JUDGMENT J.N. Trivedi, J. - The post of Principalship in the Maharaj Agrasen Inter College, Deoria having fallen vacant on the retirement of Sri Deep Narain Mani Tripathi on 31-12-1965, applications were invited for the said post. Sri Ram Surat Tripathi, the appellant was appointed Principal and he joined the college on 25-10-1966. Satya Narain Shahi, plaintiff-respondent No. 1 was also a candidate to the said post. Sri Raj Pal Singh who was also one of the candidates filed a regular suit challenging the appointment of the appellant on the ground that the selection committee was not properly constituted and consequently the appointment of the appellant as principal was bad. Satya Narain Shahi filed Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 4267 of 1966 in this Court challenging the appointment of the appellant as Principal on the ground that the selection committee was not constituted in accordance with Sec. 16-E(3) of the Intermediate Education Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and consequently the appointment was illegal. The writ petition of the plaintiff respondent No. 1 was dismissed in limine on 18-11-1966. The suit out of which this appeal arises was then filed by the plaintiff-respondent challenging, the appointment of the appellant on the ground that the appellant did not possess the minimum qualification required for the post of Principal and the selection committee was not a validly constituted selection committee. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit by its judgment dated 20th December, 1969. In appeal the lower appellate Court allowed the appeal holding that the appellant did not possess the minimum qualification required under the Act and the selection committee was not a validly constituted selection committee under the Act, hence this Second Civil Appeal. 2. It would be relevant to state that the appointment of the appellant originally was on probation and on the expiry of the period of probation, the managing committee did not think it proper to confirm him and his services were terminated. The Inspector of Schools, however, refused to give his approval to the termination order. The management then filed an appeal before the Deputy Director of Education. The Deputy Director of Education without giving an opportunity to the management dismissed the appeal. The Inspector of Schools, however, refused to give his approval to the termination order. The management then filed an appeal before the Deputy Director of Education. The Deputy Director of Education without giving an opportunity to the management dismissed the appeal. Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 1858 of 1968 was then filed by the management justifying the order of termination and challenging the order of the Deputy Director on the ground that the same was not a speaking order. The writ petition was allowed and the Deputy Director was directed to rehear the appeal of the management with the observation that the Deputy Director will hear the appeal only after Sri Ram Surat Tripathi has been paid all the arrears of his salary. A Special Appeal against the judgment of the single Judge was filed and the same was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court on 18-4-1969. The Division Bench maintained the substantive order of the single judge. According to the judgment of the Division Bench also the appeal was to be reheard only after the management had paid the arrears of salary of Sri Ram Surat Tripathi. Learned counsel for the parties inform that the departmental appeal of the management is still pending before the Deputy Director. 3. In this Second Appeal, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has contended that the findings of the lower appellate Court suffer from an error of law. His contention is that the two grounds on which the lower appellate court has held against the appellant are erroneous. 4. The first question for consideration, therefore, is whether the appellant possessed the minimum qualification required under the Act. Appendix A to the regulations framed under the Act lays down the minimum qualification for the post of Principal of an Intermediate College. 4. The first question for consideration, therefore, is whether the appellant possessed the minimum qualification required under the Act. Appendix A to the regulations framed under the Act lays down the minimum qualification for the post of Principal of an Intermediate College. The minimum qualification required for the post of Principal is "trained M.A. with an experience of teaching for at least four years in a training institution recognised by the Department or in Higher classes of a recognised Higher Secondary School, or in both combined or of having at least four years' experience as a trained graduate Head Master of a junior High School recognised by the Department, provided also that he/she is not below 30 years in age." The Appendix also mentions that "the word "recognised" means recognised by the Board of High School and Intermediate Education, Uttar Pradesh or by any University established by law." Sec. 16-F of the Act is in these words : (1) Subject to the provisions hereinafter specified, no person shall be appointed as a Principal, Headmaster or teacher in a recognised institution unless he- (a) possesses the prescribed qualifications or has been exempted under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 16-E; (b) has been recommended by selection committee constituted under sub-sec. (2) or (3) , as the case may be, of the said section and approved, in the case of principal or Headmaster by the Regional Deputy Director, Education. and in the case of a teacher by the