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1971 DIGILAW 361 (KAR)

G. N. GUDIGAR v. STATE OF MYSORE

1971-12-06

MALIMATH, NARAYANA PAI

body1971
NARAYANA PAI, J. ( 1 ) THE first group of writ petitions relates to a selection made by the mysore Public Service Commission in respect of 140 posts of Health Officers class II-cum-Assistant Surgeons Grade II pursuant to a notification or advertisement dt. the 21st of January 1970 published in the Mysore gazette dt. the 5th of February 1970. ( 2 ) THE second group of writ petitions relates to a selection made by the Mysore Public Service Commission in respect of 58 posts of Assistant dental Surgeons pursuant to a notification or advertisement dt. the 4th of January 1971, published in the Mysore Gazette dated the 14th of january 1971. ( 3 ) BOTH the groups have been heard together for the reasons that the legal contentions raised in both are the same. ( 4 ) IN both the cases, selections were made under or in accordance with the Mysore State Civil Service (Direct Recruitment by Selection) rules, 1967. In both the cases reservations in favour of Backward Classes were made pursuant to or in accordance with a notification of the State government No. GAD 177 SSR 62, dt. 16th September 1963. ( 5 ) THE contentions raised are : (1) The classification of Backward Classes in the manner required by the notification dt. 16th of September 1963 mentioned above is invalid; (2) that Rule 6 of the Mysore Civil Services (Direct Recruitment by Selection) Rules, 1967, is invalid because it is vitiated by a delegation of essential legislative function by the Governor under the proviso to art. 309 of the Constitution; and (3) Rules 6 and 7 of the said rules together operate in such a way as to bring about an infringement of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. ( 6 ) ON the facts of the case, the alternative argument in the event of the Court holding against the petitioners on the legal contentions mentioned above is that the interview by the Public Service Commission in the case of the petitioners all of whom have had a very good academic record was or must, in the circumstances, be regarded as a mere pretence or make-believe or in any event quite opposed to what may be regarded as the proper and correct objective of the interview prescribed under the Rules. ( 7 ) WE shall first discuss the legal contentions. ( 7 ) WE shall first discuss the legal contentions. ( 8 ) THE classification or criteria or method for determination of citizens as belonging to Backward Classes, may be gathered from the second paragraph of the notification dt. the 16th of September 1963 mentioned above. The said paragraph reads as follows: " Government have since reviewed the whole position regarding the classification of Backward Classes. Art. 16 (4) of the Constitution provides for reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward Class of citizens which in the opinion of the State is not adequately represented in the service of the State. It is necessary therefor to decide what should be the criterion for backwardness and thereafter determine whether any and if so, which of the classes are inadequately represented in the service. As regards the criteria for backwardness it has been held that caste alone cannot be the criterion for deciding backwardness under Art. 16 (4) of the Constitution. In view of this, Government feel that backwardness should be based on income and occupation of the parents guardians of a candidate applying for a post under the State Government service. Government have therefore decided that a candidate whose parent's guardian's income is Rs. 1200 per annum or less and who (parent guardian) is engaged in one of the occupations mentioned below, viz. , :. (1) Actual cultivator; (2) Artisan; (3) Petty businessman; (4) Inferior services (Class IV in Government services and corresponding class of any service in private employment) including casual labour; and (5) Any other occupation involving manual labour, should be considered as Backward for the purpose of Article16 (4) of the Constitution. This class constitutes a majority of the citizens specially in the rural areas and it is an accepted fact that their representation in the service is well below their proportion to the population of the State. " it will be seen that the criteria adopted are poverty and nature of occupation. That the said criteria are quite relevant and the selection of the same for determination of Backward Classes is not open to any attack of unconstitutionality is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Balaji v. State of My sore, AIR 1963 SC 649 . The same view is reiterated in the two subsequent rulings of the Supreme Court viz. The same view is reiterated in the two subsequent rulings of the Supreme Court viz. , that of chitralekha v. State of Mysore, AIR. 1964 SC. 1823. and Triloki Nath v. State of J and K, AIR 1967 SC 1283 . The effect of all these cases is that whereas a classification on the basis of caste alone might be open to constitutional prohibition against favours or disfavours on the basis of caste, the real and substantial source of backwardness both socially and educationally is poverty and the nature of occupation. ( 9 ) INDEED it is not the argument of Mr. Rama Jois on behalf of the petitioners that there is anything wrong or unconstitutional in selecting these two criteria. His only attack against the validity of this notification is that whereas in the notification now impugned relating to the topic of classification of Backward Classes for purposes of Art. 16 (4) the criterion of income is limited to that of the parent or guardian alone cf the candidate applying for a post under the State Government, in a previous notification go. No. ED 75 TGL 63 dt. 26th July 1963 on the topic of classification of Backward classes for purposes of Art. 15 (4) of the Constitution, the said criterion of income is related to the income of the entire family of the person who seeks admission into an educational institution. Dealing with the said matter, the previous notification of 26th July 1963 states " The per capita income of