JUDGMENT K.N. Singh, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by Messrs Geep Flashlight Industries Ltd. Allahabad, challenging the validity of imposition and collection of octroi from the petitioner Company. The petitioner has claimed issue of a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the Nagar Mahapalika, respondent No. 1 not to impose and collect the tax in question. 2. The petitioner is a public limited company having its registered office at Allahabad. It has got its factory within the limits of Allahabad Nagar Mahapalika, where it manufactures tourches, bulbs and dry-cells from the raw material imported by it from outside. Such raw materials are mostly imported by rail but some times they are, imported by road also. The material which according to the petitioner are imported are brass, aluminium, zinc, carbon rod, acetye lene black, managenese dioxide ore, chemicals and lubricants, glass tubes, glass beeds filament wire, sealing wax etc. Besides, these raw materials, the petitioner-company imports machinery and spare parts also by rail. The Allahabad Nagar Mahapalika has imposed tax in the shape of non-refundable octroi, the rates of which were enhanced with effect from 2nd February, 1969. Prior to 1959 the erstwhile Municipal Board, Allahabad ; used to charge refundable octroi from the petitioner and, therefore, when the petitioner exported its goods and the machineries, it used to get the benefit of refund. The petitioner has asserted that by the change of refundable octroi into a non-refundable octroi, the petitioner-company has been put to great loss. Th petitioner has challenged the legislative competence of the State Government and the Nagar Mahapalika to levy octroi to increase the rate of the tax or to include the new items of goods for imposition and collection tax. The petitioner has, further asserted that the Nagar Mahapalika is a new body and ; the protection conferred by Article 277 of the Constitution is not available to it. 3. Prior to the Constitution of the Nagar Mahapalika for the town of Allahabad, Municipal Board Allahabad was the body constituted under the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, which carried on the civil administration of the town. The erstwhile Municipal Board, Allahabad had imposed an octroi tax on goods brought within the municipality for consumption or sale therein. The system of octroi was refundable under certain circumstances enumerated in the Rules. The erstwhile Municipal Board, Allahabad had imposed an octroi tax on goods brought within the municipality for consumption or sale therein. The system of octroi was refundable under certain circumstances enumerated in the Rules. In 1957, however, the erstwhile Municipal Board Allahabad changed the system of octroi from refundable to non-refundable. The new system of non-refundable octroi tax was imposed by a notification published in the Gazette on January 25, 1957 issued under Section 135 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. The incidence of tax was on the entry of goods and animal into the limits of the Allahabad Municipality for use, consumption or sale therein. The schedule appended to the Octroi Rules framed by the Municipal Board, Allahabad contained rates and the items on which octroi was levied. This schedule has been amended from time to time. Subsequently. Municipal Board, Allahabad was replaced by Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad constituted under the provisions of U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Allahabad Adhiniyam 1959 and the non-refundable octroi continued to be in force. The Nagar Mahapalika, however, framed new proposals for the non-refundable octroi, which were finally enforced with effect from 20th February, 1969. The validity of this tax has been challenged by the petitioner-company. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Ansari has urged that the non-refundable octroi is in effect and substance a terminal tax, which cannot be imposed by the Nagar Mahapalika, as the State Legislature has no legislative competence to enact any law relating to imposition of terminal tax, He has urged that the tax in question is not saved by Article 277 of the Constitution and, therefore, the imposition of non-refundable octroi is wholly illegal. He has further contended that the raw materials which are imported by the petitioner-company are not goods for use, consumption or sale and, therefore, no tax could be levied or collected by the Nagar Mahapalika from the petitioner-company. Learned counsel for the respondent has, however, urged that here is difference between terminal tax and octroi. The Nagar Mahapalika is competent to impose levy and collect octroi tax on the goods brought within the limits of the Nagar Mahapalika, for use, consumption or sale therein. He has further urged that the raw-materials imported by the petitioner-company are goods liable to tax. 5. The Nagar Mahapalika is competent to impose levy and collect octroi tax on the goods brought within the limits of the Nagar Mahapalika, for use, consumption or sale therein. He has further urged that the raw-materials imported by the petitioner-company are goods liable to tax. 5. In order to appreciate the petitioners contention that the State Legislature has no power to enact laws with respect to the imposition of octroi tax on the entry of goods within the limits of the Nagar Mahapalika, we have to refer to various provisions contained in the Constitution. Under Article 246 of the Constitution, parliament is invested with exclusive power to make laws with respected any matter enumerated in List I in the VIIth Schedule while the State