NARAYANA PAI, C. J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner and the 3rd respondent were members of the Mysore civil Service. By an order notified on 24th February 1970, the 3rd respondent was appointed by the President of India to the Indian Administrative service in the cadre of Mysore in a substantive capacity against a vacancy in the senior post, shown in item 3 of the Cadre Schedule, with effect from 29th November 1969. The petitioner, who is admittedly a senior in the Mysore Civil Service, impugns the validity of this order and prays for the issue of appropriate writs quashing the said order appointing the 3rd respondent, to the Indian Administrative Service and directing the respondents, viz. , the Union of India and the State of Mysore, to consider the case of the petitioner and to appoint him in a substantive capacity to the Indian Administrative Service cadre post with effect from the date on which it was, according to the petitioner, due to him. ( 2 ) IT is common ground that the appointment of members of the State civil Services to the Indian Administrative Service is governed by a set of rules called the Indian Administrative Service (Appointment by Promotion) regulations, 1955, made pursuant to sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the indian Administrative (Recruitment) Rules, 1954. In the last analysis, the case of the petitioner is that the appointment of the 3rd respondent to the Indian Administrative Service and the omission to appoint himself to the said Service is the result of disobedience of the said Regulations or in exercise of the power of selection contrary to the provisions of the said regulations. The petitioner avers in his main affidavit that he had been included in the list of persons selected for appointment to the Indian administrative Service prepared in the year 1961, in which the 3rd respondent was placed at a lank below his own, but that when an occasion arose for actual appointment in a vacancy in the Mysore cadre of Indian administrative Service in the year 1969, the 3rd respondent has been illegally taken to a rank above that of the petitioner and that, therefore, the same amounts to an infraction of his right attributable to his legitimate tank in the list of relative seniority of Officers in the Mysore Civil service. ( 3 ) IN his affidavit in support of I. A. No. II for the calling of certain records, the petitioner suggests that the only obvious reason for his non-inclusion was the large number of persons belonging to the Muslim Community to which he belongs, having constituted an overwhelming section of the Hyderabad Civil Service, some of whose members including the petitioner became allotted to the new State of Mysore. This has remained a mere suggestion and no attempt has been made to substantiate it. ( 4 ) HOWEVER, because we considered that the minutes of the Selection committee which under the Promotion Regulations is invested with the initial authority of making the selection might have a bearing on the main case of non-compliance or inadequate compliance with the provisions of the Promotion Regulations, we made an order that the papers detailed in the application of the petitioner may be made available at the hearing of the Writ Petition. It later turned out that the relevant records were not with the Central Government but with the Union Public Service commission. Hence the petitioner made a fresh application I. A. No. V, in which we directed the Union Public Service Commission to cause production of the paper available with them through the Central Government or their Counsel in this Court. ( 5 ) THE Counsel for the Central Government brought to the Court the papers sent to him by the Union Public Service Commission in a sealed cover and produced before us an affidavit by the present Chairman of the Union Public Service Commission claiming privilege under S. 123 of the Indian Evidence Act. In the said affidavit, after referring to the order of this Court directing production of documents and after stating that he has carefully read and considered each of the documents, he states:"these are unpublished official records relating to the affairs of the State and their disclosure will cause injury to public interest and will materially affect the freedom and candour of cxpreesson of opinion in the determination and execution of public policy. I do not, therefore, give permission to any one under Section 123 of the Indian evidence Act, 1872, to produce the said documents or to give any evidence derived therefrom. "we therefore heard preliminary arguments on the sustainability of the claim so made in the affidavit of the Chairman of the Union Public Service commission. I do not, therefore, give permission to any one under Section 123 of the Indian evidence Act, 1872, to produce the said documents or to give any evidence derived therefrom. "we therefore heard preliminary arguments on the sustainability of the claim so made in the affidavit of the Chairman of the Union Public Service commission. ( 6 ) THE first sentence in the extract from the affidavit given above obviously invokes the principle stated in identical terms in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev singh, AIR 1961 SC 493 . Argument addressed in support of the claim of privilege also sought to draw sustenance from the said judgment. ( 7 ) THE said decision was given in an appeal arising out of an ordinary suit. A District and Sessions Judge in the erstwhile State of Pepsu was removed from service by an order of the President of India who was then in charge of the administration of the State. He made certain representations which were considered by the Council of Ministers of the said state because, in the meantime, the President's Rule