the State for the year 1961 was Rs. 266 per annum. Taking an average family to consist of 5 members, the average income of the family comes to Rs. 1,330 per year. Even though this income is low having regard to the present day cost of living, government are of the opinion that a family whose income is Rs. 1,200 per annum or less can be regarded as a family that is economically backward. " although the notification does not define what a family is, the term has been the subject of interpretation in the reported rulings of this Court and no questions arise in regard to it. ( 10 ) WHAT follows from the two notifications is that whereas a person would belong to a Backward Class for purposes of Art. 15 (4) of the constitution if the total income of his family does not exceed Rs. ( 10 ) WHAT follows from the two notifications is that whereas a person would belong to a Backward Class for purposes of Art. 15 (4) of the constitution if the total income of his family does not exceed Rs. 1200 per annum, a person would belong to such a class for purposes of Art. 16 (. 4) if the income of his parent or guardian does not exceed Rs. 1200 per annum even though the total income of his family may exceed the said figure. ( 11 ) IT is common ground that the validity of the notification dated 26th July 1963 has been upheld by this Court in certain decisions to which it is unnecessary to make reference. ( 12 ) ON this basis it has been argued by Mr. Rama Jois that the second notification of 16th September 1963 cannot possibly be upheld. His main contention is that the protected classes both for purposes of Art. 15 (4) and for Art. 16 (4) are classes which are educationally and socially backward, that once a class is determined as socially and educationally backward class it must be regarded as at once entitled to the protection both under Art. 15 (4) and Art. 16 (4) and that, therefore, a situation where a class which is entitled to protection under Art. 15 (4) does not become entitled to protection under Art. 16 (4) or vice versa is opposed to the clear intendment of the Constitution. He relies upon certain obbservations of the Supreme Court in the case of Triloki Nath (3) already referred to. ( 13 ) AS in the last analysis, Mr. Rama Joi's argument is based largely if not exclusively on the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the judgment in the case of Triloki Nath (2), it would be desirable in the first instance to see whether the said observations actually yield the inference which Mr. Rama Jois wishes to draw therefrom. These paragraphs read: " (6) Decided cases have laid down ceratin tests for ascertaining whether a particular class is a backward class or not. Though the decision in M. R. Balaji v. State of Mysore ( (1963)Supp. (1) SCR 439; air. 1963 SC 649), turned upon Art. 15 (4) of the Constitution, the principles laid down therein will equally apply to the facts of the present case. Though the decision in M. R. Balaji v. State of Mysore ( (1963)Supp. (1) SCR 439; air. 1963 SC 649), turned upon Art. 15 (4) of the Constitution, the principles laid down therein will equally apply to the facts of the present case. There this Court held that backwardness under Art. 15 (4) must be social and political and that social backwardness was in the ultimate analysis the result of poverty to a very large extent. In the context of admission to educational institutions this Court held that speaking generally in a broad way the provision for reservation should be less than 50 per cent and that actual percentage should depend upon the prevailing circumstances in each case. (7) The decision in R. Chitrlekha v. State of Mysore, (1964) 6 scr. 368 : (AIR. 1964 SC. 1823), also turned upon the interpretation of Art. 15 (4) of the Constitution. In that case the Government of mysore laid down that classification of socially and educationally backward classes should be made on the following basis: (i) economic conditions, and (ii) occupation. But the order of the Government did not take into consideration the caste of the applicant as one of the criteria for backwardness. This Court pointed out that though the caste of a group of citizens might be a relevant circumstance in ascertaining their social backwardness, it could not be the sole or the dominant test in that behalf. This Court accepted the criteria adopted by the Mysore Government for ascertaining the backwardness of a class. The argument advanced on behalf of the State, namely, that the difference in the phraseology used in Art. 15 (4) and Art. 16 (4), namely, socially and educationally backward classes in the former and backward classes in the latter, leads to the inevitable conclusion that "backward classes" of citizens in Art. 16 (4) are only such classes of citizens who are not adequately represented in the services of the State does not appeal to us. The sole test of backwardness under Art. 16 (4), the argument proceeds is the inadequacy of representation in the services under the State that is to say, however, advanced a particular class of citizens, socially and educationally, may be, if that class is not adequately represented in the services under the State, it is a backward class. The sole test of backwardness under Art. 16 (4), the argument proceeds is the inadequacy of representation in the services under the State that is to say, however, advanced a particular class of citizens, socially and educationally, may be, if that class is not adequately represented in the services under the State, it is a backward class. This contention, if accepted, would exclude the really backward classes from the benefit of the provision and confer the benefit only on a class of citizens who, though rich and cultured, have taken to other avocations of life. It is, therefore, necessary to satisfy two conditions to attract Cl. (4) of Art. 16, namely, (i) a class of citizens is backward, i. e. , socially and educationally, in the sense explained in balaji's case (supra); and (ii) the said class is not) adequately represented in the services under the State. " ( 14 ) SO far as the actual decision of the Supreme Court is concerned, what is clear