JUDGMENT P. Govindan Nair, J. 1. These are references under S.256(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) at the instance of the assessee by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench and the questions referred are: "(i) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the assessments made under S.147(a) for the years 1952-53, 1953-54 and 1954-55 were legal and valid? (ii) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the levy of interest under S.217 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is valid in respect of the assessment for the years 1952-53, 1953-54, and 1954-55?" 2. The assessment years as is evident from the questions referred, are 1952-53, 1953-54 and 1954-55. The assessments relating to those years were originally made attributing the status of an Association of Persons to the assessee. It Was discovered after a long number of years that the assessments should have been on the basis that the assessee is a Hindu Undivided Family, the family of His Highness the Maharajah of Travancore. Notices Were therefore issued on 11 5 1965 purporting to be under S.148 of the Act which had in the meantime come into force and the assessments Were reopened and fresh assessments Were made on the Hindu Undivided Family under the Act for the three years 1952-53, 1953-54 and 1954-55. Before the Income Tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal the contention that was raised was that the assessments involved only a sum of Rs. 40,000 and odd (as finally fixed) and therefore the 8 years rule under S.149(1)(a) (ii) applied and not the 16 years rule. This contention was negatived by all the authorities and the Tribunal dealing with this question observed as follows: "It is also significant to note that under S.149(1)(ii) (apparently meaning S.149(1)(a)(ii) the period of limitation for reopening would be extended to 16 years in those cases where the income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment amounts to or is likely to amount to Rs. 50,000/- or more for that year. The use of the words likely to amount to' is a clear pointer that absolute certainty that the income would be Rs. 50,000/- or more is not required by the statute. Even if it is likely to be Rs. 50,000/- or more for that year. The use of the words likely to amount to' is a clear pointer that absolute certainty that the income would be Rs. 50,000/- or more is not required by the statute. Even if it is likely to be Rs. 50,000'- or above, S.149(1)(ii) permits action to be taken within the extended period of limitation. The two decisions cited on behalf of the assessee do not appear to us to be quite relevant in the context of these facts. We hold that the proceeding under S.147(a) are valid and legal." The expression "is likely to amount to" imports that there must be reasonable cause to believe that the amount is likely to amount to Rs.50,000/-. Even so on the facts and in the circumstances of the case detailed by the Tribunal we are not prepared to say that there Was no reasonable cause to believe that the income chargeable to tax which had escaped assessment was likely to amount to Rs.50,000/-. The conclusion reached by the Tribunal that action can be taken within 16 years as provided by S.149(1) (a) (ii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is therefore unassailable. 3. Counsel for the assessee raised a new point before us. We heard arguments on this because we considered it was only another aspect of the question that was dealt with by the Tribunal. The argument was that the liability having been incurred under the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, it is the provision in S.34 of that Act that would apply and that the section provided only a period of 8 years. Therefore it was submitted that the notice on 11-5-1965 after the lapse ' of 8 years was not warranted. Assuming without deciding that the provisions of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 must apply and not the provisions in the Act, this argument cannot also hold good in view of the amendment that was effected to S.34 by S.18 of the Finance Act, 1956 with effect from the 1st April 1956. After the amendment, in cases falling under clause (a) of S.34(1) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, there was no time limit under the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. 4. We answer question No. 1 referred to us in the affirmative that is in favour of the department and against the assessee. 5. After the amendment, in cases falling under clause (a) of S.34(1) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, there was no time limit under the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. 4. We answer question No. 1 referred to us in the affirmative that is in favour of the department and against the assessee. 5. The second question referred to us raises an interesting point and depends on the construction to be placed on S.297 (2) (d) (ii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and S.217 read with S.212(3) of the Act. 6. We shall extract S.297(2)(d). "297(2). Notwithstanding the repeal of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the repealed Act), (a) ... ... ... (b) ... ... ... (c) ... ... ... (d) where in respect of any assessment year after the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1940, (i) a notice under S.34 of the repealed Act had been issued before the commencement of this Act. the proceedings in pursuance of such notice may be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed; (ii) any income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment within the meaning of that expression in S.147 and no proceedings under S.34 of the repealed Act in respect of any such income are pending at the commencement of this Act a notice under S.148 may, subject to the provisions contained in S.149 or S.150, be issued with respect to that assessment year and all the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly;" The section makes it clear that the provisions therein will apply to all assessment years after that ending on the 31st day of March 1940, and all the provisions of the Act have also been made applicable and so S.217 too must apply. The provisions of the Act must therefore necessarily apply to the years with which we are concerned; 1952-53, 1953-54 and 1954-55. Even so it was argued by counsel on behalf of the assessee that the section will only make the provisions of S.217 of the Act applicable and that if the terms of S.217 were not satisfied no interest as provided by the section could be imposed. To understand this argument, it is necessary to read S.217 as also 221(3) which is referred to in that section: "217. Interest payable by assessee when no estimate made. To understand this argument, it is necessary to read S.217 as also 221(3) which is referred to in that section: "217. Interest payable by assessee when no estimate made. (1) Where, on making the regular assessment, the Income Tax Officer finds that any such person as is referred to in sub-s.