had come to an end. The Council expressed its view in the form of a resolution; but before taking any action it invited the advice of the Public Service Commission, on receiving which the Council again considered the said representations and its final opinion on the merits of the representations was recorded in the minutes of the proceedings of the Council. The officer removed from service then filed a suit for a declaration that his removal was illegal, void and inoperative and for recovery of arrears of salary. In the said suit he made an application for production of certain documents including the views expressed by the Public Service Commission to the Council of ministers. The Chief Secretary of the State of Pepsu filed an affidavit claiming privilege under S. 123 of the Evidence Act. The trial Court accepted the claim of privilege. A revision petition presented against the said order of the trial Court was heard by a Division Bench of the high Court of Punjab which, after hearing the parties, reversed the order under revision in respect of four documents, one of which contained the opinion of the Public Service Commission. The State Government of Punjab then appealed to the Supreme Court. The State Government of Punjab then appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court and restored that of the trial Court. ( 8 ) THE matter was examined exclusively on the language and effect of Ss. 123 and 162 of the Evidence Act. In paragraph 15 of the judgment, their Lordships stated that having regard to notions about governmental functions and duties at the time the Evidence Act was promulgated, affairs of State would have meant matters of political or administrative character relating, for instance, to national defence, public peace and security and also good neighbourly relations and that a document would be one which relates to affairs of State, if the disclosure of the contents thereof might adversely affect national defence, public security and good neighbourly relations. They proceed to state further:" There may be another class of documents which could claim the said privilege not by reason of their contents as such but by reason of the fact that, if the said documents were disclosed, they would materially affect the freedom and candour of expression of opinion in the determination and execution of public policies. In this class may legitimately be included notes and minutes made by the respective officers on the relevant files, opinions expressed, or reports made, and gist of official decisions reached in the course of the determination of the said questions of policy. In the efficient administration of public affairs Government may reasonably treat such a class of documents as confidential and urge that its disclosure should be prevented on. the ground of possible injury to public interest. In other words, if the proper functioning of the public service would be impaired by the disclosure of any document or class of documents, such document or such class of documents may also claim the status of documents relating to public affairs. " ( 9 ) AFTER discussing various rulings and the arguments addressed at the Bar, the conclusion is: stated in paragraphs 25 and 26 as follows:" (25) Thus our conclusion is that reading Ss. 123 and 162 together, the Court cannot hold an equiry into the possible injury to public interest which may result from the disclosure of the document in question. 123 and 162 together, the Court cannot hold an equiry into the possible injury to public interest which may result from the disclosure of the document in question. That is a matter for the authority concerned to decide; but the Court is competent, and indeed is bound, to hold a preliminary enquiry and determine the validity of the objections to its production, and that necessarily involves an enquiry into the question as to whether the evidence relates to an affair of State under S. 123 or not. (26) In this enquiry the Court has to determine the character or class of the document. If it comes to the conclusion that the document does not relate to affairs of State, then it should reject the claim for privilege and direct its production. If it comes to the conclusion that the document relates to the affairs of State it should leave it to the head of the department to decide whether he should permit its production or not. . . . " ( 10 ) THE case of Amar Chand Butail v. Union of India AIR 1964 SC 1658 , in which the Supreme Court reiterated the same view and applied the same to the facts of the said case was also a case arising out of a civil suit. ( 11 ) IF the matter had to be examined exclusively in the light of the provisions of the Evidence Act, particularly Ss. 123 and 162 thereof, any further argument on this matter would not have been possible. The question arises whether the same principles, without any modification whatever apply to proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution or govern and control the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under the said article. ( 12 ) ON the said question, there is a clear enunciation of the principle bv the Supreme Court in the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmed ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233 . In paragraph 6 of the judgment therein, it is stated :"the first question that arises for decision in this appeal is whether High Courts have jurisdiction under Art. 226 to issue writs against decisions of Election Tribunals. In paragraph 6 of the judgment therein, it is stated :"the first question that arises for decision in this appeal is whether High Courts have jurisdiction under Art. 226 to issue writs against decisions of Election Tribunals. That article confers on High courts power to issue appropriate writs to any person or authority within their territorial jurisdiction, in terms absolute and unqualified, and Election Tribunals functioning within the territorial jurisdiction of the Hiph Courts would fall within the sweep of that power. If we are to recognise or admit any limitation on this power, that must be founded on some provision in the Constitution itself. " ( 13 ) LATER, in the case Kerala Education Bill, AIR 1958 SC 956 , dealing with Clause (33) of the said Bill, this is what the Supreme Court stated in paragraph 35 of the judgment at paces 986 and 987 of the Report: "this question raises the constitutional validity of clause 33 of the said Bill. That clause, which has herein before been set out in full, provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil procedure. 