NANDEESWARA TILES AGENCY v. TOWN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, BHADRAVATI AND HOLENARSIPUR
1971-11-25
GOVINDA BHAT, VENKATASWAMI
body1971
DigiLaw.ai
VENKATASWAMI, J. ( 1 ) IF These three petitions can be disposed of by a common order as they rise common questions. The petitioners are dealers in 'mangalore Tiles within the Municipal limits of the towns of Bhadravati and Holenarasipur. They are required to pay octroi duty on such tiles brought into the Municipal limits for sale or consumption, at the rate specified in certain Notifications issued by the concerned Municipal Councils. Aggrieved by the levy, the petitioners have approached this Court. ( 2 ) THE Notifications levying the Octroi in question are: (1) No. HC. PR. 17/67-68, dated 20th July 1967, issued by the Town Municipal Council. Bhadravati; and (2) No. A. PR. 75/66-67 dated 5-10-1966, issued by the town Municipal Council, Holenarasipur. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the said Notifications, the scheme of lew of octroi has provided for several modes of computation of such lew. They have prescribed, inter alia for rates of levy on the basis of ten Kgs of pross weight. ad valorem upto a maximum of 3 per cent and the number of articles per head. It may be mentioned that the of lew is in conformity with schedule II of the Mysore Municipalities Act, 1964. The entries with which we are immediately concerned, for the purpose of deciding the questions arising in the present petitions, are grouped in Class IV under the head "articles used in the construction of buildings". The said entries read thus:". Class IV Articles used in the construetinos of buildings. 10. Marble and tiles of all kinds (other than those referred in item 11) 0-15 Nps 11. Tiles of common earth e. g. country tiles (per thousand) 0-37 Nps (These entries are hereinafter referred to as merely entry 10 or 11 ). "it is to be mentioned that in regard to the items concerned in entry 10, the unit taken for computation of duty is "ten kilograms of gross weight", the rate of levy on each such unit being Rs. 0-15. ( 4 ) A few undisputed facts may be set out. "mangalore Tiles" are manufactured from special clay with the help of machinery. They are manufactured in factories set up for the purpose. They are only sold by numbers and never by weight. The price of such tiles is considerably lower than that of marble and ornamental, glazed and such other tiles.
"mangalore Tiles" are manufactured from special clay with the help of machinery. They are manufactured in factories set up for the purpose. They are only sold by numbers and never by weight. The price of such tiles is considerably lower than that of marble and ornamental, glazed and such other tiles. In terms of weight, "mangalore Tiles" weighing 1000 Kgs would cost Rs. 86-75 only, whereas the cost of marble tiles of the same weight would be Rs. 4,550. Though the actual cost of other types of tiles such as ornamental and glazed are not furnished, it is common knowledge that such tiles would cost considerably more than "mangalore Tiles". There is also another point of difference between "mangalore Tiles" and the other tiles comprised in entry 10. "mangalore Tiles" are exclusively used for roofing of houses and such other buildings, whereas, the other type of tiles are used mosly for flooring and ornamental purposes. It is also to be seen that "mangalore Tiles" differ from "country tiles", used for roofing purposes, r. 23 as the raw material used in the manufacture of such "mangalore Tiles" is special clay, whereas "country tiles" requires "common earth". ( 5 ) ON the basis of the aforesaid facts, the following contentions were urged on behalf of the petitioners, (1) that "mangalore Tiles" fall within entry 11 and therefore, for the purpose of levy of octroi duty, they should be treated on a par with " country tile" and (2) if octroi duty is levied on "mangalore Tiles" under entry 10, it would amount to treating unequal things as equal for the purpose of taxation, resulting in an imposition which is oppressive and unreasonable and, therefore, arbitrary, thus infringing the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 14 and 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution of India. ( 6 ) WE shall now proceed to deal with these contentions. Point No. 1: the contention urged on behalf of the petitioners is that octroi on "mangalore tiles" should be levied in accordance with entry 11, which specifically refers to tiles of "common earth", such as country tiles. The argument is that country tiles' are also manufactured from clay of inferior variety, pnd, therefore, they should be classed with "mangalore Tiles", which are also manufastured by clay, notwithstanding the fact that the clay used therein was of a special kind. We are unable to accept this contention.
The argument is that country tiles' are also manufactured from clay of inferior variety, pnd, therefore, they should be classed with "mangalore Tiles", which are also manufastured by clay, notwithstanding the fact that the clay used therein was of a special kind. We are unable to accept this contention. ( 7 ) IT is clear from entry 11 that only tiles manufactured from "common earth would fall within its ambit. Assuming that the country tiles' referred to in entry 11 can be manufactured by an inferior variety of clay, the Legislative intention that such inferior clay should be treated on a par with tiles made of "common earth" is sufficiently manifest by the entry itself, which clearly refers to "country tiles", by way of example. But the question is whether "mangalore Tiles" made out of special clav could be treated as tiles made of "common earth" so as to bring them under entry 11. It may be, in a broad manner of speaking, that 'earth1 may include 'day also. This, however, does not mean that such clay could be classed with what has been described in the entry as "common earth". We are supported in this view by the observations of the High Court of Calcutta in State of W. B, v. Jagadamba Prasad Singh, AIR. 1969 Cal. 281, 283, to the following effect:". . . The word clay is not identical with earth'. Some kind of earth may be clay. For example, earth mixed with water, or silt may be called clay. But while the definition of minor minerals includes a particular kind of clay namely "ordinary clay" under Schedule I the royalty is payable on "ordinary earth". Thus, even if the word 'earth, is wide enough to include 'clay' it cannot be said that "ordinary earth', is identical with "ordinary clay". In this case, we are not concerned with 'clay' in general, but only "ordinary clay". If 'clay' is a special kind of 'earth then it would be excluded from the expression "ordinary earth". Nobody ever speaks of "ordinary earth" as a mineral. In other words, the expression 'clay' may be included within the expression 'earth' but "ordinary earth" cannot be equated with "ordinary clay". . . . . " (underlining (italics) is ours ).
