BACHUMIAN HAMIDMIAN v. STATE — 1971 DIGILAW 37 (GUJ)

S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) THE accused No. 1 had been carrying on dairy business at Andheri in the City of Bombay. In 1967 he wanted to export buffaloes from the State of Gujarat to his stables in the State of Maharashtra for his dairy business. The accused Nos. 2 and 3 helped him in purchasing buffaloes and sending them out of the State. The export of cattle was prohibited by the Gujarat Cattle (Export Control) Order 1961 made under the Bombay Essential Commodities and Cattle (Control) Act 1958 except under the permit issued by the appropriate authority. Twenty grown up and young buffaloes were in the first instance said to have been sent by the accused Nos. 2 and 3 by railway from Anand in Kaira District to Itola in Baroda District within the State of Gujarat. At Itola the accused No. 2 is said to have taken delivery of the said cattle. They were sought to be rebooked from Itola in Baroda District to Jogeshwari in the City of Bombay outside the State of Gujarat under a forged permit purporting to have been issued by the Mamlatdar of Baroda. Upon the permit having been detected to have been forged investigation into the offence started and the case was registered against the three accused persons. The learned Magistrate held the committal proceedings and committed all the three accused to the Court of Sessions at Baroda to stand their trial for offences under sec. 8 of the Essential Commodities Act read with Clause (3) of the Gujarat Cattle (Export Control) Order 1961 and secs. 465 419 467 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. ( 2 ) THE learned Extra Additional Sessions Judge who tried the case recorded the conclusion that the accused Nos. 1 and 3 were not guilty of the offences with which they were charged. He therefore acquitted the accused Nos. 1 and 3 of all the charges. He however was of the opinion that the accused No. 2 was guilty of offences under secs. 465 467 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and under sec. 8 of the Essential Commodities Act read with Clause (3) of the Gujarat Cattle (Export Control) Order 1961 He therefore convicted the accused No. 2 and sentenced him to undergo two years rigorous imprisonment for each of the offences directing substantive sentences to run concurrently. 465 467 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and under sec. 8 of the Essential Commodities Act read with Clause (3) of the Gujarat Cattle (Export Control) Order 1961 He therefore convicted the accused No. 2 and sentenced him to undergo two years rigorous imprisonment for each of the offences directing substantive sentences to run concurrently. He further ordered that 20 grown up and young buffaloes-the Muddamal property-shall be forfeited to the State. ( 3 ) IT is against that order of conviction and sentence that the accused No. 2 has filed this appeal. ( 4 ) MR. Shah appearing for the appellant has raised two principal contentions before us. His first contention is that there is no evidence on record to connect the appellant with the offences with which he is charged. His second contention is that Clauses (3) and (4) of the Gujarat Cattle (Export Control) Order 1961 are ultra vires Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. The contention relating to the vires of Clauses (3) and (4) of the aforesaid Order was raised by him by amending the memorandum of appeal for doing which this court granted him leave earlier. ( 5 ) BEFORE we proceed to examine the merits of the contentions raised by Mr. Shah it is necessary to state that in course of the hearing of this appeal Mr. Shah submitted to us another draft amendment for raising further grounds. By the said draft amendment he wanted to challenge the vires of secs. 4 and 13 of the Bombay Essential Commodities and Cattle (Control) Act 1958 under which the aforesaid Order has been made by the Government of Gujarat. The amendment was sought by Mr. Shah at a very late stage and after the hearing of the appeal had commenced and made considerable progress. Next granting the amendment would have caused further delay in the disposal of this appeal because it would necessitate a notice to the Advocate General. The disposal of this appeal was already delayed at an earlier stage by one amendment which was granted by this court by which the appellant was permitted to raise the contention relating to the vires of Clauses (3) and (4) of the aforesaid Order of 1961. Under these circumstances we have rejected the application made by Mr. The disposal of this appeal was already delayed at an earlier stage by one amendment which was granted by this court by which the appellant was permitted to raise the contention relating to the vires of Clauses (3) and (4) of the aforesaid Order of 1961. Under these circumstances we have rejected the application made by Mr. Shah for granting him leave to amend the memorandum of appeal in order to enable him to raise further contentions. [ His Lordship after discussing the evidence held that there was sufficient evidence on record to warrant the conclusion that the appellant had produced a forged permit