M. P. THAKKAR, M. U. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) IT is argued by counsel that sec. 88b (1) (b) of the Tenancy Act is applicable to the land under acquisition inasmuch as the land is owned by an institution for public religious worship and that having regard to the provisions contained in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 88b the provisions of the Tenancy Act excepting secs. 3 4 8 9 9 9 9 10 10 11 13 andd 27 are not applicable to the land in question. In these premises it is argued that there is no security of tenancy in respect of the land in question though there is protection against enhancement of rent. Now this point has not been raised in the trial court in the manner in which it is sought to be urged before us. In fact. no foundation has been laid for a contention based on sec. 88b (1) (b ). No pointed issue was raised no evidence was adduced and no arguments were advanced. We have therefore been extremely reluctant to permit counsel to raise this point which involves a mixed question of law and facts at this stage. We however find that there is no merit in the submission and there will be no prejudice to the other side. We therefore prefer to dispose of the question on merits rather than shut out the argument on the ground that no such plea was raised. We say that no such plea was pointedly raised as the only contention which was raised by the State in its written statement was that Fulabhai was not entitled to claim any compensation having regard to the fact that the land was owned by the Trust and was exempted from the provisions relating to compulsory purchase. There was no sub stance in this contention inasmuch as the question before the court was not whether the tenant was entitled to the benefit of provisions relating to compulsory purchase. Fulabhai did not claim the entirety of the interest in the land on the footing that he was the deemed purchaser of the land. There was no sub stance in this contention inasmuch as the question before the court was not whether the tenant was entitled to the benefit of provisions relating to compulsory purchase. Fulabhai did not claim the entirety of the interest in the land on the footing that he was the deemed purchaser of the land. If such was the claim the State would have been justified in resisting it on the ground that the provisions relating to the compulsory purchase of the land were inapplicable to the land belonging to the Trust The contention was raised to guard against the claim on the part of the tenant to compensation in respect to the entirety of the interest in the land. No contention was raised having an eye on sec. 88b (1) (b ). In fact nowhere has the State even made formal assertion that it is a land which is owned by an institution for public religious worship. Therefore even the germs of the contention are lacking in the pleadings. As pointed out by us earlier no pointed issue was raised and no arguments were advanced having in its perspective sec. 88b (1) (b ). This aspect however loses its edge having regard to the fact that we propose to examine the contention on merits. Now it is not disputed by counsel that the protection in respect of the quantum of rent is available to a tenant notwithstanding the fact that the land is owned by an institution for public religious worship and falls within the description of sec. 88b (1) (b ). A plain reading of sec. 88b (1) shows that sec. 8 sec. 9 and sec. 9a relate to the rate of rent claimable by the owner and are applicable even to lands belonging to the institutions for public religious worship falling within the description of sec. 88 (1) (b ). Sec. 8 provides for the maximum and minimum rate of rent. Sec. 9 relates to the rate of rent payable by tenant to his landlord. And sec. 9a extends its protective arm in so far as the quantum of rent payable by the tenant to the landlord is concerned. Counsel has therefore not disputed that the protection in respect of the quantum of rent is available to claimant Fulabhai even assuming that he is a tenant of an institution fulfilling the requirements of sec. And sec. 9a extends its protective arm in so far as the quantum of rent payable by the tenant to the landlord is concerned. Counsel has therefore not disputed that the protection in respect of the quantum of rent is available to claimant Fulabhai even assuming that he is a tenant of an institution fulfilling the requirements of sec. 88b (1) (b ). The gravemen of the argument is that the tenant does not enjoy any protection under the Tenancy Act and his tenancy is insecure. In making this submission counsel has however overlooked the provision embodied in sec. 4b of the Tenancy Act which is applicable to the lands belonging to institutions for public religious worship. Sec. 88b (1) (b) plainly shows that what has been excluded is the applicability of provisions other than provisions specifically referred to therein and that sec. 4b has been specifically made applicable even to such lands. Counsel is unable to dispute this obvious position. It is however contended by counsel that sec. 4b affords no protection whatsoever. The said provision is