Legislature has been conferred exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the said Schedule. The Parliament as well as the State Legislatures both have power to make laws with, respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III of the said Schedule. The relevant entries in the List I and List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution are as under : "List II - tem 89-Terminal tax on goods or passengers carried by railways sea or air, tax on railways fares and freights." List III- tem No. 52-Taxes on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein." In view of the aforesaid distribution of powers contained in the List I and II of the VIIth Sechdule Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to terminal tax on goods and passengers carried by railway, sea or air, or tax on railway fares and freights. The State Legislature has no power to make any law with respect to terminal taxes. The State Legislature has, however, exclusive power to make laws with respect to the taxes on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein. Under the Scheme of the Constitution, the State Legislature cannot assume power to enact any law with respect to terminal tax as enumerated in item 89 of List I of the VIIth Schedule of the Constitution. 6. Under the Scheme of the Constitution, the State Legislature cannot assume power to enact any law with respect to terminal tax as enumerated in item 89 of List I of the VIIth Schedule of the Constitution. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the tax in question is not a tax on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein, but it is a terminal tax, which is covered by entry No. 89 of List I of the VIIth Schedule. He has urged that since the goods are brought by rail to the petitioners company where the journey of the goods terminates, therefore, in substance, and effect, the tax in question is a terminal tax and not a tax on entry of goods. There is no force in the petitioners contention. Under the Government of India Act, 1935, there was a similar distribution of legislative powers. The Federal Legislature as well as the Provincial Legislatures were conferred exclusive powers to make laws with respect to the items mentioned in List I and List II of Schedule Seven to that Act. Entry No. 58 in List I of Schedule Seven to the Government of India Act, 1935, was as follows. "Terminal taxes on goods or passengers carried by railway or air; taxes on railway fares and freights." Entry No. 49 in List II in the said Schedule was as follows . "Cesses on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein." 7. Sec. 100 of the Government of India, Act, 1935, distribute the power to make laws on the Federal Legislature and the provincial Legislature. The Federal Legislature was competent to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I of the Seventh Schedule of that Act, which was known as Federal Legislative List while Provincial Legislature was competent to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II of the said Schedule, which was called "the Provincial Legislative List". Under the distribution of legislative powers, the State Legislature was competent to make laws with respect to the cess on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein. Under the Constitution the same, Scheme, as was provided under the Government of India. Under the distribution of legislative powers, the State Legislature was competent to make laws with respect to the cess on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein. Under the Constitution the same, Scheme, as was provided under the Government of India. Act, 1935 has been continued in respect of the distribution of the Legislative powers. Entry No. 53 in List of Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act is the same as contained in Entry No. 89 in List I of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. As regards entry No. 52 of List II of the same Schedule, it is also the same as contained in Entry No. 49 in List II of Schedule Seven to the Government of India Act except that in place of the word `Cesses used in Entry No. 49 in List II of the Government of India Act, the word `tax has been used in Entry No. 52 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. This difference however does not make any material change. Cess was also a kind of tax. 8. The question of Legislative competence raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was raised before the Federal Court in the case of Punjab Flour and General Mills Co. Ltd. Lahore v. Chief Officer Corporation of City of Lahore and Province of the Punjab, A.I.R. 1947 F.C. 14. The Federal Court held that the Octroi imposed by the Municipality of Lahore constituted under an Act framed by the Provincial Legislature in exercise of its legislative powers as contained in Entry No. 49 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, was legal and valid. A similar argument that the octroi was in effect a terminal tax and, therefore, the provincial legislature had no legislative power to enact a law conferring powers on the Municipal Board to impose octroi tax, was considered in detail and rejected by the Federal Court. Their Lordship of the Federal Court observed as follows : "In our judgment there is no limitation to be implied in Entry No. 49, List II in regard to the manner in which goods may be transported into a local area. Their Lordship of the Federal Court observed as follows : "In our judgment there is no limitation to be implied in Entry No. 49, List II in regard to the manner in which goods may be transported into a local area. It follows that so far as