from the passage extracted above is that inadequate representation in the services under the State is an additional criterion for making reservations and not the sole criterion for ascertaining backward classes. It is also pointed out that the expression 'backward class' in Art. 16 (4) meant classes which are socially and educationally backward. ( 15 ) TO take the next step that once the State determines a class as socially and educationally backward for any one of the purposes of Art 15, it is obligwed to treat the same class without any difference whatever as the class socially and educationally backward for purposes of reservation under Art. 16 (4) also is not in our opinion logically possible on a close reading of the observations of the Supreme Court extrated above in the light of the texts of the Articles themselves. ( 16 ) FOR a fuller understanding of the matter, it is necessary to read the entire Arts. 14, 15 and 16. ( 17 ) IT will be seen that Art. 14 has an operation of widest amplitude. Equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India is extended to every person whether he is a citizen of india or not. Arts. 15 and 16 are limited to citizens. 14, 15 and 16. ( 17 ) IT will be seen that Art. 14 has an operation of widest amplitude. Equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India is extended to every person whether he is a citizen of india or not. Arts. 15 and 16 are limited to citizens. Art. 14 as is well established does not prohibit classification subject to the conditions that the same is based on an intelligible criterion or criteria reasonably related to the object of the legislation. Arts. 15 (1) and 16 (2) are in the nature of exceptions to the said rule of classification because they prohibit discrimination against a citizen solely on the ground of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them. Art. 15 (2) gives specific instances of discrimination on such grounds and prohibits the same. Art. 29 (2) gives another specific instance, namely, admission info any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion race caste language or any of them. Clause (4 ). of Art. 15 refers comprehensively to the general provisions of art. 15 (1) and the specific instances thereof in clause (2) of Art. 15 as well as in clause (2) of Art. 29 and empowers the State to make an exception for the benefit or advancement of any socially or educationally backward class of citizens, etc. ( 18 ) ARTICLE 16 is limited to the topic of employment or appointment to any office under the State. The exception provided for in clause (4) of art. 16 therefore is likewise limited to the fundamental right of equality of opportunity with respect to only one matter, namely, employment or appointment under the State. ( 19 ) THE difference therefore between clause (4) of Art. 15 and clause (4) of Art. 16 thus becomes quite clear. Whereas the fundamental right under Art. 16 as well as the exception thereto under clause (4) thereof are limited to a single topic the fundamental right under Art. 15 is of a wider range and in respect of several topics provision for an exception under clause (4) is not compulsory but an enabling rule. It is not necessary that the State should make exception in respect of all topics. It is not necessary that the State should make exception in respect of all topics. It is open to it to make an exception having regard to the conditions prevailing in the State in respect of only one or more topics. ( 20 ) IN this State, the exception under clause (4) of Art. 15 given effect to under the notification of 26th July 1963 is limited to the topic of admission into a selected category of educational institutions a topic which is within the general range of Art. 15 and also specifically dealt with in Art. 29 (2 ). Paragraph 6 of the said notification reads: "as regards the quantum of reservation, Government consider that it would be reasonable to reserve 30 per cent of the seats in Professional and technical Colleges and Institutions for the Backward classes who answer the criteria mentioned above. . . . . . . " the clearly expressed object of the notification of 26th July 1963 therefore is that for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes determined in accordance with the criteria mentioned in the said notification a reservation of 30 per cent of the seats in Professional and Technical colleges and Institutions should be made. The notification, cannot therefore operate or made to operate in respect of the field covered by Art. 16 nor was it intended to operate that way. ( 21 ) WHEN in Triloki Nath's case the Court describes the backward class as socially and educationally backward in the sense explained in balaji's case all that it means, in our opinion, is that the social and educational backwardness is ultimately traceable to poverty and nature of the occupation as explained in Balaji's case. The fact that in Balaji's case the court dealt with the reservations under Art. 15 (4) in respect of admissions into certain educational institutions does not and cannot mean that their lordships in Triloki Nath's case intended to hold that there could be only one determination of classes for protection both under Art. 15 (4) and under Art. 16 (4 ). In other words, the character of the tests, namely, poverty and rature of the occupation are the same. There is no prohibition against applying different figures of income or larger or smaller number of occupations provided the former has relation to poverty and the latter has relation to a tendency for backwardness. In other words, the character of the tests, namely, poverty and rature of the occupation are the same. There is no prohibition against applying different figures of income or larger or smaller number of occupations provided the former has relation to poverty and the latter has relation to a tendency for backwardness. ( 22 ) THERE can also be no possible objection of any violation of Art. 14 because the topic of admission into educational institutions is quite different from the topic of employment under the State. As observed by the supreme Court in the case of All India