ORDER R.L. Gulati, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The petitioner was a Geography Teacher in the dayanand Brijendra Degree College. Dehradun. He entered the service of the College on July 13, 1963, and. according to the petitioner, was confirmed in that post with effect from July 13, 1965, after the expiry of the probationary period of two years. It appears that the relations of the petitioner with the Principal of the College have not been happy from the very beginning. The petitioner was served with several charge-sheets containing the charges of inefficiency. carelessness and insubordination. On June 17, 1967, the petitioner was suspended and was served with a charge-sheet Annexure 'A-II' to the writ petition. The petitioner submitted a reply (Annexure `D') on July 28. 1967. According to the counter affidavit of the Principal of the College, the petitioner was found guilty of some other charges and therefore a consolidated charge-sheet dated October 31, 1967 was served upon him. The petitioner submitted reply to this charge-sheet on November 15, 1967, The Board of Management of the College appears to have appointed a Sub-Committee on December 16, 1967, The Sub-Committee submitted its report and on June 16, 1968, the Board of Management passed a resolution terminating the services of the petitioner with immediate effect. This resolution was forwarded to the Vice-Chancellor, who granted his approval to the resolution of the Board of Management and finally' an order terminating the petitioner's services was passed on August 21, 1968 which is Annexure `N' to the writ petition. 3. The petitioner has challenged in this petition the resolution of the Board of Management dated June 16, 1968 and the final order terminating his services dated August 21, 1968. The main contention of Sri S.N. Kacker, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the Board of Management has acted in contravention of Statute 30 of Chanter XVIII of the Agra University Hand Book. It may be mentioned here that the college is governed by the Statutes and the Ordinances of the Agra University. 4. Statute 30 provides that every decision by the Management of an affiliated college to dismiss or remove from service a teacher shall be subject to the provision of the Statute. It may be mentioned here that the college is governed by the Statutes and the Ordinances of the Agra University. 4. Statute 30 provides that every decision by the Management of an affiliated college to dismiss or remove from service a teacher shall be subject to the provision of the Statute. Clause (1) of this Statute lavs down that no order dismissing or removing from service a teacher shall be passed unless charge has been framed against the teacher and communicated to him with a statement of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action and he has been given adequate opportunity of : (i) submitting a written statement. (ii) being heard in person, if he so chooses and (iii) calling and examining such witnesses in his defence as he may wish. Sri S.N. Kacher contends that neither the Board of Management nor the Sub-Committee appointed by it recorded any evidence, nor was the petitioner given any opportunity to produce evidence in defence. His contention is that some of the charges were of a serious nature and could not have been established without recording evidence. He has referred to Charge No. 9 according to which the petitioner "had tried to run goondas and hirelings against the other members of the Department". In order to prove such a charge, it was necessary to take the evidence of the members of the Department upon whom goondas had been set. The Sub-Committee appointed by the Board of Management in its report found all the charges proved against the petitioner. But it appears that the Sub-Committee did not record any evidence whatsoever. The Committee might have made some enquiry. but there is no record of such an enquiry. It is clear that in such circumstances the petitioner could not lead any evidence in defence. 5. It is stated that the Police report was also made by a member of the teaching staff against the petitioner in respect of this charge, but the Police report has not been brought on the record, nor indeed any oral evidence has been recorded. The grievance of the petitioner appears to be justified. 6. When the matter went to the Vice-Chancellor he appointed a separate committee. That committee appears to have recorded the statements of some witnesses including that of the principal and a peon of the College. The grievance of the petitioner appears to be justified. 6. When the matter went to the Vice-Chancellor he appointed a separate committee. That committee appears to have recorded the statements of some witnesses including that of the principal and a peon of the College. The petitioner's contention is that the statements were recorded behind his back, but the principal in his counter-affidavit has stated that the statements were recorded in the presence of the petitioner. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Vice-Chancellor it has been stated that no evidence was recorded behind the back of the petitioner. It is not clear as to whether this committee recorded the statements of the witnesses or merely Questioned them orally. However, that is not material. The petitioner's main grievance is that the statute requires an opportunity being given to him to defend himself before the Board of Management and that opportunity has not been afforded to him. 7. Sri. S.C. Khare, learned counsel for the respondents, contended that the relationship between the petitioner and the College is governed by a contract. The Board of Management is a private body and the resolution passed by it is of an administrative character and cannot be questioned in a writ petition. The same is the position, according to the learned counsel, with regard to the final order of termination. It is not possible to accept this contention of the learned counsel. It is true that the terms and conditions of the services of the petitioner are governed by a contract, but that contract is a statutory contract. In Managing Committee of Meerut College Meerut v. Dr. V. Puri, 1969 All LJ 612 a Division Bench of this Court has held that where the Managing Committee of a College affiliated to the Agra University terminates the services of a teacher, the Vice-Chancellor has statutory duties to perform and the matter is not only contractual. It has further been held that an agreement between the Managing Committee of a College and a newly appointed teacher is entered into not because of the free will of the parties but under the compulsive force of the Act and statutes and the terms contained therein are not those voluntarily agreed to by parties but those which are prescribed. Such an agreement has the same force as the Act and the Statutes. Such an agreement has the same force as the Act and the Statutes. In view of this decision the first contention of the learned counsel for the respondent must be rejected. 8. His second contention is that the petitioner has not challenged the approval of the Vice-Chancellor and this omission is fatal to the writ petition. It is not possible to accept this contention either. The approval of the Vice-Chancellor was a matter entirely between the Vice-Chancellor and the College. The petitioner has challenged the resolution of the Board of Management as also the final order terminating his services passed after the approval of the Vice-Chancellor. I do not think it was necessary for the petitioner to have separately challenged the approval of the Vice-Chancellor which was never communicated to the petitioner. 9. Sri Khare then contended that adequate opportunity was afforded to the petitioner at every stage of the enquiry. He has stated that the enquiry committee appointed by the Vice-Chancellor examined certain witnesses and those witnesses were examined in the presence of the petitioner and he had thus adequate opportunity to cross-examine them and to adduce evidence in his defence. I have already observed that it is not clear as to whether the committee did in fact take down the statements of the witnesses. In any case the examination of the witnesses at that stage by the committee was merely to advice the Vice-Chancellor as to whether the resolution of the Board of Management should or should not be approved. It was not a part of the enquiry which is contemplated by the statute. The statute contemplates an enquiry by the Board of Management before it recommends to the Vice-Chancellor the punishment to be awarded to the accused person. At that stage no evidence whatsoever appears to have been recorded and the Board of Management passed the resolution acting upon the report of the Sub-Committee appointed by it. That Sub-Committee does not appear to have recorded any evidence. In such circumstances the question of leading evidence in defence on the part of the petitioner did not arise. The Sub-Committee has stated that it has taken into consideration the material on the record, but it is not clear as to what material was taken into record. That Sub-Committee does not appear to have recorded any evidence. In such circumstances the question of leading evidence in defence on the part of the petitioner did not arise. The Sub-Committee has stated that it has taken into consideration the material on the record, but it is not clear as to what material was taken into record. It is also not clear as to whether such material was ever disclosed to the petitioner and he was afforded an opportunity to rebut that material. I am of opinion that the resolution passed by the Board of Management terminating the services of the petitioner is contrary to the Statute referred to above and is against the principles of natural justice. That resolution is liable to be quashed. The final order of termination would also fall to the ground, if the resolution of the Board of Management is eliminated. 10. For the reasons stated above. I allow this petition and quash the resolution of the Board of Management dated 16th June, 1968 and the order of termination of the petitioner's services dated 21st August, 1968. The petitioner is entitled to his costs.