before the Assistant Station Master of Itola for the purpose of exporting 20 buffaloes to Jogeshwari outside the State of Gujarat in contravention of the provisions of the Gujarat Cattle (Export Control) Order 1961 ] [ His Lordship after discussing the evidence further observed. : ] ( 6 ) THE next contention which Mr. Shah has raised before us is that Clauses 3 and 4 of the Gujarat Cattle (Export Control) Order 1961 which prohibit the export of cattle outside the State of Gujarat except under a permit issued by the appropriate authority and except in accordance with its terms and conditions are ultra vires Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. The submissions which he has made in that behalf are as follows :1 The power conferred upon the Collector by Clauses 3 and 4 of issuing permits is arbitrary uncanalized and subject to no guidelines. 2 The said order does not provide any corrective machinery for appealing to higher authority. 3 There is no judicial review of a decision refusing to grant a permit. Sec. 17 of the Act under which the said order has been issued bars judicial review. 4 The impugned order does not provide for giving the applicant an opportunity of being heard before the permit is refused to him. 5 The Collector who is the authority specified in the said order for the purpose of issuing permits is not required to assign any reasons why an application for permit is rejected. 6 The order refusing a permit has a permanent effect. ( 7 ) SO far as the last proposition is concerned it deserves no serious consideration. It is erroneous to say that an order refusing to grant a permit has a permanent effect. 6 The order refusing a permit has a permanent effect. ( 7 ) SO far as the last proposition is concerned it deserves no serious consideration. It is erroneous to say that an order refusing to grant a permit has a permanent effect. A person who has been refused a permit can certainly apply at a subsequent stage and in charged circumstances for export of his cattle outside the State of Gujarat. Such an application is certainly not barred. We are therefore unable to see any merit in the last proposition advanced by Mr. Shah in support of his contention. ( 8 ) ACCORDING to Mr. Shah the power conferred upon the Collector to issue permits is arbitrary uncanalized and is subject to no guidelines. On a close perusal of the Act under which the aforesaid Order has been made and of the Order itself we are unable to uphold the contention raised by Mr. Shah. The impugned Order has been made under the Bombay Essential Commodities and Cattle (Control) Act 1958 Sec. 4 which empowers the State Government to make orders inter alia for regulating the maintenance movement supply and distribution of or trade and commerce in cattle itself provides for sufficient guidelines. No person can be refused a permit to export his cattle outside the State of Gujarat except for the purposes mentioned in sec. 4. The purposes mentioned in the said section are maintenance or increase of the supply of cattle securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices and for that purpose the State Government has been empowered to make an order to regulate the maintenance movement supply and distribution of or trade and commerce in cattle. The preamble to the said Act also states the objects of the Act. So far as cattle are concerned the object stated therein is maintenance licensing and movement of cattle and the licensing of dealers in cattle because it is expedient to provide accordingly in the interest of the general public. The impugned order also provides sufficient guidelines. It inter alia states as under. Whereas the Government of Gujarat is of the opinion that for maintaining and increasing the supply in the State of Gujarat of certain cattle herein after specified it is necessary and expedient to regulate the movement of such cattle to places outside the State of Gujarat otherwise than across a customs frontier. . . It inter alia states as under. Whereas the Government of Gujarat is of the opinion that for maintaining and increasing the supply in the State of Gujarat of certain cattle herein after specified it is necessary and expedient to regulate the movement of such cattle to places outside the State of Gujarat otherwise than across a customs frontier. . . . . . . . . . . . . . The impugned order cannot be enforced except for the purposes of maintenance and increase of the cattle specified in the said order in the State of Gujarat and it is with that object in view that the impugned order provides for regulating the movement of such cattle to places outside the State of Gujarat. The section under which the impugned order has been made and the impugned order itself in our opinion provide sufficient guidelines. The Officer who is authorised to enforce the impugned order and who is charged with the function of issuing permits under the impugned order to export cattle outside the State of Gujarat can exercise his power only in terms of those guidelines. It is difficult therefore to uphold the contention raised by Mr. Shah that the impugned order does not provide any guidelines to the Collector. ( 9 ) HE has then cited before us a few decisions to show that the power which has been conferred upon the Collector not being subject to any check control regulation or judicial review is excessive and arbitrary even though the order which confers such a power upon him specifies the purposes for which it can be exercised. ( 10 ) THE first decision which he has cited before us is in Messrs. Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others A. I. R. 1954 Supreme Court 224. In that case certain provisions of U. P. Coal Control Order 1953 were challenged on the ground that they were ultra vires Article 19 and that they did not constitute reasonable restrictions on the right to trade guaranteed to the citizens of India under Article 19. Clause 4 of the U. P. Coal Control Order 1953 which conferred power upon the Licensing Authority to issue licence provided as follows. (1) Every application for licence under this Order shall be made in the form given in Schedule I appended to this Order. Clause 4 of the U. P. Coal Control Order 1953 which conferred power upon the Licensing Authority to issue licence provided as follows. (1) Every application for licence under this Order shall be made in the form given in Schedule I appended to this Order. (2) A licence granted under this order shall be in Form A or Form B appended to this order and the holder of a licence granted under this order shall comply with any directions that may be issued to him by the Licensing Authority in regard to the purchase sale storage or distribution of coal. (3) The Licensing Authority may grant refuse to grant renew or refuse to renew a licence and may suspend cancel revoke or modify any licence or any terms thereof granted by him under the order for reasons to be recorded. Provided that every power which is under this order exercisable by the Licensing Authority shall also be exercisable by the State Coal Controller or any person authorised by him in this behalf. The contention which was raised before the Supreme Court was that Subclause (3) of Clause 4 of the said order which related to granting and refusing of licenses had given absolute power to the Licensing Authority to grant or refuse to grant renew or refuse to renew suspend revoke cancel or modify any licence under the said order and that the only thing that he had to do was to record reasons for the action he took. It was further contended that the power which was conferred upon the State Coal Controller could be exercised by any person to whom the State Coal Controller chose to delegate it and the choice could be made in favour of any person. It was held that the provision which contained such elements could not be held to be reasonable. It was further contended that the power which was conferred upon the State Coal Controller could be exercised by any person to whom the State Coal Controller chose to delegate it and the choice could be made in favour of any person. It was held that the provision which contained such elements could not be held to be reasonable. Holding that the said provision was not a reasonable provision the Supreme Court laid down that no rules had been framed and no directions had been given on the matters to regulate or guide the discretion of the Licensing Officer and that the said order committed to the unrestricted will of a single individual the power to grant withhold or cancel licenses in any way he chose and that there was nothing in the order to ensure proper exercise of the power or operate as a check upon injustice that might result from improper exercise thereof. Though the said order provided for some safe-guards against abuse of power in as much as the Licensing Authority was required to give reasons for what it did it was held that such a safeguard was hardly effective because there was no higher authority prescribed in the order to examine the propriety of the reasons and revise or review the decision of the subordinate officer. Therefore in the opinion of the Supreme Court the reasons which were required to be recorded were only for the personal or subjective satisfaction of the licensing authority and not for furnishing any remedy to an aggrieved person. In other words according to the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision either a corrective machinery or a judicial review was necessary where power was given to a single individual or his nominee to grant or refuse to grant a licence or to renew or refuse to renew a licence or to suspend cancel revoke or modify a licence. ( 11 ) THE next decision which Mr. Shah has cited before us is in The Corporation of Calcutta v. Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd. Calcutta A. I. R. 1964 Supreme Court 1279. In that case certain provisions of sec. 437 (1) of the Calcutta Municipal Act 1951 were challenged on the ground that they were ultra vires Articles 19 (1) (g) 13 and 245 of the Constitution. Shah has cited before us is in The Corporation of Calcutta v. Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd. Calcutta A. I. R. 1964 Supreme Court 1279. In that case certain provisions of sec. 437 (1) of the Calcutta Municipal Act 1951 were challenged on the ground that they were ultra vires Articles 19 (1) (g) 13 and 245 of the Constitution. In that case the parenthetical clause occurring in Clause (b) of sec. 437 (1) of the Calcutta Municipal Act 1951 was struck down by the Supreme Court on the ground that it constituted an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on trade. Clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 437 of the said Act was in the following terms. (1) No person shall use or permit or suffer to be used any premises for any of the following purposes without or otherwise than in conformity with the terms of a licence granted by the Commissioner in this behalf namely - (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b) Any purpose which is. in the opinion of the Corporation (which opinion shall be conclusive and shall not be challenged in any court) dangerous to life health or property or likely to create a nuisance. While striking down the parenthetical Clause in Clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 437 the. Supreme Court held that the opinion of the Corporation had been made in the matters specified in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 437 conclusive and non-justiciable and that therefore they did not constitute a reasonable restriction. The vice in the provision according to the Supreme Court was that it made the opinion of the Corporation howsoever capricious or arbitrary it might be or howsoever unreasonable on the face of it might be conclusive and non-justiciable. The conferment of such a power on a municipal body which had the effect of imposing restrictions on carrying on trade etc. could not be s aid to be a reasonable restriction within the meaning of Article 19 (6 ). The conferment of such a power on a municipal body which had the effect of imposing restrictions on carrying on trade etc. could not be s aid to be a reasonable restriction within the meaning of Article 19 (6 ). Such a provision placed persons carrying on trade and residing within the limits of the municipal Corporation entirely at its mercy even if the Corporation chose to exercise that power capriciously arbitrarily or unreasonably though not mala fide. The Supreme Court therefore agreed with the High Court that the conferment of such a power on the Corporation as it stood in the parenthetical clause in sec. 437 (1) (b) must be held to be an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on trade. ( 12 ) THE next decision which Mr. Shah has cited before us is in Hari Chand Sarda v. Mizo District Council and another A. I. R. 1967 Supreme Court 829. In that case sec. 3 of Lushai Hills District (Trading by non- Tribals) Regulations 1953 and Rules 4 5 and 7 of the Lushai Hills District (Trading by non-Tribal) Rules 1954 were challenged on the ground that they were ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution. Sec. 3 of the said Regulation provided that no person other than a Tribal resident in the District shall carry on wholesale or retail business in any commodities except under and in accordance with the terms of a licence issued in that behalf by the District Council. The second proviso to that section provided that if a licence was refused the grounds of refusal shall be recorded by the District Council. The provisions of the said Regulation led to the result that if a licence was refused to a non-Tribal there would be a total prohibition against him from carrying on his trade in the Mizo Hills District to which the said Regulation applied. It also provided that the District Council had the power to refuse to renew a licence. The refusal to renew a licence would lead to the total extinction of his trade. The aforesaid Regulation and the Rules made thereunder did not provide for any right of appeal to any superior authority against a refusal to grant or renew a licence. It also provided that the District Council had the power to refuse to renew a licence. The refusal to renew a licence would lead to the total extinction of his trade. The aforesaid Regulation and the Rules made thereunder did not provide for any right of appeal to any superior authority against a refusal to grant or renew a licence. They also did not contain any provision empowering any Civil Court to adjudicate upon any such order of refusal to grant or renew a licence According to the Supreme Court therefore a non-Tribal trader had no remedy whatsoever under the provisions of the said Regulation and the Rules made thereunder against such an order though the refusal to grant or renew a licence would amount to his being totally barred from trading in one case and his business or trade being destroyed in another. The second reason which appealed to the Supreme Court was that even if a non-tribal obtained a licence and started investing in trade a large capital there would be no security for such trade as the licence would be for one year only because the licensing authority could refuse to renew his licence and such a refusal would lead to the total extinction of his trade. Even though the Regulation provided for the licensing authority to record reasons for refusal to grant or renew a licence in the opinion of