Station Masters' and Assistant station Masters' Association v. General Manager, Central Railway AIR. 1960 Supreme Court 384, the concept of equality can have no existence except with reference to matters which are common as between individuals, between whom equality is predicated. ( 23 ) HAVING regard to the prevailing economic conditions, we have no hesitation in holding that an annual income of Rs. 1,200 of the parent or guardian of the applicant for employment under the State is low enough to establish that the applicant belongs to a socially and educationally backward class taken along with the nature of the occupation specified in the notification. As parents alone ordinarily meet the needs of children the reference to parent's income is logical or realistic. It does not cease to be so for reason only of the fact that certain other members of the family or even the applicant has acquired some earning capacity. ( 24 ) THE next attack on the said notification is that the Government do not appear to have applied their mind to the question of what may be regarded as adequate representation and determine that the socially and educationally backward classes are not adequately represented in the service of the State. The criticism is that the Government notification merely states that it is an accepted fact that the representation of these classes in the services is- well below the proportion to the population of the State. It appears to us that in the context the expression 'accepted fact' merely means a fact which is so obvious that anybody who looks at it will accept it as correct. It appears to us that in the context the expression 'accepted fact' merely means a fact which is so obvious that anybody who looks at it will accept it as correct. If regard be had to the fact that the backward classes identified by the criteria mentioned in the notification are so poor as to be unable to secure the minimum educational qualification for recruitment into Government service, it does not require much argument or demonstration to prove that their representation in the Government service is inadequate. Further, as the Government may be expected to have full and clear information about its own employees, one need not ioubt their statement that these backward classes are not adequately represented in the services. It does not, therefore, merit Mr. Rama Jois's crticism that this is a mere assertion incapable of verification even on primafacie material. ( 25 ) THE challenge made, therefore, against the validity of the Government notification No. GAD 177 SSR. 62 dt. 16th September 1963 fails and is rejected. ( 26 ) WE come now to the other contentions related to the Mysore civil Services (Direct Recruitment by Selection) Rules. Selection under these rules is made in respect of posts to be filled by direct, recruitment when the special rules applicable to the posts in question do not prescribe any particular method of selection. Under Rule 4, recruitment is to be made on the basis of selection after interview which may be either by the public Service Commission or an Advisory or Selection Committee or the appointing Authority, as the case may be. In the present case, the selections are made by, the Mysore Public Service Commission. Rule 5 indicates how eligibility of candidates for interview should be determined. It is done on the basis of the performance of the applicants at the qualifving examination. They are arranged under that rule according to merit. Candidates equal in number to four times the notified vacancies are declared to be eligible for interview. ( 27 ) THE impugned Rules 6 and 7 read as follows: " 6. lnteruiew The selecting Authority shall interview the eligible candidates selected under Rule 5. The object of such interview is to assess the suitability of the candidates for appointment to the cadre or post applied for by them and their calibre including intellectual and social traits of personality. " 7. lnteruiew The selecting Authority shall interview the eligible candidates selected under Rule 5. The object of such interview is to assess the suitability of the candidates for appointment to the cadre or post applied for by them and their calibre including intellectual and social traits of personality. " 7. List of selected candidates The Selecting Authority shall on the basis of the marks obtaining at the interview under Rule 6 and taking into consideration the orders in force relating to reservation of posts for Schedule Castes, Schedule Tribes and Backward Classes, prepare, in the order of merit a list of candidates eligible for appointment to the cadre or post. (The rest of the rule is immaterial for our present purpose ). " ( 28 ) THE argument in support of the invalidity of these rules, briefly stated, is that the 6th rule is totally devoid of any guidance to the interviewing authority as to the manner in which the suitability of candidates is to be assessed and that the said lack of guidance taken along with the fact that under the 7th rule marks obtained at the interview under R. 6 become the sole basis for selection inevitably lead to whimsical or arbitrary selections which necessarily involve an infraction of the fundamental right of equality of opportunity both under Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is said that the proper thing to do was or would have been to make provision for taking into account performance at the qualifying examination along wich the performance at the interview and that for the said purpose express provision should have been made for the subjects or topics of interview, the total number of marks for the interview and the distribution of those marks among such subjects or topics. It is contended that what is so formulated is not for a better method of selection but an absolute necessity for purposes of ensuring that the guarantee of equality of opportunity under Arts. 14 and 16 is not whittled down or denied. ( 29 ) MANY cases have been cited. It is contended that what is so formulated is not for a better method of selection but an absolute necessity for purposes of ensuring that the guarantee of equality of opportunity