JUDGMENT : M.P. Mehrotra, J. This appeal is by the Defendant. The brief facts are these. The suit was for ejectment, damages for use and occupation etc. The Plaintiff alleged that the accommodation in question was a post-1951 construction and the Defendant was the tenant at a rent of Rs. 16/- per month and the arrears of rent for the period from 1st January 1962 to 31st August 1965 were not paid within one month of the service of notice of demand and, therefore, the Defendant became a defaulter and liable to be ejected u/s 3(1)(a) of the U.P. Act III of 1947. By the notice of demand the tenancy was also determined. 2. The Defendant contested the suit. Various pleas were set up in defence but we are not concerned in the instant appeal with the merits of the same. The finding of both the Courts below is that the Defendant was a defaulter and, therefore, he was liable to be evicted u/s 3(1)(a) of the U.P. Act III of 1947. However, the trial Court dismissed the suit for ejectment on the ground that one of the three Plaintiffs, namely Smt. Vidyawati, died during the pendency of the suit on 23rd February 1966 and her legal representatives were not brought on record during the statutory period of 90 days and therefore, the suit stood abated. Further, the suit was bad on account of the absence of the said necessary parties, namely the legal representatives of Smt. Vidyawati and, therefore, the said Court held that an effective decree of ejectment could not be passed behind the back of the said legal representatives of the deceased Plaintiff No. 2. The Plaintiffs on record filed an appeal and the lower appellate Court allowed the same. The suit for ejectment and for the recovery of mesne profits was decreed. The suit for the recovery of the arrears of rent, however, remained dismissed as in the trial Court. 3. Now, the Defendant has filed the instant appeal against the judgment of the lower appellate Court in so far as a decree for ejectment and for mesne profits has been passed against him. The Plaintiffs-Respondents have filed a Cross-Objection in respect of the dismissal of their suit for the recovery of the arrears of rent. 4. 3. Now, the Defendant has filed the instant appeal against the judgment of the lower appellate Court in so far as a decree for ejectment and for mesne profits has been passed against him. The Plaintiffs-Respondents have filed a Cross-Objection in respect of the dismissal of their suit for the recovery of the arrears of rent. 4. I have heard the learned Counsel, and in my view neither the appeal nor the Cross-Objection deserves to be allowed. In other words, I agree with the judgment passed by the lower appellate Court. Mr. Naithani learned Counsel for the Appellant, did not contest the position that in the case of trespassers it was open to one of the co-owners to sue for ejectment. This law seems to be well settled, inter alia, in view of the following authorities: (1) Ram Adhar v. Gaya Din 1955 ALJ 458, (2) Rama Motibhai Vs. Dalwadi Tupoo Rama and Others, AIR 1956 Bom 264 , and (3) Shivangouda Lingangouda v. Cangawwa Rasappa AIR 1967 Mys 143. 5. However, he submitted that in a suit against the tenants it was equally well settled that all the lessors must join in determining the tenancy and they must be before the Court as Plaintiffs. This is laid down in Rama Motibhai Vs. Dalwadi Tupoo Rama and Others,(supra), itself where Head Note (b) reads as follows: As against a trespasser one co-owner on behalf of all the co-owners can maintain an action. But if an action is to be filed against a tenant, then all the co-owners must be joined. 6. In the instant case the tenancy was determined before the institution of the suit by a notice which was given on behalf of all the lessors including Smt. Vidyawati who later on during the pendency of the suit died. Sri G.B. Misra, learned Counsel for the Respondents, contends that after the determination of the tenancy by all the lessors the Defendant's status became that of a trespasser and, therefore, the law which governs suits against trespassers will be applicable and, therefore, it was open to the Plaintiffs on record as the surviving lessors to continue the suit without impleading the legal representatives of the deceased lessor and to obtain a decree for ejectment against the Defendant. Sri Misra pointedly brought to my notice the observations in Vijai Kumar Tandon v. Smt. Ganga Devi Rathor 1969 ALJ 403, where a learned single Judge of this Court observed: If in this case the tenancy had been determined by all the lessors, and the lessees deprived of their character of tenants, and reduced to that of trespassers, the Plaintiffs would certainly, have been entitled to the relief they ask for. 7. Learned Counsel submits that in the instant case that has been the position. The tenancy was determined by all the lessors but during the pendency of the suit one of the lessors died. Sri Naithani, however, submitted that even after the determination of the tenancy the Defendant did not become a trespasser, but his status was that of a statutory tenant and, therefore, the law in respect of the ejectment of trespassers would not govern this case. He placed reliance on Anand Nivas (Private) Ltd. Vs. Anandji Kalyanji Pedhi and Others, AIR 1965 SC 414 , Ram Krishna Prasad v. Mohd. Yahia 1960 AWR 437, and Nandarani Dassi Vs. Satyanarayan Harit, AIR 1951 Cal 405 . 