1908, or any other law for the time being in force, no Court shall grant any temporary injunction or make any interim order restraining any proceeding which is being or about to be taken under the provisions of the Bill when it becomes an Act, Art. 226 of the Constitution confers extensive jurisdiction and power on the High Courts in the States. This jurisdiction and power extend throughout the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. It can issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories, directions, orders or writs of the nature mentioned therein for the enforcement of the fundamental rights or for any other purpose. No enactment of a State Legislature can, as long as that article stands, take away or abridge that jurisdiction and power conferred on the High Court by that article. ( 14 ) THE underlying principle is further elucidated in the case of state of U. P. v. Vijay Anand, AIR 1963 SC 946 as follows :"under the Constitution the Legislature of a State derives its authority to make laws under Art. 245 of the Constitution, which reads. ( 14 ) THE underlying principle is further elucidated in the case of state of U. P. v. Vijay Anand, AIR 1963 SC 946 as follows :"under the Constitution the Legislature of a State derives its authority to make laws under Art. 245 of the Constitution, which reads. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of india, and the Legislature of a State may make laws for the whole or any part of the State. "art. 245 is therefore subject to Art. 226 of the Constitution. It follows that no law made by the Legislature of a State can be in derogation of the powers of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. " ( 15 ) THE effect of these rulings is that the legislative power of either the State Legislatures or of Parliament cannot be exercised in such a way as to deprive the High Courts of the power conferred upon them under art. 226 of the Constitution or to impede or obstruct the exercise of such power by the High Court. ( 16 ) WE mav mention in passing that after the addition of clause (1a) to Art. 226 by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963. the power is exercised aeainst any Government, authority or person notwithstanding the fact that the seat of such Government or Authority or the residence of such person is not within the territories in respect of which the High Court exercises jurisdiction in relation to any cause of action arising within those territories. ( 17 ) SO far as the nature and amplitude of the power of High Courts under Art. 26 of the Constitution is concerned, nothing more need be stated than what is found stated in the ruling of the Supreme Court already cited giving effect to the absolute and unqualified terms in which the article itself confers that power. ( 17 ) SO far as the nature and amplitude of the power of High Courts under Art. 26 of the Constitution is concerned, nothing more need be stated than what is found stated in the ruling of the Supreme Court already cited giving effect to the absolute and unqualified terms in which the article itself confers that power. It is also pointed out that the only limitation on that power must be such as is founded on some provision of the constitution itself Conferment of the power itself carries with it conferment of all cowers ancillary and incidental thereto, which are necessary for the effective exercise of the said power If therefore there is anything in any statute other than the Constitution itself which makes the exercise of the main power less effective than it should be or altogether ineffective then such revision must necessarily yield place to Art. 226 and make the way clear for its effective exercise. ( 18 ) NOW, one of the important aspects of the power under Art 226 is judicial review of administrative actions and to issue after such review an appropriate writ, order or direction for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose. ( 19 ) BROADLY speaking, administrative action may be either quasi judicial in nature or purely administrative. ( 20 ) IN thp cage of administrative functions which are quasi judicial in nature, the appropriate writ is ono in the nature of certiorari. In such a case, the Supreme Court pointed out hi the case of Ghaio Mal and Sons v. State of Delhi, AIR 1959 SC 65 ". . . . . When a superior Court issues a rule on an application for certiorari it is incumbent on the inferior court or the quasi judicial body, to whom the rule is addressed to produce the entire records before the Court along with its return. The whole object of a writ of certiorari is to bring up the records of the inferior court or other quasi judicial body for examination by the Superior Court so that the latter may be satisfied that the inferior Court or the quasi judicial body has not gone beyond its jurisdiction and has exercised its jurisdiction within the limits fixed by the law. Non-production of the records completely