness and his answers are reproduced below :- "Q. Who conducted the search of Sri Dhanau and how was it done by a (sic) removing any of his clothes or without doing so and from what actual place the material was recovered?" "A. Sri R.N. Bhat ASI conducted the search of Sri Dhanau by putting aside his coat and probably (I do not remember exactly) by removing the shirt. The material was recovered from underneath the right arm-pit below the shirt." "The piece of brass in due course, not only travelled "from underneath the abdomen" to the right arm-pit of the appellant but its travels extended even further. The material was recovered from underneath the right arm-pit below the shirt." "The piece of brass in due course, not only travelled "from underneath the abdomen" to the right arm-pit of the appellant but its travels extended even further. At first it was covered only by the coat and subsequently it managed to get under the appellant's shirt." "Q. Was the material held under right arm pit of Sri Dhanau naked or covered by something?" "A. It was held naked." "Q. Was the material tied up under his arm pit with some thing or it was just held there pressed under his arm?" "A. As far as I know it was not tied with anything." S.S. Shukla, Time Office's Clerk was asked:- "Q. Please state the exact location from where the material was actually recovered during the search of Sri Dhanau ? A. It was recovered from underneath the right arm pit. Q. Was the material recovered in naked form or recovered (sic) up by some thing ? A. I do not remember." 7. While dealing with the statement of this witness we should like to point out that his statement completely falsifies the allegation that the appellant confessed his guilt which was recorded in writing. He was asked :- "Q. Did Sri Dhanau admit his guilt at any stage in your presence if so was it recorded any where in writing in his statement ? A. He did not admit his guilt in this connection and I do not remember if anything in connection (sic) was recorded in his statement." He was asked :- "Q. Can you show (sic) some light as to how a brass metal material can stop in the arm-pit without any support? A. The material was kept under right pit of Sri Dhanau pressed with his arm which was further held by Rk. who caught him." 8. R. N. Bhat, Sub-Inspector of the Railway Protection Force stated that the piece of brass was recovered from underneath the right arm pit of Sri Dhanau below his coat. He was asked : "Q. How was the material recovered from Sri Dhanau during search was (sic) held there under his right arm pit and give its exact location if it was under the shirt or above it also if the material was kept there in the naked form or wrapped in some thing ? He was asked : "Q. How was the material recovered from Sri Dhanau during search was (sic) held there under his right arm pit and give its exact location if it was under the shirt or above it also if the material was kept there in the naked form or wrapped in some thing ? A. The material was held under right arm pit of Sri Dhanau by pressing his right arm over it and he was further held by his arm by RPF staff who brought him from gate no. 7 to the office. The material was located under his coat in naked form but I am not certain if it was under the shirt or otherwise,." He was asked :- "Q. Who recorded the statement of Sri Dhanau and how it was recorded and in what language ? A. The statement was recorded by me in Hindi language as narrated by Sri Dhanau and also afterwards he was questioned and replies given by him recorded in the statement. Q. Was the recovery memo also prepared by you and in same language ? A. Yes." Curiously enough when he was asked :- Q. Did Sri Dhanau accept his guilt at any stage during the investigation proceedings in SI/Office if so if it was recorded anywhere ? A. I do not remember about it at the stage and it may be in the record I am not sure about it also." (Numbers of questions are omitted by us). 9. We are not oblivious of the warning given by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in dealing with such cases the rules applicable to the assessment of evidence in criminal cases should not be applied. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao, A.I.R. 1963 , S.C. 1723, it was held as follows :- "There is no warrant for the view expressed by the High Court that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of the misconduct charged against him, the rule allowed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court, must be applied, and if that rule be not applied, the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding it departmental enquiry against a public servant, it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonable support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds." (The italicised is ours) . It was laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. H.C. Goel, A.I.R. 1964 , Supreme Court, 364 :- This conclusion does not finally dispose of the appeal. It still remains to be considered whether the respondent is not right when he contends that in the circumstance of this case, the conclusion of the Government is based on no evidence whatever. It is a conclusion which is perverse and, therefore, suffers from such an obvious and patent error on the face of the record that the High Court would be justified in quashing it. It is a conclusion which is perverse and, therefore, suffers from such an obvious and patent error on the face of the record that the High Court would be justified in quashing it. In dealing with writ petitions filed by public servants who have been dismissed, or otherwise dealt with so as to attract Art. 311 (2) , the High Court Art. 226 has jurisdiction to enquire whether the conclusion of the Government on which the impugned order of dismissal rests is not supported by any evidence at all. It is true that the order of dismissal which may be passed against a Government servant found guilty of misconduct, can be described as an administrative order; nevertheless, the proceedings held against such a public servant under the statutory rules to determine whether he is guilty of the charges framed against him are in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings and there can be little doubt that a writ of certiorari, for instance, can be claimed by a public servant if he is able to satisfy the High Court that the ultimate conclusion of the Government in the said proceedings, which is the basis of his dismissal, is based on no evidence. In fact, in fairness to the learned Attorney General, we ought to add that he did not seriously dispute this position in law." The distinction between a case where there is no evidence whatsoever to support a finding and a case where there is evidence but that evidence cannot support a finding at which the Enquiry Officer has arrived, is very thin. Lord Radcliffe has dealt with this point in Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v. Bairstow and Another, 166 Appeal Cases, 14, at page 36 thus :- "When the case comes before the court it is its duty to examine the determination having regard to its knowledge of the relevant law. If the case contains anything ex facie which is bad law and which bears upon the determination, it is, obviously, erroneous in point of law. But, without any such misconception appearing ex facie, it may be that the facts found are such that no Person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law could have come to the determination under appeal. In those circumstances, too, the court must intervene. But, without any such misconception appearing ex facie, it may be that the facts found are such that no Person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law could have come to the determination under appeal. In those circumstances, too, the court must intervene. It has no option but to assume that there has been some misconception of the law and that this has been responsible for the determination. So there, too, there has been error in point of law. I do not think that it much matters whether this state of affairs is described as one in which there is no evidence to support the determination or as one in which the evidence is inconsistent with and contradictory of the determination, or as one in which the true and only reasonable conclusion contradict the determination. Rightly understood, each phrase propounds the same test. For my part, I prefer the last of the three, since I think that it is rather misleading to speak of there being no evidence to support a conclusion when in cases such as these many of the facts are likely to be neutral in themselves, and only to take their colour from the combination of circumstances in which they are found to occur." 