Inspector.............." Section 16-E is as under :- "16-E. Appointment of teachers- (1) Qualifications for appointment as Principals, Headmaster and teachers of different subjects at different stages of the courses shall be prescribed by regulations: Provided that the Board may after considering the report of the Director exempt any person from the requirements of minimum qualifications having regard to his experience, education and other attainments. (2) There shall be constituted in every recognised institution a selection committee for the purpose of selecting candidates for appointment as teachers in the institution. The hand of the institution shall be an ex officio member of the committee. (3) There shall likewise be constituted a selection committee of three members for the selection of Principal or Headmaster of the institution. The hand of the institution shall be an ex officio member of the committee. (3) There shall likewise be constituted a selection committee of three members for the selection of Principal or Headmaster of the institution. The committee shall include as member a person not belonging to the district in which the institution is located, selected by the Committee of Management out of the regional panel referred to in Sub-sec. (4) . (4) The Director shall prepare for each region a panel of persons to act as nominated members in the selection committee referred to in Sub-Sec. (3) . (5) The constitution of the selection committee referred to in Sub-Sec. (2) and (3) , the conduct of business at their meetings, the preparation of regional panels and other matters shall be prescribed by regulations." 5. It is not disputed that the appellant held teaching experience for three years in an Intermediate College at Gorakhpur and had been a Principal for about 10 years of an Intermediate College at Bharatpur in the territory of Nepal. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the expression" University established by law" used in the Appendix does not mean a University established by law in the State of Uttar Pradesh as interpreted by the lower appellate court, but it includes any University established by the law of that country. His contention is that the degrees of the Tribhuwan University are recognised by the University of Gorakhpur and other Universities of the State and the Intermediate College of Bharatpur is an institution attached to Tribhuwan University. The plaintiff-appellant having been the Principal for 10 years of the Intermediate College at Bharatpur was, therefore, fully qualified to apply for the post of Principalship. The controversy, therefore, narrows down on the meaning of the words "University established by law". The Intermediate Education Act II of 1921 was necessitated to supervise the system of High School and Intermediate Education in Uttar Pradesh. The preamble of the Act says : "Whereas it is expedient to establish a Board to take the place of the Allahabad University in regulating and supervising the system of High School and Intermediate Education in Uttar Pradesh, and to prescribed courses therefor : It is hereby enacted as follows ........................" 6. Before the enforcement of the Act the education in the State was supervised by the Allahabad University. Before the enforcement of the Act the education in the State was supervised by the Allahabad University. After the passing of the aforesaid Act, a Board of High School and Intermediate Education was constituted to supervise education etc. in the State and the education was being supervised by the Board under the Act and the rules embodied in the Education Code. Sec. 16-A and onwards were added by amendment of the Act in the year 1958- 59. The word "University" has been defined in the University Education Code and means " a University established by law in Uttar Pradesh." It is true that the Act or the regulation do not say that the definition of any word not given in the Act or in the regulation would be taken from the Code, but at the same time it cannot he disputed that the definition given in the Code cannot be ignored and has to be taken into account for ascertaining the intention of the Board in respect of the meaning of the words "University established by law." Under Section 15 of the Act, the power to make regulations has been conferred on the Board and before the framing of the regulations in dispute in the year 1959, the Board has been interpreting the meaning of the word "University" as a University established by law in Uttar Pradesh. The normal rule of interpretation would be that the Board intended to stuck to its original definition of the word unless the contrary is apparent by some dear words. 7. Even if the word "University established by law" is given a broader meaning, then also the meaning cannot include or refer to a University established by law of any country other than India. The Board of High School and Intermediate Education is responsible for the education in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The word "University established by law" means a University established by law in the State of Uttar Pradesh. It can on no account mean a "University established by law in the State of Nepal." The degrees of the Universities established in other countries have to be expressly recognised on the principle of reciprocity. The lower appellate court, therefore, was right in holding that the plaintiff did not possess the minimum qualification required for the post of Principalship. It can on no account mean a "University established by law in the State of Nepal." The degrees of the Universities established in other countries have to be expressly recognised on the principle of