in the following terms :-NO tenancy of any land shall be terminated merely on the ground that the period fixed by agreement or usage for its duration has expired. IT is argued that it is applicable only to a tenancy of a fixed duration and it only provides that a tenant cannot be evicted merely on the ground that the term of his tenancy has expired by efflux of time. In our opinion on a plain reading of sec. 4b it appears to be clear that no landlord can terminate the tenancy merely on the ground that the period for which the lease was created has expired. In other words sec. 4b in no unclear terms throws its protective arm around the shoulder of the tenant and shields him from being evicted by an overt act on the part of the landlord viz. that of terminating his tenancy. If sec. 4b relates merely to cases where the tenancy is automatically determined by efflux of time the Legislature would not have employed the expression No tenancy of any land shall be terminated. The critical expression terminated employed by the Legislature has in its contemplation cases where by a notice of termination the tenancy of a tenant is determined. If sec. 4b relates merely to cases where the tenancy is automatically determined by efflux of time the Legislature would not have employed the expression No tenancy of any land shall be terminated. The critical expression terminated employed by the Legislature has in its contemplation cases where by a notice of termination the tenancy of a tenant is determined. In other words it relates to an overt or positive act on the part of the landlord and not to a situation arising out of an automatic determination of the tenancy by efflux of time. Now the period of tenancy may be fixed either by an agreement or by usage. And in both the cases sec. 4b provides that the tenancy cannot be terminated by an act of the landlord merely by reason of the fact that the duration or the period of the lease had expired. Some further and additional ground for eviction has to be made out by the landlord. In other words the tenancy of a tenant cannot be terminated at the mere pleasure of the landlord having regard to the objective sought to be achieved by the Tenancy Act viz. (and we quote from the preamble) the purpose of improving the economic and social conditions of peasants or ensuring the full and efficient use of land for agriculture. . . . . . . . The anxiety of the Legislature to protect the actual tiller of the land who fertilizes the land with his own sweat from being thrown out at the mere pleasure of the landlord (be it a private person or public trust) is understandable having regard to the aforesaid objective of the Tenancy Act. It is there fore clear that even a public religious trust entitled to protection of sec. 88b (1) (b) is not entitled to throw out the tenant merely by reason of the fact that the term of the tenancy has expired or that it is its pleasure or whim to evict him. Some good ground will have to be made out. It is not necessary for the purpose of the present appeal and there fore we refrain from expressing any final opinion on the question as to under what circumstances a tenant can be evicted by a public religious trust. It is sufficient for our purposes to hold that even the tenant of a public trust falling within the sec. It is not necessary for the purpose of the present appeal and there fore we refrain from expressing any final opinion on the question as to under what circumstances a tenant can be evicted by a public religious trust. It is sufficient for our purposes to hold that even the tenant of a public trust falling within the sec. 88b (1) (b) is entitled to the protection extended by the armour of sec. 4b. His tenancy is therefore comparatively secure. We do not say it is completely secure. It is however sufficient to say that it is comparatively secure and he cannot be thrown out at the mere whim and pleasure of the landlord. We have already pointed out that the tenant is entitled to protection in respect of quantum of rent and the statutory benefits conferred by sec. 8 9 and 9a. It is therefore futile to contend that a tenant having such statutory rights is in no better position than a mere tenant at will whose existence on the land is dependent on the caprice of the land lord. It needs no argument to show that the position of such a tenant is far superior when compared to the position of a tenant who has no security of rent or of tenancy. It is therefore obvious that a tenant of even a public religious institution has an interest in the land having regard to the security of his tenure and the security of the beneficial provisions relating to the quantum of rent. Besides these benefits are not contractual benefits but statutory benefits conferred by sec. 4b 8 9 and 9a. We are therefore unable to accede to the argument of the learned counsel that the tenant enjoying the aforesaid statutory protection has no interest in the land in question. We concur with the view taken by the learned trial Judge and hold that he has an interest in the land in question and that the learned trial Judge was right in upholding the claim of the tenant for compensation. .