the Supreme Court it was hardly a safeguard against an arbitrary refusal because the Regulation did not constitute any superior authority with power to revise such an order or to examine whether the grounds were legal or proper. The next reason which appealed to the Supreme Court was that the Regulation did not lay down any principles or standards on which the licensing authority could act in granting or refusing to grant the licence. In absence of any such principles or standards obviously there was no restraint or limit within which the licensing authority could exercise its power to refuse to grant or renew a licence. In the opinion of the Supreme Court therefore in the aforesaid circumstances the power of refusal was left entirely unguided and untrammelled and that therefore the said provisions were ultra vires. In the opinion of the Supreme Court therefore in the aforesaid circumstances the power of refusal was left entirely unguided and untrammelled and that therefore the said provisions were ultra vires. The aforesaid principle emphasises the need for making a provision for establishing a corrective machinery or revising authority as a check upon the arbitrary and capricious exercise of power conferred upon a licensing authority. ( 13 ) THE next decision to which Mr. Shah has referred is in Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia and others v. Union of India and others 1969 (2) Supreme Court Cases 166. In that case validity of certain provisions of the Gold Control Act was challenged on the ground that they were ultra vires Articles 14 and 19 (1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution. Sec. 5 of the Gold Control Act which was the subject matter of attack provided as follows : (1) The administrator may if he thinks fit make orders not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act for carrying out the provisions of this Act. (2) The Administrator may so far as it appears to him to be necessary or expedient for carrying out the provisions of this Act by order- (a) regulate after consultation with the Reserve Bank of India the price at which any gold may be bought or sold and (b) regulate by licenses permits or otherwise the manufacture distribution transport acquisition possession transfer disposal use or consumption of gold. It was contended that the provisions of sec. 5 conferred wide and uncontrolled power without any guidelines and was capable of being used with arbitrary discrimination. Having considered the provisions of secs. 5 11 21 22 and 34 the Supreme Court held that the substantive provisions of the Act conferred powers on the Administrator and that the power of regulation granted to the Administrator under sec. 5 (2) (b) of the said Act suffered from excessive delegation of legislative power and must be held to be constitutionally invalid. ( 14 ) THE last decision to which Mr. Shah has referred is the decision of the Calcutta High Court in M/s. T. D. Kumar and Bros. Private Ltd. v. Iron and Steel Controller and others A. I. R. 1961 Calcutta 258. ( 14 ) THE last decision to which Mr. Shah has referred is the decision of the Calcutta High Court in M/s. T. D. Kumar and Bros. Private Ltd. v. Iron and Steel Controller and others A. I. R. 1961 Calcutta 258. The provisions of Clauses 7 and 8 of Iron and Steel (Control) Order 1956 were challenged in that case on the ground that they were ultra vires Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. Clause 8 of the said order provided as follows:where any quote certificate permit or written order referred to in cl. 4 or 5 is revoked by the authority which issued it the person to whom it was issued shall forthwith return it to the authority which issued it. Relying upon two decisions of the Supreme Court referred to in paragraph 24 of the report it was observed by the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court that the power to carry on business in iron and steel was completely taken away and was ma de subject to the provisions of the Iron and Steel (Control) Order and that the Controller was given absolute power. Having analysed the provisions of Clause 8 the learned Judge held that the power to revoke or cancel the authorisation under Clause 8 was absolute and unfettered and without any direction given by the Central Government under Clause 17 of the said order was naked and arbitrary. In his opinion no restriction was placed upon the absolute power of the Controller to cancel an authorisation. There was no provision for giving notice and there was no provision for appealing against the revocation of an authorisation and no recourse to the Courts of law could also be had In that view of the matter Clause 7 of the said order was struck down by the learned Single Judge in that case. ( 15 ) AS against these decisions Mr. G. I. Nanavaty appearing for the State has invited our attention to two decisions of the Supreme Court. The first decision is in Harishanker Bagla and another v. The State of Madhya Pradesh A. I. R. 1954 Supreme Court 465. In that case Clause 3 of the Cotton Textiles (Control of Movement) Order 1948 was challenged on the ground that it was ultra vires Article 19 (1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution. The first decision is in Harishanker Bagla and another v. The State of Madhya Pradesh A. I. R. 1954 Supreme Court 465. In that case Clause 3 of the Cotton Textiles (Control of Movement) Order 1948 was challenged on the ground that it was ultra vires Article 19 (1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution. Clause 3 of the said order provided as follows:no person shall transport or cause to be transported by rail road air sea or inland navigation any cloth yarn or apparel except under and in accordance with- (i) a general permit notified in the Gazette of India by the Textile Commissioner or (ii) a special transport permit issued by the Textile Commissioner. While dealing with the challenge to Clause 3 of the said order the Supreme Court held that the requirement of a permit could not be regarded as an unreasonable restriction on a citizens right under sub-clauses (f) and (g) of Article 19 (1) and that it did not confer upon the Textile Commissioner unregulated and arbitrary discretion to refuse or to grant a permit. The reasons which weighed with the Supreme Court in that case in recording the conclusion were that the grant or refusal of a permit was governed by the policy laid down in the said order viz. to ensure an even distribution of the commodity in the country4and to make it available at a fair price to all and that discretion given to the Textile Commissioner was to be exercised in such a way as to effectuate that policy. In the opinion of the Supreme Court the conferment of such a discretion upon the Textile Commissioner could not be called invalid and if there was an abuse of power on his part there was ample power in the courts to undo the mischief. In that case also the appellants who challenged the said provisions had not applied for a permit and therefore no question of the permit having been arbitrarily refused to them arose. The applicants were not hurt in any manner whatsoever by any act of the Textile Commissioner because they had not applied for any permit. They had been transporting essential goods by rail without a permit and the only way they could get any relief was by attacking the section which obliged them to take a permit before they could transport by rail essential commodities. They had been transporting essential goods by rail without a permit and the only way they could get any relief was by attacking the section which obliged them to take a permit before they could transport by rail essential commodities. The relevant provisions of the Cotton Textiles (Control of Movements) Order 1948 in our opinion very closely resemble the impugned provisions of the Gujarat Cattle (Export Control) Order 1961 It is therefore open to us on the strength of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court to find out the check or control which the said order has placed upon the exercise of power of granting or refusing to grant a permit by the Collector to export cattle outside the territory of the State of Gujarat. ( 16 ) THE next decision to which Mr. Nanavaty has invited our attention is in Chinta Lingam and others v. The Govt. of India and others A. I. R. 1971 Supreme Court 474. In that case the provisions of sec. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act 1955 were challenged on the ground that they imposed unreasonable restrictions on the right to carry on trade. Sec. 3 of the said Act provided as follows : (1) If the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices or for securing any essential commodity for the defence of India or the efficient conduct of military operations it may by order provide for regulating or prohibiting the production supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce herein. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-sec. (1) an order made thereunder may provide (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (c ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (c ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (d) for regulating by licences permits or otherwise the storage transport distribution disposal acquisition use or consumption of any essential commodity one of the contentions raised against sec. 3 of the said Act was that the Control Order issued thereunder imposed unreasonable restrictions on the right of the petitioners to carry on trade as arbitrary powers had been conferred in the matter of issuing or withholding permits and that there were no provisions for appeal or revision against refusal to grant a permit. Dealing with this contention the Supreme Court observed that the officers authorised by the State Government to issue licences being the District Collector and the Deputy Commissioner of Civil Supplies were officers of high rank who were expected to discharge their duties in a responsible and reasonable manner. They distinguished their earlier decision in M/s. Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra) by observing that the absolute power conferred upon the licensing authority to grant or to refuse to grant any licence was struck down in that case because the law which conferred arbitrary and uncontrolled power upon the executive in the matter of regulating trade or business in normally available commodities must be held to be unreasonable and that the power in that case could be exercised by any person to whom the State Coal Controller might choose to delegate it. It was argued in the aforesaid case of Chinta Lingam and others (supra) that there was no provision relating to appeal or revision in the Control Orders against capricious or arbitrary exercise of power by the licensing authority. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that where permit is to be granted by the State Government or by responsible officers of the rank of the District Collector or the Deputy Commissioner of Civil Supplies the absence of any provision for appeal or revision cannot render such power arbitrary and uncontrolled. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that where permit is to be granted by the State Government or by responsible officers of the rank of the District Collector or the Deputy Commissioner of Civil Supplies the absence of any provision for appeal or revision cannot render such power arbitrary and uncontrolled. The very fact that the power has been conferred upon an officer of a high rank can be taken into account along with other relevant factors in judging the reasonableness of an impugned provision. Lastly the Supreme Court observed that it was pointed out in more than one decision of that court that when the power had to be exercised by one of the highest officers the fact that no appeal had been provided for was a matter of no moment. ( 17 ) MR. Nanavaty has also invited our attention to the decision of the Delhi High Court in Chuni Singh Behari Lal and other v. Union of India A. I. R. 1968 Delhi 196. In that case a challenge was raised against the validity of sec. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act 1956 and the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court held that the provisions of sec. 3 did not confer any arbitrary powers on the executive. It has been held in that decision that the fact that power has to be exercised for the purposes mentioned in the Act provides the necessary safeguards and the guidelines for the administrative agencies to observe. If the exercise of power falls outside the statute that exercise of power is bad but it cannot render the Act unconstitutional on the ground of excessive delegation. ( 18 ) THE last decision to which Mr. Nanavaty has invited our attention is in Jayantilal Parshottamdas Kapali and another v. State of Gujarat and others XI Gujarat Law Reporter 403. Provisions of secs. 5 (1) and 16 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act 1948 were challenged in that case. Having examined the relevant provisions of the said Act this High Court held that having regard to the vastness of the problem and The infinite variety of facts and circumstances in respect whereof the power will have to be exercised it was left to the wide discretion of the exexecutive by the Legislature which rested satisfied by laying down the broad policy and principle in sec. 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act. 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act. Since in that case the power was vested in the State Government or its delegate to meet special situation created by the acute shortage of accommodation and the pressing necessity to secure suitable accommodation for a public purpose the Legislature had justifiably thought fit not to provide any corrective machinery by way of appeal of otherwise against the exercise of power to requisition. So long as the State Government exercised the power as laid down in sec. 5 (1) it has been observed in that case it would not be necessary to provide any further safeguard in the form of an appeal or other corrective machinery. The necessary safeguards were provided in the section itself that the State Government must before requisitioning any land take into consideration the factors of necessity or expediency for a given public purpose. It was therefore held that it provided sufficient check on any arbitrary exercise of power and that therefore sec. 5 (1) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act did not give unfettered power to requisition land and was not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. ( 19 ) CLAUSES 3 and 4 of the Gujarat Cattle (Export Control) Order 1961 provide as follows: 3 Restrictions on export of Cattle:-NO person shall export cattle from any place in the state of Gujarat except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a permit issued under clause 4. 