defeats the purpose for which such writs are issued. . . . . . . ". ( 21 ) ALTHOUGH it may be possible to suggest that these observations of the Supreme Court have relevance only to cases of applications for certiorari, we do not think that the said suggestion can be successfully sustained, if the real purpose and object of the power of judicial review under art, 226 of the Constitution is borne in mind. ( 22 ) EVEN in the case of purely administrative action, the basic purpose of the exercise of power of judicial review is that the High Court should be satisfied that the administrative authority who exercised the said administrative power has not gone beyond its jurisdiction or scope of its power and has exercised the same within the limits fixed by the law. It should also be noted that the power under Art. 226 of the Constitution is exercised, among other purposes, for the purpose of enforcing fundamental rights. In many cases, the fundamental right, infraction of which is complained of, happens to be the right of equality of opportunity under art. 14 and cognate Articles. Even when the law, which is administered or under which the impugned administrative action has been taken, may be ex facie not open to the challenge of infringement of any fundamental right, a particular instance of administrative action taken pursuant thereto may itself be open to the attack of such infringement of a fundamental right. In such a case, one of the principal questions would be whether the provisions or directions of the law have been fully and honestly followed and complied with. ( 23 ) WHERE any power is conferred by the law on an administrative body to be exercised on the existence of certain set of circumstances and subject to certain conditions, the scope of judicial review is to see whether the administrative body or authority has first applied its mind and found that the circumstances necessary for the exercise of the power do exist and then whether it has acted in compliance with the conditions laid down by the law. Where any administrative decision has to be taken which affects the rights of parties only if certain circumstances exist and only for the purpose of achieving the expressed or necessarily implied objective of the law, the scope of judicial review is to see whether the authority has on application of its mind found that the facts and circumstances necessary for the exercise of the power exist and also to see whether the decision or order taken or made by it is reasonably connected with the facts found and subservient to the object to be achieved. The principle applied in such cases is that an authority can act validly only if it acts on relevant considerations ind does not act on irrelevant considerations, the relevancy and irrelevancy being determined in the light of the facts found and from the point of view of achieving the objective of the law in question. ( 24 ) IF, for the purpose of satisfying itself on the various matters mentioned above which are inherent in the process of judicial review, the high Court feels the necessity of looking into the papers which contain the material on which or the reasons for which or the objects with which an administrative authority has acted, to withhold such papers from the high Court would be to defeat the very purpose of judicial review. Indeed, for the purpose of defending any challenge made in respect of any administrative action, the authority concerned has necessarily to set out its defence in its return which is normally in the form of an affidavit. It will be impossible for the authority to effectively defend its action without setting out in its affidavit at least the salient features of the course of conduct followed by it. Such a statement of case in the affidavit in defence has necessarily to traverse all the grounds essential for the purpose of satisfying the High Court that it has acted within the scope of its authority, in bona fide exercise of the power, upon relevant considerations and uninfluenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations or by bias or by mala fides. Such a statement of case in the affidavit in defence has necessarily to traverse all the grounds essential for the purpose of satisfying the High Court that it has acted within the scope of its authority, in bona fide exercise of the power, upon relevant considerations and uninfluenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations or by bias or by mala fides. If part of the conduct or the course of conduct, so required to be set out in the affidavit in defence, is already recorded in documents by the authority in the course of the exercise of its power, one fails to see how it can defend its conduct without some reference to the salient facts recorded in such documents. ( 25 ) IF, in the light of the pleadings in the shape of affidavits of the petitioner and the defending administrative authority, the High Court feels the necessity of verifying the facts for reaching the satisfaction necessary for the effective exercise of the power of judicial review, it has necessarily to call for and look into relevant records. ( 26 ) IT is in such situations that the question arises for consideration as to how and in what manner the power under Art. 226 of the Constitution operates in a field which may be regarded as covered by privilege under the Evidence Act. ( 27 ) IF the principles already discussed as derived from the rulings of the Supreme Court are borne in mind, the provisions of the Evidence act cannot be pemitted so to operate as to defeat the very purpose of judicial review. When such a wide power is conferred by the Constitution itself on High Courts, there could not be the slightest doubt that due, proper and effective exercise of the said