reciprocity. The lower appellate court, therefore, was right in holding that the plaintiff did not possess the minimum qualification required for the post of Principalship. It would be relevant at this stage to state that the non-possession of the minimum qualification is not an absolute bar because under the proviso to Sec. 16-E, the Board could exempt any person from the requirements of the minimum qualification having regard to his experience, education and other attainments. This was a fit case in which the Board must have exercised its power of exemption had the selection committee or the management thought it proper to bring it to the notice of the Director and the Board. From the application of the appellant it appears that he did not conceal any facts. He expressly mentioned in his application the qualifications and experience held by him. 8. The next question for determination would be whether the selection committee was a validly constituted selection committee or not. I have earlier reproduced the relevant sections. Under Sec. 16-E the selection committee was to include as member a person from the panel of persons prepared by the Director to Act as a nominated member. The nominated member, however, was not to belong to the district in which the institution is located. Satyadeo Singh, respondent No. 5 was the nominated member in the selection committee of the institution. The plaintiff's allegation has been that the constitution of the committee was bad and against the provisions of the Act because Satyadeo Singh belonged to the district of Deoria. The finding of the court below is that Satyadeo Singh was a resident of the district of Deoria and had his ancestral house and cultivation in the district of Deoria. The further finding is that for the last 15 years he has been a lecturer in the University of Gorakhpur and has built several houses in the city of Gorakhpur. According to the contention of the appellant, Satyadeo Singh did not belong to the district of Deoria, he having shifted to Gorakhpur some 15 years back, whereas according to the plaintiff-respondent, Satyadeo Singh did not cease to belong to Deoria. According to the contention of the appellant, Satyadeo Singh did not belong to the district of Deoria, he having shifted to Gorakhpur some 15 years back, whereas according to the plaintiff-respondent, Satyadeo Singh did not cease to belong to Deoria. The word "belong" signifies a legal residence and connotes that the person must continue to have some association in the district. A nominated member who does not belong to the district where the institution is located will be free from the local influences and prejudices. While, therefore, it is correct that respondent No. 5 has been a lecturer in the city of Gorakhpur, it is not proved that he had ceased to belong to the district of Deoria. He admittedly belonged to Deoria and on the date he acted as a nominated member, his connections with Deoria were not abandoned, The lower appellate court was, therefore, correct in holding that the selection committee was not constituted in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 9. It has next been contended before me that even if the constitution of the selection committee was bad, it was only an irregularity and the appointment of the appellant could not be challenged on that account. Under the Act it was mandatory for the management to constitute a selection committee in accordance with the Act and if the selection committee was not a validly constituted selection committee, the recommendation of the committee cannot be recommendation of a validly constituted committee. It will not be an irregularity but will be an illegality. 10. It has next been contended before me by the learned counsel for the appellant that a suit for bare declaration was not maintainable. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has placed his reliance on Mst. Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 335, wherein it was laid down that : "A plea that the plaintiff asked for a bare declaration though he was in a position to ask for further relief within the meaning of Section 42 and hence the suit should have been dismissed in limine should be raised at the earliest point of time, in this event the plaintiff could ask for necessary amendment to comply with the provisions of Sec. 42. It is a well-settled rule of practice not to dismiss suits automatically but to allow the plaintiff to make necessary amendment if he seeks to do so." The appellant not having raised a specific plea about the non-maintainability of the suit, is not entitled to raise that plea in Second Appeal. 11. Lastly it has been contended that Section 21 of the Act bars a suit in respect of anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of the Act and Section 22 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of any order or decision of the managing committee. The recommendation of an illegally constituted committee cannot to something done under the Act or in pursuance of the Act. The bar of suit also will apply in respect of a legal order and will not exclude the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of an illegal order. Secs. 21 and 22 of the Act contemplate the cases of irregularities and not cases of lack of jurisdiction. 12. For the reasons given above, this appeal has to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed, but in view of the fact that the appellant should not be penalised for the action of the managing committee and in view of the fact that the plaintiff who was also a candidate to the post never objected to the constitution of the selection committee, the costs throughout shall be on parties.