under Arts. 14 and 16 is not whittled down or denied. ( 29 ) MANY cases have been cited. But from the point of view of statement of principle, it appears to us that two cases may be taken up for study in the first instance, namely, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case Chitralekha v. State of Mysore (2) and that of K. Panduranga v. State of Mysore, 1968 1 Mys. L. J. 159. After ascertaining and stating the principles as enunciated in these two cases, we may proceed to consider the other cases cited by the Counsel. ( 30 ) THE case of Chitralekha (2) dealt with an interview for purposes of admission into an educational institution. According to the rules for such admission, five topics namely, (1) General Knowledge, (2) Aptitude and personality, (3) Previous academic career including special distinctions, etc. , (4) NCC. , ACC. , etc. , and (5) Extra curricular activities including sports, social service, debating, dramatics, etc. , were prescribed as matters to be considered at the interview for all of which a maximum of 75 marks was prescribed and the ultimate selection depended upon the total of the marks at the qualifying examination and at the interview. The provision for interview was attacked as one fraught with grave dangers of exercise of caprice, arbitrariness and even mala fides. Dealing with these arguments and rejecting the same, the Court observed: " In the field of education there are divergent views as regards the mode of testing the capacity and calibre of students in the matters of admissions to Colleges. Orthodox educationsists stand by the marks obtained by a student in the annual examination. The modern trend of opinion insists upon other additional tests, such as interview, performance in extra-curricular activities, personality test, phsychiatric tests etc. Obviously we are not in a position to judge which method is preferable or which test is the correct one. If there can be manipulation or dishonesty in allotting marks at interviews, there can equally be manipulation in the matter of awarding marks in the written examinations. Obviously we are not in a position to judge which method is preferable or which test is the correct one. If there can be manipulation or dishonesty in allotting marks at interviews, there can equally be manipulation in the matter of awarding marks in the written examinations. In the ultimate analysis, whatever method is adopted its success depends on the moral standards of the members constituting the selection committee and their sense of objectivity and devotion to duty. This criticism is a mere reflection on the examiners than on the system itself. The scheme of selection, however perfect it may be on paper, may be abused in practice. That it is capable of abuse is not a ground for quashing it. So long as the order lays down relevant objective criteria and entrusts the business of selection to qualified persons, this Court cannot obviously have any say in the matter. In this case the criteria laid down by the Government are certainly relevant in the matter of awarding marks at the interview. Learned counsel contends that the ability of a student on the basis of the said criteria can be better judged by other methods like certificate from the NCC. Commander or a medical board or a psychiatrist and should not be left to a body like the selection committee which cannot possibly arrive at the correct conclusion in a short time that would be available to it. This criticism does not affect the validity of the criteria, but only suggests a different method of applying the criteria than that adopted by the Committee. It is not for us to say which method should be adopted; that must be left to the authority concerned. " two principles that clearly flow from these observations are (1) that the relevant objective criteria must be laid down and (2) that the business of selection should be entrusted to qualified persons. ( 31 ) IN the case of Panduranga (4), the matter considered was a selection to the post of Assistant Commercial Tax Officer under the Mysore recruitment of Gazetted Probationers Rules, 1959. Under the rules, selection had to be made by the Public Service Commission after conducting a competitive examination consisting of a written examination in general knowledge and a viva voce. The maximum marks for the written examination was 200 and the viva voce 100. Under the rules, selection had to be made by the Public Service Commission after conducting a competitive examination consisting of a written examination in general knowledge and a viva voce. The maximum marks for the written examination was 200 and the viva voce 100. The object of the viva voce, according to note (ii) to Rule 4 of the above rules is "to assess the suitability of the can- dates for appointment to the Gazetted Cadre and their calibre including intellectual, social and moral traits of personality, such as critical powers of assimilation, clear and logical exposition, judgment, variety and depth of interests and capacity for leadership"; The rule regarding the viva voce examination as well as the examination itself were attacked as invalid. Among various arguments in support thereof wera the arguments that rule 4 relating thereto did not specify the subject for viva voce which the governor alone could prescribe and that the viva voce in that case did not involve the application of any objective standards by the application of which the required qualities of candidates could be gathered. Both these arguments were rejected by the Court. The Court also indicated the clear difference between viva voce as an examination or test of the knowledge and viva voce for purposes of selection for appointment to a post. It was observed: " The Latin expression ''viva voce' when used as a noun means an oral examination, which more often than not supplements a written examination and is believed to be an efficacious instrument for the estimation of suitability for a civil post. Sometimes, the subject for the viva voce is the same as that for the written examination as it happens in the case of University examinations, and sometimes not. The purpose of the