4 Issue of permits:- (1) Where any person desires to export any cattle for a limited period not exceeding four months for any purpose to be specified by him the Collector may issue a permit to such person on condition that the cattle so exported shall be brought back into the State before the expiry of the period specified in the permit. (2) In any other case a permit for the purposes of clause 3 may on a application made in that behalf be issued by the Collector of the District concerned. (3) A permit under sub-clause (2) shall be issued on payment of a fee of five rupees (five only) per head of cattle. (2) In any other case a permit for the purposes of clause 3 may on a application made in that behalf be issued by the Collector of the District concerned. (3) A permit under sub-clause (2) shall be issued on payment of a fee of five rupees (five only) per head of cattle. We have reproduced earlier the relevant provisions of the Bombay Essential Commodities and Cattle (Control) Act 1958 and we have also reproduced the preamble to the Gujarat Cattle (Export Control) Order 1961 The power conferred by Clauses 3 and 4 of the impugned order must of necessity be exercised for the purpose of effectuating the policy laid down by sec. 4 of the said Act and as laid down in the preamble to the said order. Relying upon the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Harishankar Baglas case (supra) in our opinion they provide sufficient guidelines to the licensing authority specified in Clauses 3 and 4 of the impugned order and a check on the exercise of power by him. From this point of view in our opinion therefore Clauses 3 and 4 do not suffer from the vice which has been stressed by Mr. Shah before us. ( 20 ) SO far as the absence of corrective machinery is concerned the power under Clauses 3 and 4 of the impugned order is exercisable by the Collector. The Collector is a responsible officer of a high rank and the very fact that he holds a responsible office ensures a reasonable exercise of power by him. Relying therefore upon the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in that behalf in Chinta Lingams case (supra) and also as laid down by this High Court in Jayantilal Parsottamdas Kapalis case (supra) we are of the opinion that absence of any corrective machinery in the said order does not render the aforesaid clauses void or bad in law. . ( 21 ) NEXT the impugned order does not totally prohibit trade in cattle. Trade in cattle within the State of Gujarat remains totally unaffected by it. It only affects inter-State trade in cattle only to the extent that they shall not be exported outside the State of Gujarat except under a permit issued by the Collector. ( 22 ) LASTLY there is an inherent restriction upon the exercise of power under the impugned Clauses 3 and 4. It only affects inter-State trade in cattle only to the extent that they shall not be exported outside the State of Gujarat except under a permit issued by the Collector. ( 22 ) LASTLY there is an inherent restriction upon the exercise of power under the impugned Clauses 3 and 4. The Collector is empowered to issue permits with such terms and conditions as may be incorporated therein. So far as the permit its terms and conditions are concerned in our opinion they have to be provided by the State Government. Sec. 4 of the Bombay Essential Commodities and Cattle (Control) Act 1958 provides inter alia as follows : (1) If the State Government is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increating the supply or for securing the equitable distribution and availability at fair prices of any essential commodity or cattle it may by order provide -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 4 provides as follows:- without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-sec. (1) an order made thereunder may provides (a) (b ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (c ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (d) (e ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (f) for regulating by licence permit or otherwise the movement transport distribution disposal acquisition use and keeping of cattle. Reading sub-sec. (1) and sub-sec. (2) of sec. 4 together we are of the opinion that it is the State Government which has to prescribe the permit with such terms and conditions as it thinks fit. The terms and conditions may either be general or may be special to meet the contingencies of a given situation. If these terms and conditions are unreasonable or arbitrary they shall be open to challenge. That by itself does not render Clauses 3 and 4 of the Gujarat Cattle (Export Control) Order void. The terms and conditions may either be general or may be special to meet the contingencies of a given situation. If these terms and conditions are unreasonable or arbitrary they shall be open to challenge. That by itself does not render Clauses 3 and 4 of the Gujarat Cattle (Export Control) Order void. These terms and conditions subject to which a permit is issued by their very nature circumscribe the exercise of power by the Collector and operate as a check upon its arbitrary exercise in indiscriminately granting or refusing to grant them. For the reasons stated above therefore we are of the opinion that the two decisions of the Supreme Court in Harishankar Baglas case (supra) and in Chinta Lingams case (supra) are apposlte and should govern the decision of the present case. We are therefore of the opinion that Clauses 3 and 4 of the Gujarat Cattle (Export Control) Order 1961 are valid and do not suffer from any of the vices which have been stressed before us by Mr. Shah We therefore reject the contentions raised by Mr. Shah in that behalf. .