rail-borne goods may well be subjected to taxation under Entry No. 58 of List I as well to local taxation under Entry No. 49 of List II. The grounds of taxation under the two entries are, as indicated above, radically different, and there is no case for suggesting that taxation under the one entry limits or interferes in any way with taxation under the other." Their Lordships held that the imposition of octroi was not terminal tax within Entry No. 58 of List I, but was Cess on the entry of goods into a local area within Entry No. 49 of List II and, therefore, the Lahore Municipality was competent to impose octroi even on rail-borne goods entering the Municipal area. 9. Octroi and terminal taxes are different taxes, though they resemble in one respect, viz. that they are leviable in respect of goods brought into a local area. While terminal tax is leviable on goods imported or exported from the Municipal limits denoting thereby that they are connected with the traffic of goods, octroi is, however leviable in respect of goods brought into Municipal area for consumption, use or sale. It may be that in certain cases octroi and terminal taxes are levied simultaneously on the goods imported within a Municipal limits, but the most important difference in the case of octroi is that this tax becomes leviable not only when the goods enter the area, but it must be for the purposes of consumption, use or sale therein. The expression "for the purposes of consumption" should be understood as having reference not merely to the individual importer or purchaser but as contemplating distribution eventually to the consumers. The history of these two taxes clearly shows that while terminal taxes were a kind of octroi which were concerned only with the entry of goods in a local area irrespective of whether they would be used there, or not; octrois were taxes on goods brought into the area for consumption, use or sale. The history of these two taxes clearly shows that while terminal taxes were a kind of octroi which were concerned only with the entry of goods in a local area irrespective of whether they would be used there, or not; octrois were taxes on goods brought into the area for consumption, use or sale. They were leviable in respect of goods put to some use or the other in the area but only if they were meant for such user. The history of terminal tax and the distinction between the octroi and terminal tax was examined at length by the Supreme Court more than once. The distinction drawn by the Federal Court was approved by the Supreme Court and It was held that octroi and terminal taxes are two different taxes and the State Legislature is fully empowered under the Constitution to enact law conferring authority on a local body to levy and impose octroi tax, in exercise of its powers under Entry No. 59, List II of Seventh Schedule, and that such law is not covered by Entry No. 89 of List I of the said Schedule. See The Central India Spinning and Weaving And Manufacturing Co. Ltd., The Impress Mills, Nagpur v. The Municipal Committee, Wardha, A.I.R. 1958 SC 341, Burmah-Shell Oil,Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. v. Belgaum Borough Municipality, Belgaum, A.I.R. 1963 SC 906. In view of the authoritative pronouncement by the Federal Court and the Supreme Court, the petitioners contention must fail. 10. Learned counsel has then urged that the Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad has no power to levy or collect non-refundable octroi after the enforcement of the Constitution as that Mahapalika was not in existence immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, nor it had levied non-refundable octroi before the commencement of the Constitution. According to the learned counsel, Article 277 of the Constitution does not save the present tax. 11. According to the learned counsel, Article 277 of the Constitution does not save the present tax. 11. Article 277 runs as under: SAVINGS : Any tax, duties, cess or fees, which immediately before the commencement of this constitution, were being lawfully levied by the Government of any State or of any Municipality or other local authority or body, for purposes of the State, Municipality, district or other local area, may, notwithstanding that those taxes, duties, cesses or fees are mentioned in the Union List continue to be levied and to be applied to the same purpose until provisions to the contrary is made by the parliament by law." The above Article is a saving provision which ensures continuation of levy of taxes, duties, cesses or fees by the State Government or by the Municipality or any local authority, even though such taxes, duties, cesses or fees are within the exclusive legislative competence of Parliament being mentioned in List I of the seventh Schedule. The framers of the Constitution were alive to the question that some of the matters which were within the State list under the Government of India Act, 1935, were included in the Union List and, as such, after the commencement of the Constitution the levy and collection of those taxes by the local authorities or by the State Government would have been illegal. In order to avoid dislocation of finances of State and Local Bodies, Article 277 was enacted to enable the State Government and the local authorities to continue to levy such taxes, duties, cesses or fees. Article 277 comes into play only when the subject matter of a tax, duty or cess is covered by the Union list in the Constitution. But in a case where the subject matter clearly falls within the State List, Article 277 has no application. In the present case levy of octroi by the Nagar Mahapalika is covered by entry 52 in List II of the Seventh Schedule, therefore, Article 277 is not attracted at all. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Messrs J. K. Jute Company v. Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur, Writ No. 1200 of 1060. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Messrs J. K. Jute Company v. Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur, Writ No. 1200 of 1060. D/d. 15.12.1967 in support of his argument that the Nagar Mahapalika was not competent to change rates or make any addition to the items on which octroi would be levied, after the commencement of the Constitution. The Division Bench, no doubt held that increase in rates and addition to new items by the Nagar Mahapalika Kanpur was illegal as it was not permissible by Article 277 of the Constitution. The Division Bench case is, however, not applicable to the present case at all. The Division Bench was dealing with a case which related to terminal taxes imposed by the Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika. Terminal tax, as already observed, after the commencement of the Constitution, is covered by the Union List and, therefore, the State Government or a local authority has no power to levy terminal taxes, except those saved by Article 277 of the Constitution. In the case of Terminal Tax or any other tax, falling within the Union List, rates cannot be enhanced or new items cannot be included for levy of tax. Any local authority which had not imposed or levied such tax prior to the commencement of the Constitution is not authorised under the Constitution to impose or levy any such tax. Article I 277, permitted only the continuance of such taxes as were being levied by the local authorities or by the State Government at the commencement of the Constitution, notwithstanding the fact that such taxes are mentioned in the Union List in the Constitution. The Division Bench placed reliance on the case of Amraoti Municipality v. Ram Chandra Vasudeo Chimotey, A.I.R. 1964 SC 1166 in holding that the addition of new items and increase of rates was illegal. The case of Amraoti Municipality, A.I.R. 1964 SC 1166 and of Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika, Writ No. 1200 of 1060. D/d. 15.12.1967 decided by the Division Bench was in respect of terminal tax. Both the judgments have nothing to do with the case of Octroi, which clearly falls within the State List. The Division Bench case is, therefore, no authority for, the purposes of determining the legality or validity of the imposition of octroi by the Nagar Mahapalika. 13. D/d. 15.12.1967 decided by the Division Bench was in respect of terminal tax. Both the judgments have nothing to do with the case of Octroi, which clearly falls within the State List. The Division Bench case is, therefore, no authority for, the purposes of determining the legality or validity of the imposition of octroi by the Nagar Mahapalika. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the view taken by the Division Bench is binding on me and, therefore, even if, I do not agree with that judgment, I should refer the matter to a larger Bench. The Division Bench case referred to earlier is not at all relevant for deciding the controversy in question. That case related to terminal tax, while in the present case the validity of octroi tax has been challenged. I have already observe that the Federal Court as well as the Supreme Court have more than once held that imposition of octroi is exclusively within the legislative competence of the State Legislature therefore, imposition of such taxes by local authorities, if authorised by an Act framed by the State Legislature, is legal and valid. Under these circumstances, I do not consider it necessary, to refer the matter to larger Bench. 14. Sri Ansari has lastly urged that the raw materials imported by the petitioner-Company are not `goods, therefore, no octroi can legally be levied. According to the learned counsel Entry 52 of List II of Seventh Schedule confers legislative power on the State Legislature to enact a law for imposition and levy of tax on the entry of `goods for the purposes of consumption, use or sale therein. Therefore, since the petitioner-company does not import any `goods, the respondent-Nagar Mahapalika is not entitled to levy or collect the impugned octroi from the petitioner-company. According to the learned counsel, goods refer to those articles which are known to be `goods to the commercial community; raw materials as imported by the petitioner-company do not fall in that category, therefore, they do not constitute `goods. I have considered this aspect of the case carefully but I do not find any substance in the argument. 15. According to the learned counsel, goods refer to those articles which are known to be `goods to the commercial community; raw materials as imported by the petitioner-company do not fall in that category, therefore, they do not constitute `goods. I have considered this aspect of the case carefully but I do not find any substance in the argument. 