If 'clay' is a special kind of 'earth then it would be excluded from the expression "ordinary earth". Nobody ever speaks of "ordinary earth" as a mineral. In other words, the expression 'clay' may be included within the expression 'earth' but "ordinary earth" cannot be equated with "ordinary clay". . . . . " (underlining (italics) is ours ). We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that "mangalore Tiles" would not fall within the perview of entry 11 of the Notification as contended for on behalf of the petitioners. ( 8 ) POINT No. 2: The contention on behalf of the petitioners was that "mangalore Tiles" would not fall within entry 10. Even on the assumption that entry 10 governs the levy in regard to 'mangalore Tiles', the classification of Mangalore Tiles', with marble and other special tiles specified earlier, would be unreasonable in that unequal things have been treated as equal for the purpose of taxation. Further, the levy of octroi on Mangalore tiles' at the same rate as is appl cable to marble and other tiles, without reference to the differentiatin' factors between them, such as their nature, use and value, would be an imposition, which is oppressive, unreasonable and, therefore arbitrary. For these reasons, the levy of such duty would be clearly violative of Arts. 14 and 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. ( 9 ) WE are clearly of the view that this contention must be upheld as sound. It will be seen from entry 10, having regard to the broad sweep of the language used, that 'mangalore Tiles' would fall within the category of tiles of all kinds' excluding 'country tiles' governed by entry 11. It will further be seen that entry 10 takes within its ambit roofing tiles, flooring tiles and even ornamental tiles, whether made out of marble or any other material such as clay. We have earlier made reference to the difference in value of marble tiles and Mangalore Tiles' of equal weight of 1000 Kgs. and that they are Rs. 4,550 ant Rs. 86-75 respectively. The rate of levy in regard to them is one and the same and it is Rs. 0-15 per ten kilograms gross weight. Therefore, the aggregate amount of duty would be Rs. 15 in regard to 100 Kgs. of each of these articles. It will, therefore, be seen that 'mangalore Tiles' of the value of Rs.
86-75 respectively. The rate of levy in regard to them is one and the same and it is Rs. 0-15 per ten kilograms gross weight. Therefore, the aggregate amount of duty would be Rs. 15 in regard to 100 Kgs. of each of these articles. It will, therefore, be seen that 'mangalore Tiles' of the value of Rs. 86-75 would be paying the same duty as marble tiles of the value of Rs. 4,550. We do not see any rationale for this vast disparity between these two articles in the context of incidence of the duty. Further, it is to be seen from the scheme of Notifications in question, that in regard to levies made on ad valorem basis the maximum permissible is 3 per cent and not more. ( 10 ) IN the instant case, if the levy on the aforesaid articles is computed on an ad valorem basis, it would work out at 19 per cent in the case of 'mangalore Tiles' and only about 0-33 per cent in the care of marble trles. Such a vast disparity in the levies, when viewed in the eontext of the scheme of taxation concerned in the Notification in question is, it seems to us, highly unreasonable. A classification which brings about such a result cannot at all be said to be reasonable. Further, it follows from the above analysis that the incidence of such imposition on Mangalore Tiles' would be clearly oppressive, unreasonable and, therefore, arbitrary, thus infringing both Arts. 14 and 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. This conclusion of ours can also be supported by the principles laid down in a decision of this Court in Bhuvaneshwariah v. State of Mysore, (1964) 2 Mys. L. J. 470 which was later affirmed by the Supreme Court. The enunciation in question occurs at page 486 of the above report and runs thus:". . . As mentioned earlier, the taxation power of the State is one of the most comprehensive powers. But, that power like all other legislative powers is subject to the equality clause in the Constitution. If the taxation power is used in such a manner as to impose unequal burdens on things or persons similar, then its validity is open to challenge under Art. 14.
But, that power like all other legislative powers is subject to the equality clause in the Constitution. If the taxation power is used in such a manner as to impose unequal burdens on things or persons similar, then its validity is open to challenge under Art. 14. It is of the very essence of taxation that it be levied with equality and uniformity, and to this end, there should be some reasonable system of apportionment. When taxes are levied on property there must be an apportionment with reference to a unform standard or they degenerate into mere arbitrary exactions. Absolute equality of taxation can never be attained. That system is the best which comes the nearest to it. The same rules cannot be applied to the listing and valuation of all kinds of property. The object should be to place the burden so that it will bear as nearly as possible equally upon all. For this purpose different systems adjusted with reference to the valuation of different kinds of property may be adopted, the essence of the matter being that there should be equality of taxation or somthing very near to it. Classification is an unavoidable concomitant of an exercise of its taxing powers by the State. The general limitation imposed by the constitutional provisions is that classification for tax purposes must be reasonable if it is to be held valid. A prohibited degree of inequality may result from ignoring differences relevant to taxation. Similar treatment of dissimilar tax subjects may be as invalid as the dissimilar treatment of similar tax subjects. " (Underlining (italics) is ours ). ( 11 ) IN the result, the petitions succeed and are allowed. In our view, it is unnecessary to strike down the said entry 10 in order to grant reliefs to the petitioners herein, and it is sufficient for us to issue a writ in the nature of Mandamus to each of the Responden-Municipal Councils to forbear from leving, demanding or collecting octroi duty on 'mangalore tiles under entry 10 of the Notification providing for the levy, and further to refund the amounts if any, collected from the petitioners as octroi on 'mangalore Tiles' It is ordered accordingly. No costs. --- *** --- .