viva voce however, is the discovery of abilities and deficiencies not displayed by the performance in the written examination. But there is another species of a viva voce. That viva voce which is normally preferred for assisting recruitment to the services is a test devised for the assessment of abilities, aptitudes, attainments and accomplishments of the candidate, in spheres which have relevance to suitability in the context of responsibilities and duties of the post which he seeks. But there is another species of a viva voce. That viva voce which is normally preferred for assisting recruitment to the services is a test devised for the assessment of abilities, aptitudes, attainments and accomplishments of the candidate, in spheres which have relevance to suitability in the context of responsibilities and duties of the post which he seeks. The purpose of this viva voce is to evaluate those qualities, while the viva voce or the written examination in a specified subject, measures the ability of the candidate to remember the volume of knowledge in a specified subject in which the examination is conducted, and, his capacity for the organisation of that knowledge and its application in a suitable way. The viva voce of this pattern can have thus no subject as such, for, its purpose is not to assess scholarship or learning but, the evaluation of qualities which contribute to suitability for the appointment which he seeks. " ( 32 ) REFERRING to Note (ii) of Rule 4 setting out the object of viva voce, the Court observed: " The standards which Note (ii) enumerates are not irrelevant and it is plain that a viva voce for which a specified subject is named, is quite inapposite to the assessment of the multitude of attributes to which that note refers. It can reveal no more than the candidate's real academic equipment in that subject. But the profile which displays his other strengths and weakness which have materiality, is supplied only by a viva voce which has a more general background than the one provided by the prescription of a subject. That viva voce is a more efficacious diagnostic instrument for the estimation of those other qualities and, we see no reason to take the view that the more comprehensive viva voce such as the one conducted by the Public Service commission, is excluded by R. 4 of the Gazetted Probationers Rules. " ( 33 ) IN Chandrasekhara v. State of Mysore, 1962 Mys. L. J. 87. which dealt with the selection of persons for appointment as Munsiffs by a competitive examination conducted by the Public Service Commissioner, the infirmity noticed was that the Rule making authority the Governor had not prescribed the minimum marks for a pass described as minimum qualifying marks. The public Service Commission itself proceeded to fix those qualifying marks. L. J. 87. which dealt with the selection of persons for appointment as Munsiffs by a competitive examination conducted by the Public Service Commissioner, the infirmity noticed was that the Rule making authority the Governor had not prescribed the minimum marks for a pass described as minimum qualifying marks. The public Service Commission itself proceeded to fix those qualifying marks. This Court while holding that the Commission could not do the same observed: " If the prescription of an examination is an important matter, as it is admitted to be, the fixation of the qualifying marks which is a material step in the process of prescription and without which the holding of an examination, like the one held in this case, would become unmeaning and purposeless, is a matter equally important. Among those to be taken for prescribing an examination, the fixation of the qualifying marks is a cardinal step and I cannot imagine anything of greater import and consequence in the scheme of an exami' nation than the specification of the qualifying marks which formulates a standard. " earlier in the same judgment, the Court had observed: " The basic purpose of every competitive examination for whatever purpose it is held, is the selection of the worthiest person, the machinery of the examination being adopted for the assessment of a candidate's competence proficiency and attainment. A competitive examination is a well-known system designed to measure merit and for the appraisement and evaluation of proficiency. Only those persons who possess the required standard of excellence assessed on no other basis than their performance in the examination can be declared as having succeeded in the examination. One method for the required appraisement of merit is the prescription of a minimum standard, such as minimum qualifying marks. In Channappa v. State of Mys. , 1963 Mys. L. J. Supp. 170. which was also a case which dealt with an examination required under the Recruitment Rules for promotion, the court pointed out that merely to say that promotion will be made on passing of 'an examination' was insufficient prescription without prescribing the pattern and nature of examination to be conducted for the purpose. ( 34 ) THE two cases of Periakaruppan Cheinar v. State of Tamil nadu, AIR. 1971 SC. 2303 and 2085. the earlier one reported at page 2303 and the later at page 2085 of AIR. ( 34 ) THE two cases of Periakaruppan Cheinar v. State of Tamil nadu, AIR. 1971 SC. 2303 and 2085. the earlier one reported at page 2303 and the later at page 2085 of AIR. 1971 Supreme Court, lay down that when there are several different tests like sports, extra curricular activities and general physical condition, etc. , for an interview to admission into an education institution and the rules prescribed a total number of marks for the entire interview it was held that the marks should be, in the absence of prescription by the rule making authority, divided equally between the several tests or topics and marks would be allotted item-wise. In laying down that proposition, the Supreme Court approved the same view taken by this Court in the case of D. G. Viswanath v. Chief Secretary, Govt of Mysore, 1963 2 Mys. L. J. 302. ( 35 ) NOW it is upon these cases and the principles derivable therefrom that mr. Rama Jois insists that the prescription of total number of