15. It is firmly established principle that in interpretting the various items on the legislative lists in the VII Schedule, widest possible amplitude must be given to the words used therein and each general word must be held to extend to ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly be said to be comprehended in it. Article 366(12) of the Constitution defines the word goods. Art. 366 lays down that unless the context otherwise requires, the expressions mentioned in the various Sub-clauses of the Article have the meaning respectively assigned to them. Clause (12) of the Article defines goods which is an inclusive definition. `Goods according to the definition as contained in clause (12) of Article 366 in the Constitution, includes all materials, commodities and articles. The words contained in the definition clause of the Article clearly show that all kinds of goods articles and materials are envisaged by the Constitution in the Entry 52 of list II of seventh Schedule. The said entry should not be interpreted in a narrow manner so as to restrict the power of legislation conferred on the State Legislatures by the Constitution. The `goods' which are imported within the limits of Nagar Mahapalika, according to the petitioner itself, are brass, aluminium, zinc, carbon rod, chemicals, lubricants, glass tubes, glass beeds, machinery, spare parts thereof. If wide interpretation is put to the word `goods as contained in item 52 of List II of Seventh Schedule, there can be no manner of doubt that the materials and the articles which the petitioner-Company imports to its factory situated within the limits of Nagar Mahapalika are included within the definition of Goods. There is nothing to show in the constitution that the word `goods as contained in item-No. 52 of List II of seventh Schedule should be interpreted in a narrow manner so as to exclude raw materials or unfinished goods. There is nothing to show in the constitution that the word `goods as contained in item-No. 52 of List II of seventh Schedule should be interpreted in a narrow manner so as to exclude raw materials or unfinished goods. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to cases where distinction between raw material and finished goods was discussed and accepted by the Courts in considering liability of tax under the Sales Tax Act. The concept of sales tax Act cannot be pressed into service for the interpretation of a legislative list. The petitioner has placed reliance on the case of Union of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1963 SC 791 in support of his argument. In that case before the Supreme Court levy of excise duty under the Central Excise and and Salt Act was under challenge. Excise duty under the said act was chargeable only on the manufacture of `goods. In considering the question whether the raw oils purified in process which was subsequently used for the manufacture of Vanaspati was also chargeable to excise duty. It was in that context that the Supreme Court observed that the definition of goods indicated, that goods must be something which could ordinarily come to the market to be bought and sold. In making that observation their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred to the word `Manufacture, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, since the raw oil was not a manufacture oil, it could not be bought and sold in the market hence the processed raw oil was not covered by the expression `vegetable non-essential oil. The case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills, A.I.R. 1963 SC 791 in my opinion, does not help the petitioner. The word `goods occurring in Entry 52 of List II covers both raw materials as well as finished goods. The distinction sought to be drawn by the petitioner is not tenable in law. It is admitted case of the petitioner that the raw materials which are imported by it, are used for manufacturing torches, cells etc. The torches and cells so manufactured by the petitioner-company are sold in the market. The petitioner-company, therefore, imports goods which are consumed, used and sold by it within the limits of Nagar Mahapalika, hence, the levy and collection of octroi by the Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad is legal and valid. 16. The torches and cells so manufactured by the petitioner-company are sold in the market. The petitioner-company, therefore, imports goods which are consumed, used and sold by it within the limits of Nagar Mahapalika, hence, the levy and collection of octroi by the Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad is legal and valid. 16. As regards the petitioners grievance about the increase of rates and addition of new items and change of system from refundable octroi to non-refundable octroi is concerned, it must also fail. The legislature has unlimited power to impose tax in accordance with the Constitution. The State Legislature has conferred power on Nagar Mahapalika under the provisions of the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam to levy octroi. In exercise of that power Nagar Mahapalika is free to adopt refundable or non-refundable system, provided of course, that it must act within the limits of the provisions contained in the Adhiniyam. In the present case, the system of non-refundable octroi was enforced by the Nagar Mahapalika, with the previous sanction of the State Government as required by the Adhiniyam. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not pointed out any violation or breach of the Adhiniyam in enforcing non-refundable system of octroi. If the Nagar Mahapalika has power to impose and levy octroi it necesserily has power to increase the rates or to add items to the Schedule of octroi for imposing tax on new items. The Federal Court in the case of Punjab Flour and General Mills Co Ltd. Lahore v. Chief Officer Corporation of City of Lahore and Province of the Punjab, A.I.R. 1947 F.C. 14 observed that once there is legislative competence for imposing octroi, the change of system from refundable to non-refundable octroi does not render it illegal. 17. No other point has been pressed before me. Since all the points raised by the petitioner have failed, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. 18. In the result, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.