power subserves a high public purpose. The exercise of that power can be whittled down onlv by another provision of equal states also subserving a similarly high public purpose. A prevision of the said status and nature can only be a provision in the constitution itself as, for example, clause (3) of Art. 163. ( 28 ) THE doctrine of privilege in the Evidence Act is also conceived in public interest. A prevision of the said status and nature can only be a provision in the constitution itself as, for example, clause (3) of Art. 163. ( 28 ) THE doctrine of privilege in the Evidence Act is also conceived in public interest. What that interest is and how the same should be protected or is sought to be protected by the Evidence Act, are pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of Sukhdev Singh (1 ). The distinction between the purpose served by private civil litigation and the purpose sought to be achieved bv proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution clearlv is that whereas the former is governed by private interest of parties, the latter is governed bv a high public purpose of the necessity of judicial review for keeping the exercise of administrative rawer within the bounds of law and subject to the provisions of Part III of the constitution. ( 29 ) WHEN therefore the Constitution reposes great trust in the High courts in conferring the power under Art. 226 of the Constitution, it is not difficult to infer that the Constitution trusts the High Courts also to see that public interest does not suffer by disclosure of any of the contents of any document, if they are of opinion that such disclosure might jeopardise public interest. ( 30 ) IN the light of all these considerations, we are of the opinion that whereas under the Evidence Act the Courts' power is limited to determining the question whether a particular document relates to affairs of the state and the power or discretion of deciding whether the disclosure of any of the contents of such a document will injure public interest is entrusted to the officer at the head of the Department, Art. 226 must be interpreted as entrusting both those powers to the High Courts will no doubt take into account, and have due regard for, the case or tne head of the department that, in his opinion, a disclosure oi any of thie contents thereof may injure public interest. ( 31 ) UNLIKE in tne case ot ordinary civil litigation the very production of a document as evidence in a case entitles all the parties to inspect the same, the calling of documents by a High Court under Art. 226 being primarily lor tne saustaction of the High Court on a question or a matter relevant to or closely related to tne exercise ot its power or judicial review, the mere tact that tne court has iooited into a document uoes not per se entitle tne parties to look into it. Whether and it so, to what extent tne contents or any part of the contents of a document may be disclosed in me interest ot justice to any ot tne parties is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the High Court. ( 32 ) HAVING regard to all these circumstances, it appears to us that the principle stated by the Supreme Court in AIR 1959 SC 65 applies with equal force to all applications for the issue of writ of every kind and is not necessarily connfied to applications for tne issue ot writ of certiorari alone ; but there may be a small difference, viz. , that in cases tor issue ol certiorari proper, the entire record and not merely me order to be quashed should be sent up on receipt ot rule nisi by the autnority or inferior tribunal concerned, but in tne case ot otner writs, the matter will be governed by orders or directions of the High Court. ( 33 ) WHERE the person or authority in possession of relevant documents is not an original party to a writ petition, the right Court will nave to issue separate directions to such a party because he or it would not nave been served with rule nisi. All that we nave stated above with regard to privilege applies to such third parties also served with an older for production of documents. ( 34 ) AS such was the opinion entertained by us after hearing the preliminary arguments of Mr. B. Ramachandra Rao on behalf of the Union public Service Commission and of other Counsel appearing in the case on that matter, we directed Mr. B. Ramachandra Rao to hand over the documents in his possession, viz. ( 34 ) AS such was the opinion entertained by us after hearing the preliminary arguments of Mr. B. Ramachandra Rao on behalf of the Union public Service Commission and of other Counsel appearing in the case on that matter, we directed Mr. B. Ramachandra Rao to hand over the documents in his possession, viz. , the Minutes of the Selection Committee functioning under the Promotion Regulations, to us because, in our opinion, a satisfactory disposal of the contentions raised in the case was not possible without our looking into those documents. ( 35 ) WE shall now proceed to deal with the merits of the petitioner's case. ( 36 ) WE have already stated that the crux of the case is that his junior, the 3rd respondent, has been preferred for appointment to the indian Administrative Service, over-looking his own claims referable to seniority. ( 37 ) REGULATION 4 of the Indian Administrative Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955, prescribes conditions of eligibility for promotion. It is not disputed that both the petitioner and the 3rd respondent did possesss the eligibility for promotion. ( 38 ) SELECTION from among eligible persons for promotion to the indian Administrative Service is required to be made by a Committee constituted under Regulation 3 (1) for each State. Its members are the chairman of the Union Public Service Commission or where