JUDGMENT J.S. Trivedi, J. - This plaintiff's Second Civil Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the Civil judge, Mainpuri, confirming the decree of the trial Court. The brief facts are that the plaintiff-appellant was a Toll Tax Inspector employed with the respondent Municipal Board. He was dismissed on 22-10-1956. An appeal was filed by him and the appeal was allowed and he was reinstated on 15-4-1957. The appellate authority also allowed him full pay for the period he had been out of service. The appellant resumed duties on 1-5-1957. He was again dismissed with effect from 9th October, 1959. He then approached the Board for payment of his arrears of pay. As a writ petition (Civil Misc. Writ No. 2084 of 1957) was pending in the High Court, the Board replied by letter dated 10-12-1957 that steps would be taken on his representation after the decision of the High Court. Again, by letter dated 23-8-1958 the appellant was informed that his representation would be considered after the receipt of the orders of the Government to whom his case had been referred. As the arrears of pay claimed by him were not paid, the suit out of which this appeal arises was filed after due notice, for the recovery of Rs. 947.38. 2. The suit was contested by the defendant-respondent on the ground that the matter is Sub-judice before the Hon'ble High Court and, therefore, the suit was premature. In the alternative, want of proper notice and bar of limitation under Section 326 (3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act was also pleaded. Issue No. 4 "whether the suit is within time" was made the preliminary issue and the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit holding that the suit of the plaintiff was barred by limitation. According to the trial Court, the limitation for filing the suit was 6 months under Section 326 (3) of the Municipalities Act and there was no ground for not filing the suit within 6 months from 15-4-1956, the date when the appeal of the plaintiff was allowed and he was reinstated. According to the trial Court, the limitation for filing the suit was 6 months under Section 326 (3) of the Municipalities Act and there was no ground for not filing the suit within 6 months from 15-4-1956, the date when the appeal of the plaintiff was allowed and he was reinstated. The lower appellate Court confirmed the finding of the trial Court holding that Section 326 (3) of the Municipalities Act was applicable and nonpayment of arrears of the pay amounted to an act of the Board and the suit having been filed on the expiry of 6 months from the date of the cause of action is barred by the law of limitation. 3. The only question, therefore, involved in this Second Civil Appeal is whether the claim of the plaintiff-appellant was covered by Section 326 (3) of the Municipalities Act and the limitation prescribed was six months for such a suit. Sec. 326 (3) of the Municipalities Act deals with the procedure for suits against Board or its officers. The relevant portion is as under : "326 (1) . No suit shall be instituted against a board, or against a member, officer or servant of a board, in respect of an act done or purporting to have been done in its or his official capacity, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been, in the case of a board, left at its office, and, in the case of a member, officer, or servant, delivered to him or left at his office or place of abode, explicitly stating the cause of action, the nature of the relief sought, the amount of compensation claimed, and the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff, and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. (2) ..................................................... (3) No action such as is described in Sub-sec. (1) shall, unless it is an action for the recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereof, be commenced otherwise than within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action." 4. For the applicability of Sub-clause (3) it is essential that the action described should be against the Board or against an officer or servant of the Board in respect of act done or purporting to have been done in its or his official capacity. For the applicability of Sub-clause (3) it is essential that the action described should be against the Board or against an officer or servant of the Board in respect of act done or purporting to have been done in its or his official capacity. The only act which is complained of is that the plaintiff was not paid the salary for some period. Non-payment of salary according to the learned counsel for the respondent was act done or purporting to have been done by the Board in its official capacity. In support of his submissions reliance has been placed by him in a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Dargahi Lal Nigam v. Kanpur Municipal Board, A.I.R. 1952 Allahabad 382, in which it was laid down that : "A suit by a dismissed servant for his arrears of pay is governed by the period of limitation provided by Section 326 and not by the period provided by the Limitation Act". It was also laid down that : "There is no basis for holding that Section 326 contemplates only an action in tort and not an action in contract." 5. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sita Ram Goel v. The Municipal Board, Kanpur, 1959 A.L.J. 106 in support of the contention that the wrongful dismissal was an act done or purporting to have been done by the Board in its official capacity. The full Bench case of this Court A. I. R. 1952 Allahabad 382 (supra) came for consideration before a larger Bench in Antarim Zila Farishad v. Shanti Devi, 1965 A.L.J. 221 in which it was laid down that : "A suit brought by a contractor against a District Board for recovery of money due under the contract for the work done by him is not governed by the provisions of Section 192 of the District Boards Act." It will be relevant to state that Section 192 of the District Boards Act is similar to Section 326 of the U.P. Municipalities Act. The Full Bench placed reliance on the case of Baradford Corporation v. Myers, 1916 Appeal Cases 242, and the observations of Lord Shaw made therein which were as under : "........... The Full Bench placed reliance on the case of Baradford Corporation v. Myers, 1916 Appeal Cases 242, and the observations of Lord Shaw made therein which were as under : "........... Where the right of the individual cannot be corrected with a statutory or public duty to the individual, the foundation of the relations of parties does not lie in anything but a private bargain which it was open for either the Municipality or the individual citizen, consumer, or customer to enter into or to decline. And an action on either side founded on the performance or non-performance of that contract is one to which the protection Act does not apply, because the appeal, which is made to a Court of Law, does not rest on statutory or public duty, but merely on a private and individual bargain." It is also remarked in the Full Bench that: "`Act' within the meaning of the words used in various statutes may include commission or failure to do an act, but in order that the particular statute covers an omission or failure it must have been done under the statute or in the official capacity or under the official authority. There is no difficulty in respect of a positive act but in respect of a negative act, i.e. an omission or failure to do a certain act there must be a statutory authority for the negative act or it must have been done in the official capacity of the authority concerned." It was also remarked while discussing Dargahi Lal's case, A.I.R. 1952 Allahabad 382 that payment of salary may be an official act but non-payment of salary could not be an official act or even an act. 6. Shanti Devi's case, 1965 A.L.J. 221 therefore, clearly lays clown that a suit for arrears of salary is not governed by six months' rule of limitation. The facts of Sita Ram Goel's case, 1959 A.L.J. 106 are distinguishable. In that case the dismissal of the employee was challenged. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering whether the order of dismissal was an act done or purporting to have been done by the Board in its official capacity or not. The order of dismissal shall always be an order of the Board purporting to have been done in its official capacity. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering whether the order of dismissal was an act done or purporting to have been done by the Board in its official capacity or not. The order of dismissal shall always be an order of the Board purporting to have been done in its official capacity. The rule of law laid down in the Full Bench of this Court reported in 1965 A.L.J. 221 (supra) only applies to the facts of this case and the provisions of Section 326 (3) of the Municipalities Act were not applicable to the facts of the present case. The Courts below were wrong in holding that six months' rule of limitation will be applicable. The period of limitation in the absence of Section 326 (3) of the Municipalities Act would be as provided in the Indian Limitation Act, i.e. three years. 7. It has next been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that even if the period of limitation for such suit is three years, then also the suit of the plaintiff would be time barred. According to him, the period for the suit would commence from the date when the plaintiff was dismissed i.e. on 22-10-1956 and not from 15-4-1957 when his appeal was allowed and he was reinstated. The order of dismissal will give only the cause of action for setting aside the said order of dismissal and till the order of dismissal was not set aside by the appropriate authority in appeal, the plaintiff had no cause of action for his salary. The cause of action for the salary revived only after the order of dismissal was set aside by the appellate authority. Sita Ram Goel's case, 1959 A.L.J. 106 on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondent for the proposition that the cause of action commenced as soon as the order of dismissal was passed, has no application to the facts of this case. That was a case where the order of dismissal itself was challenged in a suit and the period of limitation was sought to commence from the date of the dismissal of the departmental appeal. That was a case where the order of dismissal itself was challenged in a suit and the period of limitation was sought to commence from the date of the dismissal of the departmental appeal. It was then laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any stay order by the appellate authority, the period of limitation for a suit challenging the order dismissal commenced from the date of dismissal. The fact of the present case are quite different. Here the departmental authority allowed the appeal and reinstated the person to the post with the result that the plaintiff became entitled to his salary after the order of dismissal was set aside and he was reinstated to the post. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant has stated that the period of limitation shall commence from the date when the appellate order was communicated to him and he Was actually reinstated. It is not necessary to go into that question because the suit of the plaintiff would be within limitation even from the date on which his appeal was allowed, i.e. on 15-4-1957. 9. The result, therefore, is that the Courts below were wrong in dismissing the plaintiff's suit on the ground of limitation and this appeal, therefore has to be allowed. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the case remanded to the trial Court for deciding the claim of the plaintiff on merits. Costs of this appeal and of the lower appellate Court shall abide the result of the suit.