(3) of S.212 has not sent the estimate referred to therein, simple interest at the rate of nine per cent per annum from the first day of April next following the financial year in which the advance tax was payable in accordance with the said provisions up to the date of the regular assessment shall be payable by the assessee upon the amount equal to the seventy-five per cent referred to in sub-s.(1) of S.215. Provided that the assessee shall not, under sub-s.(1) or this sub-section be deemed to be in default in respect of any amount of which the payment is deferred under S.213 until after the date communicated by him to the Income Tax Officer under that section." "212 (3). Any person who has not previously been assessed by way of regular assessment under this Act or under the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, shall, in each financial year, before the date on which the last instalment of advance tax is due in his case under sub-s.(1) of S.211, if his current income is likely to exceed the amount specified in sub-s.(2) of S.208, send to the Income Tax Officer an estimate of (i) the current income, and (ii) the advance tax payable by him on the current income calculated in the manner laid down in S.209. and shall pay such amount of advance tax as accords with his estimate on such of the dates applicable in his case under S.211 as have not expired, by instalments which may be revised according to sub-s.(2)." 7. The proviso to S.217 it is not contended, has any application. It is however emphasised that it is only those who are referred to in S.212(3) that will fall under S.217. This is evident from the wording of S.217. Counsel argued that S.212(3) can apply only to a financial year to which the Act would apply. This also appears to us on a plain reading of the section to be the meaning of S.212(3). This is evident from the wording of S.217. Counsel argued that S.212(3) can apply only to a financial year to which the Act would apply. This also appears to us on a plain reading of the section to be the meaning of S.212(3). But the question is whether we should take a literal meaning of S.212(3) or should understand the section to include the obligation caused by the corresponding section in the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. The matter is not exactly free from difficulty, but is now concluded by the decisions of the Supreme Court in Third Income Tax Officer, Mangalore v. M. Damodar Bhat (1969) 71 I.T.R. 806 and Jain Brothers and others v. Union of India and others. 1970 (77) ITR 107 8. In the first of these cases, the question that arose for consideration was whether S.156 of the Act will apply to tax that had to be paid in consequence of an order passed under the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. S.156 runs thus: "156. Notice of demand. When any tax, interest, penalty, fine or any other sum is payable in consequence of any order passed under this Act, the Income Tax Officer shall serve upon the assessee a notice of demand in the prescribed form specifying the sum so payable." The plain meaning of the words of the section is very clear; tax, interest, or penalty must be payable in consequence of an order passed under the Act. In Third Income Tax Officer, Mangalore v. M. Damodar Bhat ( 1970 (78) ITR 90 ) no amount by way of tax interest or penalty had become payable in consequence of any order passed under the Act. Nevertheless action was taken under the provisions of the Act and this was upheld by the Supreme Court on the ground that in order to give effect to the provision in S.297(2)(j) of the Act it is necessary to read the provision in S.156 mutatis mutandis and not in a strict or literal sense. S.297(2)(j) provides: "297(2). Notwithstanding the repeal of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the repealed Act), ... ... ... ... ... ... S.297(2)(j) provides: "297(2). Notwithstanding the repeal of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the repealed Act), ... ... ... ... ... ... (j) any sum payable by way of income tax, supertax, interest, penalty or otherwise under the repealed Act may be recovered under this Act, but without prejudice to any action already taken for the recovery of such sum under the repealed Act;" This is a clear provision enabling action being taken for recovery of income tax, supertax, interest or penalty imposed under the repealed Act. To give effect to this provision it was ruled that S.156 will have to be read or at least understood as enabling demand being made of tax, etc., due from an assessee in consequence of an order passed under the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. 9. Similarly dealing with S.271 of the Act read with S.297(2)(g) the Supreme Court came to the conclusion in Jain Brothers and others v. Union of India and others 2 that an assessee would be liable to penalty as provided by S.271(1) for the default mentioned in S.28(1) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. S.271(1)(a) of the Act only provides for action being taken for failure to furnish the return of the total income which the assessee was required to furnish under sub-s.(1) of S.139 or by notice given under sub-s.(2) of S.139 or S.148 or when without reasonable cause the assessee failed to furnish it within the time allowed and in the manner required by sub-s.(1) of S.139 or by such notice as the case may be. The argument Was that these provisions do not include a default under S.28 (1) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. This argument was negatived by the Supreme Court. 10. Jain Brothers and others v. Union of India and others2 was quoted with approval in the decision of the Supreme Court in C.I.T. v. Singh Engineering Works P. Ltd. ( 1970 (78) ITR 90 . The question therein was whether a default under S.18A of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 could be treated as a default under S.212 of the Act. The question therein was whether a default under S.18A of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 could be treated as a default under S.212 of the Act. After quoting a passage from Jain Brothers and others v. Union of India and others2 it was observed "In our judgment S.297(2)(g) is clearly applicable to the present case inasmuch as the assessment was completed on or after the first day of April, 1962. The provisions of the new Act contained in S.273 will apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings relating to penalty initiated in accordance with S.297(2)(g) of the new Act. 11. In view of these decisions we have to conclude that interest can be imposed under S.217 read with S.212(3) of the Act for a default of S.18A(3) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. Accordingly we answer question No. 2 also against the assessee and in favour of the department, that is in the affirmative. There will be no order as to costs. 12. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be sent to the Appellate Tribunal as required by sub-s.(1) of S.260 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.