he is unable to attend, any other member of the said commission, and other members specified in the Schedule to the Regulations in respect of different States. In the case of the State of Mysore, the other members are (1) Chief Secretary to the Government of Mysore, f2) Development Commissioner and special Secretary to the Government of Mysore, (3) a Divisional Commissioner nominated by the State Government and (4) a Secretary to the government of Mysore nominated by the State Government. One of the contentions of the petitioner was that no Divisional Commissioner of mysore sat on the Committee. We have looked into the records and we find that during all the relevant years a Divisional Commissioner of mysore State was a member of the Selection Committee. ( 39 ) THE mode of selection is set out in Regulation 5 which reads as follows :"5. Preparation of a list of suitable Officers. We have looked into the records and we find that during all the relevant years a Divisional Commissioner of mysore State was a member of the Selection Committee. ( 39 ) THE mode of selection is set out in Regulation 5 which reads as follows :"5. Preparation of a list of suitable Officers. (1) The committee shall prepare a list of such members of the State Civil Service as satisfy the condition specified in Regulation 4 and as are held by the committee to be suitable for promotion to the service. The number of the Members of the State Civil Service included in the list shall not be more than twice the number of substantive vacancies anticipated in the course of the period of twelve months commencing from the date of the preparation of the list, in the posts available for them under Rule 9 of the Recruitment Rules or 10 per cent of the senior duty posts borne on the cadre of the State or group of States whichever is greater: provided that in any particular year, the maximum limit imposed by this sub-regulation, may be exceeded to such extent as may be determined by the Central Government in consultation with the State government concerned. (2) The selection for inclusion in such list shall be based on merit and suitability in all respects with due regard to seniority. (3) The names of the officers included in the list shall be arranged in order of seniority in the State Civil Service: provided that any junior officer who in the opinion of the Committee is of exceptional merit and suitability may be assigned a place in the list higher than that of officers senior to him. (4) The list so prepared shall be reviewed and revised every year. (5) If in the process of selection, review or revision it is proposed to supersede any member of the State Civil Service, the Committee shall record its reasons for the proposed supersession. " ( 40 ) UNDER Regulation 6 the list prepared in accordance with Regulation 5 has to be forwarded to the Union Public Service Commission along with all the relevant records. Under Regulation 7 the said Public service Commission is required to consider the list and the final list is to be prepared in accordance with the opinion of the Commission. Under Regulation 7 the said Public service Commission is required to consider the list and the final list is to be prepared in accordance with the opinion of the Commission. ( 41 ) ALTHOUGH it is not denied that the petitioner had been included for the first time in a list prepared in 1961 at a place higher than the one assigned to the 3rd respondent, the only list that is relevant for our present purpose is the list of 1969 in which the 3rd respondent finds a place higher than that assigned to the petitioner. Under clause (5) of Regulation 5, the Selection Committee is required to record its reasons in the case of proposed supersessions. The supersession in the context of the regulations means the total omission of an eligible person from the list of persons selected by the Committee. That such is the meaning becomes clearer from the fact that among the papers or records to be sent to the Union public Service Commission under Regulation 6, there are separately mentioned the records of all members included in the list and records of all members proposed to be superseded by the recommendations made in the list, which means that by the preparation of the select list the superseded person gets displaced from selection. ( 42 ) AS in the list of 1969 the petitioner's name is included, the case is not one of supersession. ( 43 ) UNDER proviso to clause (3) of Regulation 5, a junior officer can be assigned a place higher than that of an officer senior to him, if the said junior officer in the opinion of the Committee is of exceptional merit and suitability. We find that the Selection Committee has recorded such an opinion in favour of the 3rd respondent. ( 44 ) AS the case of the petitioner is related exclusively to what he considers to be the rights appertaining to his seniority and he has not made out any specific case of mala fides or bias, the list of 1969 has to be upheld as one made in bona fide exercise of the power under the Promotion regulations and in accordance with the provisions thereof. ( 45 ) MR. ( 45 ) MR. KARANTH, learned Counsel for the petitioner, upon whose applications the papers were called for from the Union Public Service commission, very fairly stated that neither he nor his client desired to look into the papers sought to be called for, but that it would be sufficient from their point of view if after locking into the papers we are satisfied that every thing has been satisfactorily done. Hence the papers called for from the Union Public Service Commission were looked into only by the members of the Bench and by nobody else. ( 46 ) FOR the reasons already stated, the petitioner's claim fails and the Writ Petition is dismissed. --- *** ---