marks and also the distribution thereof among various topics or subjects prescribed for interview is an essential legislative function which the governor himself should have discharged and not left to be prescribed or selected by the Public Service Commission or other authority making the selection under the rules in question. It is also his further case that the indication of subjects or topics for interview and the allocation of marks as aforesaid is quite essential for the purpose of preventing arbitrary exercise of power by the selecting authority. ( 36 ) THE question is whether the proposition made in such absolute terms by Mr. Rama Jois receives support from the decisions referred to above. ( 37 ) AS already pointed out by us, the minimum requirement of law is that there must be an indication of objective tests which are relevant to the object of the selection and that the selection must be made by qualified person or persons competent to apply the tests. An application of these principles to varying circumstances and different examinations and selections made for different purposes may take different shapes or forms in the light of the object of the selection, and the nature of the interview or viva voce. An application of these principles to varying circumstances and different examinations and selections made for different purposes may take different shapes or forms in the light of the object of the selection, and the nature of the interview or viva voce. It appears to us therefore that to say that the law can be stated in such wide terms is neither accurate nor desirable. ( 38 ) BEFORE one could apply the law one should first have the clear idea of the nature and purpose of the interview under consideration or investigation. ( 39 ) NOW as indicated in the case of Panduranga (4), the latin term 'viva voce' and the English word 'interview' may mean the same thing. But the exact purpose of the same depends upon whether it is part of an examination, what the purpose of the said examination is and whether the interview is intended to test one's knowledge or to assess one's qualities for a particular employment or course of study. ( 40 ) IF an examination, particularly a competitive examination is made up of two parts, namely, written examination and oral examination and both of them are intended to test the knowledge, and extent or depth of knowledge of a person in the subjects of examination, then undoubtedly the prescription of marks is an inevitable necessity. The Rule making authority must make up its mind as to the relative importance of a written test and the oral test and distribute the marks between the two according to its idea on such relative importance. Same may be the position in the case of an examination either for recruitment or for promotion because in that case also it is necessary for the rule making authority to indicate the nature and pattern of the examination. There again, if the rule making authority prescribes both written and oral tests and considers that the knowledge of the person should be tested both in written and oral tests, it will have to prescribe marks. There again, if the rule making authority prescribes both written and oral tests and considers that the knowledge of the person should be tested both in written and oral tests, it will have to prescribe marks. ( 41 ) THE case of Panduranga (4) already considered is an illustration where there was a written test for general knowledge and a viva voce for testing the various qualities of a person bearing upon his suitability for the post enumerated in the second note to Rule 4 there considered which we have extracted and this Court pointed out that there is no such thing as a subject for an interview intended merely for testing the suitability of a person. Although many qualities were enumerated in the said second note to Rule 4 of the Gazetted Probationers Recruitment Rules, there was only single total of 100 marks for all of them, and there was no question of dividing the marks between the various qualities indicated for suitability. ( 42 ) FINALLY, if the interview is purely for selection for appointment to a post and the object of the interview is not to test the knowledge of the applicant in any subject or subjects but only to assess his suitability for the post, the absolute necessity of prescribing marks either in lump or subjectwar does not, in our opinion, exist. For one thing, the object of the interview is not to test the knowledge of the applicant but his suitability for the post. Suitability for the post is the possession of various qualities which go to make the man suitable to discharge the duties and responsibilities of the post for which the selection is being made. Such suitability does not depend upon any single quality nor is it possible to say any one quality is more important than another or that all the qualities are of equal importance. Ultimately it is the totality of the various qualities that go to make up the idea of suitabilty for a given post. ( 43 ) SUCH being the position, it appears to us to be highly illogical to say that the mere enumeration of possible qualities, which have a bearing upon the suitability of a person for a post must be regarded as an enumeration of different subjects for examination making it necessary to allot lumpsum marks or separate marks for each one of them. ( 44 ) WHEN the prescription of marks therefore is neither a logical necessity nor of practical utility in the matter of affording guidance, it is perfectly obvious that the prescription of marks is not the method for preventing arbitrary exercise of power or discretion. That result has to be achieved by other known human Qualities of the selecting authority such as experience, knowledge of the responsibilities and duties of the post for which selection is being made and the capacity to notice existence of such qualities in the candidates and to evaluate them appropriately which constitute the only known method of ensuring proper exercise of the power. That can be done bv entrusting the business of selection to persons of known experience, integrity and capacity. ( 45 ) IN