8. Now undoubtedly these cases clearly laid down that on the determination of the tenancy in areas where Rent Control Acts are in operation, the tenant becomes a statutory tenant. However, the Supreme Court in Anand Nivas (Private) Ltd. Vs. Anandji Kalyanji Pedhi and Others,(supra), clearly held that such persons are really not tenants at all. It was laid down: A person remaining in occupation of the premises let to him after the determination of or expiry of the period of tenancy is commonly, though in law not accurately, called a statutory tenant. Such a person is not a tenant at all; he has no estate or interest in the premises occupied by him. He has merely the protection of the statute in that he cannot be turned out so long as he pays the standard rent and permitted increases, if any, and performs the other conditions of the tenancy. His right to remain in possession after the determination of the contractual tenancy is personal, it is not capable of being transferred or assigned, and devolves on his death only in the manner provided by the statute. His right to remain in possession after the determination of the contractual tenancy is personal, it is not capable of being transferred or assigned, and devolves on his death only in the manner provided by the statute. The right of a lessee from a landlord on the other hand is an estate, or interest in the premises and in the absence of a contract to the contrary is transferable and the premises may be sublet by him. But with the determination of the lease, unless the tenant acquires the right of a tenant holding over, by acceptance of rent or by assent to his continuing in possession by the landlord, the terms and conditions of the lease are extinguished, and the rights of such a person remaining in possession are governed by the statute alone. 9. It is, therefore, obvious that after the determination of the tenancy the person concerned is really not a tenant at all but a trespasser. However, he is not liable to be ejected on account of the statutory protection granted to him. The rights of such a person are governed and protected by the statute itself. Now, in the instant case apart from the statutory protection afforded by Section 3 of U.P. Act III of 1947 the Defendant is not entitled to any right as a tenant. He is basically a trespasser but he cannot be ejected in view of the prohibition contained in Section 3 of the said Act. Now, it has been held by the Courts below that the Defendant is not entitled even to that protection in view of the fact that he did commit default after the notice of demand was served upon him. In other words, the protection afforded to him by the statute has also been held to be unavailable to him. Therefore, in the instant case even the statutory protection goes and the position of the Defendant is reduced to that of a trespasser. The lower appellate Court placed reliance on Ramnarain v. Kishorelal AIR 1964 Raj. 79 , where the facts were also similar. Therefore, in the instant case even the statutory protection goes and the position of the Defendant is reduced to that of a trespasser. The lower appellate Court placed reliance on Ramnarain v. Kishorelal AIR 1964 Raj. 79 , where the facts were also similar. It was laid down in the said case as under: The correct legal position which can be gathered from the cases referred to above is that where a tenancy has been lawfully determined by the landlord and to this I should like to add that where no question of statutory tenancy arises as in the present case, the relationship of landlord and tenant thereby does come to an end between the parties and thereafter the position of the tenant is that of a tenant on sufferance which is akin to that of a trespasser, and that being so, a suit by one of the co-owners to eject the tenant would be fully competent in law. It must follow, therefore, that the present suit which was continued by Kishorilal alone after the death of Murlidhar during its pendency in the trial Court cannot be thrown out as having abated on the ground that the latter's legal representatives were not brought on the record and the correct position is that Kishorilal being one of the co-owners was fully competent by himself to maintain the suit. I hold accordingly. 10. I agree with the aforesaid observations made in the Rajasthan case. Therefore, the Defendant's appeal has no merits. So far as the Cross-Objections on behalf of the Plaintiffs are concerned. I think the lower appellate Court correctly held that so far as arrears of rent are concerned the cause of action for the same is grounded in a contract of tenancy and not in the determination of tenancy. For such a suit the rule regulating the suits against the tenants by the landlords should be held to be applicable. In other words, all the landlords must be before the Court if they seek to enforce the terms and conditions of a contract of tenancy. As all the landlords were admittedly not before the Court in the instant case after the death of Smt. Vidyawati, therefore, the arrears of rent could not be decreed in the instant suit. In my view, therefore, the Cross-Objection also deserves to be dismissed. 11. As all the landlords were admittedly not before the Court in the instant case after the death of Smt. Vidyawati, therefore, the arrears of rent could not be decreed in the instant suit. In my view, therefore, the Cross-Objection also deserves to be dismissed. 11. The appeal and the Cross-Objection are dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs. The stay order D/- 4-4-72 shall stand vacated. The Appellant is granted two months' time to vacate the premises.