10. We have very carefully considered the evidence that was adduced against the appellant before the Enquiry Officer and the portions of the evidence which we considered relevant have been mentioned above. We are of the opinion that the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer was one at which no reasonable person could have arrived on that evidence. This would be enough to dispose of this appeal. We are however, also impressed by the third and the fifth contentions raised by the learned counsel and we shall deal with them now. 11. The third contention of the learned counsel was that the statement of one witness, the Foreman who was the immediate boss of the appellant, was recorded behind the appellant's back and he was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The report of the Enquiry Officer shows that this grievance of the appellant is perfectly justified. 12. 11. The third contention of the learned counsel was that the statement of one witness, the Foreman who was the immediate boss of the appellant, was recorded behind the appellant's back and he was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The report of the Enquiry Officer shows that this grievance of the appellant is perfectly justified. 12. The fifth contention of the learned counsel was that the appellant preferred an appeal to the Railway Board and stated therein that, in case the Board was not satisfied with what he had stated in his memorandum of appeal, he should be given an opportunity of being heard through defence counsel. Reliance is placed upon Rule 1732 of the Railway Establishment Code, the relevant portion of which is reproduced below :- "1732. Special provisions for non-gazetted staff :- (1) Where the penalty of dismissal, removal from service, compulsory retirement, reduction in rank or withholding of increment has been imposed, the appellate authority may give the railway servant either at his direction or if so requested by the latter a personal hearing, before disposing of the appeal. At this personal hearing, the railway servant may he accompanied, if he so chooses, by another railway servant of the same Railway or an official (who is not a professional lawyer) of a Railway Trade Union recognised by the railway on which the accused railway servant is employed. (2) ........................................." 13. The learned counsel contends that the word `may' used in this rule, in the context in which it has been used, muse be read as `shall'. He has relied upon State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jogendra Singh, A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court, 1618. In that case their Lordships were considering rule 4 of the U.P. Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947 which reads as follows :- "4. He has relied upon State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jogendra Singh, A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court, 1618. In that case their Lordships were considering rule 4 of the U.P. Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947 which reads as follows :- "4. (1) The Governor may refer to the Tribunal cases relating to an individual Government servant or class of Government servant or Government servant in a particular area only in respect of matters involving:- (a) corruption; (b) failure to discharge duties properly; (c) irremediable general inefficiency in a public servant of more than ten years' standing; and (d) personal immorality, (2) The Governor may, in respect of a gazetted Government servant on his own request, refer his case to the Tribunal in respect of matters referred to in sub-rule (1) ." Their Lordships observed as follows :- "The question for our decision is whether like the word "may" in R. 4 (1) which confers the discretion on the Governor, the word "may" in sub-rule (2) confers the discretion on him, or does the word "may" in sub-rule (2) really mean `shall" or "must" ? There is no doubt that the word "may" generally does not mean "must" or "shall". But it is well-settled that the word "may" is capable of meaning "must" or "shall" in the light of the context. It is also clear that where a discretion is conferred upon a public authority coupled with an obligation, the word "may" which denotes discretion should he construed to mean it command. Sometimes, the Legislature uses the word "may" out of deference to the high status of the authority on whom the power and the obligation are intended to be conferred and imposed. In the present case, it is the context which is decisive. The whole purpose of rule 4 (2) would be frustrated if the word "may" in the said rule receives the same construction as in sub-rule (1) ..............In other words, the plain and unambiguous object of enacting Rule 4 (2) is to provide an option to the gazetted Government servants to request the Governor that their cases should be tried by a Tribunal and not otherwise. The rule-making authority presumably thought that having regard to the status of the gazetted Government servants, it would be legitimate to give such an option to them. The rule-making authority presumably thought that having regard to the status of the gazetted Government servants, it would be legitimate to give such an option to them. Therefore, we feel no difficulty in accepting the view taken by the High Court that Rule 4(2) imposes an obligation on the Governor to grant a request made by the gazetted Government servant that his case should be referred to the Tribunal under the Rules ......................" 14. Now it is quite clear to us that the word "may" had to be used while conferring a discretion on the appellate authority to permit the appellant to be heard in person or through counsel. The question that arises is this-in case the appellate authority does not exercise its discretion in the appellant's favour should he or should he not accede to a request made by him to the effect that he should be heard? It is unfortunate that the word "may" covers both the exercise of discretion and an opportunity of being heard if a request is made. In our view in the context in which the word "may" has been used the appellate authority must afford an opportunity to the appellant to be heard if a request to that effect is made. 15. We do not think that it is necessary to deal with the second and the fourth contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. 16. For the reasons given above, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the learned single Judge and quash the orders passed by the General Manager of the Northern Railway and the appellate authority, the Railway Board, Annexures 8 and 10 to the writ petition. The appellant is entitled to his costs.