the present case that task of making selection has been entrusted to the Public Service Commission a body of high status composed of men of experience and knowledge about administration and the needs of administration and the appropriate duties and responsibilities of various offices under the State for which it is called upon to make selections. ( 46 ) OBJECTIVE test of suitability is the possession of qualities which go to make up suitability, regard being had for the nature of the post and the duties and responsibilities attaching thereto. The mentioning of calibre and traits of personality are by way of guidance, and they are stated in general terms for the obvicus reason that standards vary from post to post. Evaluation of qualities relatively as between several candidates has necessarily to be by assigning marks. As suitability is the single objective of the interview and as the various qualities contributing to it are not; subjects as in the case of examination of knowledge, prescription of marks is not in our opinion, an essential matter. ( 47 ) FOR all these reasons, we do not think that the validity of Rules 6 and 7 of the Mysore Civil Services (Direct Recruitment by Selection) rules, 1967, is Open to challenge. We hold that the said Rules are valid. ( 47 ) FOR all these reasons, we do not think that the validity of Rules 6 and 7 of the Mysore Civil Services (Direct Recruitment by Selection) rules, 1967, is Open to challenge. We hold that the said Rules are valid. ( 48 ) IN considering the last argument that the interview in the case of the petitioners herein must be regarded as a pretence or make-believe, the first matter to be borne in mind is that in none of the affidavits in any one of these cases is there any suggestion of mala fides or bias or dishonesty on the part of any of the members of the Public Service Commission who made the selection, or on the part of the Dean of the Medical College who sat with them to assist them. All the arguments about alleged arbitrariness resulting in the interview being a mere pretence are in actual event related to or derived from the main case of the petitioner about the invalidity of rules 5 and 6 and the alleged inherence of the vice of the arbitrariness in the rules themselves. The further elaboration of this argument that no marks had been prescribed, that the allotment of marks in one lump by the Commission in respect of all the different qualities enumerated in the rule is bad, and that the said type of marking is inherently arbitrary are also part of the same case of alleged invalidity of the rules themselves. ( 49 ) THE only substantial question of fact on the basis of which certain inferences are sought to be drawn is that all the petitioners have had a good academic record and that according to their expectation they stood a very good chance of being selected. At first flush, the matter does appear to call for scrutiny or investigation. It should, however, be remembered that all the applicants did not appear for examinations in the same year or, answered the same questions. The academic record or performance of the petitioners at the final examinations cannot therefore be regarded as to conclusive of their superiority over other applicants as to warrant the suggestion that their elimination from the selection should necessarily be related to arbitrary exercise of power by the Commission or any one of the members of the Commission. The academic record or performance of the petitioners at the final examinations cannot therefore be regarded as to conclusive of their superiority over other applicants as to warrant the suggestion that their elimination from the selection should necessarily be related to arbitrary exercise of power by the Commission or any one of the members of the Commission. ( 50 ) ANOTHER approach made to the same question or the same problem by the learned Counsel appearing for different petitioners has been that in some cases only one question was put to the applicant and in some cases a few more questions and that in the light of the applicant's own estimation of the value of these answers it is difficult to conceive how he could have been eliminated. In our opinion, one clear answer to this suggestion is that the estimate of the value or the evaluation of the answers given by the applicants is a matter which rests exclusively within the iurisdiction of the Commission and so long as there is no question of dishonesty or mala fides we fail to see how the actual estimate made by the commission can be characterised as either arbitrary or for any other reason unacceptable. ( 51 ) IT was also suggested that because members of the Commission are not medical men, they cannot be said to have such competence to judge the suitability of medical men for medical posts as to make their estimates readily acceptable. As already pointed out by us, the interview in these cases was not according to the very language of the rule intended to assess the knowledge or depth of the knowledge of the applicants in the subjects of their study. To the extent to v/hich such knowledge may have some bearing upon the suitability of the applicants the Commission did have the assistance of the Dean of the Medical College in making a correct estimate of the suitability of the various applicants for the posts for which selection was being made. ( 52 ) HOWEVER with a view to clear the possible doubts and to satisfy ourselves that the actual progress of the interviews was not vitiated by any arbitrariness we got produced through the Government Advocate the record containing the result of the interview. ( 52 ) HOWEVER with a view to clear the possible doubts and to satisfy ourselves that the actual progress of the interviews was not vitiated by any arbitrariness we got produced through the Government Advocate the record containing the result of the interview. Having carefully examined the same and considered various possible inferences capable of being drawn therefrom, we feel satisfied that the case of arbitrariness is not capable of being made out. ( 53 ) THE writ petitions, therefore fail and are hereby dismissed. --- *** --- .